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The Austrian army played a crucial role in Napoleon's decisive defeat during the War of the Sixth Coalition. Often considered a staid, hidebound institution, the army showed considerable adaptation in a time that witnessed a revolution in the art of war. In particular, changes made after defeat in the War of the Fifth Coalition demonstrate the modernity of the army. It embraced the key features of the new revolutionary way of war, including mass mobilization, a strategy of annihilation, and tactics based on deep echelonment, mobility, and the flexible use of varied formations. While the Austrians did not achieve the compromise peace they desired in 1814, this represented a political failing rather than a military one. Nevertheless, the Austrian army was critical in securing the century of general European peace that lasted until the dawn of the Great War.

Many histories written by professional historians discuss the Battle of the Bulge; however, none of them incorporate the growing field of environmental history as a lens of analysis. This paper aims to address that hole in the scholarship by evaluating the impact that environmental factors exerted on the American army's ability to fight in and around Bastogne and St. Vith, Belgium during the first week of the battle. Had it not been for the environmental factors and the Americans' ability to make better use of the natural and manmade conditions than the Germans, the Allies would not have been able to achieve eventual victory. In the historiography of the battle, weather conditions are usually referenced only as the setting in which the fighting occurred. This paper goes further than simply using the environment and climate as a stage set. By looking at the way environmental conditions impacted strategic, operational, and tactical issues, a new perspective is opened up. The role that these environmental factors played is emphasized and shows that they had a greater effect on the outcome than scholars have previously credited. This paper uses first person accounts from participants, from the command level to the soldier in his foxhole, as well as unit histories, oral histories, and the vast amount of secondary sources to focus on and synthesize the effects that the environment had. Without exploiting the environmental factors that existed in the Ardennes, the American army would not have been able to hold off the German offensive.

The history of the United States' occupation and administration of the Philippines is a premiere example of the evolution of the American military's civil administrative approach as it evolved from simple Army security in 1898, through an evolving ‘whole-of-government' method, to what was practically the full military administration of the country by March 1945. The second liberation and subsequent administration of the Philippines by the United States Army was unique, not simply because of the physical characteristics of the operations, but more so because of the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur used a rather self-reliant approach that rejected much of the direction from various authorities in Washington and adopted independently authored local solutions, but he took advantage of external resources when necessary. Ultimately the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under his command had to accept external direction to gain external resources. The Army's civil administrative planning and execution in the Philippines in 1944-1945 was the direct result of the social, political, economic, and military relationships between Americans and Filipinos from 1898 to 1944, much of which involved MacArthur, and the institutional changes that developed from these interactions. The result was civil administration that met the local and immediate requirements suitable for the conditions at hand. By August 1945 the Army ended civil affairs operations and transferred responsibility to the Commonwealth government of the Philippines and the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

The Luftwaffe Field Divisions have remained on the periphery of World War II historiography for over seventy years, overshadowed by the myth of German military excellence during the conflict. The Heer is still known for lightning-quick attacks, brutal firepower, ably trained soldiers, and formidable success on the battlefield; an army of almost faceless, remorseless pain that grimly and efficiently faced down the Allies until the very end. Only recently, flaws have begun opening in this pristine picture as historians have examined how quickly the quality of the German army deteriorated from 1942-onward. Despite the vast landscape of scholarship on the war and the recent historical analysis of the weaknesses the Germans suffered, serious study on the creation and management of the Luftwaffe Field Divisions has been sparse. What has been written about them since 1945 has done little to offer a full picture of the units, their creation, or their significance to the German war effort. The purpose of this study was to fulfill this need by answering the necessary questions about the divisions, provide a complete history of the units, and place the LwFDs properly within the historiography of the Second World War.

