ABSTRACT This paper tests the influence of family control on corporate governance. It empirically examines the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms by analyzing the forced turnovers of top executive officers in Taiwan manufacturing companies. We divide samples into family firms and non-family firms, and also into firms in the high-tech industry and firms in the traditional industry. The result shows that corporate governance in family firms differs from that in non-family firms. In the traditional industry, the top executive turnover is related to performance for family firms, and it implies the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanism. However there is no evidence to prove the efficiency of governance mechanism for non-family firms in the traditional industry. In the high-tech industry, the influence of family control on corporate governance is not significantly observed, but there is significant evidence to show the well functioning of governance mechanism in non-family firms. Overall, these results suggest that both family control and industry characteristic do influence the efficiency of corporate governance.

The purpose of this research is to increase understanding about the influence of the family on internationalisation of family firms in the Swedish context, in terms of family human, social and financial capital. Multiple cases of four Swedish manufacturing family firms were studied by conducting interviews with the family members working in the family firm. A perspective of family capital and its three components of human, social and financial capital, was adopted to analyse the empirical findings. The findings identify several positive and negative influences of the family on internationalisation of the firm. Positive factors include: family members’ deep knowledge about the firm, commitment, long-term perspective, family values like honesty, trust. Negative factors include: family firms are slow-to-change, family’s strong commitment to local society and family’s goal of slow and steady growth. Most factors confirm existing theory, on other theories these findings shed critical lights and some new insights were made. Based on the findings, future research suggestions are made.

This study addresses the effects of altruism and intention for succession on family firm's risk-taking behaviors. Results show that higher levels of familial altruism in family firms with succession plans lead to lower levels of R&D investment, but have no significant impacts on their earnings management. Also, altruism in these family firms decreases their cost of debt. / May 2016

Global warming imposes significant physical, regulatory and reputational risks to listed corporations. Consequently, climate-related issues have recently received increased attention from investors, creditors and stock market regulators. In February 2010, The United States (US) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an interpretative guidance requiring publicly listed firms to disclose material climate change risks (CCR) in their annual securities filings (10Ks). However, considering the level of enforcement and managerial discretion in the definition of materiality, market participants raised concerns about the lack and quality of CCR disclosure. This research explores the effects of family control as an important determinant of CCR disclosure strategies. Family firms are the world’s most common form of economic organizations, dominating the global economy. The socioemotional wealth (SEW) theoretical perspective argues that family firms behave differently from their nonfamily counterparts and exhibit significant heterogeneity depending on the level of family control and involvement. Using a sample of S&P 500 companies, I examine whether family firms differ from their non-family peers in their climate change disclosure strategies. Additionally, I further explore the effects of two dimensions (i.e. family control and influence, family identity) of socioemotional wealth on CCR disclosures. Overall, I find that family ownership has no impact on CCR disclosure decisions, but is negatively related to CCR disclosure quality. Moreover, I find a positive relationship between family firms prioritizing family identity and CCR disclosure quality. The findings of this research have implications for regulators, investors, and academic researchers.

