The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This paper analyzes the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000-2014. We also analyze the relative impact of the global financial crises on the bank performance. The performance of social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar.

Yes / The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This article analyses the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality, and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000–2014. We also analyse the relative impact of the global financial crisis on the bank performance. The performance of social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar.

隨著金融交易與經濟活動的不斷演變，以及資訊科技的更迭與普及，有別於傳統的、非實體型態的金融中介機構逐漸威脅過去如銀行、保險公司等傳統中介機構的功能與收益，故隨之而來討論新型態金融中介是否仍有助於經濟成長、如何影響金融中介發展等議題也漸漸升溫。有鑒於此，本文第2.3章將探討兩種不同型態的中介機構(銀行與群眾募資平台) 之風險穩定程度，並據此提出新的分析結論。 金融中介在向大眾提供資金融通服務的同時也面臨風險。以信用風險及流動性風險為例，銀行利用創新金融工具，不但能將手中融資貸款部位的信用風險轉移至願冒險投資的投資人手中，藉此增加資金以繼續提供融資服務，成功達到幫助銀行增加利潤、分散信用風險，以及增加流動性等功能，但實際上，這些可能違約的信用風險其實並未消失。 本文試圖重新檢視金融中介的信用風險議題，首先分析銀行產業結構會如何影響銀行的違約風險；並關注次貸後因市場流動性急遽消失而新興的新興金融工具--群眾募資，是否將再次導致市場上高風險項目的出現。

投資人在獲取報酬之前，可能發現其它更為有利的投資機會、甚至在短期時發生消費需求，因而有臨時要求抽回資金的可能。投資人面對如此流動性風險（liquidity risk），金融資產與活期存款皆可扮演提供流動性（liquidity provision）的功能。部分文獻上質疑，當金融市場與銀行同時存在時，活期存款亦具有可交易性，則銀行提供流動性之功能如何。本文依循Diamond（1997）所提出金融市場有限參與率的觀念，考慮投資人在可交易性資產之外，尚可選擇將部分資金投資於不具有可交易性、但具有較高效率性的長期生產活動。當銀行並未存在時，投資人不僅無法達到跨期補助（cross-subsidization）性質的消費型態，甚至將發生效率性的損害。一旦銀行（a coalition）存在時，集中資金持有後將可代表投資人進行效率性的投資活動，再將短期與長期投資報酬以提領契約的方式配置予兩類型投資人，將可避免掉效率性的損失。且由於銀行選擇的長期投資方式是不具有可交易性的效率性長期生產活動，因此提領契約當中所約定的第2期求償權（date 2 claims）是不可交易的。於是乎，銀行確實可設計符合社會最適化條件的提領契約，使得其存款客戶達到社會最適化的消費機會集合。也因此，投資人願意將資金完全存放銀行，次級市場的資產交易活動不再存在。

This thesis aims at contributing to the growing number of studies on banking productivity, by attempting to introduce the interest rate spread as one of the driving forces behind productivity changes and alterations of the intermediary role of banks. The analysis is based on observations form the banking sectors of Germany and Sweden. As there is no clear concensus on the proper way of measuring banking output, and the choice of method varies considerably form study to study, this paper adopts the intermediation approach which is one of the three most offen recurring methods applied in research papers. The results include some interesting revelations such as the low significance of a change in labour and capital to the growth in banking output (challenging traditional theory), and that Swedish banks on average were moving away from the traditional intermediary role between 1979 and 1996 while German banks kept lending business at their centre of attention.

