In this thesis I deal primarily with Hegel's theory of tragedy, in an attempt to both explicate and evaluate his ideas in this area. The works of Hegel upon which I have based my observations include the chapter entitled Spirit in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the section on Dramatic Poetry in his Philosophy of Fine Art. First I delineate the kind of moral dilemma which Hegel asserted as intrinsic to tragedy and then I evaluate the theory which arises out of this belief. The Hegelian terminology necessary for this sort of discussion is set out in the first two chapters. An explanation is given for such terms as Spirit, Freedom, the Universal, the Absolute and the self-defined subject. Hegel's interest in the Greek po1i s - the tension between the autonomy of the individual and the demands of the state and his concepts of Christian agape and Fate are also discussed. In the second chapter Hegel's historical dialectic is explored to further clarify his concept of Spirit and to provide the context in which he first presents us with the Antigone, which is his major vehicle for the abstraction of his theory of tragedy from the rest of his system. At this stage the basic ingredients of tragedy can be clearly defined, i.e., familial obligation versus civic duty. I discuss the possibility of tragic division within Spirit itself, the case in which morally justifiable belief and action may be at odds with action and belief which is equally justifiable. The third chapter offers a more thorough examination of the ethical duties which Hegel thought were unique to family life and the relation these bore to the Universal. Then a brief exegesis of the Antigone is given, followed by the philosophical significance which Hegel perceived in the play's major events and in the relationships therein depicted. In the final chapter I deal with Hegel's attempt to extend his theory to include modern tragedy. I discuss the level of coherence and consistency which he maintains and the value of his expanded theory. As he contends that modern tragedy emphasizes The individual and the needs and desires of his particular personality or character, I follow up on Quinton's query about whether Hegel's theory can hold up once we have taken the ethical significance away from the action in tragedy. Finally, I discuss what "the tragic view of life" can be said to mean for Hegel. Is he the optimist he is generally taken for and are all spheres of action and belief in his ethical world ultimately concordant and harmonious? Or, indeed, does Hegel consistently support a yes or no answer to this latter question, along with all its ensuing implications for tragedy and Spirit. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 27 septembre 2023) / Ce mémoire a pour objet le concept hégélien d'expérience (Erfahrung), et se donne pour objectif d'examiner la cohérence et la valeur de vérité de cette notion cardinale de la pensée de Hegel. À cette fin, nous examinerons dans notre premier chapitre le rôle que revêt ce concept dans le texte où il intervient pour la première fois, l'introduction de la Phénoménologie de l'esprit. En critiquant la façon dont le commencement de la philosophie a été conçu à l'époque moderne, Hegel pose alors la nécessité d'une nouvelle propédeutique philosophique dont l'expérience constituera l'assise méthodologique. Après avoir retracé cette critique, nous nous tournerons vers la façon dont Hegel conçoit l'expérience et exposerons en quoi celle-ci est apte à assurer la scientificité de ce qu'il tient pour la propédeutique philosophique véritable. Cette partie descriptive de la recherche sera suivie par une partie critique, où nous mettrons à l'épreuve la valeur de vérité du concept hégélien d'expérience. Cet examen sera conduit à partir des prémisses mêmes de la pensée de Hegel, et nous nous appuierons à cette fin sur la critique immanente qu'en formule Adorno. Dans notre second chapitre, nous tenterons ainsi de déterminer si la conception hégélienne de l'expérience rend justice au mouvement effectif du savoir philosophique. Nous visons donc à appliquer le procédé de la critique immanente théorisé par Hegel à sa propre pensée, et ce pour mettre à l'épreuve sa prétention à la vérité. Nous retracerons ensuite ce qu'Adorno tient pour une réélaboration du concept d'expérience ayant abandonné les présuppositions et les incohérences qui affectaient la pensée de Hegel.

Sze Man-hung, Stephen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Bibliography: leaves 68-70.

Notre mémoire dégage la nature du rapport de la conscience et de la vérité dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel selon deux aspects. D'un côté, la vérité est ce à quoi la conscience se rapporte comme une réalité en soi normative qu'elle distingue de son savoir. Mais, dès lors qu'elle veut s'assumer de la vérité de son savoir, elle fait l'expérience de la non-vérité de ce qu'elle tenait pour le Vrai. Cette expérience que fait la conscience et qui entraîne la perte d'elle-même, Hegel l'appelle la dialectique. De l'autre côté, l'absolu n'a pas seulement pour Hegel la teneur d'une substance, il est bien plutôt sujet, c'est-à-dire auto-mouvement mouvement d'advenir qui se manifeste phénoménalement en se déployant au cœur de l'opposition conscientielle du concept et de l'être, pour s'y montrer comme leur unité fondamentale. Le mémoire tente de cerner comment ces deux mouvements se concilient et quelles en sont les modalités d'accomplissement.

