Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Neosporosis is a parasitic disease of wide distribution and great importance to the cattle industry, mainly due to its associated reproductive losses. The life cycle of Neospora caninum typified by the tree know infectious stages: tachyzoites, tissue cysts with bradyzoites, and oocysts. Transmission routes can be horizontal and/or vertical. The vertical transmission or transplacentally is the most frequent form of infection, and an important form of maintain the agent in herds. With aim of to determine the occurrence of anti-Neospora caninum antibodies in serum samples of 260 bovine fetuses, collected in a slaughter in the municipality of Santa Maria, in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. For detection antibodies anti-N. caninum indirect fluorescent antibody test was used and immunoglobulin G and M were detected, using a cut-off 1:25. Of the 260 serum samples tested, 15% (39/260) were positive for the presence of anti-N. caninum. Of these, in 38 the presence of IgG where detected (97.4%) and in six IgM were present (10.3%). Five samples (15.4%) tested were positive for both IgG and IgM. The results reaffirming the ability of N. caninum in determine fetal infection. The results presented on the first chapter indicated that the search of IgM anti-N. caninum is of very limited help in the detection of the transplacental infection in cattle. In second chapter, was evaluated the susceptibility to infection by N. caninum in different cell cultures, for the purpose of observe the ability in vitro multiplication this agent. For this, eight cell cultures were tested, among the cell cultures tested, four presented good susceptibility to agent: cell lines VERO (yield of 21.2 tachyzoites/cell) and MA-104 (17.1); primary bovine testicle (16.3) and lung cells (13.6). Primary bovine kidney (8.2 tachyzoites/cell), MDBK (5.1) and RK-13 cell lines (0.4) presented moderate to low sensitivity. No viable tachyzoites were detected in the culture of MDCK cells. These results demonstrate that MA-104 cells present adequate susceptibility to N. caninum compared to VERO cells, which have been largely used to multiply the parasite in vitro. Due to the easy manipulation, quick multiplication and relatively low nutritional equirements, these results indicate that MA-104 cells are adequate for multiplication of N. caninum in vitro. / A neosporose é uma doença parasitária de ampla distribuição e com grande importância para a bovinocultura, principalmente pelas perdas reprodutivas que determina. O ciclo do Neospora caninum caracteriza-se por apresentar três estágios infecciosos: os taquizoítos, os cistos teciduais contendo bradizoítos e os oocistos. Suas rotas de transmissão podem ser horizontal e/ou vertical. A infecção vertical ou transplacentária é a forma mais freqüente de infecção, sendo uma importante forma de manutenção do agente nos rebanhos. Com o objetivo de determinar a ocorrência de anticorpos anti-N. caninum em fetos bovinos, foram coletadas 260 amostras de soro em abatedouro localizado no município de Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. Para detecção de anticorpos anti-N. caninum, utilizou-se a técnica de imunofluorescência indireta com a presença de imunoglobulinas G e M (IgG e IgM), sendo analisada com ponto de corte de 1:25. Do número total de amostras testadas, 15% (39/260) foram positivas para anticorpos anti-N. caninum. Destas, em 38 (97,4%) foi detectada a presença de IgG anti-N. caninum e em seis (15,4%) de IgM. Em cinco amostras (12,8%) detectaram-se ambos, IgG e IgM. Os resultados reafirmam a capacidade do N. caninum determinar infecção fetal. Os resultados obtidos no primeiro capítulo desta dissertação permitiram demonstrar que a pesquisa de IgM foi de limitada importância na detecção da infecção via transplacentária em soro fetal bovino. No segundo capítulo, foi avaliada a susceptibilidade à infecção pelo N. caninum em diferentes cultivos celulares, com a finalidade de observar a capacidade de multiplicação deste agente in vitro. Para isto, foram testados oito cultivos, sendo que quatro apresentaram boa susceptibilidade a multiplicação pelo N. caninum: células VERO (produção de 21,2 taquizoítos/célula), MA-104 (17,1), cultivo primário de testículo (16,3) e pulmão bovino (13,6). O cultivo primário de rim bovino (8,2), células MDBK (5,1) e RK-13 (0,4) apresentaram baixa sensibilidade, enquanto células MDCK não produziram taquizoítos viáveis. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que as células MA-104 apresentaram susceptibilidade semelhante a das células VERO linhagem tradicionalmente utilizada para o cultivo deste protozoário. Pela facilidade de cultivo e rápida multiplicação, menor exigência nutricional e produção de taquizoítos em níveis semelhantes às células VERO, as células MA-104 demonstraram ser adequadas para a manutenção e multiplicação do N. caninum in vitro.