In East Asian economies, about 2/3 listed firms are controlled by family shareholders. In the US and West European, the proportions of family firms are about 33% and 44%, respectively. Thus, family-controlled listed firms are common in almost every nation. In Taiwan, nearly 70% of listed firms are family-controlled. Many previous studies have pointed out that family firms are playing an important role in global economic activities. The equity structures and management ideas of family firms are different from those of common firms. For instance, family members possess decisive equities and will usually take positions of directors or top managers. They may usually view their firms as an asset inherited from forefathers, and they should pass it on to their next generations. The impact of these differences on firm¡¦s financial decisions has become a main research focus in recent years. Previous studies of family firms mainly placed the focus on the impact of family factors on corporate performance, but this study would attempt to investigate the impact of family factors on debt decisions from the perspectives of debt-financing decision and cost of debt-financing. First of all, this study probed into whether family and non-family firms have differences debt-financing decisions. Empirical findings indicated that family firms have a lower debt ratio and a 0.2813% lower cost of debt than non-family firms. A further comparison on the factors of debt decisions showed that the difference in the impact of family and non-family firms on debt levels lies in mainly three aspects, including depreciation tax shield, operational risk, and firm size. In the aspect of cost of debt-financing, family firms are relatively more sensitive to firm size, debt ratio, and credit risk. Previous studies that applied the agent theory to investigate debt decisions focused more on the problems of debt agency problem and seldom used the inter-relationship between equity agency problem and debt agency problem to discuss the impact of equity agency problem on debt decisions. The problems of equity agency of family firms encompass the traditional equity agency between the manager and shareholders and core equity agency between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Besides, family ownership and management can reduce the problems of traditional equity agency, and controlling shareholders using the pyramid structure of equities and cross-holding to enhance control right will increase the problems of core equity agency. Thus, based on the problems of equity agency problem, the family factors can be divided into family ownership, enhancement of control, and family management to investigate the respective impact on debt-financing decisions. In the aspect of debt-financing, it was empirically discovered that higher family ownership would lead to a closer relationship between firm value and the wealth of family shareholders. Debt financing would be avoided to reduce financial risks and maintain the wealth of family shareholders. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between family control and family ownership, implying when the difference between family control and family ownership is higher, the problems of core equity agency between controlling shareholders and small shareholders will be more serious, and the company will be inclined to adopt debt-financing to acquire long-term capitals. The estimate coefficient of the effect of family management on debt ratio is not significance. Thus, whether the CEO is taken by a family member will not affect debt-financing decisions. In the analysis of control level, when the control level is low, firms are inclined to adopt debt-financing decisions to reduce the effect of equity dilution. On the contrary, when the control level is high, in order to avoid the loss of control benefit caused by debt monitoring, firms will be inclined to avoid debts. As a result, control and debt ratio are in an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, for family firms, the maintenance of control and risk control are important factors affecting their debt-financing decision. In the aspect of cost of debt, family ownership can reduce the cost of debt-financing. If the non-linear relationship of family ownership is considered, the impact of family ownership on the cost of debt-financing is non-linear and in an inverted U shape. The maximum value is 8.64%. When the family ownership exceeds 17.9%, the effect of family ownership on the cost of debt financing is negative. As the minimum family ownership was defined as 10% in this study, and the average family ownership among the samples was 21%, it could be inferred that higher family ownership would lead to a lower cost of debt-financing. In a comparison with Anderson et al. (2003), it was discovered that the average family ownership has negative influence on the cost of debt, but for the family firms in the US, higher family ownership would reduce its negative influence on cost of debt, and for domestic family firms, higher family ownership would increase its negative influence on the cost of debt. The Control-enhancing mechanisms will increase core equity problem and cost of debt, and the relationship between control enhancement and cost of debt are not in a non-linear relationship. Creditors conceive that their mortgage will be more secured if family members take the position of CEO. Thus, family CEO can reduce the cost of debt-financing.

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In this thesis we show how and why non-family managers are excluded in family firms. Additionally, we depict the implications of exclusion on an individual as well as a business level. The literature framework that consists of literature from family business and organizational as well as socio-psychological studies lays the foundation for our qualitative empirical research. A method triangulation of semi-structured interviews and vignettes, based on empirical material from seven cases, is applied to understand the exclusion of non-family managers. Our findings suggest that exclusion is prevailing in family firms. Hereby, family members as well as non-family managers can be the ones excluding. We identified six main categories why exclusion of non-family managers happens. Exclusion can be based on the family’s values and norms, exclusive knowledge of a family member, the need of quick decision making, the need of secrecy, the manager’s professional values and norms, as well as the manager’s personal values and norms. Further, exclusion can take place in formal and informal selective arenas, through formal and informal breach of agreements, through structural and cultural hindrances, as well as through differences between enacted and espoused values. Moreover, we reveal several implications exclusion has on an individual and on a business level. The findings contribute to the theoretical and managerial understanding of exclusion in family firms. Thus, increasing the awareness of its existence in family firms. Additionally, we contribute to current research about exclusion in family firms by providing more insights into the complex phenomenon. This thesis is of interest to any individual in a leading position in family firms, as well as academics in the research field of family businesses.