This dissertation explores the development of America’s infantry forces between 1918-1945. While doing so, it challenges and complicates the traditional narrative that highlights the fierceness of the rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. During the First World War, both commissioned and enlisted Marines attended U.S. Army schools and served within Army combat formations, which brought the two closer together than ever before. Both services became bonded by a common warfighting paradigm, or way of battle, that centered upon the infantry as the dominant combat arm. All other arms and services were subordinated to the needs and requirements of the infantry. Intelligent initiative, fire and maneuver by the smallest units, penetrating hostile defenses while bypassing strong points, and aggressive, not reckless, leadership were all salient characteristics of that shared infantry way of battle. After World War I, Army and Marine officers constructed similar intellectual proposals concerning the ways to fight the next war. Although there were differences in organizational culture, the two were more alike in their respective values systems than historians have realized. There was mutual admiration, and targeted attempts to replicate each other’s combat thinking and spirit. They prepared for battle by observing each other’s doctrine, and sharing each other’s conception of modern combat. When preparation turned to execution in World War II, they created solutions for battlefield problems that evolved from their near-identical way of battle. At the conclusion of the war, the common bonds between the Army and Marine Corps were all but forgotten. This, ultimately, led to increased friction during the Congressional defense unification battles in 1946. / History

Many historians of the American Revolution fail to accurately assess the impact British supporters in the Thirteen Colonies had on the military dimension of the war. The Crown's American allies, commonly referred to as Loyalists, were instrumental in British operations throughout the conflict, especially in the southern colonies. Reports from the royal governors of the southern colonies numbered the Loyalists in the thousands. British officials in London developed a plan to Americanize the war by utilizing Loyalists more comprehensively, lessening the burden for more British troops. The first steps toward Americanizing the war occurred when General Sir Henry Clinton and Lieutenant General Charles, Second Earl, Cornwallis incorporated southern Loyalists with their British troops to reconquer the southern colonies in 1780. After the British conquest of Charleston, South Carolina in June 1780, Lieutenant General Cornwallis was awarded the independent command of the British forces in the South and was additionally charged with rallying and protecting the Loyalists in North and South Carolina. Cornwallis consistently tried to organize the Loyalists into militia corps to combat Rebel partisans operating in the Carolina backcountry, The constant failure of the Loyalist militia persuaded Cornwallis of their inability to sustain themselves. As a result, Cornwallis abandoned the southern colonies, as well as the Crown's loyal subjects, in favor of offensive operations in Virginia. His aim was to prevent the Rebel southern army from receiving supplies and recruits. Many slaves joined Cornwallis' army in Virginia and persuaded him to utilize them to replace the services provided by southern white Loyalists. These failed decisions contributed to Cornwallis' humiliating defeat at Yorktown in October 1781, effectively ending the military dimension of the American Revolution. / History

This dissertation explores the development of an American D-Day tale. D-Day, the Allied invasion of northwestern France in June 1944, stood out to Americans because it seemed to promise a quick end to the Second World War in Europe. This lasting conception of the amphibious assault as a critical juncture has placed it in the forefront of American memories of the war's European phase. More than a turning point, however, American conceptions of the event have come to constitute a veritable morality tale. According to its narrative, D-Day demonstrated the military competence of a free republic that put its faith in citizen-soldiers. This tale has romanticized warfare by depicting it as an event populated by democratic heroes engaging clearly evil foes in decisive clashes fought for liberty, national redemption, and world salvation. The redemptive power of violence displayed on Norman beaches enjoyed divine blessing, and even, as sometimes claimed, outright assistance. Veterans and their family members, politicians, military leaders, honorific organizations, news media personalities, filmmakers, scholars and authors all have offered entries into a staggering field of American D-Day-related material. Their messages, largely similar in tone, transmitted to American audiences through museums, monuments, news stories, books, speeches, games, documentary films and Hollywood spectaculars. This dissertation will also evaluate the impact of their memory work on America. D-Day allegedly reaffirmed cherished American notions of democracy, fair play, moral order, and the militant (yet non-militaristic) use of power for divinely sanctioned and altruistic purposes. Such interpretations of clashing arms have exerted a powerful influence on American conceptions of patriotism, civic duty, and the efficacious use of military power. Feeding the militarization of American culture in the Cold War and beyond, the D-Day tale has pushed Americans to see war as a bloody yet noble clash, a veritable crusade used by the righteous for just purpose and decisive results. This story has cemented into place popular conceptions of the battle and an ideal-type of expectations for "good" wars. / History