Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study addresses the topic of foreign direct investment in the People's Republic of China (P.Re.) by South African companies, focusing on opportunities and risks in the context of 'South-South Co-operation' between the P.RC. and South Africa. Relations between the two developing countries have only been forged since January 1998 when South Africa recognised the P.RC. government as the dejure representative of China. With the Chinese market of 1.3 billion potential consumers proving to be a lucrative opportunity for all international, multinational and transnational companies, it is imperative for South African companies to gain a foothold in the Chinese market. Therefore, entry requirements as well as impediments that could emerge have to be scrutinised. Analysis of governmental relations currently being forged between the two states is assessed as well as the wider context of 'Sino-Africa' co-operation. China's recent entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has and will continue to have a substantial effect on the international trading system. The implications of this for South African companies is given considerable attention in order to highlight resulting opportunities. Apart from assessmg the current state of relations and identifying investment and business opportunities, the study also focuses on the method of conducting business in China which has highly complex rules and regulations for companies entering the P.RC. An analysis of the different modes of entry is conducted, coupled with a focus on the cultural sensitivities and norms that are associated with building relationships when negotiating possible business partnerships. The study finally identifies potential risks that foreign direct investors need to continually assess, namely, the transfer of political power to a new generation of relatively young leaders, corruption that is spreading within China and the restructuring of State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) and the inevitable consequence of job losses. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie spreek die onderwerp van buitelandse direkte investering in die Volksrepubliek van Sjina (VRS) deur Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappye aan, en fokus op geleenthede en risikos in die konteks van 'Suid-Suid samewerking' tussen die VRS en Suid-Afrika. Betrekkings tussen die twee ontwikkelende lande is eers onlangs gesmee nadat Suid-Afrika in Januarie 1998 die VRS as die dejure verteenwoordiger van Sjina erken het. Met In Sjinese mark van meer as 1.3 miljard potensiële verbruikers wat In winsgewende geleentheid vir alle internasionale, multinasionale en transnasionale maatskappye skep, is dit imperatief vir Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappye om hulself in die Sjinese mark te vestig. Dus moet toegangsvereistes asook moontlike hindernisse noukeurig ondersoek word. Die studie doen 'n analise van betrekkings wat huidiglik tussen die twee state se regerings gesmee word, en die breër konteks van samewerking tussen Sjina en Afrika word ook geëvalueer. Die VRS se onlangse toetrede tot die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie (WHO) het en sal aanhou om 'n wesenlike impak op die internasionale handelsstelsel te hê. Daar word ook aansienlike aandag geskenk aan die implikasies hiervan vir Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappye om sodoende geleenthede uit te lig. Bo en behalwe 'n evaluering van die huidige stand van betrekkings en 'n identifisering van beleggings- en besigheidsgeleenthede, fokus hierdie studie ook op die manier waarop besigheid in Sjina onderneem word, wat uiters gekompliseerde reëls en regulasies insluit vir maatskappye wat die land betree. 'n Analise van die verskillende wyses van toegang is onderneem, tesame met 'n fokus op die kulturele sensitiwiteite en norme wat 'n invloed op die bou van verhoudings tydens die onderhandeling van moontlike besigheidsvennootskappe kan hê. Laastens identifiseer die studie potensiële risikos wat buitelandse direkte beleggers voortdurend in ag moet neem, naamlik die oordrag van mag na 'n nuwe generasie van relatief jong leiers, die verspreiding van korrupsie, die herstrukturering van staatskorporasies en die onvermydelike gevolge van werksverliese.

