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The primary aim of this study is to examine the political risks, particularly of indirect expropriation in long-term energy investment contracts, focusing on stabilisation clauses and examining what driving force(s) influence host states to agree to insert such clauses in their host governmental contracts. The secondary aim of this work is to examine the political structure of Azerbaijan and Turkey and the guarantees available to foreign investors under their laws within those nations from a comparative perspective. The work dedicates particular attention to how effective internal factors in Azerbaijan and Turkey are in facilitating contractual stability in their respective energy investment projects. This study applies both comparative and empirical research methods, fieldwork and library based research. It seeks to provide a theoretical and comparative understanding of political regimes, foreign investment laws and constitutional guarantees and investment policies in Azerbaijan and Turkey. The work has provided that the driving forces behind why Azerbaijan and Turkey consented to insert stabilisation clauses in the host government agreements of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project (BTC) can be attributed to each of these being in possession of: a weak bargaining position, weak formal and informal institutions, insufficient laws on foreign direct investment, absence of specific petroleum legislations and a keenness to promote investment and economic activities in their regional markets. It is imperative to lenders and insurers that the host state where the investment will be made is a stable environment. In order to be satisfied that this is the case and to future-proof themselves against risk, they require the insertion of stabilisation clauses in host government agreements. Credit-rating agencies assessments exercise influence over the terms to be agreed and, indeed over the investor’s decision whether to participate in a project. Further research into stabilisation clauses might invite the analysis of specific petroleum producing countries from different regions to better understand how internal and external factors are effective in providing stability. The transferability of the research findings could be further strengthened by surveying and interviewing more participants from petroleum companies, non-governmental organisations, law firms, financial institutions, political risk insurance providers, government bureaucrats and international academics.

In the aftermath of the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, there are signs that in Malaysia, corporate governance practices are gradually converging towards the Anglo-American model. Drawing on three key theoretical lenses, namely agency theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory, this study investigates an unexplored phenomenon in corporate governance reformation, at least in the context of Malaysia. The study examines the relationship between corporate governance elements and the level of foreign equity ownership (FEO) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs). More specifically, the aim of this study is to answer the following research question - Does corporate governance influence the level of FEO in Malaysian companies? In the context of this study, corporate governance is taken to be the aggregate of board of directors characteristics, directors attributes and ownership structure. On the other side of the equation is FEO, which is taken to be the proportion of equity owned by foreigners. The majority of foreign investors who are making investments in Malaysia originate from Western countries, and are accustomed to the Anglo-American corporate governance system. Thus, this study examines the influence of governance mechanisms in attracting foreign investors in a unique governance context following a major economic event i.e. the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Accompanied by institutional theory and resource dependence theory, agency theory is used as the key lens to explain the hypothesised relationships. The study's hypotheses are tested using the panel data derived from 1,836 observations over a 12 year period, from 2000 through 2011. By considering the existence of heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation problems, the generalised least square (GLS) method was employed to estimate the model. To enrich the findings, logistic regression analysis was further applied and the potential endogeneity issue was resolved with a GMM test. The findings indicate that the level of FEO in Malaysian PLCs is significantly related to foreign directorships, the Western educational background of directors, professional directors, and multiple-directorships. However, the results defy the significant relationships of board size and outside directors, as generally proposed in the extant literature. In addition, the role of ownership structure is important in foreign investors behaviour, since it is found that foreign investors avoid investing in family-controlled companies and in companies with high institutional ownership. Therefore, from the overall results of this study, it can be concluded that there is evidence that corporate governance mechanisms do influence foreign investors decision making, at least in Malaysian PLCs. The implications of this study are discussed in terms of the relevant literature, theory, methodology and practice. In brief, this study has great potential impact in many respects including its relevance for policymakers in setting up new policies, designing new rules and strengthening existing regulations, both at country and firm levels.

In my work I will deal with mergers of companies in the Czech Republic in 2000-2008. I will concentrate on the share of foreign mergers and try to find out whether the year 2004, when the Czech Republic joined the EU, had an influence on the change of the number of foreign mergers. Then I will devide them according to the classification "OKEČ". In my analytical part I will use the date from the collection of statistics and decisions of "ÚOHS". I will describe the process of approving the mergers and the benefits that lead to business connections. I will mention the most important mergers, which have been realised in the Czech Republic in recent years.

