Zugl.: Bonn, Universiẗat, Diss., 2009.

Zugl.: Bonn, Univ., Diss., 2009

Inaug.-Diss.--Munich. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation articulates the Federal Republic of Germany’s critical role in establishing and sustaining the modern multinational European aviation sector. It demonstrates how Bonn employed its 1959 acquisition of the Lockheed F-104G Starfighter combat aircraft to take advantage of the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to reduce the US military presence in Europe and achieve strategic goals of military, political, and economic primacy within NATO through multinational cooperation and consortium building. In fostering the European Starfighter consortiums and their successors, West Germany embraced a leadership role that saw it build one of NATO’s largest air forces and become a primary political and economic driver of the continent’s multinational military-aviation projects. This dissertation is predicated on intensive archival research conducted in Germany, Belgium, and the United States. This work employs economic, political, and military historical lenses of analysis to argue that the Starfighter’s legacy represents a long-term success that allowed the Federal Republic to leverage a role of normalized leadership within a decade of joining NATO, boost its moribund aviation sector, and take a leading role in contemporary multinational aviation concerns such as the Panavia Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Airbus Space and Defense. / History

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The Luftwaffe Field Divisions have remained on the periphery of World War II historiography for over seventy years, overshadowed by the myth of German military excellence during the conflict. The Heer is still known for lightning-quick attacks, brutal firepower, ably trained soldiers, and formidable success on the battlefield; an army of almost faceless, remorseless pain that grimly and efficiently faced down the Allies until the very end. Only recently, flaws have begun opening in this pristine picture as historians have examined how quickly the quality of the German army deteriorated from 1942-onward. Despite the vast landscape of scholarship on the war and the recent historical analysis of the weaknesses the Germans suffered, serious study on the creation and management of the Luftwaffe Field Divisions has been sparse. What has been written about them since 1945 has done little to offer a full picture of the units, their creation, or their significance to the German war effort. The purpose of this study was to fulfill this need by answering the necessary questions about the divisions, provide a complete history of the units, and place the LwFDs properly within the historiography of the Second World War.

− Mitt syfte med denna uppsats är att pröva förhärskande luftmaktsteori på ett verkligtskeende. I uppsatsen prövas därför giltigheten av John Boyds och John A. Warden III teorier påSlaget om Storbritannien. Min avsikt med detta är inte att ställa Warden mot Boyd för attdärigenom pröva vilken av teorierna som framstår som bättre än den andra, utan metoden attpröva dessa på ett verkligt skeende syftar endast till att pröva dem var för sig. Min frågeställningblir därför;Fråga: Håller dessa teorier för en prövning på en verklig händelse?− För att svara på min frågeställning har jag gått till väga på följande sätt. Uppsatsens förstadel handlar om vad luftmakt är, dess grundläggande egenskaper, fördelar samt begränsningar.Detta för att skapa förståelse för uttrycket som sådant. Därefter följer en genomgång och analysav vad förhärskande luftmakts teori är och tankarna bakom denna. De teorier som behandlasunder detta epitet är de av John Boyd och John A. Warden III. Därefter knyts denna och förstadelen ihop för att därigenom skapa förståelse och en helhetssyn av begreppet luftmakt ochförhärskande luftmaktsteori. Som tredje del i uppsatsen kommer själva prövningen av teoriernamot Slaget om Storbritannien. Denna del är uppdelad i fyra olika faser som avgränsas viadatum. Detta för att skapa en lättöverskådlig struktur. Faserna är i sig indelade i beskrivning avfasen, genomförande och slutresultat. Teorin prövas genom att jag jämför teori med verkligtskeende i varje fas, slutsatser rörande teorins giltighet dras därav och sammanfattas i varje del.Slutligen avslutas uppsatsen med en sammanfattning där svar ges på frågeställningen.− Avgränsningar och motiv till dessa görs under uppsatsens gång varför jag endast redovisardessa i punktform här.Jag behandlar enbart Slaget om Storbritannien, tidsperiod 10 juli 1940-31 oktober samma år.Jag behandlar enbart luftkrigetJag behandlar Warden på det tyska agerandet och Boyd på det brittiska. / My purpose with this Essay is to examine if the theories of John Boyd andJohn A. Warden III will stand a test of reality. I therefore look at theplanning, execution and result of The Battle of Britain in order to do this.The essay is divided into four different parts. The first part deals with theexpression Air Power, its basic characteristics, advantages and limitations.This part is meant to lead a non air force officer into the essay and make itunderstandable. The next part is an analysis of the theories and the thoughtsbehind them. After this the two parts is amalgamated in order to createknowledge and a comprehensive view of Air Power and its theories. Thethird part is the test of the theories. In this part The Battle of Britain isdivided into four different phases in order to create a good structure and apossibility for the reader to follow me in my discussions. The theories aretested by looking at preparation, carrying through and results in bothGerman and British behaviour. By saying this I want to stress that thepurpose with the essay is not to examine why the German campaign endedas it did or why RAF took the victory, nor is it a test of which one of thetheories is the better one. It is a test where I look at Boyd by examineRAF/FC planning, carrying through and results and Warden by doing thesame on Luftwaffe. The fourth part is a summing up, where the question ofthe essay is answered.In my answer I level criticism against the “five ring model” of JohnWarden. The remark I do concerns the idea of separating the political willfrom the people. I find this separation valid only when looking on adictatorship not a democracy. In this discussion I find that the targetingmodel affects the theory in the way that it only suits physical destructionbased on parallel attacks and not psychic breakdown.The theory of John Boyd passes without remarks.Having said this I discuss what these results tells us. I find that the essayproves the possibility to falsify a theory but that the result is valid in thiscase only. The main issue I want to point out with my result though is thatit can work as a springboard for further examinations of these theories. Ifother authors come to the same result as I, with their examinations made onother real events, the conclusion must be that the answers all togetherproofs that the theory limps. How many answers that must point in thesame direction I don’t know, the important thing is that the theories aretested, otherwise the risk is that they can be looked at as truths, which theyare not. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

