The object of this thesis is to examine the two opposite poles of human freedom, that is, determinism and total freedom, as found in the plays of Cocteau and Sartre that have been influenced by Greek drama. These contemporary playwrights however have set aside the religious aspect of ancient tragedy to concentrate on the analysis of the human condition. Cocteau, similar to Sophocles, is conscious of fate controlling human destiny. Since Cocteau is unable to alter its course, he accepts it; his plays, Antigone (1922), Oedipe-Roi (1925), Orphée (1926) and La Machine Infernale (1934), all embody such an attitude, thereby denoting freedom as an illusion. In the first chapter, Antigone, Orpheus and Oedipus are analysed as pawns of the cruel gods; as mere mortals, at the mercy of the Heavens, they cannot control their destiny. In the second chapter, emphasis is placed on man himself; we have endeavoured to show to what extent he is physically and psychologically determined and how he contains the seed of his own perdition. Cocteau's originality lies in the presentation of determinism through imagery. In La Machine Infernale, his most important play, destiny becomes a machine geared to destroy man caught in a network from which he cannot extricate himself. Such a person is Oedipus, controlled by both outer and inner forces. The outer forces or the gods plot a fate of parricide and incest which he is unable to avoid or escape. In the second instance, Cocteau studies the complexity of the human machine; in so doing, he reflects the twentieth century's interest, notably that of Freud and of the Surrealists, in the realm of the unconscious. Man is described as a complexity of heredity, natural instincts and character, especially excessive pride or hybris in the case of Oedipus, all of which influence his behaviour. According to our interpretation, the double determinism (outer and inner) which was separated to facilitate our analysis, is in fact, so interwoven as to form a complex, integral pattern of man's suffering. Sartre also is interested in man; his main concern, as philosopher and dramatist, is man and the human consciousness. The Sartrean philosophy is one of action wherein the existentialist hero, like Orestes, is the opposite of the Cocteau hero who accepts his fate; the former chooses his acts and so creates his own destiny. In chapter three we study the Sartrean revolt against God, a concept necessitated by human need and frailty. According to Les Mouches (1943) and Les Troyennes (1965), spiritual tyranny and moral order are detrimental to freedom since they hold men in bondage. Sartre believes that traditional morality is obsolete; therefore no one can guide man, even less dictate to him as he is free to invent his own values. In chapter four, Sartre's notion of total freedom is examined. The type of liberty advocated in his main play Les Mouches is not a "freedom-from" but a "freedom-for". Man must not consider himself free in the sense that he has no commitment and that he can do what he wants. Sartre wishes to replace this negative approach by a more positive type based on human solidarity and love. Once one recognizes and accepts personal autonomy, one must act in society, for being free in Sartre's terms, is being "free-to-do" and also being "free-in-society". Such a freedom however makes man suffer; he feels the anguish of responsibility and a sense of metaphysical solitude. But Sartre refuses determinism; one is either totally free or not at all. Also, determinism only serves as an alibi to avoid the harsh reality that one is basically free and solely responsible for one's acts which affect the self and society as well. Whichever path is followed, determinism or freedom, both Cocteau and Sartre arrive at the same conclusion: it is possible for him who suffers greatly to eventually attain self-knowledge and dignity, thereby reaching glory or greatness as in the case of Oedipus and Orestes. The apparent pessimism of life and its suffering can thus be transformed into optimism, which in the final analysis is a victory for mankind. / Arts, Faculty of / French, Hispanic, and Italian Studies, Department of / Graduate

