The thesis deals with the issue of photographs taken during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The ethnically motivated conflict, in which the Hutu majority tried to exterminate the Tutsi minority, claimed almost a million victims in a hundred days. The Rwandan genocide is notoriously associated with machetes and radio. Most of the victims were killed with primitive weapons, and the murders of neighbours and family members took place under the influence of a propaganda radio broadcast. The thesis describes how photojournalism in the 1990s reported on such a specific conflict as modern genocide. The thesis uses visual framing analysis, which is based on the theory of framing. After that it was possible to identify the recurring visual frames through which the Rwandan genocide is depicted in the images.

This thesis explores the Armenian diaspora’s behavior concerning the issue of recognition of the Armenian genocide through lobbying within the US and EU. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to grasp a deepened understanding of diasporic lobbying, while focusing on the Armenian case, as a case enabling further scholarly deepening for the field of IR. In order to achieve an understanding of the Armenian diaspora, the appropriated behavior through lobbying and the trajectorial changes concerning the recognition of the Armenian genocide, the paper puts forward historical process tracing, comparative research and qualitative content analysis. These methods are utilized as a means for tracing the events contributing to the construction of the diaspora. They also establish the lobby’s influence on ‘host-states’ and the understanding of internalized norms granting policy changes for the cause of recognizing the Armenian genocide, this is done through the concepts of identity, norms and recognition.

The international community has shied away from instituting safe havens in conflict zones since the fall of Srebreniça in 1995. However, a look at the roles of safe havens in genocidal violence provides a deeper understanding of the need for these spaces to be established in a timely fashion. The strategic use of cultural safe havens as places for mass violence, necessitates the establishment of international safe havens for the protection of the targeted population, yet an analysis of the relationship between cultural safe havens and international safe havens has not been done before. As such, this research seeks to shed light on the relationship between the use of cultural safe havens, their inherent danger in cases of genocide, and the need for better models for international safe havens in times of violence. It is the researcher’s argument that to achieve this, the very perception of safety must be reimagined. Using content analysis methodology in the form of case studies, along with historical sociology, this research analyzes accounts of genocidal campaigns – Armenia, Rwanda and Bosnia – to explain the relationship between the dangers of cultural safe havens and the subsequent need for international safe havens that are established in time to save the victimized populations.

One of the most violent periods of the Guatemalan civil war was the government of General Efraín Ríos Montt in the early 1980s, which went down in history with the sad legacy of genocide, large-scale displacement and other war crimes. Most of them have never been investigated or punished. The breakthrough of impunity was the accession of Claudia Paz y Paz to the head of the public prosecutor's office. Trial with Ríos Montt became the most exposed one. Despite the subsequent annulment of the incriminating verdict, this process was an important milestone in Guatemalan justice, but also in international law, contributing several key precedents. Ríos Montt became the first head of state to be convicted of genocide by a domestic tribunal. This work deals with the factors that influenced the war crimes prosecutions after the signing of peace agreements and analyzes the importance of the trial of Ríos Montt in the Guatemalan coming to terms with the past by the state. Key Words Guatemala, Efraín Ríos Montt, genocide, impunity, transitional justice