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Amidst the confrontation between the East and the West Bloc during the Cold War, the decolonization of Africa created an entirely new ideological battlefield for these two sides to compete with one another for power and influence. The Federal Republic of Germany, having been allowed to rearm its military less than a decade prior, sought to gain influence in Nigeria and Tanzania by providing them with military aid. However, in both cases it failed to fulfill its promises of aid. Through the examination of these case studies, this study argues that the Federal Republic’s ability to provide effective military aid to non-NATO countries was limited due to the combination of its cautious foreign policy and the dynamic political landscape of the countries to which it offered aid. Formerly classified government documents and newspaper articles constitute the majority of this study’s source material. While current historiography focuses on the impact of the Cold War superpowers in regions outside of Europe, less attention has been given to the important roles that smaller powers such as the Federal Republic have played. By analyzing a smaller global player, the goal of this study is to complicate the notion of the Cold War being binary in nature. Furthermore, it aims to illustrate the political tightrope that the Federal Republic walked when conducting military aid which stemmed from the legacy of its violent past and its status as a divided nation.

Starting in August 1942 the United States and United Kingdom started waging a strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Throughout the course of the 1942 and 1943 campaigns, American and British air forces struggled to gain the upper hand in the European air war. By November 1943 American and British defeats at the hands of the German Air Force, or Luftwaffe, had placed the air war in doubt. By February 1944, the air war had turned around in favor of the Allies. This dramatic turn of events has been explained by historians in a number of ways. The most popular narrative is that the introduction of the long range escort fighter, the P-51 "Mustang," turned the tide in the air war. Another narrative is that there was a change in the fighter tactics. Starting in January 1944, American fighters stopped defending the bombers and started aggressively pursuing German fighters. Yet, these analyses do not include a major command changes that took place from November to January 1944. After his appointment to command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower used his position centralize all of the major air commands in Europe under his control. By unifying the air commands, the Allies were able to better coordinate and concentrate their air against Germany. In February 1944 the Allies focused their air forces against the Luftwaffe ultimately wearing down German fighter strength. After finally removing a major obstacle impending the strategic air war against Germany, the Allies concentrated their air forces against transportation and oil targets. The destruction of these two major economic systems crippled Germany's ability to fight the Allies in 1944 and 1945. By changing the command structure, Eisenhower was able to use his air forces in successful coordinated strategic air offensives that the Allies had previously been incapable of accomplishing.