Bibliography: leaves 393-408.

<p>This dissertation addresses one of the most vexing issues in American foreign policy: Under what circumstances should the United States use military force in pursuit of national interests? Despite not having a policy upon entering office or articulating one throughout its first term, the Reagan administration used military force numerous times. Two-weeks following Reagan's landslide reelection victory, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger articulated six tests for when and how to use military force, which surprisingly seemed to call for restraint. Through the examination of three case studies, the Reagan administration's decisions are found to have been influenced by the assimilation of lessons from Vietnam, the reading of public pulse, the desire to placate Congress, and the need to protect the nation's strategic interests. All these factors, ultimately codified by Weinberger, were considered by the leaders in the Reagan administration as they tried to expand the military's ability to help the U.S. meet an increasingly wider range of threats. Thus this dissertation will show that, contrary to what one finds in contemporary scholarship, the Weinberger doctrine was intended as a policy to legitimize the use of military force as a tool of statecraft, rather than an endorsement to reserve force as a last resort after other instruments of power have failed.</p> / Dissertation

The aim of this thesis is to establish the political, economic, and military history of Samos over a millennium, from the first arrival of colonists in the Minoan and Mykenaian Ages to the submission of Samos to imperial Athens in 439 B.C. There is little evidence available for the earlier part of this period. And such later traditions about the Ionian Migration as there are have come under severe attack by modern writers, both in detail and on general grounds of chronology. But there are striking instances of the accurate preservation of information going back at least as far, notably in the case of Mopsos of Kolophon, now confirmed even as to date by Hittite records and by the bilingual inscription of Karatepe. Consequently, it is reasonable to take the traditional narrative as a basis, and see whether it receives confirmation from other sources, chiefly archaeological. Apart from the autochthonous Lelegian king Ankaios, we read in ancient writers of several different immigrant groups in the island: fugitives from Krete in the time of Minos, on their way to found Miletos; 'Aiolians' from Lesbos, sent to found a cleruchy some time before the Trojan War; 'Karians' under Tembrion; 'Ionians' from Epidauros under the leadership of Prokles. Prokles' son Leogoros became involved in war against Androklos, founder of Ephesos and one of the Neleid leaders of the general Ionian Migration. This fact enables us to fix the traditional date of Prokles' arrival in Samos to c. 1125, since the Migration took place four generations after the Sack of Troy, which should be dated, following Herodotos and with archaeological confirmation, to c. 1240. The archaeological remains in Samos agree with these traditions. At Tigani there is Minoan pottery contemporary with - or even slightly earlier than - that from the settlements at Miletos. Gradually this gave way to Mykenaian styles, until the Kretan element had quite disappeared. By the time of the Trojan War, however, the Greek element had left Tigani, no doubt replaced by Tembrion's 'Karians'. When the next Greek pottery appears it is LH III C and Sub-mykenaian, not at Tigani but at the Heraion. It may be, therefore, that of the two settlements under Tembrion and Prokles mentioned by the Etymologicon Magnum Tigani is Astypalaia, the Heraion Chesia. In the course of the Ionian Migration, the new Samians sided with the natives against the Neleids, and for a while the island was conquered and held by Androklos. The Samians went into exile for ten years, some traditionally to Anaia and others to Samothrake. There is evidence that a third group sailed further, and founded Kelenderis in Kilikia: the name of this Samian colony occurs in the Karatepe inscription, invoking Ba'al KRNTRS; and since Samian interest in the orient was not resumed until half a century after that inscription was set up, the Greek place-name would seem to have been given before the Dark Age. Names in -nd- of course are as commonly Anatolian as Greek. But there is only one other Kelenderis, and that near Epidauros, serving to confirm that the Samians did indeed come from the eastern Argolid. There is other evidence in support of this tradition (which can be traced as far back as Herodotos in an explicit form), notably the fact that the eponymous hero of the Samian colony Perinthos (602 B.C.) was an Epidaurian and companion of Orestes. For more than three hundred years, c. 1100-750, we are virtually without evidence for Samian history. We must infer from the names of tribes and months that the traditions of Neleid Ionia were assimilated during this period, and it is probable that Samos received Neleid kings. Otherwise there is only the small but steady sequence of pottery and primitive architecture at the Heraion to assure us of the continuity of the islands's habitation. Recorded history reopens in the second half of the eighth century, when we find the self-conscious Ionians destroying the Karian-infiltrated town of Melie. It seems that Samos and Priene made the attach, against the vain resistance of Miletos, itself part Karian, and Kolophon, Melie's metropolis. The victors parcelled out the territory between them, Priens taking Melie itself, Samos the coastal strip northwards from there to Ephesos. The precise border of the two parcels was to be a matter of recurrent dispute between Samos and Priene. It was about the same time that these Ionian alliances were swept into the wider struggle which grew from the agrarian dispute of Chalkis and Eretria over Lelanton. Samos fought on the side of Chalkis, and at the same time helped Sparta against Messenia and received help from Corinth, while Miletos sent aid to Eretria and may have opposed Sparta on behalf of Messenia. The literary tradition of the alliances has archaeological support. Samos shared in the Athenian disaster at Aigina c. 700, and, like Athens, spent much of the first half of the seventh century in reconstruction. This century was politically and economically the age of the Geomoroi, certain defined artistocratic families said to have held their lands ever since the original settlement. Their period of rule marked the avoidance of warfare in favour of commercial expansion overseas. In the first half of the century they had inaugurated large-scale trade with the Near-Eastern kingdoms and with Kypros. In the second half they were the first to find a new source of silver and tin at Tartessos, Cadiz (638 B.C.). Some time previously Samians had become active in Egypt: first mercenaries in the service of Psamatik I; later, after the establishment of Milesian Naukratis c. 650, merchants who secured a special place in the treaty-port. After a short interlude of tyranny, the Geomoroi founded a group of colonies in Propontis, of which the most notable was Perinthos (602. B.C.). Ensuing warfare with Megara, Lesbos, and Priene, weakened the oligarchy and led to the rise of a short-lived democracy, followed by tyranny under Syloson I c. 590. Five years later he was able to make an alliance with Miletos, now entering two generations of stasis and glad even of so unlikely an ally as Samos. Priene was defeated at last, and a new division made of the lands of the Mykale peninsula. Syloson was succeeded by a relative, perhaps a nephew, Polykrates I, whose existence, hitherto unsuspected by modern writers, is argued from literary and archaeological evidence. Under him Samos reached the peak of her prosperity basing megaloprepeia at home upon increased trade abroad. It was this tyrant who reformed the whole basis of Samian agriculture, fostered industry (notably the cosmetic trade), and embarked on the programme of public works which so thrilled Herodotos. He gained an empire among the coastal towns of Ionia and ruled the islands as far as Delos, enjoying the powerful alliance of Sparta and Lydia. Yet when Kyros conquered Lydia, Polykrates rejoiced; for Phokaia was destroyed, and she was Samos' strongest commercial rival, having seized the monopoly of the Tartessian trade. Polykrates was confident that the shipless Persians would leave him alone. In this he was mistaken, and after a raid in which the Heraion was burned down and a cemetery desecrated, the tyranny fell and was replaced by an oligarchy friendly to Persia c. 540. In 533 Polykrates II made himself tyrant and resumed his father's independent policies. For eight years he enforced a rigid military austerity to equal that of Sparta, and defied the Persians. But by 525 it had become clear that the Persians must in the end conquer, and Polykrates deserted his Egyptian allies, following the Kypriote example in going over to the Persian side. The significance of his famous thalassocracy was that his fleet held the balance between the navies of Egypt and Persian Phoinikia. It was probably this that persuaded the Spartans to attempt to unseat him after his defection.

