Officially and unofficially, Taiwan’s Global Private Banking business has established its significant market share in the region for around 20 years. It is no doubt that Taiwan is a very important market for international private banking industry. The rapid changing economical and political environments have spawned the demands of Taiwan rooted high net worth individuals for global financial solutions. The study focused on comparing the core marketing competencies of three European players ranging from big market dominator, emerging competitive player and a new entrant. The analysis framework is based on 4C model which is a core avenue to explore clients’ fears, needs, explicit and hidden expectations. 4C model sensitively unveils the tangible and intangible elements that hinder the efficiency of marketing success and provides direct and effective solutions to bankers to differentiate themselves in the fierce contention. The study raised the importance of priority for banks to the development of core competencies in increasing clients’ overt utility and abilities to hold-up clients. These are contemporary and trendy driving forces to PB bankers’ success. The study concluded with recommending the main differentiators from three perspectives – quality of marketers, innovative financial architectures and dynamic business models. The integration of well-established mechanisms from respective dimension will equip PB bankers’ distinguished competitiveness in managing ever-changing challenges and seizing the opportunities from this promising market.

Magíster en Economía Aplicada / Ingeniero Civil Industrial / En este trabajo se estudia un modelo de negociación secuencial entre dos agentes a la Rubinstein. La principal innovación presentada es la endogenización del protocolo de negociación y del monto a repartir en cada ronda. En el modelo, al principio de cada periodo, los jugadores pueden esforzarse para incrementar el monto disponible, lo que si bien es privadamente costoso, aumenta la probabilidad de manejar la agenda de negociación en el periodo. Este trabajo caracteriza la dinámica de la negociación y las ineficiencias en equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos. Los principales resultados son los siguientes. Primero, se caracteriza la dinámica de la creación de los beneficios del proyecto. Se muestra que esta consiste de una fase de construcción pura del monto a repartir, en la cual los jugadores se esfuerzan aun cuando la negociación no llegará a su fin, y de una fase de repartición, en la cual los jugadores llegarán a acuerdo y el juego termina. Los agentes ejercen esfuerzo a pesar de que la negociación no terminará porque prefieren hacerlo crecer hasta un monto mayor para luego dividirlo y obtener una ganancia más grande. Segundo, conforme avanza la negociación, los jugadores van ejerciendo un esfuerzo mayor hasta llegar al máximo posible. Hay dos efectos que motivan la realización de esfuerzo, el primero es que no es rentable tener periodos en que no haya crecimiento del monto a repartir porque esto implica una ineficiencia causada por el costo temporal, la cual es mayor a medida que el monto a repartir es más grande. El segundo es la posibilidad de manejar la agenda de negociación, lo que entrega un beneficio mayor al hacerlo, el cual se va incrementando a medida que crece el monto a repartir. En los primeros periodos en que se llega a acuerdo domina el primer efecto porque el beneficio extra por manejar la agenda no es tan grande en comparación con el costo del esfuerzo, no obstante a medida que el monto a repartir aumenta, el beneficio de ser quién controla la negociación también se incrementa, lo que lleva a que el segundo efecto sea mayor. Por último, el tercer resultado es que el monto final que se reparte es menor que el deseable socialmente. La intuición es que el jugador que maneja la agenda sabe que en periodos futuros enfrentará competencia, lo que significa que para volver a ser quien controla la negociación tendrá que incurrir nuevamente en un costo. Además existe un problema de Hold-Up debido a que el jugador que maneja la agenda no puede asegurar que los beneficios por el esfuerzo realizado le pertenezcan en futuras rondas. Esto genera que el agente prefiera asegurar su pago periodos antes de lo socialmente deseable, decidiendo llegar a acuerdo.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Paderborn 2001. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

Zugl.: Paderborn, Univ., Diss., 2009

Universiẗat, Diss., 1999--Konstanz.

This dissertation consists of three essays evaluating topics in industrial organization. The first essay investigates a market structure or property regime in which a final good exists only by assembling multiple, monopoly-supplied components. In such dynamic settings, any sunk cost results in an outcome of hold-up, also known as tragedy of the anticommons. I design a model showing conditions for which two factors that reduce sunk cost, refunds and complementarities, mitigate hold-up. If the first component purchased has positive stand alone value or the first seller offers a full refund, hold-up is mitigated. My results suggest several policies that can mitigate inefficient outcomes in assembly problems, including legal requirements on full refunds, regulation on the purchasing order of components, and prohibition of price discrimination. The second essay applies Bayesian statistics to single-firm event studies used in securities litigation and antitrust investigations. Inference based on Bayesian analysis does not require an assumption of normality that potentially invalidates standard inference of classical single-firm event studies. I investigate ten events, five from actual securities litigation cases. Various Bayesian models, including replication of the frequentist approach, are examined. A flexible Bayesian model, replacing parametric likelihood functions with the empirical distribution function, also is explored. Our approach suggests an alternative, valid method for inference with easy implementation and interpretation. The third essay, motivated in the context of pharmaceutical advertising, analyzes demand rotations caused by an exogenously determined advertising parameter under Cournot oligopoly competition. We find that firms and consumers prefer extreme levels of advertising, but preferences for which extreme do not necessarily align. However, these differences can be alleviated with few or many firms in the market or cheap or expensive technologies. Therefore, advertising levels, regulated or not, might not serve consumers' best interests unless certain market attributes hold.

