This thesis is a critical examination of Fukuyama's "end of history" version of liberalism, in which he announces the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy as a universal form of governance. The thesis seeks to investigate Francis Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy and his arguments for it, in order to assess the normative impact of market driven political and economic outcomes on the human context or life satisfaction, especially recognition. This is contrasted with Amartya Sen's notion of well-being in order to show that Fukuyama does not pay attention to some of the basic moral demands of human life. The thesis is comprised of an introduction and six chapters. The contents of these chapters can be presented briefly as follows: • The first chapter looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state. Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are the values of freedom, equality, and independence of the individual, the process of consensus, the primacy of self-preservation and the necessity of the state. Together these laid the basis for a philosophically reasoned and progressive theory of politics. This chapter also looks at the theory of laissez-faire, which paved the way for a free market economy. This doctrine was developed in the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham. For Fukuyama these thinkers inaugurated a tradition of political thought that ultimately led to liberalism and democracy. • The second chapter discusses the teleological view of history underlying the philosophical theories of history advanced by Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Each of these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or goal. It is from these philosophers that Fukuyama appropriates the idea of universality to envisage the universality of liberal democracy. • The third chapter analyzes Fukuyama's "end of history" claim and his arguments for it. When communism finally collapsed, liberal democracy was the only remaining option, he claims. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal history, Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's materialist interpretation of history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. It is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of its citizens' freedom. • The fourth chapter stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama claims that human-beings desire recognition, and can best satisfy this desire through liberal democracy. Sen for his part claims that people need well-being, and can only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a universal value. The discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen may share similar political values they differ ideologically and in historical vision. • The fifth chapter deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy. Several issues present major problems for liberal democracy. These issues are liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal democracy; the global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural homogenization of the world; the problem of parallel histories versus a single inclusive history; desire-satisfaction versus need-satisfaction, and the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy. • The sixth chapter recapitulates the preceding chapters and spells out the conclusion reached in the course of the thesis. The findings on the notion of the "end of history" show that Fukuyama wishes the equal and mutual recognition of the freedom and dignity of all individuals as well as the affirmation of their individual rights. This concern for the individual is laudable. However, excessive individualism threatens the fabric of every society, and Fukuyama realizes that this threat is especially strong in liberal democracy. His suggested solution is to cultivate social capital in the form of trust. This thesis concludes that Fukuyama's medicine is no match for the disease; the whole thrust of the intellectual tradition leading to liberal democracy - and of much else in Western culture since Hobbes - is in the direction of excessive individualism and the withering of community. Moreover, where Fukuyama sees isothymia - the desire for equal recognition, the psychological truth is probably that people desire to be recognized as superior - mega/othymia, again making individualism intrinsically more threatening to a sense of community than Fukuyama seems to realize. Fukuyama suggests that an international consensus in favour of liberal democracy is emerging. But it appears that such a consensus is unlikely to arise nation- states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation and thus insist on their sovereignty, effectively blocking any shift from the nation-state to a homogeneous and universal liberal state. It is difficult to generate the consensus needed to receive it as a universal system, because not all people subscribe to its cultural preconditions. The satisfaction of human desire of any kind cannot be universalized since human existence is centrally characterized by diversity of context, culture, and perception. Any attempt to impose cultural or ideological homogeneity requires conquest - cultural or military imperialism. The triumphant emergence of liberal democracy cannot be the ultimate end of the whole of human history. If this were the case, it would no longer be worth trying to increase human knowledge, since knowledge always points to an open future in terms of how it will be used for further advancement. Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative consequences. Liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology leading to human satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations to come as long as human thought evolves. This will remain the case as long as Fukuyama's admission that liberal democracy only works where its cultural preconditions are met, remains true. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2003.