In this dissertation, I motivate and defend a neo-Aristotelian concept of absolute prohibitions. The starting point of my argument is Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous critique of modern moral philosophy. Anscombe’s argument is widely interpreted as a call to rehabilitate Aristotelian ethics, but few among the scholars who responded to that call have dealt head-on with Anscombe’s insistence that modern moral philosophy’s deepest failure is its inability to account for absolute prohibitions. I argue that not only does Aristotle take the view that some actions are necessarily wrong, and therefore impermissible without exception, but also that this view is of genuine philosophical interest and merit. Drawing on Aristotle, I outline a concept of absolute prohibitions against gravely wrong actions on which absolute prohibitions emerge, as practical principles, from reflection on the goods human beings need to flourish. In neo-Aristotelian terms, absolute moral prohibitions are best formulated not as transcendent laws of reason or divine commands, but as preconditions for the shared life and the states of character that human beings need to live well. When we recognize that some actions directly and necessarily undermine or damage essential goods—human life, justice, virtue, and so on—we can and should rule those actions out as impermissible in principle. I argue that an Aristotelian concept of absolute prohibitions has considerable advantages over its rivals, found in traditional theology and in Kantian ethics, and that this concept can withstand the most powerful objection to the plausibility of absolute prohibitions, which is the problem of hard cases.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis has two aims. The first is to assess the cogency of the three most influential theories of intention – namely those of Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson and Michael Bratman. I identify five requirements that a convincing account of intention must fulfil, and then assess each of these theories in light of these five requirements. In the course of this analysis, I demonstrate that, while each of these theories contributes to our understanding of intention, none of them meet all the specified requirements. This leads to the second aim of this thesis, which is to develop an account of intention capable of overcoming the problems inherent in the foregoing theories of intention and hence fulfilling the specified requirements. This account is built around the definition of intention as a complex mental entity, consisting of two components: a revisable pro-attitude and a belief that the agent will try to fulfil this pro-attitude. It must further be possible for the agent to reflexively reconstruct the belief component without external information. I begin by setting out the five requirements for a convincing account of intention. In each case, I explain why it is necessary for a theory of intention to meet the relevant requirement, and elaborate on what is needed for an account of intention to fulfil this requirement. The five requirements for a convincing account of intention are: 1) It must explain the unity of the three seemingly irreconcilable uses of intention; 2) it must explain the epistemic requirements for intention; 3) it must clarify the relationship between intention and motivation, intention and causes, and intention and reasons; 4) it must explain the relationship between intention and practical reasoning, and 5) it must clarify the relationship between intention and moral responsibility. Together, these five requirements form the yardstick against which I evaluate the different theories of intention. With this yardstick in mind, I am then able to assess each of the influential theories of intention developed by Anscombe, Davidson, and Bratman. In each case, I examine how the relevant theory of intention fares in meeting each of the five requirements. This analysis shows that, while each theory provides a number of important insights, none of them succeeds in meeting all five requirements. Such analysis further enables me to identify the specific difficulties that have stymied the attempts of all three thinkers to develop a convincing account of intention. Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the three preceding accounts of intention, I then try to work out an alternative account of intention that would not fall prey to the same complications. Following the same modus operandi as before, I evaluate my proposed account against the five requirements for a convincing theory of intention. In each case, I show that my account not only succeeds in meeting the specified criterion, but also, crucially, that it is able to overcome the difficulties that have plagued previous attempts to fulfil this criterion. I conclude that, while this account is not necessarily conclusive, it does meet the conditions for a convincing account of intention and thereby casts some light into the conceptual darkness surrounding intention that Anscombe identified more than half a century ago. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis het twee oogmerke. Die eerste is om die oortuigingskrag van die drie mees invloedryke teorieë van intensie te beoordeel – naamlik die van Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson en Michael Bratman. Ek identifiseer vyf vereistes waaraan ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie moet voldoen en beoordeel dan elk van hierdie teorieë aan die hand van hierdie vyf vereistes. In die loop van hierdie analise wys ek dat, alhoewel elkeen van hierdie teorieë tot ons verstaan van intensie bydra, geeneen aan al die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen nie. Dit lei tot die tweede oogmerk van die tesis, wat die ontwikkeling van ‘n teorie van intensie behels wat daartoe in staat is om die probleme wat inherent aan die voorgenoemde teorieë is, te oorkom en wat dus aan die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen. Hierdie teorie berus op die definisie van intensie as ‘n komplekse mentale entiteit wat uit twee komponente bestaan: ‘n wysigbare pro-houding en ‘n oortuiging dat die agent hierdie pro-houding sal probeer vervul. Dit moet verder ook vir die agent moontlik wees om die oortuigingskomponent refleksief te rekonstrueer sonder eksterne inligting. Ek begin deur die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie uiteen te sit. In elke geval verduidelik ek hoekom dit nodig is vir ‘n teorie van intensie om aan die relevante vereiste te voldoen en werk ek uit wat nodig is vir ‘n verklaring van intensie om aan hierdie vereiste te voldoen. Die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie is: 1) Dit moet die ooreenstemming tussen die drie skynbaar onversoenbare gebruike van intensie verduidelik; 2) dit moet die epistemiese vereistes vir intensie verduidelik; 3) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en motivering, intensie en oorsake, en intensie en redes verhelder; 4) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en praktiese redenering verhelder; en 5) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en morele verantwoordelikheid verhelder. Gesamentlik vorm hierdie vyf vereistes die maatstaf waarvolgens ek die verskillende teorieë van intensie evalueer. Met hierdie maatstaf in gedagte is ek dan in staat daartoe om elkeen van die invloedryke teorieë van intensie, wat ontwikkel is deur Anscombe, Davidson en Bratman, te beoordeel. In elke geval ondersoek ek hoe die relevante teorie van intensie vaar in die voldoening aan elkeen van hierdie vyf vereistes. Hierdie analise wys dat, alhoewel elke teorie ‘n aantal belangrike insigte bied, geen van hul daarin slaag om aan al vyf vereistes te voldoen nie. So ‘n analise stel my verder in staat om die spesifieke probleme te identifiseer waardeur die pogings van al drie denkers om ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie te ontwikkel, gestuit is. Nadat ek die sterk en swakpunte van die drie voorafgaande verklarings van intensie geïdentifiseer het, probeer ek dan om ‘n alternatiewe teorie van intensie uit te werk wat nie aan hierdie selfde komplikasies onderhewig is nie. Deur dieselfde modus operandi as voorheen te volg, evalueer ek my voorgestelde verklaring aan die hand van die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende teorie van intensie. In elke geval wys ek dat my verklaring nie bloot daaraan slaag om aan die gespesifiseerde kriterium te voldoen nie, maar ook, van deurslaggewende belang, dat dit in staat daartoe is om die probleme te oorkom waardeur vorige pogings om die kriterium te vervul, geteister is. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, alhoewel hierdie teorie nie noodwendig afdoende is nie, dit wel die voorwaardes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie vervul en hierdeur lig werp op die konseptuele duisternis waarin intensie gehul is en wat meer as ‘n halfeeu gelede deur Anscombe geïdentifiseer is.

