The views of Edwards and Wesley regarding the sovereignty of God present a puzzle. On the face of things, both were successful evangelists while both held contrary doctrines of sovereignty. Does this mean that the doctrine of sovereignty is irrelevant? This thesis argues that the doctrine of sovereignty is crucial in evangelism and revival, and that the views of Edwards and Wesley regarding the sovereignity of God were in fact very similar. A useful framework for showing this is the Five Points of Calvinism, as well as the doctrines of justification by faith and the omnipotence of God.

The subjective experience of agency is a dimension of inner life that has consequences for motivation and moral judgment. Cognitive psychologists have studied the processes that underlie conscious will and metacognition of agency while social psychologists have examined how comparable constructs, such as autonomy and self-efficacy, relate to human needs and wellbeing. However, the consequences of the transient feeling state that accompanies agential experiences have received less attention. This dissertation examines the consequences of agency for motivation and moral judgment across seven experiments that manipulated feelings of agency via motor control games, episodic simulations, and autobiographical recollections. In its entirety, this work suggests that people seek experiences that confer high feelings of agency while both high- and low-agency experiences influence how we judge others’ actions. Chapter I reviews prior literature on agency and related constructs and introduces the conceptual and theoretical framework. Chapters II – IV discuss how feelings of agency manipulated via proximal, action-oriented cues and distal, outcome-oriented cues affect task preference. Findings suggest that people generally like experiences of high agency, and that motivation is more sensitive to proximal rather than distal disturbances. People tend to make choices to increase their likelihood of experiencing high agency via retention of action control, even at the expense of desired outcomes. Chapters V – VIII explore the relationship between agential experiences and moral judgments of others’ behavior. Results reveal a novel effect such that both high- and low-agency experiences lead to more intense judgments. In addition, people who are most sensitive to factors that influence their sense of agency also tend to deliver the harshest judgments. The findings suggest a two-process model of attributive projection and compensatory control mechanisms. They also imply a self-amplifying effect of extreme agency states such that both experiences of high and low agency may enhance activation of self-related schema, which in turn influence moral judgments. Chapters IX and X summarize the experiments and discuss the broader significance of this work for research on motivation and moral psychology.

Includes abstract. Bibliography: leaves 346-374.

This dissertation examines the doctrines of effectual calling and regeneration and argues that the biblical view is that God's saving grace is monergistic - meaning that God acts alone to effectually call and monergistically regenerate the depraved sinner from death to new life - and therefore effectual calling and regeneration causally precede conversion in the ordo salutis, thereby ensuring that all of the glory in salvation belongs to God not man. Stated negatively, God's grace is not synergistic - meaning that God cooperates with man, giving man the final determative power to either accept or resist God's grace - which would result in an ordo salutis where regeneration is causally conditioned upon man's free will in conversion and, in the Calvinist's opinion, would rob God of all of the glory in salvation. Chapter 1 introduces the monergism-synergism debate by placing it within the contemporary evangelical context. Chapter 1 not only introduces the debate between Calvinists and Arminians but also introduces the recent attempt of modified views to present a via media between the two. Chapter 1 also presents the thesis and explains the parameters and presuppositions of the dissertation. Chapter 2 examines the doctrine of monergism within the Reformed tradition. Rather than an exhaustive survey, chapter 2 selects some of the most important representatives from the Reformed tradition including: Augustine, John Calvin, the Canons of Dort, and the Westminster Confession. In discussing these figures and confessions, chapter 2 provides the historical and theological context in which the Reformed argued against the synergists of their own day. Chapter 3 turns to a biblical and theological defense of total depravity and effectual calling. Chapter 3 first begins with a biblical defense of total depravity and spiritual inability, as well as a brief discussion and utilization of Jonathan Edwards' understanding of free will (the freedom of inclination). Chapter 3 then seeks to argue for the thesis presented in chapter 1 by showing from Scripture that the Calvinist view of effectual calling is biblical. Chapter 4 continues the argument from chapter 3 by focusing in on the doctrine of regeneration. Chapter 4 argues that regeneration is monergistic rather than synergistic, meaning that God's grace in regeneration is not contingent on the will of man to believe but God's grace works alone. Therefore, faith and repentance are the result not the condition of regeneration in the ordo salutis. Chapter 5 seeks to give an accurate and fair presentation of the Arminian view(s), giving attention to the theological nuances among Arminians. Chapter 5 shows that there is diversity within Arminianism, so that there are those who hold to a "classical Arminian" view and there are those who hold to a Semi-Pelagian view. However, chapter 5 demonstrates that both views end up in the same place, namely, affirming the doctrine of synergism which makes God's grace contingent upon man's will. Chapter 6 is a biblical and theological critique of the Arminian view. Chapter 6 shows that the Arminian doctrine of synergism is not found in Scripture, contradicts Scripture, and robs God of all his glory in salvation. Chapter 7 turns from the Arminian view to examine recent modified attempts to pave a middle way between Calvinism and Arminianism. Chapter 7 shows specifically that attempts at a middle way borrow from Arminianism and consequently fall prey to an erroneous interpretation of Scripture. Chapter 7 shows that a middle way is biblically impossible and it also robs God of all his glory in salvation. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by restating the thesis, summarizing the biblical data, and arguing that only the Calvinist view can preserve the glory of God to save sinners. Three appendixes conclude the dissertation. Appendix 1 examines the Arminian and Calvinist views of the love of God and argues that divine love in Scripture is far more complex than the Arminian makes it out to be. God not only has a universal love for all people but a special, particular, and efficacious love only for the elect. Appendix 2 examines the Arminian and Calvinist views of the will of God and argues once again that the will of God in Scripture is far more complex than the Arminian makes it out to be. Scripture shows, it is argued, that God not only has a moral or preceptive will as well as a will of disposition but also a will of decree by which he effectually ordains all that comes to pass. Appendix 3 looks at the relationship between effectual calling and regeneration in the Reformed tradition and the diversity that exists among the Reformed as to how exactly describe this relationship. Appendix 3 presents and critiques each view, but pays particular attention to Michael Horton's recent proposal for "covenant ontology and effectual calling."

