<p>“Armaments and Economic Performance”. The literature on military expenditure (milex) is scrutinized with respect to five areas. <i>Investment</i> is reduced when milex increases. Most studies have found <i>economic growth </i>hindered by higher milex. No clear association between milex and <i>employment</i> is found. However, the same amount of other public expenditure creates more jobs. There is some evidence for milex as <i>counter-cyclical instrument</i> in the US. The result for studies if milex is used in <i>electoral cycles</i> in the US is contradictory. Disaggregated data are emphasized as a possible solution to get more definite results.</p><p>“The Economic Costs of Civil Wars”. The empirical studies of the economic costs of internal armed conflicts are divided into <i>accounting</i> and <i>modelling</i> methods. Cost is seen as the difference between the counterfactual production without conflict and the actual production. The average economic cost of internal armed conflict is a 3.7% yearly reduction of GDP. There are large differences between the estimates. One of the reasons for pursuing such studies is to give improved basis for more cost-effective post-conflict reconstruction, which is better achieved with an accounting method.</p><p>“War and Economic Performance – Different Data, Different Conclusions?” This article studies the importance of armed conflict for economic growth by replicating an earlier analysis with new data on conflicts. The basic model investigates how conflicts in 1960-1974 affect economic growth in 1975-1989. Koubi finds that “wars are conducive to higher growth”. Koubi’s finding is confirmed when different conflict data is used in a similar research design.</p><p>“The Role of External Factors in Economic Growth: A Comparative Analysis of Thailand and the Philippines 1950-1990”. Can differences in economic performance be explained by external factors? Both historical and regression analyses are utilised to answer the question. Three external factors are analysed: <i>International trade, foreign direct investment</i>, and <i>external debt</i>. In the regression analysis none of the external factors qualify as statistically significant. The historical analysis finds two external factors discriminating between the two countries. Thus, they might explain the differing growth rates of Thailand and the Philippines: Manufactured exports and external debt.</p>

<p>This dissertation combines psychology with peace and conflict research in a cross-disciplinary approach to reconciliation processes after intrastate armed conflict. Two overarching contributions are made to the field of reconciliation research. The first is conceptual and methodological. The vague concept of reconciliation is defined and operationalized (Paper I), and a method is proposed for how reconciliation may be studied systematically at the national level (Paper II). By discussing what reconciliation is and how we should measure it, comparative research on reconciliation is facilitated which is imperative if we wish to learn of its promises and pitfalls in post-conflict peacebuilding. The second contribution is empirical. There has been an assumption that truth telling is healing and thereby will lead to reconciliation; healing is the assumed link between truth and reconciliation. This assumption was investigated in two studies in Rwanda in 2006. A multistage, stratified cluster random survey of 1,200 adults was conducted to assess whether witnessing in the gacaca, the Rwandan village tribunals for truth and reconciliation, was beneficial for psychological health; thereby investigating the claim that truth telling is healing (Paper III). The results of the survey are disconcerting. Witnesses in the gacaca suffered from significantly higher levels of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder than non-witnesses also when controlling for important predictors for psychological ill-health such as gender or trauma exposure. To acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the experience of witnessing in the gacaca, in-depth interviews were conducted with 16 women genocide survivors who had witnessed in the gacaca (Paper IV). The results of this study challenge the claim that truth telling is healing, suggesting instead that there are risks for the individuals on whom truth-telling processes depend. Traumatization, ill-health, isolation, and insecurity dominate the lives of the testifying women. Insecurity as a result of the truth-telling process emerged as one of the most crucial issues at stake. This dissertation presents a novel understanding of the complexity of reconciliation in post-conflict peacebuilding, demonstrating that truth and reconciliation processes may entail more risks than were previously known. The results of this dissertation can be used to improve the study and the design of truth and reconciliation processes after civil war and genocide.</p>