Thesis (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As the Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) creates competitive challenges and opportunities, labour and capital will seek the highest returns, dri ving out less efficient performances while bolstering more efficient enterprises and industries. This dynamic process of adjustments will continue throughout the implementation of this agreement. The South African government sees the agreement with the European Union as a step towards restructuring the country's economy and making it part of the rapidly changing world economy. This policy view of the South African government will result in those sectors of the economy that are not internationally competitive, receiving no support from government. Consequently these sectors will decrease in time. Of the three agricultural profiles studied, fresh fruit (deciduous fruit) will benefit the most from the TDCA. The most obvious effect the agreement will have on the sector is the saving on customs duties payable on exports to the EU. An estimate on 1997 trade figures revealed that in the short term the deciduous fruit industry will save approximately RI00 million. Over the implementation period of 10 years, the industry will save about Rl billion. After that, savings amounting to approximately R125 million per annum should be possible. The canned fruit sector is an export-driven industry that exports about 90 per cent of its products, 50 per cent of which is exported to the EU. The export tariffs to the EU are very high. As non-EU member, South Africa is the biggest provider of canned fruit to the EU. Some analyses revealed that the total savings in tariffs for the first year of implementation will be R25 million. The industry stands to save approximately R100 million over the implementation period. At the EU's request, South Africa agreed to negotiate a separate Wine and Spirits Agreement. The EU believes that South Africa's continued use of certain "geographical indications" or terms is in breach of Article 23 of the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. The quotas granted by the EU on wine and sparkling wine cover 79 per cent of South African exports to the EU. South Africa granted the EU a 0.26 million litre quota for sparkling wine and a 1 million-litre quota for bottled wine. SA will phase out the use of the terms "port", "sherry", "grappa", ouzo", "korn" , "jagertee" and "pacharan" over agreed time periods. The issue will be taken to the WTO for a ruling in this regard. The EU has agreed to grant SA a duty-free tariff quota for wine but has suspended the tariff quota until the Wine and Spirits agreement has been signed. The EU will also provide financial assistance of 15 million ECU to help restructure the SA wine and spirits sector. The South African agricultural industry should take note of the constantly changing international marketing environment. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) signed with the European Union opens up new markets and enhances existing ones that must be exploited. It is imperative that every role player should evaluate the level of competitiveness of his or her enterprise. Thus the message is very clear: Agricultural production with an international trading view is the only sustainable road to follow. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Soos die Handel, Ontwikkelings en Samewerkingsooreenkoms kompeterende geleenthede en uitdagings skep, sal arbeid en kapitaal verskuif na die hoogste opbrengste beskikbaar. In hierdie proses sal daar wegbeweeg word van onvoldoende prestasies en sal effektiewe ondememings en industriee floreer. Hierdie dinarniese proses van herstruktuering sal voortduur regdeur die implementeringsperiode van hierdie handelsooreenkoms. Die Suid Afrikaanse regering beskou die ooreenkoms met die Europese Unie as 'n belangrike stap in die proses om die land se ekonomie te herstrukltureer en so deel te maak van die vinnig veranderende wereld ekonomie. Hierdie regerings beleid sal daartoe lei dat sektore wat nie intemasionaal mededingend is nie, geen ondersteuning vanaf die regering sal ontvang nie. Met tyd sal hierdie sektore verdwyn. Van die drie landbousektore wat bestudeer is, sal vars vrugte (sagte vrugte) die meeste voordeel trek uit die ooreenkoms. Die besparing van aksynsbelasting op die uitvoere na die Europese Unie is die mees kenmerkendste voordeel vir die sektor. 'n Beraming gebaseer op 1997 handels syfers toon 'n jaarlikse besparing van plus minus R100 miljoen. Deur die hele implementeringsperiode, sal die besparing plus minus Rl biljoen beloop. Na afloop van die implementeringsperiode, sal jaarlikse besparing van plus minus R125 miljoen moontlik wees. Die inmaak vrugte sektor is 'n uitvoer gedrewe industrie wat gemiddeld 90 persent van hul prod uk uitvoer. Van hierdie uitvoere is 50 persent bestem vir die Europese Unie. Die uitvoertariewe na die Europese Unie is baie hoog. As nie-lidland, is Suid Afrika die grootste verskaffer van geblikte vrugte aan die Europese Unie. Beramings voorsien dat die sektor 'n totale besparing vir die eerste jaar van implemetering van plus minus R25 miljoen kan beloop. Die industrie kan soveel as R100 rniljoen oor die implementeringsperiode