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This thesis traces the relationship between militarism and geographical thought in the United States during the early Cold War. It does so by traveling across certain spaces, or environments, which preoccupied American geopolitics and American science during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, geopolitics and science, understood during the Second World War as markedly distinct terms, came together uniquely to wage the Cold War from the position of strategy. The most intriguing and influential conjunctions were made possible by militarism, not in the deterministic sense of conditioning technologies or funding lines, but as a result of antagonistic, violent practices pervading American life. These practices reaffirmed America's status as distinctly, powerfully modern, while shoring up the burden of global responsibility that appeared to accompany this preeminence. Through militarist reasoning, the American world was turned into an object that needed securing - resulting in a profoundly insecure proliferation of danger that demanded an equal measure of global action and retreat behind new lines of defence. And in these American spaces, whether expanded or compressed, the identity of America itself was defined. From the global horizons of air power and the regional divisions of area studies to the laboratories of continental and civil defence research, the spaces of the American Cold War were material, in the sense that militarism's reach was clearly felt on innumerable human and natural landscapes, not least within the United States. Equally, however, these environments were the product of imaginative geographies, perceptual and representational techniques that inscribed borders, defined hierarchies, and framed populations governmentally. Such conceptions of space were similarly militarist, not least because they drew from the innovations of Second World War social science to reframe the outlines of a Cold War world. Militarism's methods redefined geographical thought and its spaces, prioritizing certain locations and conventions while marginalizing others. Strategic studies formed a key component of the social sciences emboldened by the successes and excesses of wartime science. As social scientists grappled with the contradictions of mid-century modernity, most retreated behind the formidable theories of their more accomplished academic relatives, and many moved into the laboratories previously associated with these same intellectual stalwarts. The result was that at every scale, geography was increasingly simulated, a habit that paralleled the abstractions concurrently promoted in the name of political decisiveness. But simulation also meant that Cold War spaces were more than the product of intangible musings; they were constructed, and in the process acquired solidity but also simplicity. It was in the fashioning of artificial environments that the fragility of strategy was revealed most fully, but also where militarism's power could be most clearly expressed. The term associated with this paradoxical condition was 'frontier', a zone of fragile, transformational activity. Enthusiastic Cold Warriors were fond of transferring this word from a geopolitical past to a scientific future. But in their present, frontiers possessed the characteristics of both.

