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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jairo Ferrandin.pdf: 1505220 bytes, checksum: fff418bd764935e649788a200a263405 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-08 / This work intends to resume the project of a phenomenological explanation of the Pauline letters concerning the original experience of primitive Christianity, drawn up by Heidegger in his course Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, in 1920-21. In it, the philosopher seeks to develop new means of access to religious phenomenon based on the notion of experience of life in its factual historicity. This is new reappropriation of tradition, not in the sense of objectivity and the repetition of content, theories and doctrines, but the destruction, which allows reconnecting from the experiences of the generation sense. The notion of facticity permeates all the peculiar characteristics that encompass the initial thought of Heidegger, particularly during their first academic activities. Will also enable the construction of new concept of philosophy, known originally as science or as hermeneutics of facticity, with sense and concepts - the formal indication - that distinguish the ideals of scientific objectivity. The resumption of Heidegger's project also has the intent to highlight how the religious and Christian theology occupied a central place in the early development of the question of the sense of being, and what their possible contributions and directions decisive for the discussion of key issues generated the basic ideas of Sein und Zeit / O presente trabalho pretende retomar o projeto de uma explicação fenomenológica das cartas paulinas referentes à experiência originária do cristianismo primitivo, elaborado por Heidegger em seu curso Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion, de 1920-21. Nele, o filósofo procura desenvolver nova modalidade de acesso ao fenômeno religioso partindo da noção de experiência fática da vida em sua historicidade. Trata-se de nova reapropriação da tradição, não no sentido de repetição de objetividades e conteúdos, de teorias e doutrinas, mas pela destruição, que permite reaproximar-se das experiências geradoras do sentido. A noção de faticidade perpassa o conjunto das características peculiares que circunscrevem o pensamento inicial de Heidegger, especialmente no período de suas primeiras atividades acadêmicas. Possibilitará também a construção de novo conceito de filosofia, denominada como ciência originária ou como hermenêutica da faticidade, com sentido e conceitos próprios - os indícios formais - que a distinguirá dos ideais da objetivação científica. A retomada deste projeto heideggeriano tem também o intento de salientar como a dimensão religiosa e a teologia cristã ocuparam lugar central no desenvolvimento inicial da questão do sentido do ser, e quais suas possíveis contribuições e indicações decisivas para a discussão de temas fundamentais geradores das ideias básicas de Sein und Zeit

Submitted by Marilene Donadel (marilene.donadel@unioeste.br) on 2018-05-30T18:06:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Neusa_Onate_2018.pdf: 1124739 bytes, checksum: 4d73ab2dcc3666d23f7654025af0860f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-30T18:06:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Neusa_Onate_2018.pdf: 1124739 bytes, checksum: 4d73ab2dcc3666d23f7654025af0860f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-09 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The objective of this work is to analyze how a phenomenological investigation is possible in Heidegger, which implies a questioning about the anteriority of matter and the sensitive content of which the world itself is constituted. For Heidegger, the world can not be understood by all its objects, for they do not make up the world, but only from the world do objects come to be. As a parameter of this analysis, we will adopt a conceptual and argumentative line of passages present in the selected set of the initial texts of the philosopher's work, contemplating, above all, the lessons of Marburg. From which we will argue that phenomenology is that of a philosophical inquiry which, in turn, is only possible through a direct and free access, is, for Heidegger, the hermeneutics of fatigue. In developing hermeneutics as a phenomenological method, Heidegger establishes the Abbau by confronting the conceptual problems inherent in the history of philosophy itself. In this conjecture, we intend to point out the philosopher's confrontation with the methodological problems of Husserl's phenomenology through Heidegger's critical analyzes of Logical Investigations and Ideas I. The research aims to present fundamental elements to understand the trajectory of Heidegger's philosophical project in which refers to the critical appropriation of phenomenological concepts.To this end, the general objective of the present research is: 1) To expose the central aspects that make up and make possible an original description of the structural scope, therefore, of hermeneutics as a phenomenological method. 2) Analyze how this investigative method can be considered a free and direct access to describe such structures. 