The Falklands Conflict has always loomed large throughout my adult life. As a young man of 19 years old, I watched the television and read the newspapers with the same degree of excitement and fascination as most of the British population. In the following year, as a direct result of the passion and glory that surrounded the war I joined the British Army as a Royal Military Policeman. It quickly became apparent to myself, if not the military, that this was a poor career choice and that I was never cut out to be a soldier. After a military career lasting no more than a few weeks I went to college and started life as a photographer, joining the Ministry of Defence in the late 1980s. Since then, I have made numerous visits to the Falkland Islands to publicise the work of the soldiers who now defend the islands from any threat of re-invasion. Looking back, it seems that the war was over remarkably quickly, and by modern standards, where the war in Afghanistan is projected to last anything between 10 and 20 years, it was. It has often been described as Britain's last colonial war, the last in a long line of small conflicts that expanded and defended the British Empire. Attitudes to war in the South Atlantic developed in a bubble of patriotism and jingoism that has not been seen since and such attitudes now seem to be forged in imperialism, in a time long past and no longer available to representatives of British culture. However, on a wider stage, the representation of all wars and the men who fight in them has a long history. Each culture has its own way of coming to terms with conflict and death, but in the western world, the origins of the representation of the warrior can be traced back to the Ancient Greeks in general, and Homer in particular. Dr. Jonathan Shay, a psychiatrist with the United States Department of Veteran Affairs has made a compelling argument that breaking the Greek covenant has had lasting implications for the veterans of the Vietnam War. (Shay 1995) This psychoanalytical work has helped provide a model of representation that explains why soldiers are portrayed in the way they are. Without the work of Dr. Shay, I am sure that this thesis would not have taken the course that it has. In pursuing this thesis I have had to accept that there may be implications, perceived or real, for my ongoing work as photographer with the Ministry of Defence. The MoD has in various measures supported this research and to date has made no attempt to direct its course or influence the findings; in fact, at the point of submission, they are unaware of its contents. It is clear, that in this type of research, not all the findings will reflect well on the MoD's past or current working practices, but I believe it is possible for it to learn from the results. My position as an MoD photographer has on the other hand had a positive benefit on the research: I have been able to gain access to archives that have remained closed to others. Hilary Roberts, Head of Photography Collections at the Imperial War Museum, has been very influential in this work and has given me more co-operation and trust than I could have hoped for. She has also allowed me more time to present this work than I could have dared asked for given the nature of the images found in the IWM archive, and that the research spanned the 25 th anniversary celebrations. I remain grateful to Hilary for her unstinting support. Finally, I would like to thank Dr lan Walker for his support and supervisor expertise over far too may years. He has read and re-read this work more times than I care to remember and has remained perennially patient with my inabilities to either type or spell, a problem that has made his job all the more difficult. The research and the writing faltered on several occasions, some more serious than others, but without his skill in getting me to do things that, quite frankly, I really did not want to do, this project would never have been completed. It is to Ian that I hold the deepest debt of gratitude.

No description available.

Early in her Prime Ministership, Margaret Thatcher fought an unlikely diversionary war far from home for the ownership of the Falkland Islands. The Islands lie off of Argentina’s coast about 8,000 miles from London, but have been subject to Britain’s rule since 1836. In April 1982, hoping to distract from domestic political and economic turmoil, Argentina’s military dictatorship ordered a surprise invasion of the Islands. Thatcher, Britain’s first female Prime Minister, responded in full force. By early May, a British fleet reached the Islands. By June, despite American efforts to stop a war between its allies, Britain launched an assault on the Islands and took them back by force. Thatcher’s victory propelled her to immense popularity in late-1982 and 1983, and the Argentine dictatorship’s defeat gave life to a people’s revolt that quickly ended the regime and decades of military leadership. This thesis examines Thatcher’s leadership in April 1982, before Britain launched its retaliatory invasion of the Islands. It seeks to answer how Thatcher managed to make the war possible and popular in three key arenas: with her own cabinet and government, with the United States and the United Nations, and ultimately with the British public. This study operates on the idea that the war served as an intentional diversion for Thatcher, who had struggled domestically as Prime Minister up until the Falklands Crisis. Utilizing newly released archival documents from the Thatcher government, this study shows the Prime Minister never had any interest in avoiding war, undermining any potential for peace as it emerged.