bespaar. Op die Europese Unie se versoek, het Suid Afrika ingestem om 'n afsonderlike Wyn en Spiritualie ooreenkoms te onderhandel. Die Europese Unie beweer dat Suid Afrika se gebruik van sekere "geografiese aanduidings" of terme, In verbreking is van Artikel 23 van die Handelsverwante Aspekte van die Intellektuele Eiendomsregte Ooreenkoms. Wyn en vonkelwyn kwotas wat deur die Europese Unie aan Suid Afrika toegestaan is, beloop 79 persent van die uitvoere na die Europese Unie. Suid Afrika het die Europese Unie In kwota van 0.26 miljoen liter vir vonkelwyn en 1 miljoen kwota vir gebottelde wyn toegestaan. Voorts sal Suid Afrika die terme "port", "sherry", "grappa", "ouzo", "kom" , "jagertee" and "pacharan" met die ooreengekome peri odes uitfaseer. Die aspek sal egter na die WHO geneem word vir In finale beslissing. Die Europese Unie het ooreengekom om aan Suid Afrika In tarief vrye kwota vir wyn toe te staan, maar het dit opgehef tot tyd en wyl die Wyn en Spiritualie ooreenkoms onderteken is. Die Europese Unie sal ook finansiele ondersteuning van 15 miljoen ECU skenk om die Suid Afrikaanse Wyn en Spiritualiee industrie te help hestruktureer. Suid Afrikaanse Landbou sal notisie moet neem van die konstante verandering in die intemasionale bemarkingsomgewing. Die Vrye Handelsooreenkoms wat geteken is met die Europese Unie, open nuwe markte en sal bestaande markte bevorder. Hierdie geleenthede moet benut word. Dit is baie belangrik dat elke rolspeler sy vlak van kompeterende vermoe moet evalueer, om so sy eie siening oor die ooreenkoms te kan uitspreek. Hieruit is die boodskap dus baie duidelik: Landbou produksie met In intemasionale handels uitkyk, is die enigste volhoubare pad om te volg.

Study project (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The African Growth and Opportunity Act was signed into law in May 2000 to allow qualifying SSA countries to export eligible products duty free to the US. The act is a non-reciprocal "agreement" designed solely by the US, with the objective of promoting increased trade and investment between the US and SSA. The US insist that trade will lead to development on the African continent if SSA countries liberalise their markets and become integrated into the global economy. The theory behind trade liberalisation is that it promotes allocative efficiency by exploiting comparative advantage. I however argue that trade liberalisation can realise its potential only if the US start dismantling the protectionist barriers that have been described in this report. The AGOA does reduce tariff barriers for a number of African products. However new non-tariff barriers have been erected which are less transparent, but just as effective as tariff barriers. The report documents the significance of existing trade barriers that seek to protect the US industries from harm, and evaluates the problems that are created in spite of the intentions of the AGOA. A number of specific issues that will be significant for the future outcomes of the Act were also dealt with. These included: the anti-dumping steel duties, US Farm Bill, NEPAD and the textiles and apparel debate. The problems found with the AGOA included: • Protectionism that is sector specific, involving the cases of the antidumping steel duties and the Farm Bill. • The unfavourable terms of trade associated with the Act, caused by the non-negotiable, non-reciprocal and temporary nature of the AGOA. • The eligibility conditions of the Act, which serve to bind African countries to the rules of the World Trade Organisation and exclude some countries on the African continent from obtaining benefits. • Internal reform problems within the SSA countries involving government departments, infrastructure and the macroeconomic environment. The evidence over the short time since it was enacted reveals that the SSA countries will not gain much from the extended trade benefits of the AGOA, unless their capacity to produce and supply the US market is enhanced. Furthermore, most of the AGOA benefits have gone to oil exporting countries and SA, who is the only non-oil country benefiting from a number of sectors at present. The Act has failed to increase trade flows from eligible countries to the US, as most of the SSA countries are not at the economic development to take advantage of the preferences that have been provided under the AGOA. Furthermore the liberalisation of many of the African economies has not been reciprocated by the US. The actions of many interest groups in the US indicate that they are "yes" to free trade but "not" at the expense of jobs and profits. This is evident, as the AGOA provides no exceptions to any of the US retaliatory measures and the fact that interest groups in the US influence many of the product decisions when domestic market share is threatened. One of the positive outcomes of the AGOA is the joint US Africa Trade and Economic Co-operation Forum that will provide future avenues for beneficial US-Africa trade relations. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: geen opsomming

