This three-essay dissertation focuses on the political economy of fiscal rules in a comparative context and highlights their unintended consequences – an issue that has received relatively little attention in public financial management literature. The first essay examines whether numerical limits on deficits, or balanced budget rules, influence the composition of public spending, particularly in the social sector. Using a combination of fixed effects and GMM regressions on a large panel of developed and developing economies, this essay finds that while deficit targets are effective in improving fiscal balances, they also tend to reduce social spending on health and social protection. This effect is particularly prominent in democratic countries, which often witness overspending problems. Countries that are considering adoption of such rules should carefully examine the effects of these requirements on expenditures that may have long-term positive externalities. Policymakers should explore mechanisms to minimize the distortionary effects of fiscal limits on spending composition. The second essay focusses on whether the adoption of deficit targets by subnational governments in India influenced the composition of public spending. Using a combination of fixed effects and GMM regressions, this essay finds that the adoption of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) legislation by Indian states improved their budget balances significantly. However, the post-FRBM period also witnessed significant cuts in development spending. Furthermore, states have reduced their capital outlay and social spending after the adoption of fiscal responsibility laws. Reduced expenditure on development, and capital projects may affect long-term economic growth, therefore future amendments to the FRBM law should explore mechanisms to minimize the distortionary impacts of fiscal targets on the composition of subnational spending. The third essay shifts attention to the effect of supermajority voting requirements on credit ratings and borrowing costs in the subnational debt market in the United States. Using a combination of generalized ordered logit and linear regression analyses on a sample of general obligation bonds issued by American state governments between 2001 and 2014, this essay finds that states with supermajority voting requirements for tax increases are more likely to receive a lower credit rating on their bonds. Furthermore, on average, the states with a supermajority voting requirement pay a premium of 18 to 21 basis points in true interest cost for their bonds. States that are considering adopting supermajority requirements should consider the unintended effects in terms of lower credit ratings and higher borrowing costs while adopting or designing such fiscal rules. The findings of this dissertation inform the policy debate on the subject and improve our understanding of the impact of fiscal institutions that are being increasingly adopted to regulate the behavior of governments across the world.

As Instituições Fiscais Independentes (ou Conselhos Fiscais - CFs) e as Regras Fiscais (RFs) são modelos de instituições que ganharam relevância teórica e política após a constatação de que os governos raramente conseguem comportar-se como planejadores centrais. Ou seja, são incapazes de conduzir a política fiscal de modo a atender o socialmente ótimo no longo prazo. Em geral, a existência de incentivos políticos distorcidos em conjunto com racionalidade limitada dos eleitores e governantes gera déficits excessivos - o chamado viés deficitário da política fiscal - os quais reduzem gradativamente o bem-estar social. A crise fiscal europeia de 2008-2009, em especial, expôs com dramaticidade inédita a profundidade desse viés deficitário na região. Diante da insuficiência dos mecanismos usuais de mercado em corrigir problema, os organismos internacionais e formuladores de política passaram a recomendar veementemente a adoção de CFs, no intuito de reforçar a aplicabilidade das RFs e realinhar os incentivos na direção da disciplina fiscal. Alguns anos após a implementação dessas instituições, estudos quantitativos buscaram avaliar o impacto de sua atuação na trajetória do resultado primário estrutural, principal medida de ativismo fiscal do governo. Os resultados mostraram-se ambíguos e sujeitos a importantes críticas quanto ao controle da endogeneidade. A presente tese busca colaborar com a literatura de reformas institucionais ao abarcar de forma ampla o problema da endogeneidade nessa questão, tanto na investigação de suas origens como no emprego de desenvolvimentos recentes da teoria econométrica para atenuar suas distorções nas estimativas. No primeiro capítulo, definimos o conceito de CF e apresentamos um panorama geral dessas instituições no mundo. Ademais, também expomos as diversas teorias, mormente no campo da economia política, que buscam justificar a presença do viés deficitário da política fiscal, bem como algumas propostas de melhorias do quadro de incentivos através de reformas institucionais, de forma e minimizar esse viés. O segundo capítulo busca investigar avaliar as condições fiscais