In the decades after attaining independence from its colonial masters, Rwanda’s two principal ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, suffered worsening tensions which often resulted in the perpetration of atrocities. Peace agreements brokered by the international community did not ease these ethnic tensions. In April 1994, the ethnic crisis took a different dimension following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. A full-blown genocide was committed by the Hutus who targeted their Tutsi and Hutu-moderates victims because of their ethnic identity and tolerant political views respectively. In a hundred days, about a million Tutsis and Hutu-moderates were massacred. Gross violations of human rights had been committed. The planning, preparation and execution of these atrocities were done by almost everyone within the Hutu majority: the leadership (both civilian and military), business men, the clergy, artists, professors, journalists, militias, the commoners, and other civil society actors. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) under the leadership of General Paul Kagame overthrew the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and brought the genocide to an end. In an effort to build a government of national unity, the Government of Rwanda under the leadership of President Paul Kagame requested the United Nations Security Council to establish a tribunal for the trial of persons who bear responsibility for the atrocities committed in Rwanda. In response to this request, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) creating the second United Nations’ ad hoc international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Annexed to Resolution 955 was the Statute of the ICTR. The Statute gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over three crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Amongst other things, it also defined on which individuals it would impose criminal responsibility. The definition of genocide and the punishable acts as contained in the Statute of the ICTR (Article 2) were simply imported from the United Nations’ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948 (Article III). One of these punishable acts is direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute of the ICTR). As seen in Article 6(1) of the Statute of the ICTR, there are five different modes of participation that would lead to the imposition of criminal responsibility: planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting. Instigation is one of these modes of participation. An examination of the jurisprudence of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTR reveals that there is an overlap between direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) and instigation as a mode of participation under Article 6(1). The Trial and Appeal Chambers have contributed enormously to the development of the jurisprudence of direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c). Now settled as an inchoate crime in international criminal law, criminal responsibility is imposed irrespective of whether the direct and public incitement successfully results in the commission of genocide. On the other hand, instigation is one of the modes of participation which would lead to the imposition of criminal responsibility. Participation under Article 6(1) is not limited to any particular crime, but extends to all the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction – genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. The jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers on Article 6(1) states that criminal responsibility can only be imposed where it is proved that the accused’s mode of participation substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. Therefore, instigation, which is one of the modes of participation, must be shown to have substantially contributed to the commission of the crime for criminal responsibility to be imposed. In my opinion, this requirement of substantial contribution for the imposition of criminal responsibility is wrong. It emanates from a poor understanding of Article 6(1) and the construction of the words therein. It is a judicial invention which does not square with established principles of criminal responsibility in general and inchoate crimes in particular. This thesis critiques the jurisprudence of the ICTR on instigation as a mode of participation under Article 6(1). Instigation is a recognised mode of participation in international crimes. Under the common law system, it is also an inchoate crime. International instruments and the jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers have recognised the inchoate nature of incitement. However, in the construction of Article 6(1) wherein instigation features as a mode of participation, the Trial and Appeal Chambers erred. I illustrate in this thesis that a correct construction and understanding of Article 6(1) shows its inchoate and bifurcated character: first, any of the modes of participation must lead to any of the stages of any of the crimes (planning, preparation or execution). These modes of participation are not limited to any particular crime. Therefore, if instigation leads to the planning or preparation of any of the crimes, that renders it inchoate (which is understood to mean a criminal activity that is incomplete, still at its initial stage). Second, the imposition of criminal responsibility is bifurcated. In other words, it must go through two stages: first, there must be a mode of participation, and second, it must lead to any of the stages of the crimes. Third, the substantial contribution requirement does not square with a strict construction of Article 6(1). In articulating the different stages that a mode of participation must lead to, it states ‘planning, preparation or execution’ of any of the crimes. The use of a disjunctive word ‘or’ rather than a conjunctive word ‘and’ suggests that any of the modes of participation that leads to any of these stages (planning, preparation or execution) of any of these crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II) would suffice. Therefore, to require that there must be a substantial contribution to commission of a crime before criminal responsibility can be imposed under Article 6(1) is a clear limitation to the last stage of the crime, which is execution (or commission). As evidenced by the cases tried at the Tribunal, Article 2(3)(c) which addresses the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide and Article 6(1) which deals with the imposition of criminal responsibility, do overlap. In other words, incitement that qualifies as direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) may as well qualify as instigation to any of the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction under Article 6(1). From the delivery of its first judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu,1 the Trial Chambers did not recognise the confluence 1 Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4. T. Ch. I, 2 September 1998. between these two Articles. However, in the case of The Prosecutor v Callixte Kalimanzira,2 the Trial Chambers made this observation, and outlined a set of guidelines on how to resolve cases of overlap. Though a colossal step in fixing this problem, the guidelines are faulted because they repeat the same mistakes made by previous Trial Chambers: first, they limit instigation only to genocide even under Article 6(1); second, they still hold that criminal responsibility can be imposed under Article 6(1) only when it is proved that the mode of participation substantially contributed to the commission of the crime. While it resonates with conventional wisdom today that incitement, synonymous with instigation, is limited to the crime of genocide, this thesis critiques the jurisprudence of both the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the ICTR and argues that instigation is a mode of participation in crimes against humanity following a strict construction of Article 6(1). Furthermore, incitement that qualifies as ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) may also qualify as instigation to commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or both under Article 6(1). Third, ‘direct and public incitement’ to commit genocide under Article 2(3)(c) is limited to the crime of genocide, and must fulfil the caveats of ‘direct’ and ‘public’. Meanwhile, instigation under Article 6(1) does not need to meet any requirement as long as it leads to the ‘planning, preparation or execution’ of any of the crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction. The poor construction of Article 6(1) has resulted in huge controversies about instigation as a mode of participation in crimes over which the ICTR has jurisdiction under Article 6(1). More specifically, instigation, which is one of the modes, overlaps with the wording of Article 2(3)(c) which deals with the inchoate crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The substantial contribution requirement is a judicial invention which does not align squarely with established principles of criminal responsibility for inchoate crimes. It is the unfortunate outcome of a poor construction of Article 6(1) and has orchestrated a confused understanding of instigation as a mode of participation. It has blurred and obfuscated instigation as a mode of participation in crimes against humanity; stagnated the evolution of the jurisprudence on instigation to 2 Judgment, Case No. ICTR-05-88-T, T. Ch. III, 22 June 2009. commit crimes against humanity; and above all, propelled international criminal law on an ambitious and controversial mission from which it must retreat