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Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Responsibility is either linked to duties and expectations, or it is linked to the freedom of an agent. These links are questionable. It is therefore necessary to investigate the freedom and context of commission and omission. There are numerous difficulties in evaluating suicide: - The problem to distinguish between successful suicide and failed pseudo suicide. - The problem of the mind: The limited accessibility of the emotions and attitudes despite its expressibility And the unexpressibility of the experiences despite its immediate accessibility. And the problem of other minds. - The problem of the freedom of the will. Prove is given that no aspect of the mind is free - despite our illusions of freedom. - The problem of the cause, origin and extent of an act. - The problem of the relation between brain and mind. This problem is important when we consider the origin of acts and the concept of the self. The important issues when solving the difficulties pertaining to suicide are: - Agency: The self is owner of all acts and instances of mind. The self is also the subject of all physical acts and acts of the mind. - The self is an open complex system. The self is entangled in relations of differences, conflict and deferment of meaning. The important conclusions when evaluating suicide are: - The agent is the owner and the subject of his acts. The agent has illusions of freedom. The agent is inseparable from his circumstances. - Acts originate in the context of these circumstances. - Responsibility exists in the context of power in society. - The answers to the questions of Why? Are logical reconstruction and politically correct confabulations - whatever the answer is, it is shared by all participants of the context.The evaluation of suicide: - The self-murderer`s act originates from the context of the circumstances of which he is a participant. - Suicide happens within the context of a pancheiria with aspects of autocheireō and heterocheireō. - The pancheiria started before the autocheireō. - The pancheiria continues after the autocheireō. The autocheireō is but an indication of the seriousness van the larger pancheiria. The self-murderer (autocheir) and his autocheireō persist as a silhouette in our midst. - The possibility of the self-murderer`s illusion of freedom does not liberate us from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither does se sharing of guilt give as relieve from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither will we benefit from any rationalization. Finally we can do nothing but to utter these statements of denial and confession : - Suicide is wrong. - But we have not done it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verantwoordelikheid word óf aan verpligtinge en verwagtinge, óf aan die vryheid van die agent verbind. Hierdie verbindings word betwyfel. Daarom is dit nodig dat die vryheid van handeling en nie-handeling sowel as die konteks waarin die handeling en nie-handeling gebeur ondersoek word. Verskeie probleme ten opsigte van die beoordeling van die selfmoord word uitgewys: - Die probleem om die werklike geslaagde selfmoord te onderskei van die gefaalde selfmoordpoging. - Die probleme van die verstand. Naamlik die beperkte toeganklikheid van die emosies en houdings, alhoewel dit uitdrukbaar is. En die onmiddelike toeganklikheid van die ervarings wat dit te spyt nie uitdrukbaar is nie. Asook die probleem om ander verstande te ken. - Die probleem van die vryheid van die wil. Dit word aangetoon dat geen aspek van die verstand vry is nie. Dit nie teenstaande het ons steeds die illusie van vryheid. - Die probleem van die oorsaak, die oorsprong en die reikwydte van handelinge. - Die probleem van die verhouding tussen die brein en die verstand. Hierdie probleem is belangrik by die oorwegings van die oorspong van handeling en die siening van die self. Belangrike elemente by die oplossing van die beoordeling van selfmoord is: - Die agentskap: naamlik dat die self die eienaar van alle verstandsitems en handelinge is, en dat die self die subjek van alle verstandshandelinge en sigbare handelinge is. - Die self as `n oop komplekse stelsel wat in wederkerige verhoudings is van verskil, geskil en uitstel van betekenis.Gevolgtrekkings wat belangrik is by die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die agent is eienaar en subjek van sy handelinge, het die illusie van vryheid, is deel van sy omstandighede. - Die handeling ontstaan in die konteks van hierdie omstandighede. - Verantwoordelikheid bestaan in die konteks van mag in die samelewing. - Die antwoord op Hoekom? en Waarom? is logiese herkonstruksies en politiese korrekte konfabulasie - maar wat ookal die antwoord is, dit word gedeel deur al die deelnemers aan die konteks. Die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die selfmoordenaar se handeling ontspring uit die konteks van sy omstandighede waaraan hy `n deelnemer is. - Die selfmoord gebeur eerder binne die konteks van `n pancheiria met aspekte van autocheireō en heterocheireō. - Die pancheiria was reeds voor die autocheireō. - Die pancheiria duur voort na die autocheireō. Die autocheireō toon aan ons die erns van die oorkoepelende pancheiria. Die selfmoordenaar (autocheir) en sy autocheireō bestaan voort as silhoeët in ons midde. - Die moontlike illusie van vryheid van die selfmoordenaar kan ons nie die aanklag deur die silhoeët ontsnapping bied nie. - Net so min kan die verdeling van skuld ons van die aanklag laat ontsnap. - Enige rasionalisering van ons kant is nutteloos. Laastens kan ons net sê: - Selfmoord is verkeerd. - Ons het dit nie gedoen nie. Hierdie stellinge dien as ontkennings sowel as skuldbeleidenisse.

Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.

Thesis--Lund. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 150-158) and index.

Thesis--Lund. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. 150-158.

Habilitationsschrift--Salzburg. / Bibliography: p. [xvii]-xxiv.

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-24T17:03:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 FÁBIO ROQUE DA SILVA ARAÚJO.pdf: 1582509 bytes, checksum: 8e10d75edde07fae378aaeb21a8a8cd3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-24T17:03:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 FÁBIO ROQUE DA SILVA ARAÚJO.pdf: 1582509 bytes, checksum: 8e10d75edde07fae378aaeb21a8a8cd3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-24T17:03:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FÁBIO ROQUE DA SILVA ARAÚJO.pdf: 1582509 bytes, checksum: 8e10d75edde07fae378aaeb21a8a8cd3 (MD5) / A culpabilidade, elemento constitutivo da estrutura analítica do crime, desempenha papel de fundamental importância, na imposição e delimtação da sanção penal. Fruto da construção histórica de um Direito Penal racionalizado e tributário dos direitos fundamentais, a culpabilidade assentou-se sobre o primado do livre-arbítrio, compreendido como capacidade de autodeterminação individual. As recentes descobertas da neurociência cognitiva, acabam por propugnar a existência de um neurodeterminismo, que teria o condão de rechaçar a importância da culpabilidade, consagrando uma intervenção punitiva em descompasso com a dinâmica das relações sociais. A tese neurodeterminista e a consequente abolição da culpabilidade, porém, não possui procedência à luz do atual estágio de desenvolvimento da ciência, e da necessidade de um juízo de reprovação que fundamente a imposição da pena.