Yes / Despite the revival of interest in nineteenth century psychology and ethics in Britain during the 1980s, and the current debate around Utilitarian ethics in medicine (Buckle, 2005) and care (Offer, 2004), Utilitarian premises, understood as a psychological theory rather than as a moral philosophy, remain largely dormant in contemporary British Psychology. This is so despite their apparent survival in Behaviourism (Plaud & Vogeltanz, 1994). This article examines aspects of their decline within Victorian psychology, by focussing upon the relatively neglected psychological writings of Herbert Spencer. In doing so, it seeks to make a modest contribution to unravelling the complex changes in the nature of nineteenth-century psychology. In particular it is argued that, whilst some explanations of the decline of Utilitarian premises in the Victorian development of psychology focus upon the later part of the century and cultural or institutional factors, an examination of Spencer's works at the mid-century supports the view that changes were under way earlier. Whilst several explanations might be offered for this, changes in economic organisation and in the experience of individual agency are highlighted. The relation between Utilitarian psychology and Utilitarian ethics will then be considered. Finally, at this stage it should be possible to comment upon the significance of the marginalization of Utilitarian premises within the development of Victorian psychology for the contemporary debate about health resource allocation. / ESRC

Esta dissertação é um estudo da doutrina evolucionária do gradual desenvolvimento da mente de Herbert Spencer, em especial como aparece na terceira parte de seus Principles of Psychology: General Synthesis (1855). Atenção é dada aos princípios epistemológicos basilares do seu sistema da Filosofia Sintética, assim como os conceitos de complexidade, estrutura, função e teleologia, em sua concepção evolucionista pré-darwiniana. Examinam-se também alguns debates em que se envolveu Spencer nesse período vitoriano / This thesis is a study of the evolutionary doctrine of gradual development of the mind of Herbert Spencer, especially as it appears in the third part of his Principles of Psychology: General Synthesis (1855). The basic epistemological principles of his Synthetic Philosophy are studied, as well as the concepts of complexity, structure, function and teleology, in his pre-Darwinian evolutionary conception. Some of his debates in this Victorian era are also examined

Esta dissertação é um estudo da doutrina evolucionária do gradual desenvolvimento da mente de Herbert Spencer, em especial como aparece na terceira parte de seus Principles of Psychology: General Synthesis (1855). Atenção é dada aos princípios epistemológicos basilares do seu sistema da Filosofia Sintética, assim como os conceitos de complexidade, estrutura, função e teleologia, em sua concepção evolucionista pré-darwiniana. Examinam-se também alguns debates em que se envolveu Spencer nesse período vitoriano / This thesis is a study of the evolutionary doctrine of gradual development of the mind of Herbert Spencer, especially as it appears in the third part of his Principles of Psychology: General Synthesis (1855). The basic epistemological principles of his Synthetic Philosophy are studied, as well as the concepts of complexity, structure, function and teleology, in his pre-Darwinian evolutionary conception. Some of his debates in this Victorian era are also examined

