Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophisches Seminar--Universität Münster, 2000. / Bibliogr. p. 160-163. Index.

Texte remanie de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität zu Köln, 2006.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1919.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Freie Universität Berlin. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 101-105).

This dissertation is an attempt to better understand the moral and political thought of John Rawls. I begin by calling into question the conventional, though misleading, image of Rawls as a thoroughgoing Kantian. While the influence of Kant upon Rawls is undeniable and therefore well documented, there are important theoretical differences between them, and these differences open up the necessary interpretive space for the under-appreciated influences of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and G.W.F. Hegel. That neither Rousseau – a theorist of recognition – nor Hegel – a theorist of reconciliation – is regarded as an important influence on Rawls is a major oversight in the history of political thought – an oversight that my dissertation hopes to amend. But there is more at stake here than the addition of a new chapter in the history of political philosophy: when we expose the full extent of the Rousseauian and Hegelian heritage of justice as fairness (and later, political liberalism), we get a more complete, nuanced – and, in my view, a more attractive – image of the moral and political philosophy of Rawls. This new, richer image of Rawls’s political philosophy is captured by what I call “robust reasonableness”: what Rawls offers, in the end, is a more conspicuously demanding account of the reasonable – of our obligations towards our fellow participants in social cooperation. Justice as fairness is thus anchored by a morality of engaged and committed citizenship. This is precisely what Rawls sees as missing from Kant’s ethical philosophy. In response, he turns to Rousseau and to Hegel, both of whom provide, at least on Rawls’s view, persuasive solutions to the pathologies of social and political life. Rawls incorporates many of these solutions into the normative and practical landscape of his own philosophical doctrine, and this compels us to reconsider that doctrine in the light of these unrecognized influences.

This dissertation is an attempt to better understand the moral and political thought of John Rawls. I begin by calling into question the conventional, though misleading, image of Rawls as a thoroughgoing Kantian. While the influence of Kant upon Rawls is undeniable and therefore well documented, there are important theoretical differences between them, and these differences open up the necessary interpretive space for the under-appreciated influences of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and G.W.F. Hegel. That neither Rousseau – a theorist of recognition – nor Hegel – a theorist of reconciliation – is regarded as an important influence on Rawls is a major oversight in the history of political thought – an oversight that my dissertation hopes to amend. But there is more at stake here than the addition of a new chapter in the history of political philosophy: when we expose the full extent of the Rousseauian and Hegelian heritage of justice as fairness (and later, political liberalism), we get a more complete, nuanced – and, in my view, a more attractive – image of the moral and political philosophy of Rawls. This new, richer image of Rawls’s political philosophy is captured by what I call “robust reasonableness”: what Rawls offers, in the end, is a more conspicuously demanding account of the reasonable – of our obligations towards our fellow participants in social cooperation. Justice as fairness is thus anchored by a morality of engaged and committed citizenship. This is precisely what Rawls sees as missing from Kant’s ethical philosophy. In response, he turns to Rousseau and to Hegel, both of whom provide, at least on Rawls’s view, persuasive solutions to the pathologies of social and political life. Rawls incorporates many of these solutions into the normative and practical landscape of his own philosophical doctrine, and this compels us to reconsider that doctrine in the light of these unrecognized influences.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis examines the problem of identity and difference in Hegel and Heidegger and thereby attempts to shed light on the relationship between the critique of metaphysics and the critique of modernity. Both Hegel and Heidegger, it is argued, investigate identity and difference in relation to the problem of self-consciousness or subjectivity within the historical context of modernity. Their respective critiques of modern subject-metaphysics can for this reason also be viewed as critiques of the philosophical foundations of modernity. Two paths or lines of inquiry can be identified: Hegel’s dialectical-speculative path, which attempts to supersede modern subject-metaphysics in favour of speculative philosophy, the form of thought adequate to the experience of freedom in modernity; and Heidegger’s ontopoetic path, which attempts to detach itself from metaphysics in order to usher in a ‘non-metaphysical’ experience of technological modernity. These two paths are explored through a critical dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger as a way of showing the relationship between the critique of metaphysics and the critique of modernity. Part I of the thesis considers the philosophical background to the identity/difference problem and its relation to the principle of self-consciousness within modern philosophy. The early Hegel’s encounter with Kant and Fichte is explored as an attempt to criticise the (theoretical and practical) deficiencies of the philosophy of reflection. Part II considers Hegel’s positive project in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in particular the theme of intersubjective recognition and its significance for theorising self-consciousness in modernity. Hegel’s critique of substance- and subject-metaphysics is examined in the Science of Logic, which integrates the logic of identity and difference within the threefold Conceptual unity of universal, particular, and individual. Part III then turns to Heidegger’s explicit confrontation with Hegel, discussing Heidegger’s project of posing anew the question of Being, and examining in detail Heidegger’s “Cartesian-egological” reading of the Phenomenology. The later Heidegger’s “non-metaphysical” or ontopoetic evocation of identity and difference is further explored in light of Heidegger’s critical engagement with the nihilism of technological modernity. In conclusion, it is suggested that the critical dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger can open up new paths for exploring the problem of freedom in modernity.