Mini-study project (MBA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The processes of regionalism and regionalisation, of which a relatively high level is evident in the Indian Ocean Rim (lOR), that characterise today's global economy offer opportunities for economic growth and development to the mainly developing countries in the Indian Ocean Rim. The lOR has achieved the status of regional society which contributes towards the region actively articulating the interests of the member nations. The lesser-developed countries may well use this developing regionalisation in the lOR to combat its risk of marginalisation in the global order. Great diversity and disparity exist amongst lOR countries on levels of economic development, growth and openness, resulting in few countries achieving the major portion of the region's economic activities. This may complicate the development needs of the nation-states resulting in a low level of development uniformity. Such diversity poses a risk of polarised and unequal investment and development amongst member nations, and ultimately marginalisation in the global order. This does not support economic integration, but calls for economic co-operation to assist with economic development of the lOR. The lOR, as part of the global trading process, comprises a significant portion of the world's trade arising from the region and it presents a large market in the global economy. The lOR is further predominantly developing under the framework and rules of the WTO. Comparing the lOR-ARC with other regional organisations involving main global trading nations, it is evident that in trade volume and economic impact it is not comparable. However, the strategic importance of its energy resources and its locality in particular raises the prominence of the region in the global order. A low level of regional trade exists in the region resulting in the lOR countries being poor candidates for regional integration. However, it is significant to note that intra-regional trade in the lOR has over recent years grown significantly higher than its trade with the world. SA, as hegemon in Southern Africa, may gain development opportunities from its prominence in the lOR. The emerging African Union and NEPAD, however, are expected to receive higher priority amongst political decision makers than the lOR. The country's existing trade focus is with the developed North and it appears that the broader focus in the immediate future will be with mainly non-lOR countries. Variable geometry amongst the nations is common and developments amongst the region's numerous sub-regional groupings are leaning heavily towards economic integration into the future. A high level of institutionalisation has developed out of the role and activities of the lOR-ARC in the region. The IOR-ARC's principle of open regionalism promotes integration. The lOR-ARC, originally aimed at multi-sector cooperation as part of its focus on economic co-operation, is therefore expected to move towards economic integration into the future. When considering a broader perspective, it is evident that the lOR's readiness to embrace economic integration at this point is relatively low. Overall the focus within the lOR although currently focussing on economic cooperation, is expected to move towards economic integration, or neo-functional integration, into the medium to long term. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die prosesse van regionalisme en regionalisasie wat die hedendaagse globale ekonomie kenmerk en hulself manifesteer op relatiewe hoë vlak binne die Indiese Oseaan Randgebied (lOR), bied geleenthede vir ekonomiese groei en ontwikkeling aan die hoofsaaklik ontwikkelende lande in the lOR. Die lOR het die entiteit status van streeks-gemeenskap bereik wat dit in staat stelom by te dra om die lidlande se belange te artikuleer. Die minder-ontwikkelde lande mag egter hierdie ontwikkelende regionalisasie uitsluitlik gebruik om hul risiko tot marginalisasie in die globale orde te beperk. Hoë vlakke van diversiteit en dispariteit bestaan tussen die lOR lande in areas van ekonomiese ontwikkeling, groei en toeganklikheid, wat aanleiding gee dat 'n paar lande die oorgrote meerderheid ekonomiese aktiwiteite en bydrae lewer. Hierdie tendens mag egter lidlande se ontwikkelingsbehoeftes kompliseer wat lei tot 'n lae vlak van ontwikkeling-eenvormigheid in die streek. Hierdie diversiteit skep 'n risiko van gepolariseerde en ongelyke investering en ontwikkeling by die lidlande, en gevolglik 'n risiko van globale marginalisasie. Hierdie aspekte ondersteun nie ekonomies integrasie nie, maar eerder ekonomiese samewerking om by te dra tot die ekonomiese ontwikkeling van die lOR. Die lOR, as deel van die globale handelsproses, maak 'n noemenswaardige gedeelte uit van wêreldhandel, met oorsprong in die streek, en die streek bied 'n groot mark binne die globale ekonomie. Die ontwikkeling van die lOR in hierdie aspek vind hoofsaaklik plaas binne die raamwerk en reëls van die Wêreld Handelsorganisasie. 