<p>This thesis aims at contributing to the growing number of studies on banking productivity, by attempting to introduce the interest rate spread as one of the driving forces behind productivity changes and alterations of the intermediary role of banks. The analysis is based on observations form the banking sectors of Germany and Sweden. As there is no clear concensus on the proper way of measuring banking output, and the choice of method varies considerably form study to study, this paper adopts the intermediation approach which is one of the three most offen recurring methods applied in research papers. The results include some interesting revelations such as the low significance of a change in labour and capital to the growth in banking output (challenging traditional theory), and that Swedish banks on average were moving away from the traditional intermediary role between 1979 and 1996 while German banks kept lending business at their centre of attention.</p>

Cette thèse se propose d'étudier une activité et des organisations singulières, le brokerage et les sociétés d'intermédiation financière de type Prestataire de Service en Investissement - encore appelée récemment société de bourse - sur EURONEXT France. L'idée est d'éclairer, à partir des pratiques des acteurs qui y sont impliqués et leurs interactions avec leur environnement, le processus de formation de la stratégie entendu comme agir stratégique ou « strategizing » dans la perspective de la Strategy-as- Practice. Ce type d'organisation, inséré dans le système financier aujourd'hui très prégnant économiquement et socialement, nous semble particulièrement intéressant car au centre de développements en microstructure et en sociologie de la finance mais peu observé du point de vue du management stratégique. Il est soumis à des transformations importantes depuis deux décennies ayant pour conséquences, plus ou moins apparentes, des tensions internes voire des dérapages. / The aim is to contribute to the research agenda of “Strategy As Practice” taking a practice perspective and showing how practitioners are also engaged in the creation process or strategizing for their own professions and their institutional positions. After a long period of stability, the French stock exchange environment and its associated practices have, for over two decades now, co-evolved very quickly. One category of stock market professionals has been particularly impacted: the brokers, historically at the heart of the Stock Exchange. On French financial markets, the former agents de change have become brokerage companies with some disruptions of professions and an increasing place for others and their practices. If the usefulness of brokerage as an intermediation activity has been examined by finance, interesting developments in the sociology of finance have also enabled the social construction perspective but there is a lack of studies in the strategic management.

The study examined the relationship between financial intermediation and poverty in selected developing countries. In particular the study sought to examine the deterministic relationship, cointegration and the causality between financial intermediation and poverty. Panel data spanning the period 2004-2016 for 35 developing countries was employed. Substantial empirical research proposed that financial development expands economic prospects and reduces poverty and inequality. Hitherto, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the potential effects of formal financial dimensions of financial access, financial efficiency and financial stability in reducing poverty. There is also a lack of empirical work on the joint effect of the other financial dimensions in a financial intermediation setting in poverty reduction. The present study contributed to literature by including these financial dimensions in examining cointegration and causality between financial dimensions and poverty. The study employed a number of econometric methodologies to address the objectives of the research such as the GMM, panel ARDL and panel ECM. The GMM was employed to examine the determinants of poverty that were selected for this study. To examine the long run, short run and the causal relationship, the panel ARDL and the error correction model were used. In addition the study deployed PCA to develop the composite index for institutional quality. Panel heterogenous estimation methods such as the pooled mean group to infer the cointegration and causal effect between the financial dimensions and poverty were employed. The Hausman test was used to determine the most appropriate estimator and the PMG estimator was selected as the most appropriate since the p-value of the Hausman test was insignificant. The results from panel ARDL, cointegration test showed the existence of a long run relationship between financial intermediation, financial access, financial efficiency, financial access and poverty. Furthermore, the study noted that the relationship between financial intermediation and poverty differ depending on how poverty is measured. Therefore, the distortions in understanding and definition of poverty may consequently lead to distorted policies that yield little or no results for the effectiveness of the financial sector in poverty reduction.The study found strong causality in the long run for all the poverty proxies and the selected financial variables. Additionally the results from the panel causality tests indicate the bidirectional causality of the variables in the long run. We fail to observe the causality among most iii of the variables in the short run. There is strong joint causality among the variables in the panel as the results of the error correction term is negative and significant indicating that there is dynamic stability between the financial variables and poverty. The study further included the domestic public debt and remittances as determinants of poverty in a financial intermediation setting. Since domestic public debt can crowd out private credit, this study included domestic public debt for the panel of the developing countries and the study found that domestic public debt has a poverty reducing effect. Additionally the study found that remittances reduce the share of population living in poverty whilst increasing inequality as indicated in the findings of the study. / Finance, Risk Management and Banking