This thesis explores relationships between economics and theology through the concept of salvation. Self-interested behaviour is often equated with sin in religious circles including Christian theology, while it is the foundation of modern economic theory. Must there be a deep gulf between theology and economics in this and other areas? This is the question of the thesis. The aim of this thesis is to show that economics and theology are mutually intertwined, and that understanding these links contributes to a better understanding of salvation. By showing that self-interest is not only the main motive of economic behaviour but also the basis of theological faith, the thesis will investigate their mutual interrelationship. It argues that economics has a theological dimension as theology is embedded in economic thought, and that theology has an economic aspect as faith is dependent on the self-interested consciousness similar to economics. Different theology leads to different economics. Theological investigation of human behaviour cannot avoid economic account of human self-conscious desire as a way of salvation. The argument about salvation is developed in relation to the two major philosophers Adam Smith and G.W.F. Hegel. Smith???s self-interest is a natural instinct embedded in human nature, while Hegel???s self-consciousness is a rational ability to be realized. It will be argued that this bifurcation comes from the differences in their theological foundations regarding grace, original sin, eternality, transcendence, immanence, etc. The illumination of the theological foundations of the economic ideas of two main thinkers helps to enrich our understanding of the issues related to salvation such as: sympathy and recognition, poverty and the state, invisible hand and cunning of reason, evil and scarcity, and eschatology. This thesis concludes that human self-conscious desire is a way of salvation both in economics and theology as they are mutually interrelated in theologies of economics in Adam Smith and Hegel. This interdisciplinary thesis contributes to better understanding of human behaviour not only in the world of economics but also in the ethical and religious world.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Legal punishment is frequently regarded as a cornerstone of both the legal system and of society more broadly yet (surely to its detriment) it is a practice which lacks a firm philosophical foundation. In spite of exercising many extremely capable legal and philosophical minds (particularly during the twentieth century) no generally agreed upon justification of punishment has been found. The nub of the problem has however been acknowledged as the inability of either of the major candidate theories (utilitarianism or retributivism) to provide an account able to address all the relevant parties. Whilst utilitarianism is often regarded as competent to the task of justifying punishment to society in terms of the attainment of some greater good, it seems entirely inadequate when it comes to formulating a justification to the criminal to explain why he has been singled out for punishment. And in the case of retributivism the situation is reversed. To the criminal it can be put that through punishment he is treated in accordance with what has done, but in the matter of justifying punishment to society, the key principle of desert is unable to be properly grounded. Thus the central motivation of this thesis is to attempt to redress this shortcoming in the philosophical literature and to formulate a viable justification of legal punishment. Ultimately it will be argued that the accounts of both Kant and Hegel offer a way of resolving the dilemma of punishment, and in particular their idealist orientation over and above their more widely acknowledged characterization as retributivists. In Kant’s case his contribution is derived from a reworked and more sophisticated version of his retributivism than is generally found in the literature, inspired by the work of Susan Meld Shell. Following Shell’s lead Kant’s construction of justice is explored and found to both enhance and support the traditional justification of punishment he can offer to the criminal, and to furnish an otherwise elusive justification of punishment to society more broadly. A reading of Hegel on punishment is also developed by taking seriously his theory of recognition and aspects of his logic, particularly regarding negation and contradiction. His account then addresses quite neatly and straightforwardly the three audiences for whom a justification of punishment is sought – the criminal, the victim and society itself. Not only does the thesis address the problem of punishment but it has further implications for Kant and Hegel scholarship as well as philosophy more broadly. One of the key points to come out of this thesis is that Kant and Hegel (if given adequate intellectual consideration) seem potentially able to offer up significant contributions to contemporary problems and issues beyond just the one argued for here regarding punishment. Their work is not merely of historical interest but has real and wide ranging possibilities which provide a rich resource for future research.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis examines the problem of identity and difference in Hegel and Heidegger and thereby attempts to shed light on the relationship between the critique of metaphysics and the critique of modernity. Both Hegel and Heidegger, it is argued, investigate identity and difference in relation to the problem of self-consciousness or subjectivity within the historical context of modernity. Their respective critiques of modern subject-metaphysics can for this reason also be viewed as critiques of the philosophical foundations of modernity. Two paths or lines of inquiry can be identified: Hegel’s dialectical-speculative path, which attempts to supersede modern subject-metaphysics in favour of speculative philosophy, the form of thought adequate to the experience of freedom in modernity; and Heidegger’s ontopoetic path, which attempts to detach itself from metaphysics in order to usher in a ‘non-metaphysical’ experience of technological modernity. These two paths are explored through a critical dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger as a way of showing the relationship between the critique of metaphysics and the critique of modernity. Part I of the thesis considers the philosophical background to the identity/difference problem and its relation to the principle of self-consciousness within modern philosophy. The early Hegel’s encounter with Kant and Fichte is explored as an attempt to criticise the (theoretical and practical) deficiencies of the philosophy of reflection. Part II considers Hegel’s positive project in the Phenomenology of Spirit, in particular the theme of intersubjective recognition and its significance for theorising self-consciousness in modernity. Hegel’s critique of substance- and subject-metaphysics is examined in the Science of Logic, which integrates the logic of identity and difference within the threefold Conceptual unity of universal, particular, and individual. Part III then turns to Heidegger’s explicit confrontation with Hegel, discussing Heidegger’s project of posing anew the question of Being, and examining in detail Heidegger’s “Cartesian-egological” reading of the Phenomenology. The later Heidegger’s “non-metaphysical” or ontopoetic evocation of identity and difference is further explored in light of Heidegger’s critical engagement with the nihilism of technological modernity. In conclusion, it is suggested that the critical dialogue between Hegel and Heidegger can open up new paths for exploring the problem of freedom in modernity.