En av de största och viktigaste marknaderna i dagens samhälle är den finansiella marknaden.Denna marknad består dels av valutamarknaden, där det handlas med olika konvertibla valutor, dels av kapital-marknaden som består av penningmarknaden och aktiemarknaden. Aktie- marknaden har en oerhört viktig roll när det gäller marknadsekonomin bland annat på grund av att den tillhandahåller riskvilligt kapital till företag samt ger möjlighet till spridning och omfördelning av risk. Aktörerna på aktiemarknaden strävar ständigt efter att öka värdet på sina placeringar. Värdet på dessa beror på hur företagets ekonomiska ställning ser ut. Aktörernas ambition att försöka öka värdet på sina placeringar förekommer främst på marknader som sägs vara effektiva. En effektiv aktiemarknad består av korrekt prissatta aktier och all tillgänglig information är avspeglad i aktiekursen. Här antas också att alla investerare har tillgång till samma information vilket minskar möjligheten för insatta placerare att skapa abnormala avkastningar. Hur effektiv är då den svenska aktiemarknaden? Studiens problemformulering lyder: Är aktiemarknaden effektiv vid publicering av kvartalsrapporter? Syftet är att genom en event study studera om aktiemarknaden är semi-starkt effektiv vid publicering av ny information i form av kvartals-rapporter. Vi ska studera om marknaden anpassar sig direkt till den nya informationen eller om det finns en anpassningsperiod då aktörer på marknaden kan göra abnormala avkastningar. Vi ska även se om marknaden är effektiv under dagarna innan publiceringen av kvartals- rapporten. Vi utgår från hypotesen om effektiva marknader för att med en kvantitativ metod studera problemet. Vi har studerat publiceringen av kvartalsrapporter under 2003 till 2006 för 30 stycken av de mest omsatta aktierna på Large Cap-listan på Stockholmsbörsen. Fyra kvartalsrapporter per år ger 480 kvartal som delas in i tre portföljer beroende på om det verkliga resultatet som publicerades i kvartalsrapporten var bättre, sämre eller ungefär lika som det prognostiserade resultatet. För aktierna har vi beräknat den kumulativa abnormala avkastningen från 10 dagar innan publiceringen av kvartalsrapporten till 20 dagar efter publiceringen och har genom statistiska test prövat hypotesen att marknaden är effektiv. De perioder vi studerar är 10 dagar efter publiceringen av kvartalsrapporten, 20 dagar efter publiceringen, publiceringsdagen och 10 dagar innan publiceringen. Resultatet visar att aktie- marknaden ej är effektiv fullt ut för de aktier vi valt att studera. För de aktier där det verkliga resultatet var sämre än förväntat eller ungefär lika som förväntat så är marknaden effektiv för perioderna omkring publiceringen av kvartalsrapporten förutom dagen då publiceringen sker. För de aktier där kvartalsrapporten visade ett resultat som var bättre än det prognostiserade fann vi att marknaden inte är effektiv för perioden direkt efter publiceringen, den längre perioden efter publiceringen, publiceringsdagen eller perioden innan publiceringen. Detta betyder att för de aktier där resultatet var bättre än det prognostiserade så kan aktörer på marknaden göra abnormala avkastningar.

Background: Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities. This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored. Such an event is a profit warning. Purpose: This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute to the debate on the insider trading legislation. Method: The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies. Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model since it is the most widely used model. Conclusion: For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level, the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years extending the results to a period other than tested should be made with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.

Background: Studying insider trading is difficult due to its sensitive and delicate nature. Therefore it is hard to gauge the extent of such activities. This problem has resulted in a fierce debate whether it should be prohibited or not. Using a method where the effect on monopolistic information usage can be isolated insider trading can be monitored. Such an event is a profit warning. Purpose: This paper examines whether insider trading exist for companies making a profit warning between year 2003 and 2007 on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Furthermore the aim with the study is to contribute to the debate on the insider trading legislation. Method: The study’s purpose is achieved through an event study studying the cumulative abnormal return as well as average daily returns during the thirty days preceding the warning for a sample of thirty companies. Since profit warnings should be completely random and as such almost impossible for the market to know in advance, a significant abnormal return can only be explained with insider trading. The abnormal returns were calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model since it is the most widely used model. Conclusion: For the chosen time frame, when testing on a 95% significance level, the study found a significant abnormal return during the last 10 days of the event window but not for the entire period of thirty days. The daily average return for the thirty companies were significant for six of the thirty days within the event window. Two of them were included in the last ten day period with a confirmed significant abnormal return which might suggest that on average insider trading tend to occur during these days. The other four was discarded due to sample issues. Since the study was limited to a period of four years extending the results to a period other than tested should be made with great care since conditions may differ over time. Concerning the current debate on the insider legislation, the findings can be used by both sides. Either to argue for a strengthening of the law or to question its existence.

