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Thesis (DPhil (History))--University of Stellenbosch, 1946. / 409 leaves printed on single pages, preliminary pages i- ix and numbered pages 1-445. Includes bibliography. / Digitized at 330 dpi black and white PDF format (OCR), using KODAK i 1220 PLUS scanner. / No abstract available

A note on terminology. Throughout, the term 'Holland' is used to apply only to the province of that name. Similarly, where 'Flanders' appears in the text it applies only to that province, although commonly used by contemporaries to designate the Netherlands as a whole. 'Dutch' is employed as a convenient shorthand for the inhabitants of the rebel provinces, but 'Belgian' has been avoided for the southern provinces because it implies a predetermined racial/ national division in the Netherlands. 'Spanish' is used generally to describe the government and the armed forces operating against the United Provinces even though, in the armed forces, Spaniards were themselves a small minority. This is justified by the commanding position held by the servants of Madrid during this period. Rather than adopt a slavish consistency with place names, we have employed forms familiar to English speakers, such as The Hague (Den Haag), Antwerp (Antwerpen), Flushing (Vlissingen). Elsewhere, the form familiar to the inhabitants has been employed (Mechlin for Malines, Liege for Luik). Dates are given according to the 'New Style' except where otherwise stated, or where it is unclear which style is being used.

The period from 1294 until 1307 saw England engaged in wars with the French, the Welsh and the Scotch. In only three years, 1299, 1302, and 1305 was there no campaign. The object of this dissertation is to examine the ways in which the country was mobilised for this exceptional military effort, and to investigate the means by which the wars were financed. Various aspects of both the military and administrative history of this period have been dealt with by Tout, Morris and others, but much of the surviving evidence has not been fully used, and no historian has attempted to treat the subject as a whole.

This thesis surveys and discusses the documentary and archaeological evidence for sixth-century fortifications in Byzantine Africa. Chapter I examines the sources of evidence, noting that over 80 years have passed since the last major study of the subject was undertaken, by Charles Diehl in 1896. Chapter II traces the military history of Byzantine Africa from 533 to 602, with introductory and concluding sections on the fifth and seventh centuries. Chapter III discusses the evidence for the military organization and defensive strategy of Byzantine Africa in the sixth century, looking in particular at the structure of military command, the composition of the Byzantine army, the garrison structure (including the evidence for the nature and size of local garrisons stationed in forts and towns), the administrative machanisms by which fortifications were built and the strategy to be discerned in their siting. The chapter ends with a general appraisal of the benefits that Roman Africa received from Justinian's reconquest. Chapter IV examines the architecture of Byzantine fortifications in Africa, comparing it with earlier and contemporary practice in the eastern and western empires. The tactical aspects of fortifications are also considered, in particular the question of how far their design was influenced by the use made of artillery and archery in the sixth-century Byzantine army. In a short final chapter, an assessment is made of the value that the study of sixth-century Byzantine fortifications in Africa has for understanding later developments in the military architecture of eastern and western Christendom and of Islam. The Gazetteer includes full descriptions (with plans and photographs) of all the Byzantine fortifications identified in Africa, and shorter notes on other structures of more doubtful Byzantine identification; an index to fortifications in Africa referred to by Procopius; and a corpus of sixth- and seventh century military inscriptions from Africa.

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This thesis is an attempt to portray the part the forts of the Southwest had in developing the Federal Indian Policy in that region from 1865 to 1885.

This dissertation fundamentally re-interprets King Frederick the Great of Prussia as military commander and military thinker, and uses Frederick to cast new perspectives on the warfare of ‘his time’: that is, of the late seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries. It uses the methodology of cultural history, which focuses on the meanings given to human activities, to examine Frederick and the warfare of his time on three levels: cultural, temporal, and intellectual. It shows that Frederick’s warfare (at least in his youth) was culturally French, and reflected the towering influence of King Louis XIV, with Frederick following the flamboyant masculinity of the French baroque court. Frederick was a backward-looking military thinker, who situated his war-making in two temporal envelopes: broadly in the long eighteenth century (1648-1789), which was dominated by the search for order after the chaos of religious and civil wars, but more specifically in the ‘Century of Louis XIV’: the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Frederick embraced French military methods, taking inspiration from generals like Turenne and Luxembourg, employing aggressive French battle tactics, and learning his concept of ‘total war for limited objectives’ from French writers like the Marquis de Feuquières. Frederick also sought to surpass the ‘personal rule’ of the Sun King by commanding his army personally. This work shows the early eighteenth century as a liminal period, which saw the Louisquatorzean paradigm interact with the beginnings of the Enlightenment, developments in scientific methods, and the growth of the administrative capacity of states, all of which would exercise an increasing influence as the century progressed. The combination of older traditions and newer ideas placed enormous pressure on the monarchs of this period, and this was seen in Frederick’s strained relations with his generals. Finally, this work examines how ideas are created. It shows military knowledge in the early eighteenth century as the product of power structures (and often an element within them). Military command was itself an element in the assertion of political power, and Frederick depended on ‘the power of (military) knowledge’ to maintain his authority with his generals. Power, however, is negotiated, and knowledge is typically produced collectively. In the early part of Frederick’s reign, the Prussian war effort was a collective effort by several actors within the Prussian military hierarchy, and ‘Frederick’s military ideas’ were not necessarily his own.

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