Esta dissertação constitui-se de três ensaios. O primeiro trata da impossibilidade de existência do livre arbítrio dentro e fora da Teoria Econômica Utilitarista. O segundo aborda a questão da inconsistência temporal (i.e. quando a ação empreendida presentemente pelo agente não é coerente com a decisão tomada anteriormente por ele) sem que para tanto se recorra às noções de autocontrole e força de vontade. O terceiro trata da possibilidade de responsabilidade moral na ausência de livre arbítrio e autocontrole/ força de vontade. / This dissertation contains three essays. The first one regards the impossibility of free will in and out of Economic Theory. The second one discusses the question of temporal inconsistency (i.e. when the agent’s present action isn’t coherent with his prior decision) without recur to the notions of self-control and willpower. The third one is concerned with the possibility of moral responsibility in absence of freewill and self-control/ willpower.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:48:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Piva.pdf: 408423 bytes, checksum: 724b19f54fd1334527b0ab955cef1604 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-23 / In this work the author begins with a short historic introduction about Saint Augustine, John Calvin and Free Will in order to deal specifically with their similarities and differences concerning this subject. His goal is to contribute to a larger understanding about the human will and its limitations from the perspective of Science of Religion, thus enlarging the field of knowledge of the humanities. / Neste trabalho o autor faz uma pequena introdução histórica sobre Santo Agostinho, João Calvino e o tema Livre-Arbítrio para tratar especificamente das convergências e divergências entre estes dois teólogos sobre o referido tema. Seu objetivo é contribuir para o maior entendimento sobre a questão da vontade humana e suas limitações sob o ponto de vista das Ciências da Religião, ampliando assim o campo do conhecimento das humanidades.

The paper examines the philosophical themes of Free Will as opposed to Determinism/Predestination and how they are portrayed in the seven books about Harry Potter. It is discussed whether the character of Harry Potter, but also the world itself in which he acts, seem to be governed primarily by forces of Free Will and/or Determinism. The author concludes that though Harry is indeed strongly tempted to believe in Determinism, influential figures around him direct him towards a different choice - making himself believe in Free Will instead.

For centuries, criminal and deviant behaviors have always been considered as a mystery because they do not represent the social norm. Why do some people hurt others or themselves? What guides the decision to perform good or bad actions? What is the role played by individual differences in such choices? Criminal behavior is not an unitary phenomenon and many approaches can be proposed to understand it. In the present thesis, I focused on the subjective experience that accompanies our actions commonly known as the sense of agency. The sense of agency can be defined as the experience of being the author of an action and its consequences. Therefore, understanding how the subjective experience of being responsible for an outcome influences our actions is a key issue for the notion of criminal responsibility. Throughout each chapter of the present thesis, I aimed at systematically explore how disturbances in the intention-action-outcome chain impact the sense of agency, by using behavioral and electrophysiological methods. I hope the methods and findings presented in this thesis will provide new routes to explore the human mind and particularly the sense of agency in the context of moral responsibility. / Doctorat en Sciences psychologiques et de l'éducation / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Three separate fMRI studies were conducted to study the neural dynamics of free decision formation. In Study 1, we first searched across the brain for spatiotemporal patterns that could predict the specific outcome and timing of free motor decisions to make a left or right button press (Soon et al., 2008). In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 using ultra-high field fMRI for improved temporal and spatial resolution to more accurately characterize the evolution of decision-predictive information in prefrontal cortex (Bode et al., 2011). In Study 3, to unequivocally dissociate high-level intentions from motor preparation and execution, we investigated the neural precursors of abstract intentions as participants spontaneously decided to perform either of two mental arithmetic tasks: addition or subtraction (Soon et al., 2013). Across the three studies, we consistently found that upcoming decisions could be predicted with ~60% accuracy from fine-grained spatial activation patterns occurring a few seconds before the decisions reached awareness, with very similar profiles for both motor and abstract intentions. The content and timing of the decisions appeared to be encoded in two functionally dissociable sets of regions: frontopolar and posterior cingulate/ precuneus cortex encoded the content but not the timing of the decisions, while the pre-supplementary motor area encoded the timing but not the content of the decisions. The choice-predictive regions in both motor and abstract decision tasks overlapped partially with the default mode network. High-resolution imaging in Study 2 further revealed that as the time-point of conscious decision approached, activity patterns in frontopolar cortex became increasingly stable with respect to the final choice.