Includes abstract / Bibliography: leaves 346-374 / viii, 374 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, 1988

Zugl.: Regensburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.

Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T09:42:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ferraz_MariliaCortesde_M.pdf: 594205 bytes, checksum: fb169b56cfd9f1eb5975fe5b78c0f24c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: A dissertação examina a análise de Hume dos conceitos de liberdade e imputabilidade moral. O texto de referência para a pesquisa é a seção VIII da Investigação sobre o entendimento humano. Mostro, a partir do estudo dessa seção, em que sentido os conceitos de liberdade e necessidade são compatíveis para Hume. Para tanto, analiso o compatibilismo humeano enfatizando a unidade explicativa que o autor esposa claramente na obra citada. De fato, Hume, em seu exame das noções de liberdade e necessidade anuncia introduzir novidades que prometem ao menos algum resultado na decisão da controvérsia entre a doutrina da necessidade e a doutrina da liberdade (da vontade). Ele propõe um 'projeto de reconciliação¿ (reconciling project) que consiste em mostrar que liberdade e necessidade são perfeitamente compatíveis entre si, e que afirmar que as ações humanas são livres não é afirmar que estejam fora do âmbito da necessidade, mas apenas que se realizaram sem constrangimento. Em seguida, esclareço as razões que conduzem à crença na vontade livre, crença esta infundada, segundo Hume. Por fim, procuro estabelecer as conseqüências que o compatibilismo humeano traz para a noção de responsabilidade moral. Hume entende que não só é perfeitamente possível explicar os juízos morais pelo seu compatibilismo, como também que o seu compatibilismo é a única alternativa de fato consistente para dar conta dos ajuizamentos que fazemos acerca da moralidade. Entendo que a explicação dos juízos morais de imputabilidade oferecida por Hume representa uma hipótese altamente persuasiva e com vigor suficiente para responder a objeções geralmente apresentadas pelos incompatibilistas / Abstract: The dissertation examines the analysis of Hume of the concepts of freedom and moral imputability. The text of reference for the research is section VIII of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I show, from the study of this section, how freedom and necessity are compatible for Hume. To this effect, I analyze the humean compatibilism emphasizing the unit of the explanation that the author maintains in the cited work. Hume, in his examination of freedom and necessity, announces a new approach that promises at least some results for the decision of the controversy between the doctrine of the necessity and the doctrine of the freedom (of the will). He proposes a conciliatory project that consists in showing that freedom and necessity are perfectly compatible, and that to say that the human actions are free is not to say that they are out of the scope of the necessity, but only that they are without constraint. After that, I clarify the reasons that lead to the belief in free will, which is baseless according to Hume. Finally, I establish the consequences that humean compatibilism brings for the notion of moral responsibility. Hume understands not only that it is perfectly possible to explain moral judgments by means of his compatibilism, but also that his compatibilism is the only consistent alternative to account for moral judgement. I understand that the explanation of moral judgments of imputability offered by Hume represents a highly persuasive hypothesis, and strong enough to answer the objections generally raised by incompatibilists / Mestrado / Filosofia Moral / Mestre em Filosofia