<p>De klassiska sjökrigsteorierna har åtskilliga år på nacken. Fortfarande anses emellertid Julius S. Corbetts och Alfred T. Mahans idéer äga sin giltighet – trots att den tidigare var verksam under första halvan 1900-talet och den senare under framförallt den andra halvan av 1800-talet. Syftet med arbetet har varit att undersöka huruvida dessa teoretikers syn på strategier i sjökriget som fenomen kan anses relevanta i det moderna sjökriget. Slaget om Falklandsöarna i början 1980-talet har betecknats som en av de första drabbningarna till sjöss som utspelats i en modern telekrigsmiljö. Utgångspunkt har varit att studera i vilken utsträckning Corbetts och Mahans teorier kan skönjas i utförandet av den brittiska operationsplanen i Falklandskriget. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys av Mahans och Corbetts litterära verk, och litteratur om dessa, har adekvata indikatorer tagits fram. Dessa har jämförts med en fallstudie som utgjorts av Falklandskriget. Slutsatsen blev att teorierna – och då framförallt Corbetts tankar – äger sin giltighet, om än inte bokstavligen och i varje detalj, men som en övergripande förklaring på vilket sätt framgång i modern sjökrigsföring kan uppnås.</p> / <p>The classic naval theories have been around for a considerable sum of time. Despite of these circumstances the ideas of Julius S. Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan are still regarded to be obligated their validity – even though that the foremost of them was active under the first part of the 1900 and the latter active particularly during the second part of the 1800. The purpose of the paper has been to examine whether these naval thinker view on strategy in naval warfare could be considered to be relevant in the modern naval warfare. The battle for the Falklands islands in the beginning of 1980 have been designated as one of the first encounters on the high seas that was situated in a modern electronic warfare environment. The starting point has been to study in which extension Corbett’s and Mahan’s theories could be notices in the execution of the British campaign plan in the Falklands war. Through a qualitative text study of Mahan’s and Corbett’s literary creation, and literature about them, adequate indicators have been brought forward. These have been comprehended with a case study consisting of the Falklands war. The conclusion where that the theories – particularly Corbett’s thoughts – still posses, if not figuratively and in every aspect, but as an overlooking clarification through in which way the success in modern navel warfare ought to be accomplished.</p>

De klassiska sjökrigsteorierna har åtskilliga år på nacken. Fortfarande anses emellertid Julius S. Corbetts och Alfred T. Mahans idéer äga sin giltighet – trots att den tidigare var verksam under första halvan 1900-talet och den senare under framförallt den andra halvan av 1800-talet. Syftet med arbetet har varit att undersöka huruvida dessa teoretikers syn på strategier i sjökriget som fenomen kan anses relevanta i det moderna sjökriget. Slaget om Falklandsöarna i början 1980-talet har betecknats som en av de första drabbningarna till sjöss som utspelats i en modern telekrigsmiljö. Utgångspunkt har varit att studera i vilken utsträckning Corbetts och Mahans teorier kan skönjas i utförandet av den brittiska operationsplanen i Falklandskriget. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys av Mahans och Corbetts litterära verk, och litteratur om dessa, har adekvata indikatorer tagits fram. Dessa har jämförts med en fallstudie som utgjorts av Falklandskriget. Slutsatsen blev att teorierna – och då framförallt Corbetts tankar – äger sin giltighet, om än inte bokstavligen och i varje detalj, men som en övergripande förklaring på vilket sätt framgång i modern sjökrigsföring kan uppnås. / The classic naval theories have been around for a considerable sum of time. Despite of these circumstances the ideas of Julius S. Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan are still regarded to be obligated their validity – even though that the foremost of them was active under the first part of the 1900 and the latter active particularly during the second part of the 1800. The purpose of the paper has been to examine whether these naval thinker view on strategy in naval warfare could be considered to be relevant in the modern naval warfare. The battle for the Falklands islands in the beginning of 1980 have been designated as one of the first encounters on the high seas that was situated in a modern electronic warfare environment. The starting point has been to study in which extension Corbett’s and Mahan’s theories could be notices in the execution of the British campaign plan in the Falklands war. Through a qualitative text study of Mahan’s and Corbett’s literary creation, and literature about them, adequate indicators have been brought forward. These have been comprehended with a case study consisting of the Falklands war. The conclusion where that the theories – particularly Corbett’s thoughts – still posses, if not figuratively and in every aspect, but as an overlooking clarification through in which way the success in modern navel warfare ought to be accomplished.