Francis Fukuyama s’est fait connaître aux yeux du grand public à la fin des années 1980 et au début des années 1990, suite à sa célèbre thèse controversée de « la fin de l’histoire ». Érigé comme un parfait défenseur du modèle politique et économique libéral occidental, le politologue fut régulièrement associé au néoconservatisme américain, cela jusqu’à sa rupture clairement affichée au milieu des années 2000. Si Fukuyama dénonce alors la vision « agressive » de la génération post-Guerre froide du mouvement en politique étrangère, on s’aperçoit par ailleurs également, avant cette période, de l’existence de certaines divergences avec les premiers néoconservateurs, notamment en politique intérieure. Dès lors, on peut s’interroger sur la place réelle qu’occupe l’auteur de « la fin de l’histoire » au sein du néoconservatisme américain. À ce titre, nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle l’œuvre fukuyamienne, loin d’être marginale, incarne au contraire pleinement le socle intellectuel du néoconservatisme. Preuve, au-delà de la diversité indéniable, d’une unité idéologique plus large au sein du courant. / Francis Fukuyama became known in the eyes of the general public in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following his famous controversial “End of History” thesis. Perceived as a perfect defender of the Western liberal political and economic model, the political scientist was regularly associated with American neoconservatism, until its break clearly displayed in the mid-2000s. If Fukuyama denounces the “aggressive” vision of the post-Cold War generation in foreign policy, we also notice, before this period, the existence of some divergences with the first neoconservatives, particularly in domestic policy. Consequently, one may question the real place occupied by the author of “The End of History” in American neoconservatism. As such, we defend the thesis that the Fukuyamian work, far from being marginal, fully embodies the intellectual base of neoconservatism. This is proof, beyond the undeniable diversity, of a broader ideological unity within the current.

Ce mémoire explore la possibilité d'une parenté insoupçonnée entre deux penseurs des Relations Internationales, Raymond Aron et Francis Fukuyama. Traditionnellement associées aux écoles libérale et réaliste, leurs idées pouvaient effectivement apparaître comme parfaitement inconciliables. Or, les deux grandes sections de notre texte essaient plutôt de montrer, qu'en dépit de certaines différences, l'argumentation des deux auteurs se rejoint sur plusieurs questions. En ce qui concerne leurs conceptions de l'histoire, nous verrons qu'Aron et Fukuyama adhéraient au principe de «rationalisation du monde» cher à différents sociologues occidentaux, et particulièrement à Max Weber. L'analyse du parcours universitaire de l'auteur français permettra de repérer des influences phénoménologique ou néokantienne sur le plan épistémologique et wébérienne sur le plan ontologique. Nous nous pencherons également sur le passage de Francis Fukuyama à l'Université Cornell où il fit la connaissance d'Allan Bloom. C'est par l'intermédiaire de ce dernier que l'auteur nippo-américain entra en contact avec Alexandre Kojève, Léo Strauss et Raymond Aron. Une fois ces éclaircissements faits, il sera question du rôle joué par le concept wébérien de rationalisation du monde dans la philosophie fukuyamienne de l'histoire. Par la suite, nous verrons comment ces philosophies de l'histoire déterminent la vision des Relations Internationales des deux auteurs. Plus précisément, nous nous attarderons sur les changements que la société industrielle sont susceptibles d'amener dans les rapports que les États entretiennent entre eux. Tant chez Fukuyama qu'Aron, on pourra constater que les notions de guerre ou de paix se transforment radicalement à partir du Traité de Vienne. Nous consacrerons la dernière section à la praxéologie des deux auteurs, ou à la politique étrangère idéale qu'ils proposent aux nations occidentales. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Raymond Aron, Francis Fukuyama, Relations Internationales, Philosophie de l'Histoire.

In this thesis I analyze and problematize Francis Fukuyama's position on posthumanism, largely expressed in his 2002 book Our Posthuman Future. In it he warns against the likely negative outcome of a potential biotechnological revolution, which could enable easy access to interfering with human genome via practices such as genetic modification or human cloning. Fukuyama's major assumption is that all members of society must meet some limited standards of humanity in order to be equal, because if people acquire different levels of artificially altered "human natures," the outcome will be stratification, irrecuperable inequality and perhaps even class warfare. For this reason, Fukuyama calls for a pre-emptive regulation of genetic manipulation so as to avoid a "posthuman future." I contrast this theory with a selection of transhumanist and feminist theorists as well as with examples from fiction, namely the trilogy Lilith's Brood (1987-1989) by Octavia Butler and the novel Never Let Me Go (2005) by Kazuo Ishiguro. Drawing on these sources I conclude that Fukuyama's position is harmfully exclusionary and divisive; and also counter- productive in the sense that in his pursuit of securing freedom and equality he renders potential posthuman subjects fundamentally inferior, thus principally defeating his...

