Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Kungliga Tekniska högskolan, 2006. / Härtill 5 uppsatser.

Disputats, Linköping Universitet, 2006. / Med litteraturhenvisninger.

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In the fall of 2015 over 100 000 refugees came to Sweden, seeking asylum. As a result, Swedish schools are now educating children and young people, whose future is uncertain, since some of them will not continue to live their lives in Sweden. The Swedish curriculum is adapted to the needs and values of Swedish society. It can be questioned if this is the best education for asylum seekers who are not allowed to stay in the country. Amy Gutmann has introduced the idea of adequacy in the philosophical debate about education. According to this theory, an adequate education is one that makes it possible for all educable children to take part in the democratic processes as adults. Elizabeth Anderson has developed the theory further, from the point of view that a society is governed by an elite. She concludes that it is important that this elite consists of representatives from all socio-economic tiers in a society to be democratically viable. For this to happen, schools need to be more integrated than they are today. It is the aim of this essay to see if the education of asylum seeking pupils in Sweden is adequate in fostering active democratic citizens. The author therefore looks at the way the Swedish school system handles asylum seeking pupils and their parents. UNHCR’s Educational Strategy is also used as a guide to an adequate curriculum. The author reaches the conclusion that adequacy points to certain changes in the curriculum and organization of schools, which would better prepare individuals both for a life in Sweden, and for a return to their native countries. Furthermore, adequacy gives us a reminder that people seeking asylum are also part of the democratic processes in the host country.

Proponents of mereological nihilism attempt to achieve a simpler metaphysical ideology,a more parsimonious ontology and a solution to paradoxes of composition by denyingthat composition occurs. There are no objects with proper parts, only mereologicalsimples. One criticism of nihilism is that it appears to render propositions in scientificand ordinary language false, such as ‘there is a chair here’. van Inwagen offers usparaphrases of the form ‘there are some simples here arranged chair-wise’ that allowour ordinary language to express a true statement, albeit ontologically imprecise.Bennet argues that this does not really answer the question of composition, it merelymoves it into another one. Instead of ‘when do the xs compose a y?’, the questionbecomes ‘what does the world have to be like for some xs to be arranged y-wise?’Tallant builds on her argument to make the stronger claim that nihilism ultimately fails.This essay examines his argument and contrasts it with Sider’s positive case fornihilism, finding that while Tallant poses a serious challenge to nihilism, it can be met.However, Sider’s replacement of composition with mathematical sets does not doenough to fully answer the challenge of Tallant.

In his 2003 paper “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation” Nick Bostrom argues that it is reasonable to believe that we are currently living in a computer simulation run by another civilisation. To argue this, Bostrom derives a mathematical formula that helps him calculate the probability that our universe is indeed simulated. The paper has gained widespread popularity, and is every bit as intriguing today as when it was written nearly 20 years ago. In this essay I will critically analyze Bostrom’s simulation argument and its implications. I will start off by focusing on the arguments that Bostrom presents in his 2003 article. I will then proceed by arguing why an incredibly advanced civilization may run a huge number of simulations in an attempt at finding out where their civilization comes from, or how it has developed. I will do this because Bostrommerely assumes that it is reasonable to assume that this is the course of action a highly developed civilisation will take. I will also take other works he’s written on the subject into consideration, namely his answer from 2011 to a mistake found in the original paper.

In Plato's Phaedrus, the conflict between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul plays a central role. While the best life, according to Plato, is the rational pursuit of philosophical contemplation, the soul can nevertheless not rid itself from its non-rational parts. In the Phaedrus, Plato presents this tension by likening the soul to a winged chariot with a charioteer and two horses. In this essay, I lean on the account of the soul in the Republic to argue that a solution to the conflict can be found by taking the wings of the chariot to symbolise inner harmony. In this way, I show that the non-rational parts of the soul are not a hindrance to the rational pursuit of philosophy, but, in fact, necessary for it.

Within the field of aesthetics, there are several approaches to answering what affects how and whether an individual engages with a particular art or aesthetic object. Two theories that attempt to come to a solution on this issue are theories of attunement and attachment which respectively argue that one’s engagement is primarily affected by one’s attunement or attachment, through a system of values, beliefs, and associations, to an object. While these theories are successful in responding to a variety of cases, individually, they leave something to be desired explicatively, and, in light of this, I will develop in this essay an alternative that centres itself on the character of the aesthetic subject which will do the work of both approaches without having to make any taxing conceptual commitments.

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Rachels badkarsexempel och Quinns Doctrine of doing and allowing är båda två olika sätt att hantera görande och tillåtande av skada. Rachels menar genom hans badkarsexempel att det inte existerar någon intrinsikal skillnad och det bör därför enbart vara intentionerna som agenterna har som rättfärdigar eller förbjuder görande och tillåtande av skada. Quinn menar dock att det fortfarande existerar en skillnad mellan att göra skada och att låta skada ske. Denna skillnad har att göra med våra postiva och negativa rättigheter. Att göra skada kränker våra negativa rättigheter, men att låta skada ske kränker våra positiva rättigheter. Quinn menar att det ibland är moraliskt tillåtet att låta skada ske för ett gott ändamål, men att det inte är moraliskt tillåtet att aktivt skada någon för samma goda ändamål. Denna uppsats tjänar till att närmare undersöka dessa två olika synsätt på skillnaden mellan att göra skada och att låta skada ske.