Dans sa première partie, cette thèse étudie l’utilisation optimale des produits dérivés par les intermédiaires financiers dans leur gestion du risque, en prêtant spécifiquement attention au marché des dérivés de taux d’intérêt. En modélisant la structure de capital optimale d’une banque, le premier chapitre montre comment l’usage optimal des dérivés affecte certaines décisions souvent étudiées en finance d’entreprise : l’offre de crédit, la transformation de maturité, la politique de dividendes ou les probabilités de défaut. La seconde partie de la thèse étudie au contraire le marché des dérivés comme un système à part entière. Le second chapitre utilise une base de données nouvelle et unique d’expositions bilatérales sur des contrats CDS afin d’offrir une description détaillée de la structure du réseau des expositions. Le troisième chapitre a pour objet la régulation des marchés de produits dérivés. Il étudie la compensation centrale des produits dérivés standardisés, et la demande de collatéral induite par cette réforme à l’échelle mondiale, sous une variété d’hypothèses concernant la microstructure du marché. / In its first part, this thesis studies the optimal use of derivatives contracts for risk management by financial intermediaries, focusing especially on interest rate derivative contracts. It models the optimal capital structure policy of a bank and shows how the optimal use of derivatives affects a number of oft-studied decisions in corporate finance: bank lending, maturity mismatching, payout policy or default probabilities. The second part of the thesis, in contrast, studies derivatives market as a system on its own. The second chapter uses a new and unique dataset of bilateral exposures to CDS contracts in order to provide a detailed description of the network structure of exposures. The third chapter focuses on the regulation of derivatives markets. It studies central clearing of standardized derivatives contracts and the collateral demand induced by the reform at a global scale, under a variety of hypotheses regarding the market microstructure.

