<p>Recent accounting scandals, often led by managers trying to improve results and thereby their own bonuses, have severely damaged the publics view of management. In the aftermath of scandals such as Enron, Parmalat and Skandia, demand has increased for Corporate Governance codes and similar regulation. The Swedish code for Corporate Governance came into effect on July 1, 2005. The code requires all Swedish companies listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange (OMX A- and O-list), with a turnover exceeding 3 billion SEK, to disclose a report regarding Corporate Governance, attached to the annual report.</p><p>The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the new disclosure required by the Swedish Corporate Governance code will have a measurable effect on stock prices. The authors have applied event study methodology examining daily returns around the announcement of the Corporate Governance reports. The listed companies mentioned above were also divided into groups depending on whether or not the report hade been audited, and to which extent the authors found the reports to be transparent. Also, two groups were formed with companies applying SOX, and companies not required to apply the code.</p><p>The results show that a measurable negative effect could be identified on the 1% significancelevel on the day of the event for the whole sample of companies. Companies publishing audited reports found positive Abnormal Returns, but without significance. Negative abnormal returns were found on the 1% significance-level for companies not presenting audited reports. No significant results were found for the groups classified after the degree of transparency. The findings suggest that the market is not fully mature enough to evaluate unaudited reports. The market rewards companies that audit the reports. The conclusion of this paper is therefore that reports regarding Corporate Governance do have a negative effect on stock prices.</p>

Recent accounting scandals, often led by managers trying to improve results and thereby their own bonuses, have severely damaged the publics view of management. In the aftermath of scandals such as Enron, Parmalat and Skandia, demand has increased for Corporate Governance codes and similar regulation. The Swedish code for Corporate Governance came into effect on July 1, 2005. The code requires all Swedish companies listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange (OMX A- and O-list), with a turnover exceeding 3 billion SEK, to disclose a report regarding Corporate Governance, attached to the annual report. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the new disclosure required by the Swedish Corporate Governance code will have a measurable effect on stock prices. The authors have applied event study methodology examining daily returns around the announcement of the Corporate Governance reports. The listed companies mentioned above were also divided into groups depending on whether or not the report hade been audited, and to which extent the authors found the reports to be transparent. Also, two groups were formed with companies applying SOX, and companies not required to apply the code. The results show that a measurable negative effect could be identified on the 1% significancelevel on the day of the event for the whole sample of companies. Companies publishing audited reports found positive Abnormal Returns, but without significance. Negative abnormal returns were found on the 1% significance-level for companies not presenting audited reports. No significant results were found for the groups classified after the degree of transparency. The findings suggest that the market is not fully mature enough to evaluate unaudited reports. The market rewards companies that audit the reports. The conclusion of this paper is therefore that reports regarding Corporate Governance do have a negative effect on stock prices.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Agricultural Economics / Ted Schroeder / Food recalls have been an issue of great concern in the food industry. Stakeholder responses to food safety scares can cause significant economic losses for food firms. Assessing the overall impact that may result from a food recall requires a thorough understanding of the costs incurred by firms. However, quantifying these costs is daunting if not impossible. A direct measurement of a firm’s total costs and losses of revenue associated with a food recall requires firm-level data that is not available. The method utilized in this study overcomes this severe limitation. Using an event study, the impact of meat and poultry recalls is quantified by analyzing price reactions in financial markets, where it is expected that stock prices would reflect the overall economic impact of a recall. A unique contribution of this study is evaluating whether recall and firm specific characteristics are economic drivers of the magnitude of impact of meat and poultry recalls on stock prices. Results indicate that on average shareholders’ wealth is reduced by 1.15% within 5 days after a firm is implicated in a recall involving serious food safety hazards. However, when recalls involve less severe hazards, stock markets do not react negatively. Also, reductions in company valuations return to pre-recall levels after day 20. Firm size, firm’s experience, media information and recall size are drivers of the economic impact of meat and poultry recalls. That is, firms recalling a larger amount of product perceive greater reductions in company valuations. Additionally, recalls issued by larger firms are less likely to present negative effects on stock prices, compared to smaller firms. Moreover, firms that have recently issued a recall are less harmed by a new recall compared to those firms issuing a recall for first time. Thus, suggesting that investors take into consideration the past performance of a company when dealing with food recalls. Furthermore, media information has a negative impact on shareholder’s wealth. Findings from this study provide essential information to the meat industry. In particular, understanding the likely impact of such “black swan” events is critical for firm’s investing in food safety technologies and protocols.

In this study, the difference between shareholder reactions to eco-harmful behaviour by firms in China and Germany are being researched. Previous research has focused on shareholder reaction in developed countries, especially the US. What remains unknown is whether shareholders in developing countries have adopted the same norms concerning the environment as shareholders in developed countries. Institutional theory, legitimacy theory and desensitization theory are examined in this study. An event study was conducted with an [-1,1] and [-1,3] event window surrounding the announcement of eco-harmful behaviour by firms. Events were drawn from relevant news articles and environmental databases. In total 43 events have been discovered over the years 2007 to 2015. Overall, results indicate that the decrease in share prices is not significantly different from zero. However, when comparing China and Germany, evidence is found that Chinese firms are punished more severely than German firms when corporations harm the environment. Contrary to expectations, it can be concluded that the institutionalization of environmental norms has taken place in China, either through internal or global pressures.