Background: The reasons why this study is conducted is because of the latest recession in the global economy. The current recession has made a lot of companies more aware of its cost, and in order to fit the new harsher economic climate the companies has to be more cost efficient. In order to do so many companies choose to reduce their amount of employees. When this happens in a recession, most of the layoffs are an effect of reactive causes, such as lower incoming orders, and fewer customers. This leads to a problem for the companies that don’t know how these kinds of layoffs will affect the value of the company’s stock. This leads to a question whether there is a significant pattern between layoffs that are a result of reactive reasons and the number of employees that are being laid off, in percentage of the total number of employees of the companies in question? Purpose: The reason for this study is to find out if there is any correlation between how many employees that is laid off, in percentage of the company’s total employees, and if different percentages have different impact in the valuations of the company’s stock. Approach: This study is made in the form of a modified event study and narrows down to the recession during 2008-01-01 to 2009-10-01, and only involves companies that are on trade on the stock market in Stockholm Sweden. The objects that are involved in this study are from the stock markets large and mid-cap sections. The criteria for companies in this study are that they should have made layoffs for reactive reasons in the time period that we are interested in. The variations in the company’s stock are compared to Stockholm’s stock markets OMX-index. The information needed to conduct this study is gathered from press realises and from financial reports made by the companies. Result and conclusions: The study shows that there is a correlation between how large percentage of the company’s total employees that are laid off and the effect of variations in the stock. The correlation is -0,306 but it is not statistical verified. This result was not in line with our hypotheses that we had concluded from earlier research and theories that are in the study. Earlier research on the American stock market shows a stronger connection between large percentage layoffs and how this makes the stock value to decrease.

This paper examines whether the phenomena of price drift around quarterly earnings re-leases exist among firms listed on the large cap. list at the Stockholm Stock Exchange for a time period ranging from the first quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2006. It fur-thermore examines the ability of the variables forecast error, relative to analyst’s estimates, and firms’ size to explain the variation in price drift among firms. A sample of some 30 firms were drawn in the first three quarters of each year between 2003 and 2005, for the year of 2006 only the fist two quarters were included in the study. For each quarter all firms were classified into three different portfolios on the basis of earnings deviations relative to mean analyst’s estimates (forecast error). The returns for each firm in all portfolios were investigated during 20 days post- and pre quarterly earnings release date, resulting in an event window totaling 41 days. In order to clear out effects from general market movements the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM, was used in which betas were estimated for all firms each quarter. The findings from this study indicate that price drift, measured by cumulative abnormal re-turn, occur for firms with both negative forecast error as well as positive. For firms with positive error, statistically significant positive price drift was found for both the pre- and post period. As for the firms with earnings below analyst’s mean estimates, negative prean-nouncement drift was statistically supported. The ability of firms size and forecast error to explain the variation in price drift on a stock level was very weak, R2 measures of below 5% was reported. However, forecast error was a strongly significant independent variable in the context of the regressions run for both pre- and post-announcement drift. The firms below the lower market cap. quartile in the sample show, on average, lower pre-announcement drift than the firms belonging in the largest quartile. Concerning market efficiency among the large cap. firms the price drift found is an indica-tion of market inefficiency both it terms of the semi strong and the strong form. However, care should be taken before generalizing the results from this study but. Possible misspeci-fication of the equilibrium return model will skew the price drift measurement. Moreover, speculation is not explicitly controlled for in this test. Finally, this study is done within a li-mited time span; hence generalization over time is not possible

This paper will analyze the market reactions to news announcements of a corporate headquarter relocations for 76 firms through the time period of 1984 to 2012. Previous literature has identified that the market interprets capital expenditure decisions and acts on these interpretations, which can be found in the changes of the price of a security. The study uses an event-study methodology as well as a multiple-regression model to examine the contextual factors that play a role in influencing the corporate headquarter relocation decision. For the event-study, the event windows being used are two-day (-1,1), four-day (-2,2), fourteen-day (- 7,7), and two nineteen-day (-14,5 and -5,14) periods. The multiple regression model tests the relationship between the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the event period three days prior to and after the day of the announcement (-3,3) against a number of other contextual variables.