3) To evaluate how Husserl's phenomenology makes hermeneutic phenomenology feasible. / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar como se torna possível uma investigação fenomenológica em Heidegger, o que implica num questionamento acerca da anterioridade da matéria e do conteúdo sensível do qual o próprio mundo é constituído. Como parâmetro desta análise, adotaremos uma linha conceitual e argumentativa de passagens presentes no conjunto selecionado dos textos iniciais da obra do filósofo, contemplando, sobretudo, as lições de Marburgo. A partir dos quais defenderemos que a fenomenologia é o como de uma investigação filosófica que, por sua vez, só é possível mediante uma via de acesso livre e direta. Tal via é, para Heidegger, a hermenêutica da faticidade. Ao desenvolver a hermenêutica enquanto método fenomenológico, Heidegger empreende a Abbau confrontando-se com os problemas conceituais inerentes à história da própria filosofia. Sob esta conjectura, pretendemos assinalar a abordagem do filósofo no tocante aos problemas metodológicos da fenomenologia de Husserl através das análises críticas efetuadas por Heidegger em relação às Investigações Lógicas e às Ideias I. A pesquisa visa apresentar elementos fundamentais para se compreender a trajetória do projeto filosófico de Heidegger no que tange à apropriação crítica dos conceitos fenomenológicos. Para tanto, o objetivo geral, concernente à presente pesquisa é: 1) Expor os aspectos centrais que compõem e tornam possível uma descrição originária do âmbito estrutural, portanto, da hermenêutica como um método fenomenológico. 2) Analisar o quanto este método investigativo pode ser considerado um acesso livre e direto para descrever tais estruturas. 3) Avaliar o quanto a fenomenologia de Husserl viabiliza a fenomenologia hermenêutica.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Felipe Netto Lauer.pdf: 575327 bytes, checksum: 6022e98d212cd348ccaf658ccf21811a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-03 / Fundação Araucária / The conductive thread of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger s phenomenological investigations is the concept of intentionality; his analysis has for purpose to solve the fundamental methodological problem concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience (Erlebnis). So that it becomes clear, it is necessary to consider him formally. In Husserl, the sphere of lived experience is the one of the pure ego or pure consciousness, and the intentionality is understood as intentionality of consciousness; in Heidegger, it is treated of what denominated factical life or existence of Dasein, in that the intentionality designates the type of comportment that the human existence maintains in relation to itself and to the world. This work seeks a critical confrontation among the two positions, pointing out the heideggerian concern with the inadequacies of the theoretical attitude and her form of conceiving the field of the formal, towards an investigation concerning the nature and the formation of the concepts and philosophical statements as formal indications. / O fio condutor das investigações fenomenológicas de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger é o conceito de intencionalidade; sua análise tem por finalidade resolver o problema metodológico fundamental acerca do modo de abrir cientificamente a esfera dos vividos (Erlebnis). Para que se torne claro, é necessário considerá-lo formalmente. Em Husserl, a esfera dos vividos é a do ego puro ou consciência pura, e a intencionalidade é compreendida como intencionalidade da consciência; em Heidegger, trata-se do que denominou vida ou existência fáctica do Dasein, em que a intencionalidade designa o tipo de comportamento que a existência humana mantém em relação a si e para com o mundo. Este trabalho visa um confronto crítico entre as duas posições, salientando a preocupação heideggeriana com as insuficiências da atitude teorética e sua forma de conceber o campo do formal, em direção a uma investigação acerca da natureza e da formação dos conceitos e enunciados filosóficos como indicações formais.

How might ‘the digital’ be conceived of in an ‘expanded field’ of art practice, where ontology is flattened such that it is not defined by a particular media? This text, together with an installation of art work at the Exhibition Research Lab, Liverpool John Moores University (13-24 March), constitutes the thesis submission as a whole, such that in the practice of ‘reading’ the thesis, each element remains differentiated from the other and makes no attempt to ‘represent’ the other. In negating representation, such practices present a ‘radical’ rethinking of the digital as a differentiated in-itself, one that is not defined solely by entrenched computational narratives derived from set theory. Rather, following Nelson Goodman’s nominalistic rejection of class constructs, ‘the digital’ is thus understood in onto-epistemic terms as being syntactically and semantically differentiated (Languages of Art 161). In the context of New Zealand Post-object Art practices of the late 1960s, as read through Jack Burnham’s systems thinking, such a digitally differentiated ontology is conceived of in terms of the how of practice, rather than what of objects (“Systems Aesthetics”). After Heidegger, such a practice is seen as an event of becoming realised by the method of formal indication, such that what is concealed is brought forth as a thing-in-itself (The Event; Phenomenological Interpretations 26). As articulated through the researcher’s own sculptural practice – itself indebted to Post-object Art – indication is developed as an intersubjective method applicable to both artists and audience. However, the constraints imposed on the thing-in-itself by the Husserlian phenomenological tradition are also taken as imposing correlational limitations on the ‘digital’, such that it is inherently an in-itself for-us and thus not differentiated in-itself. To resolve such Kantian dialectics, the thesis draws on metaphysical arguments put forward by contemporary speculative ontologies – in particular the work of Quentin Meillassoux and Tristan Garcia (After Finitude; Form and Object). Where these contemporary continental philosophies provide a means of releasing events from the contingency of human ‘reason’, the thesis argues for a practice of ‘un-reason’ in which indication is recognized as being contingent on speculation. Practice, it is argued, was never reason’s alone to determine. Instead, through the ‘radical’ method of speculative indication, practice is asserted as the event through which the differentiated digital is revealed as a thing-in-itself of itself and not for us.