No description available.

The purpose of this paper is to understand why a host country (HC) shows ex post opportunistic behaviors in E&P projects and frequently forces international oil companies (IOCs) to renegotiate previously signed contracts. This research employs the concept of asset specificity and hold-up problem in transaction cost economics (TCE). It then examines the unique characteristics of E&P projects, HC’s opportunistic behaviors, and IOCs’ safeguards. For a case study analyzing the implications between the economic theory and HC’s ex post opportunism in oil E&P project, I have selected Kazakhstan. The result is that HC’s ex post opportunism can be explained by a hold-up problem resulting from IOCs’ sunk investments and the unique characteristics of the oil E&P industry. When IOCs’ important capital assets become sunk investments and the price of oil increases rapidly, HC has a strong incentive to appropriate IOCs’ profits through ex post opportunism. Yet at the same time, HC must consider the damage to its reputation when deciding the extent and ways of its ex post opportunistic behaviors in oil E&P projects. / text

This work analyzes the solid flow dynamics of gas-solid downer fluidized bed reactor in co-current and, particularly, in counter-current mode. This reactor is potentially interesting for catalytic applications where very short (sub second) and precise contact times are required between the solid catalyst and the gaseous reactants-products. To this aim, a 1.5 m and 36 mm ID downer reactor setup was built to replicate the conditions in a real unit in cold flow and using materials that enable the observation of the solid particle dynamics. Specifically, two state-of-the-art techniques have been used: Particle Image Velocimetry (PIV) and Digital Image Analysis (DIA). Three types of particles have been used: two commercial fluidized catalytic cracking (FCC) particles (ρp = 1300 kg/m3, dp = 75 and 56 μm) and sand (ρp=2600 kg/m3, dp= 370 μm). High-speed cameras were positioned in two axial positions: 70 and 140 cm from the top, to reveal the flow behavior across the reactor. It was found that the solid flow initially was segregated because of the solid feeding design. Thus, 3D printed re-distributer was used to even the solid flow. The solid particles in the counter-current downer was approaching the plug-flow behavior with 23% variation in the velocity gradient across the radial direction, compared with 40% for the co-current counterpart. A method to estimate solid hold-up based on images was developed, yielding values in a good agreement with literature. Keywords: Hydrodynamics, counter-current, downer, PIV, DIA, Solid hold-up

L’idée que le football professionnel en Europe est en crise fait très largement consensus parmi les économistes. Dans notre thèse, nous montrons que ce diagnostic suppose de négliger un certain nombre d’éléments constitutifs de l’inscription du football dans le monde économique. C’est pourquoi, nous défendons que, loin d’être en crise, le football professionnel européen est, depuis les années 1980, dans une phase de très forte croissance. Pour ce faire, nous adoptons une démarche mésoéconomique régulationniste et procédons à une analyse systémique et multi-niveaux du football professionnel européen. Nous aboutissons ainsi à la caractérisation d’un « régime économique de fonctionnement » que nous qualifions de « financiarisé » compte tenu de l’instrumentalisation du football par des intérêts financiarisés et de leur influence sur les stratégies des acteurs traditionnels du football. Cette financiarisation du football engendre une forte instabilité de son régime puisque l’activité des clubs implique du déficit et du surendettement. En effet, l’incitation à la performance sportive (ligue ouverte), le fort pouvoir de négociation des joueurs (hold-up) et la souplesse de l’environnement réglementaire du football conduisent les clubs à des niveaux de dépenses élevés. Au contraire des « petits » clubs, cette situation n’est pas problématique pour les « grands » clubs, puisqu’ils sont soutenus par des agents à forte capacité de financement et tirent des revenus élevés de leur participation aux compétitions supranationales. Dans ce contexte, le régime est donc durable : sous l’effet de l’instabilité, les acteurs nouent de nouveaux compromis qui modifient les « dispositifs institutionnels » existants et rendent ainsi pérenne la logique de croissance en vigueur. Il y a donc régulation (au sens de la théorie de la régulation) du football. Il reste toutefois que ces modalités de régulation conduisent à accroître les inégalités entre les clubs et que cela pourrait, à terme, amener à une crise économique majeure du football professionnel européen. / Economists argue that the European professional football is in crisis. This thesis discusses this postulate by testing the relationship between the changes in football and the transformations of modern capitalism. Our methodology is based on a meso-level analysis from the French “Régulation theory” which provides a systemic and multilevel analysis. The thesis thus emphasizes how the progressive integration of financialised interests in football has an influence on the strategies of football traditional stakeholders. It actually shows that the financialisation process of the European professional football leads to growth since the 1980s. However, this growth is rather unstable because losses and indebtedness are part of clubs activity. The incentive for sports performance (open league), the players’ strong bargaining power (hold-up) and the flexibility of the regulatory environment are the main determinants of the clubs’ high spendings. Contrary to the “small” clubs, this situation is not a constraint for the “big” clubs thanks to the financial contributions they obtain from their owners, from their funding partners and from their participation to supranational competitions. In this environment and despite instability, the growth regime remains nevertheless sustainable. The stakeholders create new compromises to reduce imbalances: these compromises are the roots for new institutional arrangements that finally support the growth logic which is in place. There is therefore a “régulation” in European professional football, that is to say a process that contributes to the reproduction of the sector. However, this process paradoxically increases inequalities and may encourage the conditions for a major economic crisis.