Au début du XVIIIe siècle, les récits à la première personne abondent dans les lettres françaises. Parmi les narrateurs soucieux de retranscrire le cheminement de leur vie se signalent plus spécifiquement des personnages de philosophe. De 1721 à 1731, les lecteurs découvrent par exemple Usbek, le spectateur français, l’indigent philosophe et Cleveland, quatre personnages de fiction romanesque qui sont autant d’épistolier, de journaliste ou de mémorialiste philosophes. Auteurs, ils exercent leurs pensées sur le fond de leurs expériences intimes. Notre travail tend à examiner de quelle façon, à l’époque de Marivaux, Montesquieu et Prévost, la littérature de fiction à la première personne place le philosophe face à lui-même, nouveau Narcisse censé réfléchir le sens d’une existence. Intégré à la trame narrative, le philosophe (ou le moraliste) du premier XVIIIe siècle n’est plus cet observateur d’une objectivité détachée qui se retranche derrière des discours : il devient lui-même figure, c’est-à-dire forme observable livrée à l’appréciation des lecteurs. Ils ne manqueront d’ailleurs pas de relever les ambiguïtés de cette figure paradoxale qui ne parvient pas toujours à concilier les impératifs de la sensibilité et ceux de la raison. Précisément les œuvres du corpus interrogent les conditions du déploiement de la pensée dans l’esprit humain et dans le monde des choses concrètes. Les implications – littéraires et philosophiques, mais encore poétiques, esthétiques, morales ou cognitives – de la figuration du philosophe dans la fiction constituent ainsi l’objet de notre étude. / In the early 18th century, first-person novels would abound in French literature. Philosophers would become a prominent figure among the various kinds of narrators that specify their personal way of life. From 1721 to 1731, readers discovered Usbek, the spectateur français, the indigent philosophe, and Cleveland, four fictional characters who are letter writers, journalists or memorialists. As authors, they were inspired by their personal life experience and wrote to share their thoughts. The purpose of this work is to analyse at the time of Marivaux, Montesquieu and Prévost how the first-person literature makes philosophers face up their own image. Therefore, the philosopher becomes a new Narcissus supposed to reflect the meaning of existence. While integrated into the narrative, the philosopher (or the moralist) is no longer an objective observer who could hide behind a speech: he is himself a figure facing the judgment of readers. Moreover, they point out the ambiguities of this paradoxical figure that does not always manage to deal with sensitivity and reason. The works of the corpus are questioning the conditions for the deployment of thought in the human mind and the world of concrete things. The implications of the representation of the philosopher in fiction are the object of this study, whether on the literary or philosophical fields, but also on the poetic, aesthetic, moral or cognitive fields.

奎因 (W. V. Quine)的「翻譯的不確定說」(indeterminacy of tran- slation)，不僅在他自己的哲學體系中佔有重要的地位，在當代分析哲學 中也是一個非常重要的理論。「翻譯的不確定說」不僅主張，我們翻譯另 一個語言時，會有翻譯上的不確定性；而且主張，對鄰居語言的翻譯，也 會有不確定的情形；甚至，它也主張，在第一人稱中，我使用的語言所指 涉的東西到底是什麼，仍是不可確定的。本文的目的，是想追究兩個問題 ：第一，奎因以什麼策略或理論論證出「翻譯的不確定說」？第二，「翻 譯的不確定說」可以合理地適用於什麼範圍？關於第一個問題，本文將從 Word and Object 第二章中，奎因所提的「徹底翻譯」(Radical Translation) 的概念開始討論，因為「翻譯的不確定說」是從這裡關始 建立的，而且，在「徹底翻譯」的討論中，可以幫助我們更深入地研究奎 因是以什麼理論支持「翻譯的不確定說」。本文第二章就分別討論三種奎 因對「翻譯的不確定說」的論證進路：「整體論」、「物理理論的不可限 定說」(underdeterminacy of physical theory)和「字詞指涉的不可測 度說」(Inscrutability of reference of terms ) 。最後，本文認為「 整體論」是其中最強的論證進路。關於第二個問題，本文從奎因的「存有 相對性」 (Ontological rela- tivity) 的觀點開始討論。「存有相對性 」主張，除非相對於背景語言，否則不能說對象語言中字詞指涉的東西是 什麼；而這個存有相對性擴展的程度，就是「翻譯的不確定說」適用的程 度。本文認為，它只能適用於對另一個語言、或對另一個言說者的翻譯上 ，並不像奎因所主張的可以適用於第一人稱 (first person) 中、對自己 語言的再詮釋上。本文反對奎因的理由不是基於直覺，而是基於奎因理論 本身的不一致之處，以及基於幾項對第一人稱中翻譯不確定性優缺點的反 省，來反對奎因的這項主張。第一個問題可以幫助我們瞭解第二個問題， 不過它不僅是用來協助我們釐清問題，它本身就是一個需要詳細討論的主 題；第二個問題，也是戴維森 ( Donald Davidson) ，色勒 (John Searle) ，克爾克(Robert Kirk) 以及方萬全先生所關心的問題，它會涉 及私有語言、語意的公共特質和同一語言的判定等若干哲學問題。對這個 問題，本文的立場和方萬全先生最接近，雖然所持的理由不盡相同。在第 一、二章中，討論的是第一個問題，三、四章中討論的是第二個問題。