Purpose: The main objective of this thesis is to study if acquiring companies’ shareholders on the Swedish market earn abnormal returns after an M&A and further to examine possible differences in the abnormal return depending on whether the M&A is announced during a period with high level of merger activity or low level of merger activity. Method: This thesis uses a quantitative research method and an event study to examine abnormal returns. The abnormal return is obtained by calculating the difference between the actual return and the normal return. Stock prices for the thirty companies in the sample have been collected; fifteen M&As from periods characterized by high merger activity and fifteen M&As from periods of low merger activity. The event window consists in total of eleven days, five days before the announcement day and five days after. Day minus six is used as an index. Finally, the results have been tested with t-statistics for further analyzing. Conclusion: Our findings regarding the Swedish market in this thesis is not consistent with most of the previous research. Earlier research claims negative abnormal returns for the acquiring companies’ shareholders. In our study we have found that the Swedish acquiring companies’ shareholders actually earn positive abnormal returns after an M&A. Moreover, the abnormal returns are higher for M&As announced during times with high level of merger activity on the market compared to the abnormal returns for M&As announced when the level activity of merger is low. / Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka om förvärvande företags aktieägare på den svenska marknaden uppnår onormal avkastning efter ett företagsförvärv. Studien undersöker även skillnader i onormal avkastning till det förvärvande företaget beroende på om förvärvet genomförts under en tidsperiod med hög respektive låg aktivitet av företagsförvärv på marknaden. Metod: Denna uppsats använder sig av en kvantitativ forskningsmetod samt en eventstudie för att undersöka onormal avkastning. Den onormala avkastningen erhålles genom att beräkna skillnaden mellan den faktiska avkastningen efter ett företagsförvärv med den normala avkastningen om förvärvet inte genomförts. Aktiepriset för de trettio företagen i urvalet har samlats in, hälften av urvalet är hämtat från en period med hög förvärvsaktivitet och resterande från en period med låg förvärvsaktivitet. Händelsefönstret består av elva dagar, fem dagar före och fem dagar efter tillkännagivandet av företagsförvärvet. Dag minus sex används som index. Slutligen har resultatens testats med t-test för vidare analys. Slutsats: Våra resultat gällande den svenska marknaden är inte samstämmiga med de flesta av de presenterade tidigare forskningarna. Enligt mycket tidigare forskning erhåller förvärvande företagens aktieägare negativ onormal avkastning medan vår studie av svenska företag visar positiv onormal avkastning till följd av ett företagsförvärv. Dessutom är den onormala avkastningen högre för företagsförvärv som genomförs i perioder med hög aktivitet av förvärv på marknaden jämfört med den onormala avkastningen för företagsförvärv som genomförs när aktivitetsnivån på förvärv är låg.

The Say on Pay vote, part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law by Barack Obama in July 2010, is a non-binding vote that either approves or disapproves of the compensation given to Named Executive Officers. As of June 21, 2012, there have been 103 companies that have failed to reach 50% approval in this vote. For this paper I analyze the 103 companies over event windows of two, four, and ten days around the date of the failure to test for statistically significant abnormal stock market returns. None of the average cumulative abnormal returns for the three event windows are significant at any level, and I find no evidence that failing the Say on Pay vote corresponds to an increase or decrease in stock market returns.

This paper describes the effects of environmental innovation, or EI, on the market value of a firm. EI involves the creation or enhancement of ‘green’ products or ‘eco-efficient’ production processes which result in improved environmental performance. The study involves the selection of a number of press releases related to EI and environmental performance. These form the basis of an event study to determine the effect of these announcements on share prices. Results indicate that the market recognizes the value of EI, especially for product-driven initiatives. It is also found that the market values good environmental performance, particularly when it has been recognized externally through an award, membership, or certification. Implications for policy and for management are discussed.

The technology industry is characterized by a greater than usual reliance on intangible assets. During the tech bubble many firms were valued entirely on intangible assets and growth prospects. In the aftermath of the bubble, intangible assets still play an important role as the innovative performance of a firm’s human capital and the value of its patents creates much of the value of high-tech firms. The problem of transferring human capital and knowledge may be further exacerbated when the firms belong to separate national cultures. Investor perception of acquisition announcements may be more favourable if the target workforce is much smaller relative to the bidder, and thus easier to integrate. Also, perceptions may be favourable when the target has a high ratio of intangible assets to total assets, as this may be a proxy for the relative value of the extractible intangible assets. This study uses a sample of 61 acquisition announcements between 1991 and 2004, where both acquirer and target are high-tech firms and accounting and trading data is available from three years prior to three years after the acquisition announcement. There is weak evidence to support the employee ratio hypothesis for bidder returns, and no evidence to support the intangible assets to total assets hypothesis for either bidder or target returns. Additionally, it is found that average bidder abnormal returns during the announcement period (as measured from one day prior to the announcement acquisitions to one day afterwards) are negative but not significantly different from zero, and that average target abnormal returns are positive and significant. Average wealth gains to bidders are negative and to targets are positive over the window from five days prior to the acquisition announcement to five days afterwards. Furthermore, combined wealth gains are negative, indicating the synergistic gains from high-tech cross-border acquisitions are offset by high premiums paid by the bidders for the targets. Relatedness, a lack of tender offers, and non-US acquirer status are demonstrated to be related to negative returns to bidders, whereas tender offers, US-acquirer status, and termination provisions are shown to be related to increased returns to target shareholders. In the long-run, it is found that acquirers experience superior operating cash flow returns when compared to their industry peers, however, the acquirer experiences diminished performance when compared to the combined performance of the pre-acquisition acquirer and target firms.