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The central argument in the thesis is that lack of professionalism within the military establishment was the leading factor for coups in the politics of Lesotho. Other sources of military involvement in the politics of Lesotho include the following: Firstly, the rivalries for power within the military establishment and between the military and the ruling government. Secondly, the desire of the military to transform the country from political and economic decay by the civilian government and the leadership of the military. Thirdly, the involvement of foreign states and organizations such as the Republic of South Africa (R. S. A), Zimbabwe, Botswana, countries of the Eastern bloc, Nigeria, India, China, the United States of America (U. S. A) the Southern African Development Community (S. A D. C.), the United Nations Development Programme (U. N. D. P.) and the Commonwealth in the internal affairs of the country thus preventing or motivating coups in Lesotho. Finally, the failure of the civilian governments to demobilize the civil society at large and the military which were war-oriented during the Basotho National Party (B. N. P.) and military dictatorships respectively (1970-1986 and 1986-1993). Although the struggle for power among the political elites in Lesotho dates as far back as the country's independence in 1966, the military was never affected by these politics until its indoctrination into politics by the BNP government after the 1970 general elections. Because of the politicization of the military, recruitment and promotions within the military were determined/influenced by politicians. Another criterion for entry of the military officers into the armed forces and their upward mobility was nepotism. This motivated the officers who were sidelined during the process to rebel against the ruling government and the leadership of the military. As a result, the political and economic institutions of Lesotho were weakened and unstable as the resources of the country were spent on military weaponry, setting up militias and rewarding the soldiers who were loyal to authoritarian rule in Lesotho. Simultaneously, the country experienced low levels of economic productivity as national resources were misappropriated, embezzled and used for personal enrichment by both the BNP and the military junta. Similarly, when the civilian government came to power in 1993, it was interested in power consolidation. This motivated similar demands by the military due to the political influence by opposition parties that were hungry for power. With the transition of the country to democratic rule in 1993, the civilian government was faced with the problem not of its own making. It had to deal with the military which was heavily armed and deeply divided along political lines. As a result, it was impossible for the civilian regime to control and transform the institution to adjust to the principle of neutrality of the soldier in a democratic dispensation. Consequently, the Basotho people in general and their democratic governments, namely the Basotho Congress Party (B. C. P.) and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (L. C. D.) had never enjoyed the fruits of civilian rule. Since 1993, the military had the capacity Ipower to intervene against a civilian regime. Therefore, it became a major source of instability in Lesotho. For example, the junior military officers were actively involved in the 1998 political crisis. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2005.

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<p> After the United States entered World War II, the nation began a technical assistance program and a military aid program in Paraguay as part of its Latin American foreign policy. The U.S. rooted its technical assistance program in an idealized narrative of U.S. agricultural history, in which land-grant colleges and the agricultural reforms of the New Deal had contributed to prosperity and democracy. The extension of this American Way to other countries would strengthen prosperity, encourage democratic reforms, and prevent fascist and Communist subversion. The U.S. also extended military aid to Paraguay to draw Paraguay's military away from its fascist sympathies. Over the next twelve years, policymakers debated the relationship between technical assistance and military aid, their effects on Paraguay, and their compatibility with U.S. foreign policy. Initially, U.S. policymakers saw the programs as mutually reinforcing. By the mid-1950s, however, the promise of agrarian democracy remained unfulfilled in Paraguay.</p>