Background: Both Freud (1921) and Skinner (1971) were regarded as 'hard determinists' who saw human thought and action as determined by prior events, and the idea of free will as simply an illusion. While this belief system clearly impacted on the models of therapy they developed, whether such beliefs also had an impact on their ability to develop qualities of effective therapy, such as empathic and genuine therapeutic relationships, is not known. Furthermore, whether there is something about holding this belief system that could affect therapists' abilities to attain and nurture such qualities, remains unclear. Research Question: The research study reported here sought to gain some insight into the above question, and into what it is like to deliver therapy from a hard determinist philosophical frame, by asking how clinical psychologists who hold a hard determinist philosophy, experience delivering therapy. Method: The study made use of a qualitative design methodology. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven hard determinist clinical psychologists, and interview transcripts were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Results: Four super-ordinate themes emerged from the analysis: 'From Hell to Utopia: How it feels to be a hard determinist therapist', 'Hating the sin, loving the sinner: Enhancing the therapeutic relationship', 'Free will: A felt vs reflective understanding', and 'Therapist as thinker'. Implications: The themes to emerge from the data gave rise to a number of implications and recommendations for practice and further research. In particular, it was recommended that the link between hard determinist beliefs and a perceived enhancement of the therapeutic relationship warrants further research. Furthermore, since the philosophy was linked to ideas about power, self-control, therapeutic models, science, and research, discussions of the philosophy may add valuable contributions to clinical psychology's understanding of these issues. In addition, a replication or development of this study with a broader range of therapists is recommended, to establish whether the findings reported here can be generalised to therapists from fields outside clinical psychology.

The object of this thesis is to examine the two opposite poles of human freedom, that is, determinism and total freedom, as found in the plays of Cocteau and Sartre that have been influenced by Greek drama. These contemporary playwrights however have set aside the religious aspect of ancient tragedy to concentrate on the analysis of the human condition. Cocteau, similar to Sophocles, is conscious of fate controlling human destiny. Since Cocteau is unable to alter its course, he accepts it; his plays, Antigone (1922), Oedipe-Roi (1925), Orphée (1926) and La Machine Infernale (1934), all embody such an attitude, thereby denoting freedom as an illusion. In the first chapter, Antigone, Orpheus and Oedipus are analysed as pawns of the cruel gods; as mere mortals, at the mercy of the Heavens, they cannot control their destiny. In the second chapter, emphasis is placed on man himself; we have endeavoured to show to what extent he is physically and psychologically determined and how he contains the seed of his own perdition. Cocteau's originality lies in the presentation of determinism through imagery. In La Machine Infernale, his most important play, destiny becomes a machine geared to destroy man caught in a network from which he cannot extricate himself. Such a person is Oedipus, controlled by both outer and inner forces. The outer forces or the gods plot a fate of parricide and incest which he is unable to avoid or escape. In the second instance, Cocteau studies the complexity of the human machine; in so doing, he reflects the twentieth century's interest, notably that of Freud and of the Surrealists, in the realm of the unconscious. Man is described as a complexity of heredity, natural instincts and character, especially excessive pride or hybris in the case of Oedipus, all of which influence his behaviour. According to our interpretation, the double determinism (outer and inner) which was separated to facilitate our analysis, is in fact, so interwoven as to form a complex, integral pattern of man's suffering. Sartre also is interested in man; his main concern, as philosopher and dramatist, is man and the human consciousness. The Sartrean philosophy is one of action wherein the existentialist hero, like Orestes, is the opposite of the Cocteau hero who accepts his fate; the former chooses his acts and so creates his own destiny. In chapter three we study the Sartrean revolt against God, a concept necessitated by human need and frailty. According to Les Mouches (1943) and Les Troyennes (1965), spiritual tyranny and moral order are detrimental to freedom since they hold men in bondage. Sartre believes that traditional morality is obsolete; therefore no one can guide man, even less dictate to him as he is free to invent his own values. In chapter four, Sartre's notion of total freedom is examined. The type of liberty advocated in his main play Les Mouches is not a "freedom-from" but a "freedom-for". Man must not consider himself free in the sense that he has no commitment and that he can do what he wants. Sartre wishes to replace this negative approach by a more positive type based on human solidarity and love. Once one recognizes and accepts personal autonomy, one must act in society, for being free in Sartre's terms, is being "free-to-do" and also being "free-in-society". Such a freedom however makes man suffer; he feels the anguish of responsibility and a sense of metaphysical solitude. But Sartre refuses determinism; one is either totally free or not at all. Also, determinism only serves as an alibi to avoid the harsh reality that one is basically free and solely responsible for one's acts which affect the self and society as well. Whichever path is followed, determinism or freedom, both Cocteau and Sartre arrive at the same conclusion: it is possible for him who suffers greatly to eventually attain self-knowledge and dignity, thereby reaching glory or greatness as in the case of Oedipus and Orestes. The apparent pessimism of life and its suffering can thus be transformed into optimism, which in the final analysis is a victory for mankind. / Arts, Faculty of / French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of / Graduate