Στην παρούσα διατριβή παρουσιάζεται μια νέα μεθοδολογία σύνθεσης μη-πρωτεϊνικών αμινοξέων (ΜΠΑ) κατάλληλων για εφαρμογές στην πεπτιδική σύνθεση με χρήση του ασπαραγινικού οξέος ως χειρόμορφου εκμαγείου. Η μεθοδολογία αυτή βασίζεται στην επιτυχή και σε καλές αποδόσεις σύνθεση της β-αλδεΰδης του Ν-τριτυλοασπαραγινικού τριτ-βουτυλεστέρα, η οποία αποτελεί την ένωση «κλειδί». Αυτή στη συνέχεια έδωσε μια ποικιλία νέων ΜΠΑ μέσω αντιδράσεων Wittig, Horner-Emmons ή με επίδραση οργανοψευδραργυρικών αντιδραστηρίων. Ανάλογες μελέτες με σκοπό την σύνθεση των αντίστοιχων ομολόγων τους με έναν άνθρακα λιγότερο ή περισσότερο στην πλευρική αλυσίδα, ξεκινώντας από σερίνη ή γλουταμινικό οξύ δεν απέδωσαν τα αναμενόμενα αποτελέσματα ή ήταν ανεπιτυχείς. / In the present dissertation a new methodology is reported for the synthesis of novel non-proteinogenic amino acids (NPAAs) suitable for applications in solid phase peptide synthesis. This methodology involves aspartic acid as chiral template and relies on the successful and in good yields pepraration of the key N-tritylaspartic tert-butyl ester’s β-aldehyde, which when followed by Wittig, Horner-Emmons or Grignard type reactions may result in a variety of new NPAAs. Furthermore unsuccessful attempts towards the application of the present methodology for the synthesis of NPAA homologues bearing one carbon atom less or more in the side chain by using as chiral templates serine or glutamic acid, respectively, are also reported.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía mención en Metafísica / El problema principal de esta Tesis, y sobre el cual girarán todo el resto, está planteado desde ya, en el mismo título: el nihilismo. Abordaremos el concepto de nihilismo desde el significado que tiene para nuestra época, como reflejo de un síndrome generalizado. Para cumplir nuestra misión expositiva, nos apoyaremos básicamente, en un autor, tan profético como polémico, que vaticinó el nihilismo y declamó la decadencia de nuestra cultura Occidental. No cien por ciento filósofo, cosa que dejó siempre bien en claro. Un psicólogo, más bien, como solía auto catalogarse. Escritor, por necesidad fisiológica y espiritual. Personificó una declaración de guerra a la moral cristiana y cargó con todo el peso de la cruz social, que le acarreó el definirse como anticristiano. Discípulo de Dionisos, maestro del aforismo, padre literario de Zaratustra, fundador de la “Doctrina del eterno retorno”; y quien, se calificara a sí mismo como, el anticristo.

This Master's Thesis deals with the famous work of a Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington. The topic is described to full extent. First of all, there are defined basic terms connected with culture. Afterwards, the conception of a Clash of Civilizations is described in its basic concepts, whereas there are not omitted consequences connected with the author's other works as well as his life. A special chapter is dedicated to the impact that this work caused. This chapter is devided into two parts. In the first part, there are presented general references of several authors. In the other part, there are discussed comprehensive conceptions of certain authors. Concretely, they are represented by Francis Fukuyama, Immanuel Wallerstein, Alvin Toffler and Michael Novak. After description of basic ideas of these big thinkers, there is made a comparison of their conceptions, which is based on the following terms -- universalism, democracy a capitalism, world order and modernization. In the last part of this Master's Thesis, there are deduced conclusions from the comparison of these conceptions that deal with the international system, which makes this issue more clear for both public and academic people.

Este trabalho propõe o estudo da ideia de “fim da História”, conforme apresentada pelo cientista político norte-americano Francis Fukuyama. Em um primeiro momento, delimitamos seu conceito de “fim da História” a partir do artigo original The End of History?, de 1989, e de suas publicações seguintes, até o livro The End of History and the Last Man, de 1992. Na segunda parte, após contrastar a ideia ao paradigma de “choque de civilizações”, de Samuel Huntington, aproximamos a estrutura conceitual proposta por Fukuyama de tópicos da teoria da história e história da historiografia relacionados ao conceito moderno de História e sua eventual exaustão identificada por diversos autores. No terceiro momento, o trabalho aborda o percurso da obra de Fukuyama após a repercussão inicial de sua proposta de “fim da História”, até os dias de hoje, buscando eventuais novidades à estrutura conceitual delimitada anteriormente. A título de conclusão, abordamos o cenário atual dos debates da historiografia para especular acerca do futuro do campo do conhecimento e do ofício do historiador. / This work proposes the study of the idea of the “end of History“, as it is presented by the North American political scientist Francis Fukuyama. At first, we delimit the concept from his original article The End of History?, published in 1989, and from his following publications, up to his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man. In the second part, after contrasting Fukuyama’s idea to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm, we put the conceptual structure proposed by Fukuyama alongside topics regarding theory of history and history of historiography related to the modern concept of History and its eventual exhaustion, already signaled by several authors. The third part approaches the long course of Fukuyama’s work regarding “the end of History”, after the repercussion of his initial article up until the present days, looking for eventual innovations in the conceptual structure previously designed. For the sake of conclusion, we approach the current debates around the topic, to speculate about the future of the field of knowledge and the role attributed to the professional historian.