We have here a theoretical research that intends to question the concept of culpability, in other words, the idea of being able to act otherwise considering the problem of free will. We argue that the concept of culpability is legitimized by a libertarian sense of free will in the common sense that has no empirical basis. Thus, given the impossibility of proving the existence of free will, we affirm that the criminal law cannot justify punishment on desert. Despite the compatibilist appearance, the idea of being able to do otherwise is supported implicitly by a libertarian point of view. In other words, the judgment of disapproval is justified by an untenable notion of freedom. The idea is to demonstrate that the way people see free will is an illusion because the assumptions that sustain it are false. In support, we use arguments of some philosophers and discoveries of neuroscience. From them, we demonstrated that the only way out of culpability is the normative presumption based on an a priori concept of average man. Besides false free will, the culpability brings a sense of moral realism that cannot be sustained in the face of some discoveries of neuroscience. In the background, we showed the evolution of criminal law as a systematic construction and the role played by culpability in the criminal dogmatic system. With the denial of the normative concept, we analyzed the functionalism of Claus Roxin and Gunther Jakobs, and also the theory of utilitarianism by deterrence. / Trata-se de pesquisa teórica que procura questionar a ideia do poder agir de outro modo da culpabilidade a partir do problema do livre-arbítrio. Defendemos que a culpabilidade é legitimada por uma sensação libertista de livre-arbítrio no senso comum que não tem fundamento empírico. Assim, diante da impossibilidade de comprovação da vontade livre, afirmamos que o Direito penal não pode fundamentar a pena no merecimento. Apesar da aparência compatibilista, o poder agir de outro modo se baseia, implicitamente, no libertismo. Em outras palavras, o juízo de reprovação é justificado por uma noção insustentável de liberdade. A ideia é demonstrar que o modo como as pessoas enxergam o livre-arbítrio representa uma ilusão, pois os pressupostos que o sustentam são falsos. Como fundamentação, utilizamos argumentos de alguns filósofos e descobertas da neurociência. A partir deles, demonstramos que a única saída para a culpabilidade é a presunção normativa com base em um conceito a priori de homem médio. Além do falso livrearbítrio, a culpabilidade traz uma noção de realismo moral que não pode ser sustentada diante de algumas descobertas da neurociência. Em segundo plano, demonstramos a evolução do Direito penal como construção sistemática e o papel ocupado pela culpabilidade no sistema da dogmática penal. Com a negação do conceito normativo, analisamos as propostas funcionalistas de Claus Roxin e Gunther Jakobs, e também a teoria do utilitarismo por dissuasão.

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-21T23:21:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Picoli_GleisyTatiana_M.pdf: 1328650 bytes, checksum: cd9fa95eb859b2577edd8431c6f4d3d5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Esta dissertação tem por objetivo ressaltar a importância do conhecimento da doutrina crista da graça para a compreensão das doutrinas schopenhauerianas da compaixão e da liberdade moral. Afinal, Schopenhauer faz uso de conceitos cristãos para explicar os principais pontos de sua ética, donde se destaca o papel da graça. Para cumprir o meu objetivo, analiso, primeiramente, a filosofia do "doutor da graça", Agostinho, e, em seguida, avalio suas implicações na filosofia de Schopenhauer / Abstract: This dissertation aims to highlight the importance of the knowledge of the Christian doctrine of grace to the comprehension of the schopenhauerian doctrines of compassion and moral freedom. After all, Schopenhauer uses Christian concepts to explain the key issues of his ethics, in which the role of grace stands out. For achieving this goal, I first analyze the philosophy of the "Doctor of Grace", St. Augustine, and afterward assess its implications in Schopenhauer's philosophy / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestra em Filosofia

Can unfree people make themselves free? Some people are unfree because of the social and political conditions in which they find themselves. To become freer would require changing those conditions; yet changing them requires the exercise of freedom. So it seems like they must already be free in order to become free. Drawing on John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and B.R. Ambedkar, I argue that the unfree can make themselves free. Unfreedom involves external constraints and how those constraints shape people’s agency. Becoming freer involves coming to know, from the inside, how our agency has been shaped. We can change that shaping and in turn the social conditions. The problem of unfreedom is a vicious cycle. Social conditions constrain agency, which in turn further entrenches the social conditions. A virtuous cycle is possible. Agents can change their conditions, reducing the constraint on their agency, in turn enabling greater change. Conditions are unstable, and agents can take advantage of that instability.