que antecederam a grande leva de reformas que na última década deram origem aos CFs. Encontramos evidência de que a implementação do CF é precedida por um recuo de aproximadamente 2,59 p.p. do resultado primário efetivo no segundo ano anterior ao tratamento, relativamente aos países não adotantes ou ainda sem adoção no período. No ano da adoção e no anterior, essa diferença deixa de ser significante. Tais achados apontam para uma segunda fonte de endogeneidade nas mensurações da efetividade dos CFs, na qual os países fiscalmente instáveis reagiriam com mais vigor ao advento de crises nas contas públicas, inclusive com a promoção de reformas institucionais. Na literatura institucional, o tipo de endogeneidade mais comumente assinalado é o de causalidade reversa, em que, contrariamente ao tipo anterior, são os países mais austeros que tendem a exibir maior probabilidade de realização de reformas. No terceiro capítulo, a efetividade dos CFs em alterar a trajetória do resultado estrutural é avaliada por meio da metodologia do controle sintético, numa tentativa de controle mais rigoroso da endogeneidade, de nosso conhecimento inédita até então na literatura. Os resultados encontrados indicam a inexistência de um efeito significativo dos CFs sobre aquela variável, em contraste com os obtidos em avaliações anteriores. O último capítulo da tese traça considerações a respeito da Instituição Fiscal Independente (IFI) brasileira, criada em 2016, à luz de recentes avaliações empíricas sobre o novo papel dessas instituições no contexto internacional. / The Independent Fiscal Institutions (or Fiscal Councils - FCs) and Fiscal Rules (FRs) have gained theoretical and political relevance after realizing that governments rarely manage to behave as central planners. That is, they are unable to conduct fiscal policy in order to meet the socially optimal in the long run. In general, the existence of distorted political incentives coupled with the limited rationality of voters and rulers generates excessive deficits - the so-called deficit bias of fiscal policy - which gradually reduce social welfare. The European fiscal crisis of 2008-2009, in particular, dramatically exposed the depth of this deficit bias in the region. Given the inadequacy of the usual market mechanisms to correct the problem, international organizations and policy makers began to strongly recommend the adoption of FCs in order to strengthen the applicability of FRs and realign incentives in the direction of fiscal discipline. Some years after the implementation of these institutions, quantitative studies sought to evaluate the impact of their performance on the trajectory of the primary structural result, the main measure of government fiscal activism. The results were ambiguous and subject to important criticisms regarding the control of endogeneity. The present thesis seeks to collaborate with the literature on institutional reforms by comprehensively covering the problem of endogeneity in this question, both in the investigation of its origins and in the use of recent developments in econometric theory to attenuate its distortions in the estimates. In the first chapter, we define the concept of CF and present an overview of these institutions in the world. In addition, we also present the various theories, especially in the field of political economy, which seek to justify the presence of the deficit bias of fiscal policy, as well as some proposals for improvements in the incentives framework through institutional reforms, in order to minimize this bias. The second chapter seeks to investigate the fiscal conditions that preceded the great series of reforms that in the last decade gave rise to the FCs. We found evidence that the implementation of FCs is preceded by a decrease of approximately 2.59 p.p. in the primary balance in the second year prior to treatment, in relation to non adoption or non-adopters in the period. In the year of adoption and in the previous year, this difference is no longer significant. These findings point to a second source of endogeneity in the measurement of CF effectiveness, in which fiscally unstable countries would react more vigorously to the advent of public account crises, including the promotion of institutional reforms. In the institutional literature, the type of endogeneity most commonly reported is that of reverse causality, in which, contrary to the previous type, the more austere countries tend to be more likely to carry out reforms. In the third chapter, the effectiveness of CFs in altering the trajectory of the structural balance is evaluated through the methodology of the synthetic control, in an attempt to control more strictly the endogeneity problem, of our knowledge a novelty in the literature. The results indicate that there is no significant effect of FCs on that variable, in contrast to those obtained in previous evaluations. The last chapter of the thesis outlines considerations regarding the Brazilian Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI), created in 2016, in the light of recent empirical assessments of the new role of these institutions in the international context.