This dissertation proposes to examine the conspiracy narratives of Don DeLillo, Joan Didion, and Leslie Marmon Silko that retell American experience with the Cold War and its culture of paranoia for the last half of the twentieth century. Witnessing the resurgence of Cold War paranoia and its dramatic twilight during the period from late 70s to mid-80s and the sudden advent of the post-Cold War era that has provoked a volatile mixture of euphoria and melancholia, the work of DeLillo, Didion, and Silko explores the changing mode of Cold War paranoid epistemology and contemplates its conditions of narrative possibility in the post-Cold War era. From his earlier novels such as Players, The Names, and Mao II to his latest novel about 9/11 Falling Man, DeLillo has interrogated how the American paradigm of paranoid national self-fashioning envisioned by Cold War liberals stands up to its equally paranoid post-Cold War nemesis, terrorism. In his epic dramatization of Cold War history in Underworld, DeLillo mythologizes the doomed sense of paranoid connectivity and collective belonging experienced during the Cold War era. In doing so, DeLillo attempts to contain the uncertainty and instability of the post-Cold War or what Francis Fukuyama calls "post-historical" landscape of global cognitive mapping within the nostalgically secured memory of the American crowd who had lived the paranoid history of the Cold War. In her novels that investigate the history of American involvements in the Third World from Eisenhower through Kennedy to Reagan, Didion employs the minimalist narrative style to curb, extenuate, or condense the paranoid narratives of Cold War imperial romance most recently exemplified in the Iran-Contra conspiracy. In her latest Cold War romance novel The Last Thing He Wanted, Didion reassesses her earlier narrative tactic of "calculated ellipsis" employed in A Book of Common Prayer and Democracy and seeks to commemorate individual romances behind the spectacles of Cold War myth of frontier. Departing from the rhetoric of "hybrid patriotism" in Ceremony, a Native American story of spiritual healing and lyricism that works to appease white paranoia and guilt associated with the atomic bomb, Silko in Almanac of the Dead seeks to subvert the paranoid regime of Cold War imperialism inflicted upon Native Americans and Third World subjects by mobilizing alternative conspiracy narratives from the storytelling tradition of Native American spirituality. Silko?s postnational spiritual conspiracy gestures toward a global cognitive mapping beyond the American Cold War paradigm of "paranoid oneworldedness".

Este trabalho propõe o estudo da ideia de “fim da História”, conforme apresentada pelo cientista político norte-americano Francis Fukuyama. Em um primeiro momento, delimitamos seu conceito de “fim da História” a partir do artigo original The End of History?, de 1989, e de suas publicações seguintes, até o livro The End of History and the Last Man, de 1992. Na segunda parte, após contrastar a ideia ao paradigma de “choque de civilizações”, de Samuel Huntington, aproximamos a estrutura conceitual proposta por Fukuyama de tópicos da teoria da história e história da historiografia relacionados ao conceito moderno de História e sua eventual exaustão identificada por diversos autores. No terceiro momento, o trabalho aborda o percurso da obra de Fukuyama após a repercussão inicial de sua proposta de “fim da História”, até os dias de hoje, buscando eventuais novidades à estrutura conceitual delimitada anteriormente. A título de conclusão, abordamos o cenário atual dos debates da historiografia para especular acerca do futuro do campo do conhecimento e do ofício do historiador. / This work proposes the study of the idea of the “end of History“, as it is presented by the North American political scientist Francis Fukuyama. At first, we delimit the concept from his original article The End of History?, published in 1989, and from his following publications, up to his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man. In the second part, after contrasting Fukuyama’s idea to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” paradigm, we put the conceptual structure proposed by Fukuyama alongside topics regarding theory of history and history of historiography related to the modern concept of History and its eventual exhaustion, already signaled by several authors. The third part approaches the long course of Fukuyama’s work regarding “the end of History”, after the repercussion of his initial article up until the present days, looking for eventual innovations in the conceptual structure previously designed. For the sake of conclusion, we approach the current debates around the topic, to speculate about the future of the field of knowledge and the role attributed to the professional historian.