Este trabajo analiza la crítica que muchos filósofos han dirigido contra la tesis de la indeterminación del significado inspirados por la idea que J. Searle desarrollara en su célebre artículo de 1987, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person". Searle defiende que la tesis constituye una reducción al absurdo de sí misma, ya que precisa hacer uso de distinciones semánticas que ella misma declara inexistentes. Esta reducción al absurdo se debe, siempre según Searle, a la perspectiva de tercera persona que adoptan los defensores de la tesis - Searle analiza aquí la exposición de la tesis de sus dos más ilustres defensores: W. V. O. Quine y D. Davidson - . Nuestro trabajo intenta mostrar cómo esta línea de ataque no dispone de argumentos satisfactorios. La tesis se estructura en tres grandes capítulos. En el primero se expone la tesis de la indeterminación del significado en sus dos grandes vertientes: la conocida como indeterminación de la traducción y la inescrutabilidad de la referencia. Se expone la tesis tal y como aparece en Quine primero y en Davidson después, analizando elementos de enorme relevancia para la tesis, como el holismo del significado y la relación entre la indeterminación y la infradeterminación.En la segunda parte se expone la mencionada crítica de Searle, con especial atención a cómo desarrollaron esta idea de rechazar la indeterminación apelando a una noción de significado desde la perspectiva de la primera persona autores como P. Alston y S. Soames. En la tercera parte se estudia la forma más novedosa que ha adoptado esta visión de "significado de primera persona", a saber, la apelación a las intuiciones lingüísticas de los hablantes. Ha sido D. Bar-On quien más ha ahondado en esta idea. Se defiende aquí la teoría davidsoniana acerca de la autoridad de la primera persona respecto al significado de sus palabras. Se defiende, en particular, la forma davidsoniana de conjugar la indeterminación con la autoridad de la primera persona.Cierra el trabajo una sección de "conclusiones y perspectivas", donde se resumen las conclusiones alcanzadas y se apuntan cuestiones que, tras las conclusiones obtenidas, merecen una profunda revisión. / This work analyzes the criticism that many philosophers have made to the thesis of meaning indeterminacy inspired by the idea exposed by J. Searle in his celebrated article, from 1987, "Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person". Searle defends that the thesis supposes a reductio ad absurdum of itself due to the fact that it requires semantic distinctions that it itself declares non-existent. This reductio is due, according to Searle, to the third person perspective adopted by the defenders of the thesis - Searle analyzes here the exposition of the it made by its two more distinguished defenders, namely, W. V. Quine and D. Davidson - . Our work tries to show that this line of attack does not have satisfactory reasons. This work is organized into three large chapters. The first one is devoted to exposing the thesis in its two aspects: the one known as indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. The thesis is exposed as it appears firstly in W. V. Quine and later in D. Davidson, studying different relevant factors for the it, as meaning holism or the relation between indeterminacy and underdetermination. The mentioned Searle's criticism is developed in the second chapter. The work analyzes here the arguments presented by the authors who have rejected the thesis by appealing to a first person perspective - viz. P. Alston or S. Soames - . The third chapter is devoted to studying the most current form this "first person meaning" has adopted, namely, the appellation to the linguistic intuitions of speakers. D. Bar-On has been the most prolific author following this line. We defend here the Davidsonian theory about first person authority with respect to the meaning of her words. We defend, in particular, Davidson's way of combining indeterminacy and first person authority. The work finishes with a section of "Conclusions and Perspectives", where the reached conclusions are summarized and some issues are brought up which, following on from our conclusions, need in-deepth revision.