This thesis explores the rules of treaty interpretation as they are applied by foreign investment arbitral tribunals ("FIATs"). Its primary aims are: a) to determine whether FIAT treaty interpretation practice is generally consistent with other international courts and tribunals; b) to assess whether the treaty interpretation rules contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("Vienna Convention") are suitable for application in investor-State treaty disputes; and c) to evaluate the contribution of FIAT treaty interpretation jurisprudence to international law. The body of the thesis provides a background to treaty interpretation rules in international law and then examines in detail the application of the rules of interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention by both international courts and tribunals and FIATs. It also explores modes of interpretation that have been deployed by these two groups which are not explicitly referenced in the Vienna Convention. Investigation is also made of some unique or notable aspects of FIAT jurisprudence that relates to treaty interpretation. The research was carried out primarily through the analysis of international court and tribunal decisions and FIAT awards. The principal findings of the thesis are that: a) a general congruence exists between the interpretative practice of FIATs and that of other international courts and tribunals; b) the application of the Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation are suitable for investment treaty arbitration, with some exceptions, e. g., in situations where investors have vastly disproportionate access to the preparatory work of treaties as compared with respondent States; and c) FIATs have made a significant contribution to the international law of treaty interpretation.

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Capital-importing countries face a trade-off between the need to attract new investment and the desire to extract gains from investment already obtained. This dissertation analyses the developing countries’ taxation and nationalization of direct investment from the late 1960s and onwards. In contrast to previous work, it is considered that the developing countries compete with each other in their interaction with multinational enterprises. Using sequential bargaining games, two theoretical chapters determine the distribution of gains from direct investment through taxation and nationalization. One chapter adds external effects on the environment, casting light on when and why host countries may accept pollution as a price for obtaining direct investment. Finally, model based tests explain which countries nationalized in the 1970s, and why the nationalization policy was largely discounted in the late 1970s. The study suggests that host country policies which manipulate the behavour of multinational enterprises do not normally prevent direct investment from being undertaken, or distort the pattern of investment. Policies which interfere with ownership, on the other hand, may prevent and distort direct investment. Two states may be distinguished. The first, in which many countries nationalize, applies to the early 1970s. The second, in which few countries nationalize, has prevailed from the late 1970s. The findings of the study yield certain policy implications. The risk of a wide spread return to nationalization subsequent to an investment revival may not be curbed by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established as a member of the World Bank Group in 1988. A solution is likely to require measures that alleviate the developing countries’ acute scarcity of foreign exchange. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Foreign direct investments are easier today then in the past owing to lower communication costs, improved and new information technology systems. In 1990, Brazil opened up for the global econ-omy and is today one of the tenth largest economies in the world, furthermore one of the largest recipients of foreign direct investments. Many different aspects need to be taken into consideration when investing in a foreign country such as motives, risks, entry modes and financing alternatives. The purpose with this thesis is to describe Swedish corporations’ es-tablishment in Brazil, during 1990-2005. The authors aim to illus-trate the motives behind the establishment, choice of entry mode, the perceived risks of operating in Brazil and if these risks affect the financing decisions. To answer the purpose of this thesis both quantitative- and qualitative methods have been applied. A quantitative method has been employed when performing the preliminary study, by sending a standardized questionnaire by email to the entire population to as-semble those corporations who established in Brazil during 1990-2005. When designing the interview questionnaire and accomplishing the telephone interviews a combination of qualitative- and quantitative methods have been utilized. The most common motives to invest in Brazil are expanding markets and following already existing customers. When deciding upon how to enter the market, the majority of the respondents choose to start up from the ground, a Greenfield investment. The risks which had the largest impact of the corporation during the establishment were the political risk and protectionism. Intercompany financing has been the main financing alternative, though it is very expensive to borrow in Brazil. The risks affecting the financing decisions are the exchange rate, inflation and the interest rate.

I examine five international investment cases that embrace the neoliberal vision. This economic model provides a new, contested space between the construction of hegemonic globalisations from above and the contestation of these globalisations from below. The first objective is to describe this space. Each ends the same way: the exit of an unwanted foreign investor after intense social mobilisation. The second objective is to show that counter-hegemonic victories are difficult to achieve: the regime relegates the voice of the subaltern to an inconsequential role, limits public interest state projects that may interfere with investor rights, and often includes a compensatory promise to foreign investors irrespective of the host state’s fiscal capacity. The third objective is to demonstrate the ambivalent role of the state in promoting such neoliberal projects, which necessitate that it adopt a more active role in either policing investment or policing society.