Cette thèse est composée de trois chapitres distincts. Dans le premier chapitre, coécrit avec Edouard Challe, nous analysons la détermination jointe de l'information incorporée dans les prix, et la composition du marché par type d’ordres sur un marché d'actifs avec information dispersée. La microstructure du marché est telle que les agents informés peuvent placer soit des ordres de marché simples, soit un ensemble d’ordres limites. Les market-makers établissent le prix. Les agents utilisant des ordres de marché simple négocient moins agressivement sur leur information et réduisent ainsi le contenu informationnel du prix; dans un marché où seul ce type d’ordre est présent, l'information incorporée dans le prix est limitée, quelle que soit la qualité de l'information des agents sur le dividende de l'actif. Lorsque les agents peuvent choisir leur type d'ordre et les ordres limites sont plus coûteux que les ordres de marché, alors les agents choisissent majoritairement les ordres de marché lorsque la précision des signaux privés tend vers l'infini. Les ordres limites sont des substituts: à des niveaux élevés de précision, une fraction résiduelle d’agents plaçant des ordres limites est suffisante pour aligner le prix aux signaux des agents, et donc au dividende. Ainsi le gain à conditionner ses ordres au prix (via des ordres limites) en plus de son propre signal (comme le font tous les agents) disparaît. Nous appliquons ensuite ce mécanisme dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse. Les spéculateurs envisageant une attaque (comme dans le cas des crises de change) doivent deviner les croyances des autres spéculateurs, ce qu'ils peuvent faire en regardant le marché boursier. Ce chapitre examine si ce processus de collecte d'informations est stabilisateur, en ancrant mieux les attentes ou déstabilisateur en générant des équilibres multiples. Pour ce faire, nous étudions les résultats d'un jeu global en deux étapes où un prix d'actif déterminé au stade de négociation du jeu fournit un signal public endogène sur le fondamental qui affecte la décision des agents d'attaquer dans la phase de coordination du jeu. La microstructure du marché d’actif reprend celle étudiée dans le premier chapitre. Les frictions de microstructure qui conduisent à une plus grande exposition individuelle (au risque d'exécution des prix) peuvent réduire l'incertitude agrégée (en fixant un résultat d'équilibre unique). Enfin, dans le troisième chapitre, en collaboration avec Victor Lyonnet, nous présentons un modèle des interactions entre les banques traditionnelles et les shadow banks qui parle de leur coexistence. Au cours de la crise financière de 2007, certains actifs et passifs des shadow banks sont passées aux banques traditionnelles et les actifs ont été vendus à des prix de fire sale. Notre modèle réplique ces faits stylisés. La différence entre les banques traditionnelles et les shadow banks est double. Premièrement, les banques traditionnelles ont accès à un fonds de garantie qui leur permet de se financer sans risque en période de crise. Deuxièmement, les banques traditionnelles doivent respecter une réglementation coûteuse. Nous montrons qu'en cas de crise, les shadow banks liquident les actifs pour rembourser leurs créanciers, alors que les banques traditionnelles achètent ces actifs à des prix de fire sale. Cet échange d'actifs en temps de crise génère une complémentarité entre les banques traditionnelles et les shadow banks, où chaque type d'intermédiaire profite de la présence de l'autre. Nous constatons deux effets concurrents d'une petite diminution du soutien des banques traditionnelles en période de crise, que nous appelons effet de substitution et effet de revenu. Ce dernier effet domine le premier, de sorte qu’un niveau de soutien anticipé plus faible aux banques traditionnelles en temps de crise induit plus de banquiers à s’orienter vers le secteur traditionnel ex-ante. / This dissertation is made of three distinct chapters. In the first chapter, which is joint with Edouard Challe, we analyse the joint determination of price informativeness and the composition of the market by order type in a large asset market with dispersed information. The market microstructure is one in which informed traders may place market orders or full demand schedules and where market makers set the price. Market-order traders trade less aggressively on their information and thus reduce the informativeness of the price; in a full market-order market, price informativeness is bounded, whatever the quality of traders’ information about the asset’s dividend. When traders can choose their order type and demand schedules are (even marginally) costlier than market orders, then market-order traders overwhelm the market when the precision of private signals goes to infinity. This is because demand schedules are substitutes: at high levels of precision, a residual fraction of demand-schedule traders is sufficient to take the trading price close to traders’ signals, while the latter is itself well aligned with the dividend. Hence, the gain from trading conditional on the price (as demand-schedule traders do) in addition to one’s own signal (as all informed traders do) vanishes. We then apply this idea in the second chapter of this dissertation. Speculators contemplating an attack (e.g., on a currency peg) must guess the beliefs of other speculators, which they can do by looking at the stock market. This chapter examines whether this information-gathering process is stabilizing by better anchoring expectations or destabilizing by creating multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. To do so, we study the outcome of a two-stage global game wherein an asset price determined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous public signal about the fundamental that affects traders’ decision to attack in the coordination stage of the game. The trading stage follows the microstructure of the first chapter. Price execution risk reduces traders’ aggressiveness and hence slows down information aggregation, which ultimately makes multiple equilibria in the coordination stage less likely. In this sense, microstructure frictions that lead to greater individual exposure (to price execution risk) may reduce aggregate uncertainty (by pinning down a unique equilibrium outcome). Finally, in the third chapter, joint with Victor Lyonnet, we present a model of the interactions between traditional and shadow banks that speaks to their coexistence. In the 2007 financial crisis, some of shadow banks’ assets and liabilities have moved to traditional banks, and assets were sold at fire sale prices. Our model is able to accommodate these stylized facts. The difference between traditional and shadow banks is twofold. First, traditional banks have access to a guarantee fund that enables them to issue claims to households in a crisis. Second, traditional banks have to comply with costly regulation. We show that in a crisis, shadow banks liquidate assets to repay their creditors, while traditional banks purchase these assets at fire-sale prices. This exchange of assets in a crisis generates a complementarity between traditional and shadow banks, where each type of intermediary benefits from the presence of the other. We find two competing effects from a small decrease in traditional banks’ support in a crisis, which we dub a substitution effect and an income effect. The latter effect dominates the former, so that lower anticipated support to traditional banks in a crisis induces more bankers to run a traditional bank ex-ante.