Family firms are ubiquitous around the world. Family involvement in family businesses gives rise to unique features that not only make family firms behave distinctively from their nonamily counterparts but also lead to great variations among such firms. From an innovation perspective, while family firms are regarded as conservative businesses that lack an innovation spirit in some studies, others recognize family firms as key economic drivers demonstrate entrepreneurial spirit. This dissertation is an attempt to advance the understanding of family firm innovation heterogeneity by focusing on the role of family CEOs. In particular, this research explores what idiosyncratic resources and capabilities are generated from family management, specifically when a family member holds the CEO position. Employing a capability-based perspective of firm innovation, this research posits that the impact of a family CEO on firm innovation is twoold. Family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation due to the distinctive resources possessed and the unique goals pursued. Family CEOs also have an indirect impact on firm innovation via the configuration and orchestration of other top management team (TMT) members’ competencies, which manifests as high-order, idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. Therefore, superior or inferior family firm innovation is the result of both TMT members’ unique competencies acquired and developed by family firms as well as family CEOs’ idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. A randomly selected sample of 250 high-technology firms was used for the empirical tests. Findings suggest that family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation input and output and that family CEOs configure and orchestrate TMT resources distinctively compared to their professional counterparts. The results reveal theoretical implications for both family business and firm innovation and offer practical implications for leaders of family firms.

The governance field is well studied. However, small family firms do not receive their fair amount of coverage, despite their importance. In this work the field of governance in small family firms is qualitatively explored, using a sample of eight Swedish firms with a total of ten interview partners. Using a Constructivist Grounded Theory, informed by previous literature, we find nine key themes characterizing governance in small family firms: (1) Ownership & Board, (2) Holding Company, (3) Advisor & External Help, (4) Responsibility, (5) Formality, (6) Informality, (7) Conflict, (8) Succession and (9) Discussion & Conversation. Our findings suggest that all small family businesses employ some form of governance, however, this is not always recognized as such in previous literature, showing that corporate governance is too narrowly defined. We also investigate why governance structures are (not) implemented and how this is done. In connection to this, we visualize the factors influencing whether or not a small family firm implements formal governance structures. Additionally, we discuss what actually makes a family firm small. We contribute by investigating governance concepts in another context, namely the one of small family businesses, and seeing to what extent they hold up. The work allows us to conclude that some findings confirm existing theory, while others question it or cannot be found therein at all.

<p>Småföretagen kan ses som en viktig del av samhällsekonomin i Sverige då de utgör 98 procent av Sveriges företag. Deras överlevnad kan därför vara betydelsefull, bl.a. som arbetsgivare. Men vilka är då dessa småföretagare: är det möjligt att se dem som jämförbara homogena grupper av individer i homogena branscher? Vi har därför i denna studie undersökt vilka dessa småföretagare är i en homogen bransch som plastindustribranschen och hur småföretagarna verkar i sitt företagande. Studien avgränsades till att endast omfatta företagare från de riktigt små aktiebolagen, mikroföretagen, med 2-9 anställda inom plastindustrin. Urvalet är gjort utifrån</p><p>företagens medlemskap i Svensk Plastindustriförening (SPIF). Företagarna studerades utifrån sina styrelseuppdrag i urvalets plastindustriföretag.</p><p>Ledningsskifte kan utgöra en stor och omvälvande förändring för ett litet företag, vanligen familjeföretag, då ofta både ledning och ägare byts. Vi har därför i studien gjort jämförelser mellan tre grupperingar av företag: de som genomfört ledningsskifte, de som troligen kommer att göra ledningsskifte inom en nära framtid och de som troligen inte kommer att göra ledningsskifte inom en nära framtid, för att se om det fanns några skillnader mellan dessa grupper. Dessa tre grupper studerades utifrån olika dimensioner som antal anställda, omsättning, könsfördelning, styrelsepositioner och kön, mikroföretagens ålder, ledningsstruktur, företagarnas ålder,</p><p>familjeföretagande eller kompanjoner samt multipelt företagande. Det visade sig att det inte förelåg några entydiga skillnader mellan de tre grupperingarna av företag varför vi inte kan se att ledningsskifte har avgörande betydelse för mikroföretag i plastbranschen.</p><p>Studiens resultat visade att det var svårt att se plastbranschens mikroföretagare som en homogen jämförbar grupp då de var mycket olika i sitt företagande trots vissa likheter. Överraskande många företagare kunde beskrivas som multipla företagare, vilket bidrar till svårigheten att se dem som homogen grupp då de är verksamma inom många olika branscher och verksamheter. Detta föranleder oss att se multipla mikroföretagare som ett område som borde studeras närmare.</p>