With few previous data and literature based on the South African banking sector, the key aim of this study was to contribute further results concerning the effect of operational loss events on the reputation of South African banks. The main distinction between this study and previous empirical research is that a small sample of South African banks listed on the JSE, between 2000 and 2014 was used. Insurance companies fell outside the scope of the study. The study primarily focused on identifying reputational risk among Regal Treasury Bank, Saambou Bank, African Bank and Standard Bank. The events announced by these banks occurred between 2000 and 2014. The precise date of the announcement of the operational events was also determined. Stock price data were collected for those banks that had unanticipated operational loss announcements (i.e. the event). Microsoft Excel models applied to the reputational loss as the difference between the operational loss announcement and the loss in the stock returns of the selected banks. The results indicated significant negative abnormal returns on the announcement day for three of the four banks. For one of the banks it was assumed that the operational loss was not significant enough to cause reputational risk. The event methodology similar to previous literature, furthermore examined the behaviour of return volatility after specific operational loss events using the sample of banks. The study further aimed at making two contributions. Firstly, to analyse return volatility after operational loss announcements had been made among South African banks, and secondly, to compare the sample of affected banks with un-affected banks to further identify whether these events spilled over into the banking industry and the market. The volatility of these four banks were compared to three un-affected South African banks. The results found that the operational loss events for Regal Treasury Bank and Saambou Bank had no influence on the unaffected banks. However the operational loss events for African Bank and Standard Bank influenced the sample of unaffected banks and the Bank Index, indicating systemic risk.

With few previous data and literature based on the South African banking sector, the key aim of this study was to contribute further results concerning the effect of operational loss events on the reputation of South African banks. The main distinction between this study and previous empirical research is that a small sample of South African banks listed on the JSE, between 2000 and 2014 was used. Insurance companies fell outside the scope of the study. The study primarily focused on identifying reputational risk among Regal Treasury Bank, Saambou Bank, African Bank and Standard Bank. The events announced by these banks occurred between 2000 and 2014. The precise date of the announcement of the operational events was also determined. Stock price data were collected for those banks that had unanticipated operational loss announcements (i.e. the event). Microsoft Excel models applied to the reputational loss as the difference between the operational loss announcement and the loss in the stock returns of the selected banks. The results indicated significant negative abnormal returns on the announcement day for three of the four banks. For one of the banks it was assumed that the operational loss was not significant enough to cause reputational risk. The event methodology similar to previous literature, furthermore examined the behaviour of return volatility after specific operational loss events using the sample of banks. The study further aimed at making two contributions. Firstly, to analyse return volatility after operational loss announcements had been made among South African banks, and secondly, to compare the sample of affected banks with un-affected banks to further identify whether these events spilled over into the banking industry and the market. The volatility of these four banks were compared to three un-affected South African banks. The results found that the operational loss events for Regal Treasury Bank and Saambou Bank had no influence on the unaffected banks. However the operational loss events for African Bank and Standard Bank influenced the sample of unaffected banks and the Bank Index, indicating systemic risk.

This paper researches the effects of choice of payment (cash and stock) and M&amp;A type (technological and non-technological) on bidders’ performance. We investigate 500 events in Swedish market between 2005 and 2015. Moreover, we also control the size of firms and the value of takeovers. In this paper, we conduct an event study in order to generate abnormal returns for the bidders at and around the M&amp;A announcement. This research generates statistically significant and positive abnormal returns for the bidders especially when deals are financed by shares. Moreover, we also find that the technological M&amp;A brings about lower abnormal returns than non-technological M&amp;A. When we control for payment choice in technological M&amp;A, the result shows that technological M&amp;A paid for in shares generates higher abnormal returns than technological M&amp;A paid for in cash.

This study examines the trading activity of a large cross section of American bank holding companies upon various sub-events associated with the introduction of Basel III. An event study methodology was applied to various sub-composite portfolios, as determined by regulatory capitalization and leverage ratios. The results suggest that statically significant abnormal negative returns occurred on the announcement to negotiate due to heightened regulatory uncertainty, especially amongst the least capitalized and highest leveraged banks. However, this effect is complemented by statically significant positive returns upon the release of the initial guidelines. Reactions to subsequent events report to be less significant.

In this paper I analyzed the intra-industry competitive and contagion effect during bond defaults in China. The analysis is performed using bond price, since the Chinese stock market is immature and has incredible amount of volatility. The sample includes 15 cases of default across 10 different industries since 2014, and the cumulative effect of the industry portfolio is positive over 11-day event window (competitive effect) with a t-statistic of 6.22. In addition, I found that SOE defaults overall have a significant positive abnormal return on their industry portfolios during 11-day event window with a t-statistic of 4.72, indicating a competitive effect. In contrast, Non-SOE defaults overall have a significant negative abnormal return on their industry portfolios over 3-day window with a t-statistic of -3.36, showing a contagion effect. But this difference could be due to the characteristics of industries as opposed to the nature of SOE. By analyzing the condition and characteristics of each industry, I found that the significance of abnormal return depends on the level of competition of the industry and the level of information available. In terms of contagion and competitive effect, industries showing a contagion effect offer products that are difficult to differentiate, such as cement and water bottle. Industries showing a competitive effect offer products that are highly specialized and rely heavily on technology innovation, such as the special equipment industry and electric equipment industry.

<p>Background: Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate</p><p>nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities.</p><p>This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be</p><p>prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic</p><p>information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored.</p><p>Such an event is a profit warning.</p><p>Purpose: This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies</p><p>making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm</p><p>Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute</p><p>to the debate on the insider trading legislation.</p><p>Method: The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the</p><p>cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during</p><p>the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies.</p><p>Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such</p><p>almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant</p><p>abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal</p><p>returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model</p><p>since it is the most widely used model.</p><p>Conclusion: For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level,</p><p>the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days</p><p>of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The</p><p>daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six</p><p>of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included</p><p>in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal</p><p>return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend</p><p>to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to</p><p>sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years</p><p>extending the results to a period other than tested should be made</p><p>with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the</p><p>current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by</p><p>both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.</p>