<p> This dissertation examines the role of the Federal Reserve System in the formation and conduct of American foreign relations between the Second World War and the Korean War. Specifically, it seeks to understand why Fed officials willingly subordinated monetary policy to the priorities of war finance during the former conflict, but actively fought for greater policy autonomy during the latter. Using a constructivist bureaucratic politics approach it examines how American central bankers understood the economic and political implications of both domestic and international policy developments. Drawing upon the perceived lessons of the interwar years, Fed officials believed that economic prosperity was a critical feature of a stable and peaceful international system. At the same time, however, they believed the situation was more complicated than a simplistic causal relationship whereby greater domestic growth resulted in greater international peace and prosperity. Instead, central bankers recognized that events in either the domestic or international political or economic arenas, if improperly handled, threatened to upset the delicate balance between prosperity and peace. The belief in these fundamental interconnections, while often not explicitly expressed, provided a coherent and logical guide to Fed policy, during the era, informing many of its internal debates and positions. This dissertation, therefore, represents the first attempt to understand the role of the American This dissertation examines the role of the Federal Reserve System in the formation and conduct of American foreign relations between the Second World War and the Korean War. Specifically, it seeks to understand why Fed officials willingly subordinated monetary policy to the priorities of war finance during the former conflict, but actively fought for greater policy autonomy during the latter. Using a constructivist bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy analysis it examines how American central bankers understood the economic and political implications of both domestic and international policy developments. Drawing upon the perceived lessons of the interwar years, Fed officials believed that economic prosperity was a critical feature of a stable and peaceful international system. At the same time, however, they believed the situation was more complicated than a simplistic causal relationship whereby greater domestic growth resulted in greater international peace and prosperity. Instead, central bankers recognized that events in either the domestic or international political or economic arenas, if improperly handled, threatened to upset the delicate balance between prosperity and peace. The belief in these fundamental interconnections, while often not explicitly expressed, provided a coherent and logical guide to Fed policy, during the era, informing many of its internal debates and positions. This dissertation, therefore, represents the first attempt to understand the role of the American Federal Reserve System as an active participant in foreign policy-making, including its involvement in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, as well as discussions over the 1946 British Loan, and the Marshall Plan. Additionally, this study bridges the gap between domestic and foreign affairs, demonstrating the critical interrelationships between those two areas. </p>

The intention of this thesis is to examine the careers of chaplains in the parliamentary armies and, more widely, the subject of religion in the parliamentary forces in the light of generalisations that have been made by historians about them. To this end, some 280 chaplains have been identified and their biographies have been summarised in the biographical index (Appendix II). The main text of the thesis, however, is devoted to a general discussion of chaplains' careers and of what has been said about them by seventeenth-century commentators and by later historians. The details of chaplains' employment, the circumstances of their service in the different parliamentary armies and their relationship with the clerical profession as a whole are assessed. In Chapter I consideration is given to the fact that most seventeenth-century commentators confined their remarks to either the armies of Essex and Manchester or the New Model army. Few said anything about service in the provincial forces, which, until l647, out-numbered the New Model army, or about the parliamentary forces which served in Ireland and Scotland. Hence this contemporary description cannot be considered to be representative of the majority of the parliamentary forces. Furthermore, much of the seventeenth-century writing on preaching in the parliamentary armies did not refer to chaplains. Thomas Edwards, for example, named many religious radicals who preached in the army of whom the majority were soldiers and junior officers, not chaplains. A number of the twentieth-century historians who have written on chaplains and religion in the parliamentary forces have not fully appreciated the limitations of some of the seventeenth-century writing on this subject. Particular attention is paid to the study by Professor Leo Solt of the political and religious ideas of certain New Model army chaplains. Dr. Mark Kishlansky's work on the New Model army is also discussed. It seems that twentieth-century historians have largely confined their observations to a few chaplains who served in the New Model army, especially those at the general's headquarters. These chaplains were singled out for comment by their contemporaries because they were unusual. The circumstances in which chaplains served are described in the second chapter, as well as the ways in which they were appointed and paid and what they did. It was considered normal for each regiment to have a chaplain, usually appointed by the colonel, sometimes with the advice of a body like the Westminster Assembly or a county committee (in the case of a provincial regiment). However, few regiments had chaplains continuously throughout their existence. It was difficult to recruit chaplains and few served for longer than a few months. Colonels seem to have appointed chaplains to keep up their troops' morale and to preach conformity to the beliefs of the army command. Colonels seem rarely to have appointed chaplains who shared their particular religious idiosyncracies. It is clear, however, that a number of chaplains shared a close personal and working relationship with their colonels, more so indeed than with one another, for there were rarely periods when large numbers of regiments were gathered together. Chaplains acted as messengers and confidential agents for their colonels, performing tasks which ranged from taking news of a victory to Parliament to helping to negotiate the marriage of Cromwell's son. The following five chapters are devoted to the chaplains in each of the main parliamentary armies: Essex's, Manchester's and Waller's, the provincial forces, the New Model, and the armies in Ireland and in Scotland. Most of the chaplains who joined the armies in the early months of the war were Presbyterians and several of them had been conspicuous for their opposition to the policies of Charles I and Archbishop Laud. As the war progressed the better known Presbyterians left, to return to their parishes or to sit in the Westminster Assembly. They were replaced by other Presbyterians and, increasingly, by Independents. However, the Independents in Manchester's army seem to have been conspicuous more because of their disputes with the Scottish Presbyterians in the same army than because of their numbers which were no greater than those in Essex's army. Dr. KisHansky contends, from Professor Solt's work, that only nine New Model army chaplains have been identified. However, over the period 1645-1658, thirty-eight men are known to have served as chaplains. The largest number serving simultaneously was seventeen (in l647), but even the smallest number was ten (in 1650). This suggests that by no means all regiments had chaplains. Nevertheless, regimental chaplains were not a negligible presence. The New Model army recruited a higher proportion of Independent chaplains than had served in the armies of Essex and Manchester, from which the New Model was largely recruited. This proportion continued to grow until 1647 when the Presbyterians were virtually driven out. The proportion of radical sectaries amongst the soldiers in the New Model remained small and the only sectarian chaplains seem to have been Baptists. It therefore seems unlikely that chaplains were responsible for influencing soldiers with radical political or religious ideas. Indeed, the extent to which they were identified with the army command by their appointments would have made this unlikely in any case. However, it seems probable that chaplains were partly responsible for making soldiers, dislocated from their normal environment, more receptive to new ideas. It is also likely that a number of chaplains were themselves influenced by these ideas, though they espoused them only after leaving the army. The provincial forces, until l647, outnumbered the other parliamentary forces and hence deserve more consideration than work on the parliamentary forces traditionally gives them. These forces were even more fragmented and short-lived than the others so it is hard to make generalisations about them. However, eighty-two men who served as chaplains in the provincial forces between 1642 and 1650 can be named. A high proportion of them were Presbyterian, and Presbyterians remained an important presence in the provincial forces longer than they did in the New Model. Sectaries seem to have been less tolerated than in the New Model and only one Baptist chaplain is recorded. Most of the provincial forces were recruited from and served in a confined area. They were officered by the local gentry and their chaplains were the local clergy, so they did not suffer the same dislocation as the soldiers in Essex's army and the New Model. They seem to have been markedly less receptive to radical political and religious ideas, possibly as a consequence of the retention of these local links. The armies which went to Ireland and Scotland were technically part of the New Model, but the army which went to Ireland seems to have been treated as an expeditionary force for which a number of people, particularly chaplains, were specially recruited. The chaplains who went to Ireland in 1649 and the early l65Os were expected to minister to the Protestant settlers as well as to the soldiers. It is, therefore, hard to distinguish precisely between those chaplains on the army establishment and those on the civil list. They were predominantly Independent, though several Baptists went too. Many of them seem to have had some previous connection with Ireland rather than any previous army experience. By contrast many of the chaplains who went to Scotland in 1650 were already serving in the army.