<p>Det som undersökningen beskriver är hur EU:s säkerhetsstrategi påverkade de utrikespolitiska målen inför militära insatser i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo 2006, Tchad/Centralafrikanska republiken 2008 och Somalia 2009.</p><p>Vår <em>utrikespolitiska vilja</em> och dess <em>utrikespolitiska mål</em> motiverar vårt deltagande i militära insatser utomlands. Dessa mål skall vara vägledande och skall genomsyra insatsens genomförande. Detta generade en problemställning i denna uppsats som lyder:</p><p>På vilket sätt har bakomliggande säkerhetspolitiska resonemang till EUs säkerhetsstrategi påverkat utformandet av de nationella svenska motiven till internationella insatser i de EU-ledda militära insatserna i Afrika 2006-2009? Kan incitament och motiv identifieras som inflytelser i propositioner från samma period?</p><p>Syftet var att undersöka målsättningarna i dokumentet <em>Ett</em> <em>säkert Europa i en bättre värld, en Europeisk säkerhetsstrategi (ESS)</em>, för att se hur dessa målsättningar påverkat de svenska propositionerna inför de EU-ledda insatserna.</p><p>Som metod användes en kvalitativ textanalys deduktivt, genom att analysera de utrikespolitiska målen med ett <em>analysverktyg </em>indelat i s<em>äkerhets-</em>, <em>välfärds-</em> och <em>idémål</em>.</p><p>Resultatet visade att EU:s övergripande säkerhetsstrategi genomsyrade våra motiv i propositionerna men att det fanns sammantaget en avsaknad av EU:s tydlighet med att vara aktiv, preventiv och handlingskraftig i propositionerna. För att få effekt i välfärdsmålsättningar anser EU att detta skall integreras med olika resurser och där även med civil och militär integrering. Denna integrering var inte fullt tydlig i undersökningens studerade propositioner.</p><p>Den främsta och prioriterade effekten var att tillgodose de mänskliga rättigheterna vilket gör att signaleffekten var hög både för EU och Sverige i insatserna, både regionalt och strategiskt.</p> / <p>This essay examines how The EU Security Strategy affected the objectives of Swedish foreign politics before launching military operations in The Democratic Republic of Congo 2006, Chad/Central African Republic 2008 and in Somalia 2009. The intentions and goals of foreign politics determine Governmental bills and the objectives for the military operations that are sent overseas. These objectives are to serve as guidelines for the realization of the operations.</p><p>This was the basis of the overall problem for my study which asks: How have security policies based on EU reasoning of Security Strategies affected the Swedish national motives for military operations commanded by the EU in Africa 2006-2009? Can they be identified and explained in the Governmental bills from the same era?</p><p>The document, <em>A secure Europe in a better world ­ European Security Strategy, </em>(2003) is used in the case study to identify the objectives and to compare how these have been implemented in the Swedish governmental bills before the initiation of the EU commanded military operations. This was achieved by using qualitative text analysis and a deductive method to analyse foreign policies with an analysis tool, divided into <em>security,</em> <em>welfare of the state</em> and <em>ideological objectives.</em></p><p>The outcome of the study identified that the motives for the Governmental bills were permeated by EU’s overall objectives. In the Governmental bills, it was identified that there was generally a lack of the sharpness that the EU policy stands for, regarding being active, preventive and resolute. In order to achieve more effectiveness in the <em>welfare of the state </em>objectives, the EU considers this objective ought to be integrated into all resources as well as into civil and military integration. Additionally, this integration was not emphasized in explicit terms in the examined bills. The main and most prioritised outcome was to consider Human Rights, which resulted in high ranking publicity for the EU and Sweden in the outcome of the operations, both regionally and strategically.</p>

<p>Per definition så befinner sig Nordkorea och Sydkorea i krig med varandra sedan 25 juni 1950. Den aktiva delen av kriget varade endast i tre år och avlöstes av <em>Armistice </em><em>Agreement </em>27 juli 1953. Avtalet syftade till att möjliggöra för politiska företrädare att enas om ett fredsavtal – något man aldrig lyckades uppnå.</p><p>Denna uppsats analyserar tiden från Kairokonferensen 1943 intill <em>Armistice Day </em>1953 utifrån hur bakomliggande incitament – sett ur realistiska och liberalistiska perspektiv inom ramen för internationella relationer – kan förklara händelseutvecklingen på den koreanska halvön.</p><p>Resultatet visar på hur erfarenheter och efterbörd av VK II, politiska målsättningar, misstro mellan parterna och till FN, successivt bygger upp dagens delade Korea utifrån vad som främst återfinns inom den realistiska teoribildningen.</p> / <p>North Korea and South Korea has been at war with each other since June 25, 1950. The active part of the war lasted only three years, which resulted in the <em>Armistice Agreement </em>July 27, 1953. The main purpose of the agreement was to allow political representatives to open up for diplomatic negotiations and agree on a peace agreement – something they never managed to achieve. </p><p>This paper will analyze the time from the Cairo Conference in 1943 until <em>Armistice Day </em>in 1953, and investigate how realistic and liberalized political forces, in the context of International Relations theory, influenced the developments on the Korean Peninsula.</p><p>The conclusions will show how the post-war reconstructions of WW II, U.S. and Soviet foreign policy objectives and UN intervention gradually shaped a permanent landmark at the 38th parallel based on realistic values.</p>