'n Vergelyking tussen die Indiese Oseaan Randgebied Assosiasie vir Ekonomiese Samewerking (lOR-ARC) en ander streeksorganisasies, wat die hoof globale handeldrywende nasies insluit, toon duidelik dat die lOR-ARC in handelsvolume en ekonomiese impak nie vergelykbaar is nie. Die strategiese belangrikheid van die energiebronne en die streeksligging in besonder, verhoog egter die belangrikheid van die streek in die wêreld orde. Die huidige lae streekshandel in die lOR dra daartoe by dat die lOR lande nie sterk kandidate vir streeksintegrasie is nie, alhoewel merkwaardige groei die afgelope jare op intra-streekshandel in die lOR voorgekom het. Sulke groei was aansienlik hoër as groei in lOR handel met die wêreld. SA, as hegemonie in Suider-Afrika, mag baat by ontwikkelingsgeleenthede wat mag uitvloei uit die land se prominensie in die lOR. Die Afrika Unie en NEPAD sal na verwagting egter hoër prioriteit by politieke besluitnemers geniet as die lOR. SA se gevestigde handelsfokus is gemik op die ontwikkelde "Noorde", en dit blyk asof die onmiddelike breër handelsfokus hoofsaaklik op nie-lOR lande gaan mik. Wisselende geometrie is algemeen by lOR lande en verdere verwikkelinge tussen die streek se veelvuldige sub-streeksorganisasies neig sterk na toekomstige ekonomiese integrasie. 'n Hoë vlak van institusionalisering het ontwikkel uit die rol en aktiwiteite van die lOR-ARC in streeksverband. Die lOR-ARC se beginsel van ope regionalisme bevorder integrasie verder. Die verwagting is dat die lOR-ARC, met sy oorsprong in multi-sektor ekonomiese samewerking, in die toekoms gaan beweeg na ekonomiese integrasie. Vanuit In breër perspektief gesien is dit duidelik dat die gereedheid van die lOR om ekonomiese integrasie aan te gryp tans relatief laag is. In die geheel gesien word die lOR, met die huidige fokus op ekonomiese samewerking, verwag om te beweeg na ekonomiese integrasie of neo-funksionele integrasie in die medium tot langtermyn.

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This report is an evaluation of the impact of the quotas imposed on clothing and textiles imported from China on the clothing and textile manufacturing industry in South Africa. On 28 August 2006 the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the People’s Republic of China concluded a memorandum in terms of which the export of certain tariff lines of the Chinese textile products to South Africa would be administered in accordance with the volumes specified in the memorandum for a period of two years. The fundamental objective of these import quotas was to provide South African clothing and textile firms the space in which to operate, with the aim of improving competitiveness in domestic and export markets in the long run. The Chinese market-share of South African global clothing imports has risen steadily to the mid-2006 level of just under 75 percent. It was claimed that because of the significant growth in imports from China between 63 000 to 67 000 jobs were lost in the domestic clothing and textile industry from March 2003 to September 2006. The effect of the imposition of the quotas is evaluated by comparing the state of the clothing and textile industry in South Africa prior to 2006, that is pre-quota imposition to the state of the industry up to two years after imposition of the quotas. Reference is made to employment in the clothing and textile industry in South Africa, the size of the industry in South Africa, the position of clothing retailers, labour costs and productivity, as well as the competitiveness of the local clothing and textile industry. The comparison shows that the import quotas did not solve the industry’s woes and that the trends prior to the imposition of the quotas continued. It further shows that the imposition of quotas had a detrimental effect on the welfare of consumers in the country. A change of tack for the industry’s policy makers and businesses is proposed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verslag is ‘n evaluering van die impak van kwotas ingestel op die invoer van klerasie en tekstiele vanuit China op die Suid Afrikaanse klerasie- en tekstiel-bedryf. Op 28 Augustus 2006 het die regerings van Suid-Afrika en China ‘n memorandum onderteken ingevolge waarvan die uitvoer van sekere Chinese tekstiel-tarieflyne na Suid-Afrika vir ‘n tydperk van twee jaar beperk sou word tot volumes gespesifiseer in die memorandum. Die doel van hierdie kwotas was om aan Suid Afrikaanse klerasie- en tekstiel-ondernemings die ruimte te skep om handel te dryf en sodoende hul mededingendheid in beide die plaaslike- en uitvoermarkte te verbeter. Die Chinese markaandeel van Suid-Afrikaanse klere-invoere het geleidelik gestyg tot net onder 75 persent in die middel van 2006. Arbeids-organisasies het aangevoer dat die aansienlike toename in invoere van China daartoe gelei het dat tussen 63 000 en 67 000 werksgeleenthede verlore gegaan het in die plaaslike klerasie- en tekstiel-bedryf vanaf Maart 2003 tot September 2006. Die effek van die kwota-instelling word geëvalueer deur die stand van die Suid-Afrikaanse klerasie- en tekstiel-bedryf voor 2006 - dit wil sê voor die instelling van die kwotas - te vergelyk met die stand van die bedryf vir ‘n tydperk van twee jaar ná die instelling van die kwotas. Verwysings word gemaak na die vlak van indiensneming in die Suid Afrikaanse klerasie- en tekstiel-bedryf, die grootte van die plaaslike bedryf, die posisie van klere-kleinhandelaars, arbeidskoste en produktiwiteit, asook die mededingendheid van die plaaslike bedryf. Die vergelyking toon dat die invoer-kwotas nie die bedryf verbeter het nie en dat tendense aanwesig voor die instelling van die kwotas steeds voortduur. Bowendien toon dit dat die instelling van die kwotas ‘n nadelige invloed gehad het op die welvaart van Suid-Afrikaanse verbuikers. ‘n Koersverandering vir die bedryf se beleidmakers en besighede word voorgestel.