Cette thèse a pour objectif de déterminer quelques aspects des figurations du sujet au XVIIe siècle à travers une lecture conjointe des romans à la première personne et des textes philosophiques de cette période. Partant de questionnements proches, ces deux genres discursifs construisent une figure du sujet savant et itinérant : être animé d'un désir de connaissance et amené à repenser les conditions d'énonciation de son expérience particulière. Pour les auteurs du corpus, la vérité se découvre au fil d'expériences singulières si bien que dire le monde avec exactitude revient à l'énoncer à la première personne, à en rendre une perception d'abord subjective. Se pose alors le problème de la légitimation de l'énonciation personnelle, légitimation qui permet d'articuler la première personne à une altérité tout en conservant la singularité du sujet. Cette singularité se double toujours d'une dispersion des identités du sujet et des référents de la première personne. Mais narration, fiction et usages du corps figurent cette identité en constellation. Les deux premières exposent la diversité des visages du « je », leurs concordances ou leurs discordances, à la fois être passé et présent, homme réel et personnage imaginaire, narrateur et auteur. Dans les usages liés aux peines et aux plaisirs du corps se dessine une autre forme de rencontre possible entre la particularité du sujet et l'autre : celui qu'il désire, avec lequel il souffre, avec lequel il jouit, qui vit en lui. Par tous ces aspects, énonciatif, narratif, fictionnel, physique, la subjectivité construite par les textes est toujours et essentiellement une relation : récit raconté pour rejoindre autrui. / The objective of this thesis is to set out several aspects of the figuration of the subject in the 17th Century, through a joint reading of first person novels and philosophical texts from this period. Beginning with similar questions, these two discursive genres construct a figure of a knowing and itinerant subject, a subject animated by the desire to know and thus guided to rethink the conditions that articulate his particular experience. For the authors of these works, the truth is discovered through a series of singular experiences and experiments; the world more clearly announces itself in the first person, rendering a principally singular perception. This poses the problem of the legitimation of personal pronouncement, legitimation which allows for the articulation of the first person with an alterity, while conserving the singularity of the subject. This singularity always doubles as a dispersion of the identities and referents of the first person. Still, narration, fiction and corporal practice show this identity as constellation. The first two expose the diverse faces of the ‘I’, their agreements and disagreements, their being at the same time past and present, real persons and imaginary characters, narrator and author. From the practices tied to the pain and pleasure of the body is drawn another form of possible encounter between the particularity of a subject and an other: the one he desires, with whom he suffers and plays, the one who lives in him. Through all these aspects, enunciative, narrative, fictional, physical, the subjectivity that is inscribed in and described by these texts is always primarily relational: an account recounted to encounter the other.

Unreliable homodiegetic narration presents a unique mode of narrative transmission which demands the encoding within the text of 'translational indices', that is, signifiers of several kinds which justify the reader/receiver in over-riding the sincere first person avowals of the apparent mediator of the discourse. The argument establishes the presence of an epistemologically primary 'immanent' narrative situation within an ostensibly unitary narrative situation. Such a stereoscopic perspective upon the presented world of the literary 'work provides the reader/receiver with a warrant for a rejection of the epistemological validity of the homodiegetic narrator's discourse. Moreover, the thesis advances a typology of such translational indices as they occur in the dense ontology of the literary work of art. The narratological theory of unreliable homodiegetic narration developed in the first half of the dissertation is applied in the second half to selected exemplars of such narrative transmissions, demonstrating thereby the theoretical fecundity of the model for the discipline of narratology. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1988.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 238-244).

No description available.