As Instituições Fiscais Independentes (ou Conselhos Fiscais - CFs) e as Regras Fiscais (RFs) são modelos de instituições que ganharam relevância teórica e política após a constatação de que os governos raramente conseguem comportar-se como planejadores centrais. Ou seja, são incapazes de conduzir a política fiscal de modo a atender o socialmente ótimo no longo prazo. Em geral, a existência de incentivos políticos distorcidos em conjunto com racionalidade limitada dos eleitores e governantes gera déficits excessivos - o chamado viés deficitário da política fiscal - os quais reduzem gradativamente o bem-estar social. A crise fiscal europeia de 2008-2009, em especial, expôs com dramaticidade inédita a profundidade desse viés deficitário na região. Diante da insuficiência dos mecanismos usuais de mercado em corrigir problema, os organismos internacionais e formuladores de política passaram a recomendar veementemente a adoção de CFs, no intuito de reforçar a aplicabilidade das RFs e realinhar os incentivos na direção da disciplina fiscal. Alguns anos após a implementação dessas instituições, estudos quantitativos buscaram avaliar o impacto de sua atuação na trajetória do resultado primário estrutural, principal medida de ativismo fiscal do governo. Os resultados mostraram-se ambíguos e sujeitos a importantes críticas quanto ao controle da endogeneidade. A presente tese busca colaborar com a literatura de reformas institucionais ao abarcar de forma ampla o problema da endogeneidade nessa questão, tanto na investigação de suas origens como no emprego de desenvolvimentos recentes da teoria econométrica para atenuar suas distorções nas estimativas. No primeiro capítulo, definimos o conceito de CF e apresentamos um panorama geral dessas instituições no mundo. Ademais, também expomos as diversas teorias, mormente no campo da economia política, que buscam justificar a presença do viés deficitário da política fiscal, bem como algumas propostas de melhorias do quadro de incentivos através de reformas institucionais, de forma e minimizar esse viés. O segundo capítulo busca investigar avaliar as condições fiscais que antecederam a grande leva de reformas que na última década deram origem aos CFs. Encontramos evidência de que a implementação do CF é precedida por um recuo de aproximadamente 2,59 p.p. do resultado primário efetivo no segundo ano anterior ao tratamento, relativamente aos países não adotantes ou ainda sem adoção no período. No ano da adoção e no anterior, essa diferença deixa de ser significante. Tais achados apontam para uma segunda fonte de endogeneidade nas mensurações da efetividade dos CFs, na qual os países fiscalmente instáveis reagiriam com mais vigor ao advento de crises nas contas públicas, inclusive com a promoção de reformas institucionais. Na literatura institucional, o tipo de endogeneidade mais comumente assinalado é o de causalidade reversa, em que, contrariamente ao tipo anterior, são os países mais austeros que tendem a exibir maior probabilidade de realização de reformas. No terceiro capítulo, a efetividade dos CFs em alterar a trajetória do resultado estrutural é avaliada por meio da metodologia do controle sintético, numa tentativa de controle mais rigoroso da endogeneidade, de nosso conhecimento inédita até então na literatura. Os resultados encontrados indicam a inexistência de um efeito significativo dos CFs sobre aquela variável, em contraste com os obtidos em avaliações anteriores. O último capítulo da tese traça considerações a respeito da Instituição Fiscal Independente (IFI) brasileira, criada em 2016, à luz de recentes avaliações empíricas sobre o novo papel dessas instituições no contexto internacional. / The Independent Fiscal Institutions (or Fiscal Councils - FCs) and Fiscal Rules (FRs) have gained theoretical and political relevance after realizing that governments rarely manage to behave as central planners. That is, they are unable to conduct fiscal policy in order to meet the socially optimal in the long run. In general, the existence of distorted political incentives coupled with the limited rationality of voters and rulers generates excessive deficits - the so-called deficit bias of fiscal policy - which gradually reduce social welfare. The European fiscal crisis of 2008-2009, in particular, dramatically exposed the depth of this deficit bias in the region. Given the inadequacy of the usual market mechanisms to correct the problem, international organizations and policy makers began to strongly recommend the adoption of FCs in order to strengthen the applicability of FRs and realign incentives in the direction of fiscal discipline. Some years after the implementation of these institutions, quantitative studies sought to evaluate the impact of their performance on the trajectory of the primary structural result, the main measure of government fiscal activism. The results were ambiguous and subject to important criticisms regarding the control of endogeneity. The present thesis seeks to collaborate with the literature on institutional reforms by comprehensively covering the problem of endogeneity in this question, both in the investigation of its origins and in the use of recent developments in econometric theory to attenuate its distortions in the estimates. In the first chapter, we define the concept of CF and present an overview of these institutions in the world. In addition, we also present the various theories, especially in the field of political economy, which seek to justify the presence of the deficit bias of fiscal policy, as well as some proposals for improvements in the incentives framework through institutional reforms, in order to minimize this bias. The second chapter seeks to investigate the fiscal conditions that preceded the great series of reforms that in the last decade gave rise to the FCs. We found evidence that the implementation of FCs is preceded by a decrease of approximately 2.59 p.p. in the primary balance in the second year prior to treatment, in relation to non adoption or non-adopters in the period. In the year of adoption and in the previous year, this difference is no longer significant. These findings point to a second source of endogeneity in the measurement of CF effectiveness, in which fiscally unstable countries would react more vigorously to the advent of public account crises, including the promotion of institutional reforms. In the institutional literature, the type of endogeneity most commonly reported is that of reverse causality, in which, contrary to the previous type, the more austere countries tend to be more likely to carry out reforms. In the third chapter, the effectiveness of CFs in altering the trajectory of the structural balance is evaluated through the methodology of the synthetic control, in an attempt to control more strictly the endogeneity problem, of our knowledge a novelty in the literature. The results indicate that there is no significant effect of FCs on that variable, in contrast to those obtained in previous evaluations. The last chapter of the thesis outlines considerations regarding the Brazilian Independent Fiscal Institution (IFI), created in 2016, in the light of recent empirical assessments of the new role of these institutions in the international context.