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2006. / The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 by President Clinton to allow sub-Saharan countries to export designated products duty-free into the US. AGOA is a temporary measure that is non-reciprocal and not negotiated by the participating parties. The initiative was launched to liberalise the markets of developing countries on the road to become integrated in the global economy. The initial success of AGOA was limited, with only a few countries making use of AGOA to increase their exports into the US markets. Problems encountered were high levels of protectionism from the US and the existence of technical trade barriers (including sanitary measures in agriculture) and nontariff barriers (including quotas). African countries are using shipment as the main transport for exports, and the US barred transshipment due to corruption that occurred in the past. The AGOA also made provision for 'special provisions' measures to enable AGOA eligible countries to export apparel and textile to the US. The export of apparel was very successful until the Multifibre Agreement expired in 2005, leading to relocation of apparel factories to lower cost bases. The real beneficiaries from AGOA are oil-exporting countries that make up more than 90% of total AGOA benefits. South Africa is the only country who succeeded in diversified AGOA exports. AGOA has been supplemented by AGOA II (extending the product range) and AGOA III (extending the expiry date to 2015). After the EU-SA Free Trade Agreement has been concluded in 1999, the US started with FTA negotiations with the South African Customs Union (SACU) to improve the exposure of US products to the SACU market and to decrease the trade deficit. However, the agenda of the FTA negotiations included second generation issues of intellectual property rights, trade in services, investment and government procurement. The SACU negotiators learnt some lessons from the EU-SA FTA and progress was slow. The extension of AGOA to 2015 saw a decrease in the urgency of striking a SACU-US FTA. Negotiations slowed down and the decision was made in April 2006 to conduct talks on a lower level. This breathing time can be used by the SACU negotiators to develop an aggressive offensive strategy for future negotiations, and to build competency against the efficient and offensive US negotiators. The US-SACU FTA must still be pursued to ensure that the benefits of AGOA are locked in. It will be beneficial for SACU if the different needs for all the SACU countries are addressed and the negotiations are done in incremental steps .

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The SACU bloc, which accounts for one-half of the subcontinent's GDP, is the largest market for the US exports in SSA (Langton, January 2005). Wide differences exist among the economies of SACU - while SA has developed a significant manufacturing and industrial capacity, the other countries remain dependent on agriculture and mineral extraction. The grouping is dominated by SA, which accounts for 87% of the population, and 93% of the GDP of the customs area. SACU member states had a combined real GDP of $201bn in 2003. Services made up 65% of SA Trade in 2003 and had become a major player. In 2003, SACU was the 32nd largest trading partner of the US with two-way trade equivalent \ $7.3bn. Merchandise imports from SACU totaled $5.6bn in 2003, a 17.3% increase from 2002 and a 126% increase from 1996. They were composed of minerals such as platinum, diamonds, and titanium, textiles and apparel, vehicles, and automotive parts. Major US exports to the region include aircraft, vehicles, computers, and construction and agricultural equipment. Services trade between the US and SA has increased dramatically for both countries, with US exports increasing 154% and service imports from SA increasing by 383% respectively since 1992. The stock of US FDI in SA totaled $3.9bn in 2003 and was centered around manufacturing chemicals and services. The main economic objective of FTAs is to reduce trade barriers between member countries and liberalize trade and investment rules (Kanoute, November 2005). This improves market access which is the key to foreign export earnings and investment. But market access is a door that swings both ways, opening local markets to a flood of imports. This can undermine domestic production and employment, and thus exacerbate poverty. Some US civil society organizations have expressed concern that a SACU FTA could have negative consequences for poor Southern Africans, citing potential adjustment costs for import-competing farmers, poor enforcement of labour rights, privatization of utilities, and increased restrictions on importing generic drugs to treat HIV/AIDS (Langton, January 2005). The proposed FTA is ambitious, especially given the tight deadline and the broad range of topics on the negotiating table (Zunckel, Tralac). These include not only tariffs on goods, as is traditional in trade talks, but the wider global