[pt] O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a noção fregeana de pensamento e discutir o problema da dinâmica cognitiva. Para tal, serão seguidos os seguintes passos. Inicialmente, faremos uma análise da noção de pensamento tal como elaborada por Gottlob Frege. A teoria fregeana será contrastada com sua principal teoria alternativa, a saber, a explicação de Bertrand Russell dos pensamentos ou proposições. Em seguida, será discutido o problema da dinâmica cognitiva, a questão que diz respeito à preservação de crenças e conhecimento por um indivíduo diante das mudanças de contexto. Entende-se ser este um problema com o qual qualquer teoria do pensamento deve lidar. Nosso objetivo é avaliar as soluções para o problema desenvolvidas tanto pelos fregeanos quanto pelos neo-fregeanos, mostrando que elas têm méritos, mas também fraquezas. Questionar-se-á também a viabilidade das propostas de solução avaliadas e será apontada qual delas parece ser a mais plausível. Por fim, discutimos um tipo específico de pensamento que também concerne à questão da dinâmica cognitiva: tratam-se dos pensamentos na primeira pessoa, ou pensamentos de se, ou seja, pensamentos que têm como seu objeto o sujeito referido pelo pronome da primeira pessoa eu . Eles são um caso especial de pensamentos para os quais a questão da dinâmica cognitiva também vale, embora apresentem atributos típicos. Um desses atributos é a imunidade ao erro por má-identificação, já discutida na obra de Gareth Evans. Outras características dos pensamentos na primeira pessoa também serão discutidas, buscando-se apontar para aquela que parece ser a melhor forma de explicar sua natureza e a dinâmica cognitiva que eles envolvem. / [en] The aim of this essay is to analyze the fregean notion of thought and discuss the problem of cognitive dynamics. To this end, I shall take the following steps. To begin with, I analyze the very notion of thought as put forward by Gottlob Frege. Frege s theory is to be contrasted with its main alternative, that is, Russell s account of thoughts or propositions. I proceed, then, to discuss the issue of cognitive dynamics, which is the issue of how it is that the subject is able to maintain his beliefs through context changes. This is, I take it, a difficulty that any theory of thought has to face. My aim is to assess the solutions devised both by the Fregeans and the Neo-Fregeans, showing that they have merits as well as weaknesses. I also question the viability of the would-be solutions and tell which seems the soundest. Finally, I discuss a specific type of thought the issue of cognitive dynamics concerns too: the so-called I-thoughts, or de se thoughts, that is, thoughts that have as their object the very subject referred to by the first person pronoun I . They are a special case of thoughts for which the issue of cognitive dynamics holds too, although they present their own characteristic features. One of these features is the immunity to error through misidentification, already discussed in the work of Gareth Evans. Other characteristics of the I-thoughts will also be discussed, with a view to figure out what seems to be the best way to account for their nature and the cognitive dynamics they involve.

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O principal objetivo desta tese é a investigação do foco narrativo nos romances Nenhum olhar e Cemitério de pianos, de José Luís Peixoto, com vistas a defender a hipótese de que o narrador em primeira pessoa promove a assunção de duplos. Ambas as obras trazem personagens que contam a sua história e, no processo da narração, entram em contato consigo mesmas, sob uma perspectiva pautada nas deformações intrínsecas à passagem do tempo. Nesse sentido, a faculdade da memória assume um papel fundamental na relativização do passado. Trata-se, em primeiro lugar, de uma análise do plano da expressão. Concomitante à questão do narrador e seus duplos, observamos que o conteúdo de ambos os romances evoca o tema da busca da salvação. Compreendemos que a concepção de mundo que permeia as referidas obras está pautada na jornada de Cristo na Terra e, em especial, ao drama da Paixão. Concluímos, pois, que, ao desejo do narrador em primeira pessoa de contar a sua história, estão intimamente relacionados o fenômeno do duplo e a negação da morte. Desse modo, por meio da duplicação, as personagens entram em contato com uma realidade supratemporal, fundada no mito. / The main objective of this thesis is the investigation of narrative focus on novels Nenhum olhar and Cemitério de pianos, by José Luís Peixoto, in order to defend the hypothesis that the first-person narrator promotes the assumption of doubles. Both works bring characters to tell their story and in the process of narration, get in touch with themselves, a perspective based on the deformations intrinsic to the passage of time. In this sense, the faculty of memory plays a key role in the relativization of the past. It is, firstly, an analysis of the level of expression. Concomitant with the question of the narrator and his double, we observed that the contents of both novels evoke the theme of the quest for salvation. We understand that the world view that permeates these works is based on the journey of Christ on Earth and in particular the drama of the Passion. Therefore we conclude that the desire of the first-person narrator to tell his story, are closely related to the phenomenon of the double and the denial of death. Thus, by duplicating the characters come into contact with supratemporal reality, founded on myth.