This dissertation is an exposition and critique of Robert Brandom's theory of discursive objectivity. It discusses this theory both within the context of Brandom's own systematic philosophical project and, in turn, within the ideas and questions characteristic of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition in German philosophy. It is argued that Brandom's attempt to articulate a theory of the objectivity of discursive norms (and hence also of the content of discursive attitudes) resembles J.G. Fichte's development of themes central to Kant's philosophy. This "Fichtean" approach to the problem of objectivity is then compared and contrasted to that of G.W.F. Hegel. Though Brandom, Fichte and Hegel share the desire to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity from the social character is discursive practices, Hegel offers a version of this project that differs with respect to the nature of self-consciousness, sociality and truth. It is then argued that Brandom's theory suffers significant internal inconsistencies that could be avoided by adopting a more "Hegelian" approach to these three themes. More specifically, Brandom's own project requires that he recognize the necessity and irreducibility of firstperson and second-person discursive attitudes, as well as that he recognize the role of "I-We" social practices for discursive objectivity. Furthermore, he must include in his explanations some form of natural teleology and hence he must abandon his deflationary approach to semantic explanation. However, Brandom's methodological and metaphysical commitments prevent him from doing so.

El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar justamente la Ciencia de la Lógica, texto en el que Hegel por primera vez presenta formalmente su método dialéctico (al cual llama, justamente, el Método, en la última parte del Libro III), el cual no es otra cosa que una manera de visualizar la realidad que, siguiendo fundamentalmente los planteamientos de Heráclito, se muestra como una total alternativa a la lógica tradicional de Aristóteles. Las palabras recién citadas de Ernst Bloch, ya adelantan la peculiaridad del pensamiento del filósofo que aquí se comienza a estudiar.

My dissertation concerns Hegel’s mature theoretical philosophy. I focus on the role of logic, meant here in a much more conventional sense of the term than is usually thought relevant to Hegel’s thought. I argue that Hegel’s main achievement in logic is to attempt a noncircular derivation of its laws and materials. Central to my interpretation is a sympathetic treatment of Hegel’s claim that Kant did not have a comparably rigorous justification for logic. In Hegel’s view, the critical philosophy’s pervasive reliance on logic precludes it from evaluating the latter in a non-question-begging way. As a result, Kant is forced to ground logic psychologically (though not “psychologistically” in Frege’s sense). For Hegel, Kant’s critical philosophy is insufficiently self-critical with respect to its own logical foundations. It is therefore vulnerable to criticism on logical grounds — especially from a Hegelian direction. As I also hope to show, Hegel rejects Kant’s critique of metaphysics, arguing that its logical presuppositions are unfounded. Once those presuppositions are overhauled, the true source of the metaphysical tradition’s impasses becomes apparent, and a non-Kantian-idealist, metaphysical solution is at hand. The lesson is that metaphysics is an enduring possibility, provided it is based on secure logical foundations.

This dissertation defends a Hegelian model of our relationship to social roles. This model functions both as a new interpretation of Hegel’s own view, and as a contribution to the contemporary debate about role obligations. On this model, it is constitutive of our agency, and therefore obligatory, to carry out our social roles. Yet, ‘carrying out’ our roles also necessarily involves that we persistently develop our roles, and the social order of which they are part, towards realizing the human good. In that process, we are required to lead society through a process of social evolution, whose basic structure mirrors the development of natural life at a higher, self-conscious level. From the standpoint of Hegel scholarship, the main upshot of my interpretation is that Hegel’s vision of social participation does not only leave room for social critique, as commentators have recently argued, but rather centrally requires such critique. In fact, I argue that Hegel has – what I will call – a Neo-Aristotelian model of social critique (centered around the idea of ‘living unity’) that is an essential component of his account of how we should relate to social roles, but that has been hitherto overlooked. From the standpoint of the contemporary debate on role obligations, the main upshot of my interpretation is that Hegel offers an account that neither limits the normativity of social roles to those roles we have actually accepted, nor to the roles that are reflectively acceptable. Instead, Hegel develops an account on which even reflectively unacceptable roles give us obligations – namely obligations to evolve them, through a process of social experimentation, into something better. It is this view – and the central function that it attributes to social evolution as part of our role obligations – that make Hegel an interesting, but often overlooked, contributor to the debate about role obligations today.