This thesis deals with the problem of an extent to which fiscal policy can be delegated to an independent fiscal agency, which is considered as the tool to minimize the deficit bias and also with applying this solution in case of Slovakia. Foreign literature and comparison of this type of institutions that operate in several EU countries are used as bases for solving this problem. The main outcome of this thesis is a design of a fiscal council for the Slovak Republic, which main function is to analyze public finances sustainability, fiscal policy evaluation and preparation of macroeconomic forecasts. What is more, it has some additional functions in the evaluation of measures that have an impact on fiscal policy.

Essay 1 (with Mikael Elinder): We show that house prices in general did not respond to a large cut in the property tax in Sweden. Our estimates are based on rich register data covering more than 100,000 sales over a time period of two and a half years. Because the Swedish property tax is national and thus unrelated to local public goods, our setting is ideal for causal identification of the property tax on house prices. Our result that house prices did not respond to the tax cut at the time of implementation cannot be explained by early capitalization at the time of announcement. Two other stories appear to explain our results. First, it is possible that house buyers expect an offsetting increase in the supply of housing. Second, house buyers might simply not understand how the tax cut affects total future costs of owning a house. Unfortunately, it has proven difficult to disentangle the two mechanisms, and we must therefore conclude that both may be relevant. Essay 2:  I investigate government consumption smoothing (sensitivity) under a balanced budget rule in Swedish municipalities. In general, I find Swedish municipalities to be highly consumption sensitive. Municipalities consume 87.6% out of predicted current revenues in the time period leading up to the implementation of the balanced budget rule, and they consume 76.3% out of predicted current revenue in thetime period following the implementation. Fiscally weak municipalities are found to be more consumption sensitive than fiscally strong municipalities. Very weak municipalities have become more consumption sensitive compared with very strong municipalities since the implementation of the balanced budget rule. Thus, I find indicative evidence that both credit market constraints and formal budget rules such as balanced budget rules increase municipal consumption sensitivity Essay 3: Using the Swedish municipal sector as my political laboratory, I study the effect of a coalition partner on policy outcomes. I use a version of Regression-Discontinuity Design (RDD) specifically suited to proportional systems to define close elections, which can be used for identifying the effect of the Left Party as coalition partner to the Social Democrats. The Left Party is found to have a positive and medium sized effect on the municipal income tax rate. The positive effect is in line with what we expect given the policy preferences of Left Party representatives, but also given the predictions from political fragmentation theory. I find no effects on expenditures or debt, and the negative result for investments is not robust. Essay 4 (with Linuz Aggeborn): In a model where voters and politicians have different preferences for how much to spend on basic welfare services contra immigration, we conclude that established politicians that are challenged by right-wing populists will implement a policy with no spending on immigration if the cost of immigration is high enough. Additionally, adjustment to right-wing populist policy is more likely when the economy is in a recession. Voters differ in their level of private consumption in such a way that lower private consumption implies higher demand for basic welfare services at the expense of immigration, and thus stronger disposition to support right-wing populist policies. We propose that this within-budget-distributional conflict can arise as an electorally decisive conflict dimension if parties have converged to the median voter on the size-of-government issue. / <p>Felaktigt isbn: 978-91-85519-61-3</p>