<p>Uppsatsen är inriktad på den militära delen i upprorsbekämpning och tar sin utgångspunkt i två stycken militärteoretikers teorier inom ämnet. Teoretikerna är John Mackinlay och David Kilcullen, som under 2009 utkom med varsin ny bok inom området, The Insurgent Archipelago samt The Accidental Guerilla. Den metod som arbetet vilar på är kvalitativ textanalys. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka i vilken utsträckning som teorin och doktrinerna stämmer överrens. Därför har först teoretikernas syn på hur en utifrån kommande intervenerande styrka påverkar lokalbefolkningen analyserats. Det som framkommit av detta är dels Mackinlays uppfattning att samtliga styrkor av denna karaktär kommer att betraktas som ockupanter av lokalbefolkningen. Dels Kilcullens uppfattning att styrkan påverkar lokalbefolkningen till att gripa vapen mot dem. Detta trots att även de har en avig inställning mot upprorsrörelsen. Som lösning på problemet för Kilcullen fram bildandet av en strategisk tjänst i likhet med Office of Strategic Services. Från dessa teorier har ett antal kriterier valts ut vilka sedan använts som analysverktyg för att undersöka doktrinernas syn på områdena. De doktriner som har analyserats är Storbritanniens Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, USA:s Joint Publication 3-24, samt NATO:s i nuläget gällande styrdokument BI-SC Cointerinsurgency Joint Operational Guidelines. Av analysen har framkommit att en viss överrensstämmelse mellan teori och konceptuell verklighet förekommer. Dock att teorin snarare rör sig inom en eventuell framtid emedan doktrinerna är fast inom nulägets ramar.</p> / <p>The essay focuses on the military part of counter-insurgency and is based on two theories by the military theorists John Mackinlay and David Kilcullen. Who both in 2009 published a new book on the subject, The Insurgent Archipelago and The Accidental Guerrilla. The method used in the essay is qualitative text-analysis. The purpose of this essay is to examine whether resemblance between theory and doctrine exists. Therefore first of the theorists view in how an exogenous intervening force affects the local population has been analyzed. What emerged from this is partly Mackinlay's view that all forces of this nature will be seen as occupiers by the local people. Partly Kilcullen's view that the force affects the local population to resort to arms against them. This despite the fact that they’re original attitude towards the insurgent movement, which is the reason for the intervening forces presence, is of negative. As a solution to the problem Kilcullen brings forward the constitution of a strategic service, like the Office of Strategic Services. From these theories, a number of criteria have been selected which are then used as analytical tools to examine the doctrines. The doctrines which have been analyzed is the UK's Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 and the currently governing NATO document BI-SC Counterinsurgency Joint Operational Guidelines. The analysis has shown that some resemblance between theory and conceptual reality exist. However that theory, rather involved in a possible future while the doctrines are restrained by the framework of the present day.</p>

<p>The reason for this study is to settle the balance between technology and preponderance in war. Each theory claims its own superiority to be decisive when it comes to achieving military victories, but this study will show what actually happens when the two theories are analyzed together in the same conflict. To prove the conclusions, a case-study on Operation Gazelle is used. The study will describe the theories, what a military victory is and which party in the conflict came out victorious after this specific operation. Both sides’ forces will be shown and compared. The most significant technological systems will be analysed and compared. When this is done, the victory and the theories’ importance can be explained. Operation Gazelle was an act performed by Israel in October 1973 during the conflict with Egypt. It was an attempt to cross the Suez Canal and in that way gain an improved political status during the peace negotiations that were to come. The main question that will be answered is:- Which of the two theories, numerical preponderance and technology, is decisive when it comes to achieving military goals? To answer this question three other questions are answered:- What were the numerical conditions during Operation Gazelle?- What were the technological conditions between the parties?- Which party was victorious?</p>

“Armaments and Economic Performance”. The literature on military expenditure (milex) is scrutinized with respect to five areas. Investment is reduced when milex increases. Most studies have found economic growth hindered by higher milex. No clear association between milex and employment is found. However, the same amount of other public expenditure creates more jobs. There is some evidence for milex as counter-cyclical instrument in the US. The result for studies if milex is used in electoral cycles in the US is contradictory. Disaggregated data are emphasized as a possible solution to get more definite results. “The Economic Costs of Civil Wars”. The empirical studies of the economic costs of internal armed conflicts are divided into accounting and modelling methods. Cost is seen as the difference between the counterfactual production without conflict and the actual production. The average economic cost of internal armed conflict is a 3.7% yearly reduction of GDP. There are large differences between the estimates. One of the reasons for pursuing such studies is to give improved basis for more cost-effective post-conflict reconstruction, which is better achieved with an accounting method. “War and Economic Performance – Different Data, Different Conclusions?” This article studies the importance of armed conflict for economic growth by replicating an earlier analysis with new data on conflicts. The basic model investigates how conflicts in 1960-1974 affect economic growth in 1975-1989. Koubi finds that “wars are conducive to higher growth”. Koubi’s finding is confirmed when different conflict data is used in a similar research design. “The Role of External Factors in Economic Growth: A Comparative Analysis of Thailand and the Philippines 1950-1990”. Can differences in economic performance be explained by external factors? Both historical and regression analyses are utilised to answer the question. Three external factors are analysed: International trade, foreign direct investment, and external debt. In the regression analysis none of the external factors qualify as statistically significant. The historical analysis finds two external factors discriminating between the two countries. Thus, they might explain the differing growth rates of Thailand and the Philippines: Manufactured exports and external debt.