國內至今有關等候理論所發表的論文尚不多見，即使有之，亦多限於較基本之等候模 型，而少及於非卜松模型之探討，至於能將理論應用於企業決策之實務分析，而熔理 論與實務於一爐者，則更屬鳳毛麟角，為此，作者乃試圖作此一方面的嘗試。 本文分六章，由理論與個案分析二部構成。第一章為緒論，說明本研究的動機與目的 、研究架構及研究方法；第二章至第四章為理論的探討，首先於第二章中說明等候理 論的幾個重要的基本觀念，而後分別於第三章和第四章討論非卜松等候模型的Ｍ╱Ｇ ╱ｍ和Ｇ╱Ｍ╱ｍ模型，由於第五章的個案研穹中應用到Ｍ╱Ｇ╱ｍ模型，故對此章 有較詳細的敘述。實務之應用分析置於第五章，作者以ＹＭＬ公司為個案之研究對象 ，希望能因此而對理論與實務間的結合及限制有較深的認識。第六章為檢討與建議， 乃針對本文之理論與實務部份，提出囿於作者時間及精力所未能考慮，而應深入加以 研討部份，以供進一步研究之用。

Η “καθιερωμένη θεώρηση για την πράξη”, όντας δεσμευμένη σε ένα ευρύτερο νατουραλιστικό μοντέλο, κατανοεί την πράξη ως “επιμέρους συμβάν”, το οποίο προκαλείται αιτιακά από συγκεκριμένες νοητικές καταστάσεις. Σ’ αυτό το πλαίσιο, η αιτιακή επίδραση της πρόθεσης υπάγεται στο σύνηθες χιουμιανό μοντέλο της αιτιότητας μεταξύ συμβάντων. Ωστόσο, η εν λόγω θεώρηση αποτυγχάνει ουσιωδώς να ερμηνεύσει τις πράξεις στην εξέλιξή τους, πριν δηλαδή να διαμορφωθεί το απαιτούμενο (από το χιουμιανό μοντέλο) εξατομικευμένο συμβάν. Το γεγονός αυτό έχει ευρύτερες επιπτώσεις για τον τρόπο με τον οποίο αντιλαμβάνεται η εν λόγω προσέγγιση τόσο την έννοια της πρόθεσης, όσο και κατ’ επέκταση το ρόλο του δρώντος. Στην παρούσα εργασία και με αφορμή κυρίως πρόσφατες εργασίες από τους Hornsby και Crowther, επιχειρηματολογώ σχετικά με το ότι μπορούμε να υιοθετήσουμε μια εναλλακτική προσέγγιση, τόσο για την οντολογία της πράξης, όσο και για την πρόθεση, η οποία δίνει ικανοποιητικότερες απαντήσεις στις ανωτέρω προκλήσεις. Κεντρική θέση στα πλαίσια αυτής της προσέγγισης είναι η αναγνώριση της “δραστηριότητας” ως συγκροτησιακού στοιχείου της πράξης, κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας η αιτιακή συμβολή του δρώντος παραμένει συνεχής, σε συμφωνία με μια αριστοτελικού τύπου προσέγγιση της αιτιότητας. Όι παραδοχές αυτές οδηγούν σε μια θεώρηση της πρόθεσης ως καθοδηγητικής της πράξης καθόλη τη διάρκεια εξέλιξής της. / The “standard story of action” being committed to a broader naturalistic model, understands action as a “particular event”, which is caused by certain mental states. In this context, the causal efficacy of intention is covered by the standard humean model of causality between events. Nevertheless, the story in question substantially fails to give an account for actions as they develop, that is, before the required (by the humean model) individuated event has been formed. That fact has broader effects on the way that the approach in question understands the concept of intention, and ultimately the role of the agent. In this thesis, following mainly on recent papers by Hornsby and Crowther, I argue that we can endorse an alternate approach regarding the ontology of action, as well as intention, that gives more adequate answers to the challenges mentioned above. The main thesis in this context is to recognize “activity” as a constitutional element of action, during which the causal efficacy of the agent remains ongoing, in accordance with an aristotelian type of approach to causality. These commitments result in recognizing intention as guiding action throughout the whole of its development.