When authors write fiction about real, traumatic events, they face ethical challenges about how to portray trauma and its impacts. This dissertation employs methods of close reading and application of theory to investigate authorial choices. I argue that authors writing fiction about trauma often make aesthetic choices that blur the line between figurative and literal language in order to portray bodily experiences. This dissertation takes as its subject novels from sub-Saharan Africa that depict traumas caused directly and indirectly by colonialism. Authors including David Diop (1966-) and Birago Diop (1906-1989) have used these techniques to write about tirailleurs sénégalais, West African men conscripted to serve France’s military in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I bring these authors together with Boris Boubacar Diop (1946-) and Véronique Tadjo (1955-), who wrote books about the Rwandan genocide, because they also perform this translation for the body, asking readers to approach these works with a sensitivity to the ways the body endures trauma. The effect of these choices is a humanizing and integrated portrayal of trauma as a phenomenon that challenges the mind-body separation of cartesian influence and complicates human experience of time as linear. These works create space to think about trauma and recovery as individual as well as communal, to map similarities of human responses to trauma without pathologizing it. Ultimately, these works point to the conclusion that living through/with trauma is possible when the trauma can be incorporated into a new conception of the self.

本稿は、条約解釈規則を分析軸として、国際司法裁判所によるジェノサイド条約の判断が、条約当事国の意思に従っているのかについて検討する。本稿では、国際司法裁判所の判例の中でも、1951年「ジェノサイド条約の留保」勧告的意見に限定した結果、分析軸となる条約解釈規則も、当該勧告的意見当時の条約解釈規則に限定している。 / This article examines by means of the rules of treaty interpretation whether the decisions of Genocide Convention by the International Court of Justice follows the intentions of the parties to the Convention. It focuses on Advisory Opinion of Resevations to the Convention on Genocide in Cases of the Court, so the rules are limited to them of those times. / 博士(法学) / Doctor of Laws / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

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The purpose of this essay is to analyse the movie Hotel Rwanda from a didactic point of view using the movie’s use of history and historical culture as the main analytical tools. We also intend to problematize the use of movies in teaching focusing on the teaching guide from the Swedish film institution concerning Hotel Rwanda. We choose to work with a qualitative method. The reason why we decided to work with a qualitative method is the intention, as mentioned before, to analyse the movie using the tools we described earlier. By doing this we learnt that the movie uses history as a mean to simplify the roles of perpetrator and victims and it also describes the events without historical context. Concerns about the facts of the movie and its complementary guide has also been raised especially the role of the movies main protagonist Paul Rusesabagina. Therefore we have reason to question the use of this movie in an educational environment.

Throughout history, recurring instances of genocide have subjected specific groups and minorities to severe human rights violations. The most significant aspect of genocide is the international community's response, which often proves ineffective due to delayed reactions and self-interest. Currently, the Uyghur genocide is unfolding, with millions of innocent Uyghur Muslims enduring arbitrary detentions and being labeled as terrorists by the People's Republic of China (PRC). This thesis aims to investigate the discursive strategies employed by the international community when discussing the human rights abuses targeting the Uyghur minority in Xingang. Additionally, it will analyze China's response to the international backlash and its utilization of sophisticated discursive methods. Through a discourse analysis and a theoretical framework rooted in poststructuralism, incorporating concepts of discourse and deconstruction, both perspectives will be critically examined and compared.