This study examines how Great Britain fared so well against the Fuerza Aérea Argentina during Operation Sutton of the Falklands war in 1982. This operation is problematic and interesting due to the fact that despite being severely outnumbered, the British managed very well and emerged victorious. The purpose of the operation was to land British materiel and personnel on the beach of San Carlos. Since the Argentines could only contest using its aerial forces, the battle was decided in the air. The study was conducted using the newly-released Underdog’s Model, a theory of asymmetric air power, as a theoretical lattice. The theory consists of six categories in which the underdog should seek to outperform its opponent in order to maximize its chances of winning. The purpose of the study is to gain a deeper understanding of how the British managed to win against a numerically superior opponent. There exists a research gap regarding the topic of the air war over the Falklands, and rarely has it been examined using a pair of theoretical spectacles. Therefore, this study would contribute to the current research field of military studies regarding asymmetric air power and the Falklands war. The general results of this study imply that the British managed to outperform the Argentines in basically all the categories. The category in which this was perhaps most evident was in “Engage vulnerable military targets”, while the one category where it was unclear was the one of “Creativity”.

Por meio de tradicionais e novos conceitos da Geopolítica, são analisadas as especiais circunstâncias que cercaram as relações entre a Argentina e os principais países do mundo desenvolvido, os EUA e parte da Europa, durante a Guerra das Malvinas, para, a partir desse mesmo ferramental conceitual, verificar como esse episódio teve seu impacto nas relações de Brasil e Argentina na América do Sul. Os principais acontecimentos políticos, táticos e logísticos desse conflito são descritos para auxiliar nessa análise feita. A partir desse ponto de inflexão na história sul-americana, utiliza-se o conceito de Medidas de Confiança Mútua (MCM) para se verificar como as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina intensificaram suas relações dentro do novo marco geopolítico acordado entre os dois países. São descritos os sucessos dessa política de aproximação em cinco fases históricas distintas, didaticamente elaboradas: duas anteriores à própria Guerra das Malvinas, e três posteriores. Destacam-se, neste estudo, justamente, as três últimas fases. Ou seja, a terceira fase, após a Guerra das Malvinas, onde são descritos, dentre outros aspectos, os encontros estratégicos organizados pelo EMFA (Brasil) e pelo EMCFA (Argentina) no final da década de 80 do século passado; a quarta fase, ao longo da década de 90, por ter sido o período em que as principais MCM de sucesso ocorreram; e a quinta fase, já na virada do milênio, onde são discutidos os limites atuais das MCM que vêm sendo adotadas e as possíveis perspectivas futuras. A primeira e a segunda fases situam-se ainda nos períodos iniciais e intermediários da Guerra Fria, mas, por já existirem ali algumas MCM embrionárias entre as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina, importantes para desdobramentos futuros, estas fases têm também discutidas as suas importâncias históricas. Enfatiza-se que, na primeira fase, os principais episódios ocorreram sob grande influência dos EUA, enquanto, na segunda fase, já se constatava uma ligeira autonomia regional nas medidas adotadas. / There are analyzede, by means of traditional and new concepts of geopolitics, the special circumstances that surrounded the relations between Argentina and the main developed countries, the United States and part of Europe, during the Malvinas War, in order to, based on such conceptual tool, exam, how such episode impacted the Brazil-Argentina relations on South America. The main political, tactic and logistic events are described to help with the analysis. As of this turning point in the South-American history, it is used the concept of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM) to verify how the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies intensified their relations in the new giopolitics milestone agreed upon between both countries. There are described the successful events in such approaching policy and politics in five different phases, didactically worked out: two prior to the Malvinas War and three afterwards. This study high lights precisely the three last phases, i.e., the phases after the Malvinas War. In the third phase, there are described, among other aspects, the strategic meetings organized by the EMFA (Brazil) and the EMCFA (Argentina) at the end of the 1980s; in the forth phase, are highly emphasized the 1990s since this is the period during which most of the MCM succeeded; and, in the fifth phase, already at the turning of the millennium, the current limits of the MCM, that are being adopted, are discussed, as well as the possible perspectives for the future. The first and second phases are the ones still during the beginning and intermediate periods of the Cold War. These phases are also discussed because they already presented some embryonic MCM policies between the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies, important for the way the events unfolded later on. In the first phase, there are stressed the main episodes that took place under the influence of the US, while, in the second, one can already notice a slight regional autonomy in the measures adopted.