economic panoply of agriculture, rules of origin intellectual property, trade in services, investment, government procurement, trade remedies, labour, environmental standards and trade dispute settlement. The US gains reciprocity by gaining improved access to the SACU market than it currently enjoys under AGOA. The IP and "TRIPS plus" provisions are of particular concern to consumers (www.tralac.org.) Ongoing developments at the multilateral level bode against the advisability of entering into binding bilateral agreements with less favourable provisions on essential medicines. Foreign investment could lead to greater industrialization within SACU and competition within local industry, boosting efficiency. But safeguards and industrial policy must be utilized effectively to protect the region's developmental goals. Reliance on domestic courts as the forum of first instance (and state-to-state dispute settlements should those fail) is preferable, as it allows greater possibilities of defending the public interest of SACU citizens over investors' interests (Langton, January 2005). Reaching consensus on negotiating strategy in SACU is no easy feat. Formal negotiations began in June 2003, but talks have made little progress over the past years. The interests of the five different countries, at differing stages of development, have to be reconciled (Draper. 2004). No doubt SA, with its diverse array of interests relative to its BLNS partners in the customs union, will drive this. SACU negotiators, in common with those in many developing countries, have great difficulty in understanding, let alone mobilizing, their services sectors. Hence they have adopted a defensive posture, favouring liberalization only in those (few) sub-sectors that are well understood. SACU has formally accepted an offer made by the US to progress a so-called trade and investment cooperation agreement (TICA). Prior negotiation will be needed among SACU countries, who clearly have an interest in coordinating its negotiation with other US bilateral negotiating partners (Whalley & Leith, December 2003).

The Eisenhower Administration sought to create a large role for U.S. multinational corporations, who could provide a significant amount of the capital needed for trade expansion and industrial growth. This policy became known as "trade not aid." The trade not aid policy reflected both the fiscal conservatism and ideological beliefs of the Eisenhower Administration. By 1957 Eisenhower shifted to a policy of trade and aid. This study examines three foreign economic policies in the context of American-East Asian relations. It focused primarily on Japan, since that country served as the center of the American regional "workshop economy" concept in Asia. Tracing the development of the trade/aid program, this thesis then compares and contrasts governmental policies with business activity and opinion during the 1950s. It concludes that the foreign economic policy of the Eisenhower Administration contained serious flaws, served the needs of only a few countries in the region, and was weighted heavily toward a military support role rather than economic development. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

The main purpose of this paper was to explore the role economic partnership agreements play in regional integration. The whole paper was premised on identifying the nature of economic partnership agreements that is conceived as a free trade arrangement. Therefore the paper discussed the feasibility of the reciprocal principle between the European Union and ACP countries, and further indicated that there is no need to implement the principle of reciprocity at present. The paper also discovered that, due to the fact that unequal trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries still exist, the implementation of the EPAs is most likely to generate the complementary but non-competitive trade relations between the EU and the ACP countries. Such a situation could result in the ACP countries over-independence on the EU's market. ACP countries are not expecting to such integration. In addition the paper ascertains that the EPAs themselves could contain the intrinsic negative impacts such as discrimination against the third countries on regional integration.

In this thesis, I examine the politics of European Union (EU) and Russian energy relations. The main analysis is focused on the Russian energy policy towards the European Union and whether or not Moscow’s attempts at deepening reliance on Russian’s natural gas are a part of a Russian broad strategy or to gain political leverage vis-à-vis European countries. More specifically, this thesis focuses on the state-owned natural gas company Gazprom as a tool of Russia’s energy policy and the extent to which Russian authorities use this company to shape the politics of EU – Russian energy relations. This study investigates whether Gazprom has become an extension of the Russian government, and whether the company has been used as leverage tool to affect relations between the EU and Russia. Finally, this study also traces the tremendous growth of the EU – Russia energy partnership by examining several ongoing projects. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013.