While historians of Britain in the 1640s have long been attracted by the English New Model Army and in recent years by the English royalist armies, the armies fielded by the Scottish Covenanters have suffered a strange neglect. It was not until the work on this thesis was well- advanced that the crude nature of previous efforts became apparent. In an attempt to provide a basic understanding of the Covenanting forces, this thesis synthesizes a mass of material relating to the religious aspects of the armies. Two crucial questions emerged: did the military reflect Scottish society or any part of it; were the Covenanters' forces godly armies seeking to evangelize the areas they occupied? These themes have been interpreted broadly to include the rules of war, the army chaplains, religious manifestations in military life, the moral behaviour of the soldiers, and the role of the armies in spreading the presbyterian faith. In addition to those topics, an examination of the soldiers' relations with civilians and the political activities of the military have been included. The first most clearly allows one to determine whether the Covenanting armies attained the status of godly armies. The political question arises out of the close relationship between religious and political activities in the period. With the exception of family legal papers the entire spectrum of Scottish seventeenth-century sources was inspected. The records of the 1.Estates and its committees, the General Assembly and its Commission, form the basic sources for a view of national developments. At the local level the burgh, presbytery, family and kirk session records proved invaluable. Unfortunately few diaries, memoirs or letters survived. English materials primarily state papers, pamphlets and news books were also helpful. The findings of this thesis suggest that the armies of the Covenanters failed to achieve the ideals set for them.