Por meio de tradicionais e novos conceitos da Geopolítica, são analisadas as especiais circunstâncias que cercaram as relações entre a Argentina e os principais países do mundo desenvolvido, os EUA e parte da Europa, durante a Guerra das Malvinas, para, a partir desse mesmo ferramental conceitual, verificar como esse episódio teve seu impacto nas relações de Brasil e Argentina na América do Sul. Os principais acontecimentos políticos, táticos e logísticos desse conflito são descritos para auxiliar nessa análise feita. A partir desse ponto de inflexão na história sul-americana, utiliza-se o conceito de Medidas de Confiança Mútua (MCM) para se verificar como as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina intensificaram suas relações dentro do novo marco geopolítico acordado entre os dois países. São descritos os sucessos dessa política de aproximação em cinco fases históricas distintas, didaticamente elaboradas: duas anteriores à própria Guerra das Malvinas, e três posteriores. Destacam-se, neste estudo, justamente, as três últimas fases. Ou seja, a terceira fase, após a Guerra das Malvinas, onde são descritos, dentre outros aspectos, os encontros estratégicos organizados pelo EMFA (Brasil) e pelo EMCFA (Argentina) no final da década de 80 do século passado; a quarta fase, ao longo da década de 90, por ter sido o período em que as principais MCM de sucesso ocorreram; e a quinta fase, já na virada do milênio, onde são discutidos os limites atuais das MCM que vêm sendo adotadas e as possíveis perspectivas futuras. A primeira e a segunda fases situam-se ainda nos períodos iniciais e intermediários da Guerra Fria, mas, por já existirem ali algumas MCM embrionárias entre as Marinhas de Brasil e Argentina, importantes para desdobramentos futuros, estas fases têm também discutidas as suas importâncias históricas. Enfatiza-se que, na primeira fase, os principais episódios ocorreram sob grande influência dos EUA, enquanto, na segunda fase, já se constatava uma ligeira autonomia regional nas medidas adotadas. / There are analyzede, by means of traditional and new concepts of geopolitics, the special circumstances that surrounded the relations between Argentina and the main developed countries, the United States and part of Europe, during the Malvinas War, in order to, based on such conceptual tool, exam, how such episode impacted the Brazil-Argentina relations on South America. The main political, tactic and logistic events are described to help with the analysis. As of this turning point in the South-American history, it is used the concept of Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM) to verify how the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies intensified their relations in the new giopolitics milestone agreed upon between both countries. There are described the successful events in such approaching policy and politics in five different phases, didactically worked out: two prior to the Malvinas War and three afterwards. This study high lights precisely the three last phases, i.e., the phases after the Malvinas War. In the third phase, there are described, among other aspects, the strategic meetings organized by the EMFA (Brazil) and the EMCFA (Argentina) at the end of the 1980s; in the forth phase, are highly emphasized the 1990s since this is the period during which most of the MCM succeeded; and, in the fifth phase, already at the turning of the millennium, the current limits of the MCM, that are being adopted, are discussed, as well as the possible perspectives for the future. The first and second phases are the ones still during the beginning and intermediate periods of the Cold War. These phases are also discussed because they already presented some embryonic MCM policies between the Brazilian and Argentinean Navies, important for the way the events unfolded later on. In the first phase, there are stressed the main episodes that took place under the influence of the US, while, in the second, one can already notice a slight regional autonomy in the measures adopted.