Is the risk of civil conflict related to the quality of government? This dissertation contributes to the quantitative research on this topic. First, it provides a more nuanced account of the role of the government in influencing the risk of civil conflict. In doing so, the dissertation bridges a gap between the quantitative literature, which primarily focuses on types of regimes, and the qualitative literature, which emphasizes variations in how political authority is exercised within these institutions. Second, the dissertation introduces novel measures of the quality of government, and tests their association with civil peace across countries, over time. The dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and four separate essays. Essay I examines the risk of conflict across different types of authoritarian regimes. The statistical results suggest that single-party regimes have a lower risk of civil conflict than military and multi-party authoritarian regimes. The finding is attributed to the high capacity for coercion and co-optation within single-party institutions. Essay II studies whether cross-national variations in the occurrence of civil conflict are due to differences in the quality of government. The essay finds that governments that are not able to carry through such basic governing tasks as protecting property rights and providing public goods, render themselves vulnerable to civil conflict. The focus of Essay III is on patronage politics, meaning that rulers rely on the distribution of private goods to retain the support necessary to stay in power. The statistical results suggest that patronage politics per se increase the risk of conflict. The conflict-inducing effect is mediated by large oil-wealth, however, because the government can use the wealth strategically to buy off opposition. Essay IV argues that patronage politics can also lead to violent conflict between groups. The results from a statistical analysis, based on unique sub-national data on inter-group conflict in Nigeria, are consistent with this argument. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation suggest that both the form and degree of government have a significant influence on the risk of civil conflict.

Why do some individuals choose to participate in rebellion, and what recruitment tactics can rebel groups use to affect this decision? These questions are central to the study of civil war because rebel groups must raise troops in order to challenge the government and to survive as an organization. Indeed, much of the civil war literature builds on participation as a key causal mechanism, yet it is rarely specified in theoretical or empirical models. The dissertation attempts to open this black box by tackling three sets of gaps in the existing literature; these relate to the assumptions made in most studies, the theoretical bases for understanding participation and recruitment, and the record of empirical testing. Essay I examines whether a particular type of recruitment practice, ethnic mobilization, is associated with higher levels of violence. The results show that when rebel groups mobilize along ethnic lines, there is a higher risk for intensified violence. Essay II employs new data on rebel troop size to study what factors affect participation in rebellion. The findings indicate that concerns over personal security rather than economic and social incentives best explain participation. Essay III addresses coerced recruitment, positing that conflict dynamics affect whether rebel groups shift from voluntary to coerced recruitment. Using micro-level data on the conflict in Nepal, the results show that the more losses rebels suffer on the battlefield, the greater the number of individuals they subsequently abduct. Finally, the Nepal case study presented in Essay IV suggests that indoctrination as a recruitment strategy was more important to rebel leaders than other facets of the insurgency. Taken together, this dissertation indicates that there is analytical leverage to be had by examining not only the individual’s decision to participate, but also the rebel group’s recruitment strategy, and that these rebel strategies are flexible and contingent on conflict dynamics.

<p>Rebel attacks on civilians constitute one of the gravest threats to human security in contemporary armed conflicts. But why do rebel groups kill civilians? The dissertation approaches this question from a strategic perspective, trying to understand when and why rebel groups are likely to target civilians as a conflict strategy. It combines quantitative studies using global data on rebel group violence with a case study of the civil war in Mozambique. The overall argument is that rebel groups target civilians as a way of improving their bargaining position in the war relative to the government. The dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four papers that all deal with different aspects of the overall research question. Paper I introduces new data on one-sided violence against civilians, presenting trends over time and comparing types of actors and conflicts. Paper II argues that democratic governments are particularly vulnerable to rebel attacks on civilians, since they are dependent on the population. Corroborating this claim, statistical evidence shows that rebels indeed kill more civilians when fighting a democratic government. Paper III argues that rebels target civilians more when losing on the battlefield, as a method of raising the costs for the government to continue fighting. A statistical analysis employing monthly data on battle outcomes and rebel violence, supports this argument. Paper IV takes a closer look at the case of Mozambique, arguing that the rebel group Renamo used large-scale violence in areas dominated by government constituents as a means for hurting the government. Taken together, these findings suggest that violence against civilians should be understood as a strategy, rather than a consequence, of war.</p>