Spelling suggestions: "subject:"fulton"" "subject:"multon""
21 |
“Parliamentary sovereignty rests with the courts:” The Constitutional Foundations of J. G. Diefenbaker’s Canadian Bill of RightsBirenbaum, Jordan Daniel 02 February 2012 (has links)
The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation.
Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction.
However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.
|
22 |
“Parliamentary sovereignty rests with the courts:” The Constitutional Foundations of J. G. Diefenbaker’s Canadian Bill of RightsBirenbaum, Jordan Daniel 02 February 2012 (has links)
The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation.
Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction.
However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.
|
23 |
“Parliamentary sovereignty rests with the courts:” The Constitutional Foundations of J. G. Diefenbaker’s Canadian Bill of RightsBirenbaum, Jordan Daniel 02 February 2012 (has links)
The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation.
Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction.
However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.
|
24 |
“Parliamentary sovereignty rests with the courts:” The Constitutional Foundations of J. G. Diefenbaker’s Canadian Bill of RightsBirenbaum, Jordan Daniel January 2012 (has links)
The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation.
Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction.
However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.
|
25 |
The Surficial Geology of Fulton County, Ohio: Insight into the Late Pleistocene-Early Holocene Glaciated Landscape of the Huron-Erie Lake Plain, Fulton County Ohio, USABlockland, Joseph D. January 2013 (has links)
No description available.
|
26 |
George Tsutakawa's fountain sculptures of the 1960s: fluidity and balance in postwar public art.Cuthbert, Nancy Marie 20 August 2012 (has links)
Between 1960 and 1992, American artist George Tsutakawa (1910 – 1997) created more than sixty fountain sculptures for publicly accessible sites in the U.S., Canada, and Japan. The vast majority were made by shaping sheet bronze into geometric and organically inspired abstract forms, often arranged around a vertical axis. Though postwar modernist artistic production and the issues it raises have been widely interrogated since the 1970s, and public art has been a major area of study since about 1980, Tsutakawa's fountains present a major intervention in North America's urban fabric that is not well-documented and remains almost completely untheorized. In addition to playing a key role in Seattle's development as an internationally recognized leader in public art, my dissertation argues that these works provide early evidence of a linked concern with nature and spirituality that has come to be understood as characteristic of the Pacific Northwest. Tsutakawa was born in Seattle, but raised and educated primarily in Japan prior to training as an artist at the University of Washington, then teaching in UW's Schools of Art and Architecture. His complicated personal history, which in World War II included being drafted into the U.S. army, while family members were interned and their property confiscated, led art historian Gervais Reed to declare that Tsutakawa was aligned with neither Japan nor America – that he and his art existed somewhere in-between. There is much truth in Reed's statement; however, artistically, such dualistic assessments deny the rich interplay of cultural allusions in Tsutakawa's fountains. Major inspirations included the Cubist sculpture of Alexander Archipenko, Himalayan stone cairns, Japanese heraldic emblems, First Nations carvings, and Bauhaus theory. Focusing on the early commissions, completed during the 1960s, my study examines the artist's debts to intercultural networks of artistic exchange – between North America, Asia, and Europe – operative in the early and mid-twentieth century, and in some cases before. I argue that, with his fountain sculptures, this Japanese American artist sought to integrate and balance such binaries as nature/culture, intuition/reason, and spiritual/material, which have long served to support the construction of East and West as opposed conceptual categories. / Graduate
|
Page generated in 0.0337 seconds