Nell’aprile 1982, l’Argentina – un Paese alleato degli Stati Uniti attraverso il Patto di Rio – invase le isole Falkland, un Territorio d’Oltremare del Regno Unito, rivendicato da Buenos Aires sin dal XIX secolo. Margaret Thatcher, l’allora Primo Ministro britannico, rispose con vigore. Alla fine la Gran Bretagna – alleato NATO degli USA – riuscì a riconquistare le isole e a ristabilire lo status quo ante. Il conflitto va inquadrato nel framework della ‘seconda Guerra Fredda’. Il confronto tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Unione Sovietica fu particolarmente aspro nei primi anni Ottanta e la logica bipolare influenzò le dinamiche diplomatiche della guerra del 1982. Da un lato, l’Emisfero occidentale era al centro della rinnovata strategia americana anti-comunista e l’Argentina era il principale pilastro nel Cono Sud. Dall’altro lato, il rafforzamento della ‘speciale relazione’ anglo-americana costituiva la pietra angolare della grand strategy statunitense nel teatro europeo. Con questo sfondo, è naturale domandarsi quale ruolo Washington scelse di giocare nella guerra delle Falkland tra due dei suoi alleati. A causa di interessi divergenti, la ‘relazione speciale’ non fu infatti del tutto speciale. / In April 1982, Argentina – a country allied with the United States through the Rio Pact – suddenly invaded the Falkland Islands, a long-time Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom, disputed by Buenos Aires since the XIXth century. Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, vigorously responded and finally Britain – a US NATO ally – was able to regain the Islands and re-establish the status quo ante. The conflict needs to be contextualized in the ‘second Cold War’ framework. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was particularly tough in the first years of the 1980s and the bipolar logic strongly influenced the diplomatic course of the 1982 war. On the one hand, the Western hemisphere was at the core of the renewed anti-communist US strategy and Argentina was the main pillar in the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the strengthening of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ was the European cornerstone of the US grand strategy. Against this background, what kind of role the US chose to play in the Falklands war between two of their allies instinctively arises as the main question. Affected by diverging interests, the ‘special relationship’ was not indeed entirely special.

Denna undersökning har studerat ett lätt infanteriförbands användning av kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan under en amfibieoperation samt vilka aspekter som påverkade möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning p.g.a. operationens amfibiska karaktär. Fallet har utgjorts av Parachute Regiments två bataljoner som under Falklandskriget utkämpade tre slag vid Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon och Wireless Ridge. Som analysverktyg har använts Robert Leonhards teori om den kombinerade bekämpningens tre principer. Indikatorer på principerna har varit syften med verkan hämtade ur teorin om de grundläggande förmågorna. Två av slagen befanns endast delvis kännetecknas av Leonhards två första principer, principerna om kompletterande system och dilemman. Den tredje principen om fördelaktig terräng uppfylldes inte. Det tredje slaget regementet utkämpade kännetecknades helt igenom av Leonhards två första principer medan den tredje delvis beaktades. Undersökningen konstaterar att kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan kan utvecklas av ett lätt infanteriförband under en amfibieoperation. Dock ledde ofördelaktig disponering av förbandet i de aktuella fallen till att kombinerad bekämpning tidvis omöjliggjordes. Leonhards tredje princip tenderade att förringas. De specifikt amfibiska aspekterna avseende möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning utgjordes främst av tillgången till fartygsartilleri, kraven på helikoptertransporterbart fältartilleri samt bristen på lätta trossfordon. / This dissertation has investigated how a light infantry force has used combined arms during an amphibious operation, specific factors related to the operations character affecting the possibility to develop combined arms have also been highlighted. The case chosen for the study was Parachute Regiments actions during the three battles of Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge during the Falklands War. As a analytical tool Robert Leonhard’s theory about the three principles of combined arms was used together with indicators borrowed from the theory about the warfighting functions purposes of fires. Two of the battles were found to be only partially characterized by Leonhard’s first two principles, complementary systems and dilemmas. The third principle about favorable terrain was neglected. The third battle was throughout characterized by the first two principles and to a larger extent than the former by the third principle. The dissertation concludes that light infantry can use combined arms during amphibious operations. The battles studied were, however, often characterized by unfavorable disposition of the force which affected the possibilities to use combined arms. Leonhard´s third principle was usually neglected. The most important amphibious aspects affecting the possibilities to combined arms were found to be naval gunfire support, light field artillery and the scarcity of light all-terrain vehicles.