<p> This dissertation chronicles the role of airpower as a focal point in the evolution of the hawk vs. dove dynamic in American politics. It accounts for the relationship between changes in the viability of aerial weapons technologies and the general commitment of elected officials to expand or restrict the standing and use of hard power as a foreign policy tool. By comparing and contrasting the aftermath of two main paradigms of conflict -- the post-Vietnam era and the post-9/11 era -- it shows how disagreement over the size, scope, and role of the nation&rsquo;s armed forces has changed amid the introduction of airpower technologies that have in many cases been developed to mitigate the increasing level of conflict asymmetry witnessed by the transition from one strategic threat environment to the next. Accordingly, the analysis follows a basic chronology of comparative case study: first it examines the waning years of the Vietnam War through to the years following its conclusion, establishing a baseline for the character of the hawk/ dove dynamic amid a mindset of mostly conventional conflict before proceeding to the post-9/11 era, evaluating how trends in the hawk/ dove debate have shifted in an age of extreme asymmetry and non-linear battlefields. The lion&rsquo;s share of the research analyzes legislative voting data on the U.S. Congress from 1964-2012 to visually chart how the hawk/ dove dynamic has fluctuated over time in terms of its intensity, primary focal point(s), and the balance of the dynamic. Seven litmus tests are identified as individual moving parts: 1) airpower policy, 2) defense spending in general, 3) (de)escalation of conflict, 4) foreign military aid, 5) WMD policy, 6) war powers/ inter-branch relations, and 7) NASA support as part of air and space power. Providing a quantitative basis for analysis, the findings are revealed along with contextual points of interest found in the public communication of key intellectual leaders (including those in the executive branch). Taken together, the research offers a comprehensive view into the evolving debate over peace and war in an age of rapidly-advancing airpower systems used in increasingly asymmetrical conflict. </p>

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This thesis examines the administration of the Late Roman or Early Byzantine Empire under Maurice (582-602). His reign is not commonly known, and he is often given brief mention only together with the other rulers following the reign of Justinian the Great, although his era spans twenty eventful years. / Indeed, his rule is of considerable importance since it is in his time that we first hear about new administrative structures such as the Exarchates of Carthage and Ravenna. / The focal point of this thesis is the military and civil administration of the Empire at the end of the sixth century. In order to arrive at a more precise picture of these subjects, different types of materials have been analyzed, such as military handbooks, numismatic data and laws, as well as the literary sources of the reign. Among the latter, the most valuable is the Histories of Theophylact Simocatta. It has been seen as important, or even essential, to relate the more technical material to this literary source. / The conclusions reached from this study are various. From the numismatic evidence we can see that there was considerably more stability in monetary matters in the East and the West than is sometimes assumed. By comparing expenditures in general, and subsidies paid especially, at different times in Late Roman or Byzantine history, we learn that the "gold drain" on the Empire's resources was not necessarily as devastating as is sometimes thought. With regard to the military administration, the malaise of frequent unrest among the soldiers is traced to problems of internal structure besetting the military establishment for various reasons, including bad choices of commanding officers. / Finally, changes in both military and civil administration are often seen as developments of an evolutionary kind rather than as arbitrary innovations established by Imperial fiat.

From 1940 through 1943, British grand strategy was shaped by a broad consensus, generally accepted and understood in the central direction of the war. This consensus was based on the assumption of relative weakness, and was expressed by what may be termed the "wear down" approach: "to knock out the props" from under Axis military power by a combination of blockade, bombing, raids, subversion and sabotage, and peripheral campaigns. An ultimate direct assault would only be launched after enemy power had visibly declined. The balance, emphasis, and specific thrust of this outline changed; its essence did not. Even as a powerful Grand Alliance emerged, the British remained convinced that the assumption of relative weakness must continue to guide its grand strategy. This assumption was finally rejected by the coalition as a whole, but it proved well founded for the British themselves. Ultimately, however, this formulation of grand strategy by consensus was, in general, a sober and responsible interpretation of the overall British situation.