The main concerns of the study, covering the years 1945-84, are arrangements that have been made for the use of military bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces. The subject is examined within a chronological framework. The development of the United States military presence is traced, from the earliest Joint Chiefs of Staff plans in 1945 and the Spaatz- Tedder agreement in 1946, which gave the United States permission to deploy certain forces in the United Kingdom in time of emergency. The 1948 Berlin Crisis led to the arrival of bombers in East Anglia which was the first major post-war deployment of United States forces to Britain. It was stated that it would be for a period of temporary duty. In fact the bases have remained from that day to this, though their number and types have varied over time. The Korean War proved to be the next major turning point. It increased demands upon the Attlee government for an agreement defining the conditions of use of United States bases in the United Kingdom. The subsequent Truman- Attlee, and later Truman-Churchill, meetings resulted in the key phrase: the use of bases would be 'a matter for joint decision ... in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.' Different interpretations have been placed on these words at different times. The years 1950-57 saw a consolidation of the United States military presence, with Britain's importance as an intelligence base also growing. The dawning of the missile age symbolised by the first Soviet earth satellite in 1957, the agreement in the same year to deploy Thor missiles, and the deployment of Polaris to Holy Loch in 1960, raised questions regarding the adequacy of the earlier agreements on the conditions of use. This factor, alongside the development of a distinct European identity of which Britain has become a part, has led to a questioning of American hegemony within NATO. The arrival of cruise missiles in 1983 gave added urgency to the debate. Whilst it may be generally recognized that the bases make a substantial contribution to the United Kingdom's defences, the need for clarification of the uses to which the bases can be put by United States forces remains.

Thesis (MA (History))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / From 1952 until the ending of apartheid in 1994, South Africa possessed a system of compulsory military service for white males. Until 1967, conscription was not universal and men were selected by ballot to attend military training. From 1967 onwards, all medically fit white South African males were obliged to perform national service, a service which from the mid 1970s often included tours of duty on the border of Angola and South African-occupied Namibia, and later tours of duty in Angola or within the townships of South Africa herself. This thesis looks at aspects of the public reactions to compulsory military service in white South Africa. It traces the evolution of anti-conscription sentiment amongst the white community, juxtaposed with the continued support for compulsory military service that was found in many quarters up until the end of apartheid. It makes a brief examination of the anti-conscription organisations that existed, most notably the End Conscription Campaign, analysing their impact on white society as well as discussing their limitations. The impacts of conscription are also considered, looking at some implications of compulsory military service for the men involved, for society as a whole, and for the Defence Force in which the conscripts served. A thorough examination is also made of the motivations that existed for young men to either acquiesce to or reject military service, taking into account the unique set of circumstances that prevailed in South Africa during the military service era. While South Africa during these years has no direct parallel anywhere else in the world, this thesis briefly discusses South African conscription in an international context, demonstrating, where relevant, the similarities and differences between the South African experience and those of other Western nations, such as Britain, France, Israel and the United States of America. While a reasonable amount of literature and other media exist pertaining to South African conscription, this thesis demonstrates how many of these works are unsatisfactory, and how the topic is in some respects becoming largely misunderstood in both academia and in wider society. The current existence of a number of false beliefs, or myths, about South African conscription is discussed, along with an assessment of how and why these myths were created.

This thesis examines how Britain's government and military establishment conceptualised the role of the voluntary Territorial Army (TA) between the World Wars, and explores the relationship with British defence policy during the period. It also evaluates whether or not the TA was capable of carrying out its ascribed role, through a balanced assessment of its organisation, training and military efficiency. It posits that the TA was integral to British defence planning and played a key part in the Army's mobilisation plans, although the priority given to its role shifted throughout the period in accordance with the direction of Britain's strategic focus. Additionally, this thesis will emphasise that the Territorial Army had not one purpose but several. Alongside its central function as the framework for a conscript National Army it held key responsibilities for both home and imperial defence. This thesis examines the TA's role and organisation in a thematic and broadly chronological manner. Part I deals with the TA's expeditionary role and its function as the framework for all future military expansion, as well as its role as a voluntary imperial reserve for any medium scale wars conducted without resorting to conscription. Part II focuses on the Territorial Army's home defence responsibilities, in particular its domestic role in aiding the civil power and its contribution to Britain's increasingly important air defence capabilities.