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T14:16:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Waldir Stefano.pdf: 2863968 bytes, checksum: f780e204a79b8d3f3f23b46dfab77ca6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-18 / The present thesis deals with Herbert Spencer Jennings (1868 1947) contributions to genetics and evolution between 1908 and 1912. During this period, this American biologist developed a series of experiments with Paramecium, and attempted to test the action of selection on those organisms. The aim of this thesis is to analyse Jennings experimental results, trying to elucidate whether his conclusions were well grounded according to the patterns of scientific rationality of his time or not, taking in account the contributions of his colleagues on the subject. Besides that, it will try to situate Jennings contributions in the history of genetics and evolution trying to find out if some labels applied to him or his contributions such as pioneer of biological investigation ; the one who changed the directions of biology ; or who published and presented works clear and coherent , were fair. This thesis contains an introduction and five chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the hereditary and evolutionary precedents as well as Jennings general outlook concerning the subject. Chapter 2 presents some information related to the experimental material employed by Jennings in his experiments. Chapter 3 discusses some results related to heredity and evolution obtained by Jennings in his experiments with Paramecium developed from 1908 to 1910. Chapter 4 discusses the results got by Jennings in his experiments developed from 1911 to 1912, in which he tried to elucidate some features of evolution and heredity in such organism. Chapter 5 presents some final remarks on the subject. This study led to the conclusion that Jennings conclusions (such as that natural selection does not act on pure lines, and that conjugation does not rejuvenate those organisms) were well grounded. However, he cannot be regarded as a pioneer of biological investigation , since several other authors dedicated themselves to it before his time. The scope of this thesis does not allow us to answer whether Jennings contributions changed the directions of biology. But certainly his works were clear and coherent and his contributions enriched the history of genetics and evolution / Esta tese trata das contribuições de Herbert Spencer Jennings (1868 1947) para a genética e evolução de 1908 a 1912. Durante este período o biólogo norte-americano desenvolveu uma série de experimentos com Paramecium, inclusive procurando testar experimentalmente a ação dos processos de seleção. O objetivo desta tese é analisar os resultados dos experimentos de Jennings, procurando elucidar se suas conclusões estavam bem fundamentadas de acordo com os padrões de racionalidade científica da época ou não, levando em conta as contribuições de seus colegas sobre o assunto, na época. Além disso, procurará situar as contribuições de Jennings na história da genética e evolução, procurando detectar se alguns rótulos que lhe são aplicados ou às suas contribuições, tais como pioneiro da investigação biológica ; aquele que mudou os rumos da biologia ; ou aquele que publicou ou apresentou trabalhos claros e coerentes são justos. Esta tese contém uma introdução e cinco capítulos. O Capítulo 1 trata dos precedentes evolutivos e genéticos e do panorama geral da situação da época em que Jennings apresentou suas contribuições relacionadas ao assunto. O Capítulo 2 traz algumas informações sobre o material experimental utilizado por Jennings. O Capítulo 3 discute alguns resultados relacionados à hereditariedade e evolução obtidos por Jennings em seus experimentos com Paramecium que foram desenvolvidos de 1908 a 1910. O Capítulo 4 discute os resultados dos experimentos desenvolvidos por Jennings com Paramecium, de 1911 a 1912, nos quais ele procurou elucidar aspectos relacionados à evolução e hereditariedade nesses organismos. O Capítulo 5 apresenta algumas considerações finais sobre o assunto. Este estudo mostrou que as conclusões de Jennings (tais como que a seleção natural não age dentro de uma linhagem pura ou que a conjugação não produz rejuvenescimento) estavam bem fundamentadas. Entretanto, ele não pode ser considerado um pioneiro das investigações biológicas uma vez que vários autores a ela se dedicaram antes de sua época. Os limites desta tese não permitem responder se as contribuições de Jennings mudaram os rumos da biologia. Mas, certamente, seus trabalhos eram claros e coerentes e suas contribuições enriqueceram a história da genética e evolução

The Method and its Disappearance: Analysis between philosophies of social contract and classical sociologies. A Study in Epistemology Jan Maršálek Université de Franche-Comté/Charles University in Prague Supervisors: prof. Frédéric Brahami, prof. Miloslav Petrusek (†), dr. Jan Balon. Résumé: In a doubly disloyal continuity with regard to the French epistemological tradition, largely preoccupied with the formation of scientific concepts, the present work addresses the phenomenon of disappearance of 'analytical' method. Nevertheless, the present work does not constitute an historical investigation: its very goal is to show (within the works of T. Hobbes, J.-J. Rousseau, H. Spencer and E. Durkheim) the variation of the epistemological status of the analysis, and thus to set up the concept of an 'epistemological event'. Examining the disappearance of the analysis requires its identification in the theoretical work whereby its leverage remains unacknowledged. Thus, having the status of a method in the philosophies of the social contract of Hobbes and Rousseau, the analysis 'continues' to structure, in a tacit way, the work of Spencer and Durkheim, both of them founders of scientific sociology. Is it possible to claim that, in the 19th century, the analysis manifests itself in the sociology's common recourse to...