This diploma thesis deals with the problem of free will and the reliability of an introspective access to action intentions. The traditional questions of free will, responsibility and determinism are currently receiving a lot of attention due to the advances in cognitive sciences. Because of various scientific findings, many authors claim that free will is just an illusion. The purpose of this study is to discuss traditional conceptualization of this topic and point out its problems. As an alternative, I am trying to suggest a compatibilistic theory of freedom and responsibility, which is internally coherent and compatible with scientific evidence. The core of my thesis is a replication and modification of a recent experimental study, investigating voluntary decision-making and an introspective access to one's own intentions. The participants of the experiment performed reflexive actions which they misjudged as intentional. The goal of the theoretical part of my thesis has been accomplished on the basis of examining a voluminous foreign literature. The method involves a philosophical analysis of concepts with an emphasis on contemporary scientific findings. In the empirical part of my work, results were obtained in a cognitive-psychological experiment involving reaction time and evoked potential data acquisition and their analysis. First, a discussion of concepts relevant to the problem of free will is undertaken. An explication of the most significant experiments that question traditional intuitions about the human mind and free will is then given. A detailed description of my experiment follows, including its results and implications. Finally, conclusions about the nature of free will and responsibility are made together with certain suggestions for both the criminal justice system and everyday situations. Although I base the theoretical part of my thesis on the results of many authors, I contribute to it to a substantial degree with my own opinions and arguments. The empirical study is the most significant contribution of mine as its realization demanded i.a. a development of a stimulus presentation software, execution of the experimental tasks with a relatively large number of subjects and a mathematical and statistical evaluation of the acquired data.

Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen. / This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.

The Prose Edda chapter, Ragnarok as recorded by Snorri, was taken as a pivotal point for exploring fate according to the Norse mythology. The eschatological concept of collapsing gods and destruction of the world was explored through the logical and theological fatalist theory, diverging the orientation from standard textual exploration. The thesis examines the concept by employing the methodology of hermeneutics to scrutinise the text. The analysis derived results confirmed the existence of belief in fate embedded in the text; the logical fatalism that polarises statements by their truthfulness, even though it was not found or indicated textually, provided a strong contrast to theological fatalism, evidenced throughout the text. The weak theological fatalism (determinism) was suggested in the findings based on Ragnarok text, by which the inexorable change of aeons as set-in motion by the Universal Force (predicted by the three Volvas), does not entirely compromise the Aesir's free will; such as the cosmic order includes the free will in its mechanism; while Aesir's voluntary choice was dependent on God's forescience, it was still free to operate within the remit of its emission, unperturbed within the cosmic design. The Nietzschean concept of Amor Fati (Love for Fate) in accepting the inevitable, through the cyclicality of time, and as it appears with a reason that is to keep one happy, additionally illuminated our understanding of fate in Ragnarok. To counterbalance this idea and bring it into equilibrium, I reflected upon the notion of "Designer of Destiny", whereby human beings are assumed to run the entirety of their destiny, soon to learn that this human urge clashes with theit biology (over which they do not have complete control) and the cosmic power that has already predetermined the human path.