LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

in English The doctrine of "humanitarian intervention" has long been a controversial subject, both in law and in international relations, and remains so today. For humanitarian intervention is typical that it is a multidisciplinary issue. This problem is questionable not only from the point of view of law; however there also arise many ethic and moral dilemmas. The study handles the humanitarian intervention from the view of international law hence my aim is to outline the legal questions connected with this issue. At first it must be said that humanitarian intervention exists for a very long time although it has been subject of discussions for last ten or twenty years. What makes the humanitarian intervention such controversial point in question in contemporary international law? First of all the concept of humanitarian intervention must be distinguished from related concepts, such as "humanitarian action", "humanitarian operations", "humanitarian assistance", "intervention to protect nationals abroad", "intervention to facilitate self- determination", " pro-democratic intervention" and more other concepts closely link to humanitarian intervention If we start to concetrate just on humanitarian intervention there are questions to think about: Firstly, the main question is: What is the humanitarian...

[pt] Essa dissertação visa analisar o debate referente às tomadas de decisão para as práticas de intervenção humanitária nos anos noventa utilizando instrumentos teóricos provenientes da Filosofia da Linguagem de Wittgenstein. O foco investigativo se direciona aos discursos dos membros do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (ONU) e como estes, por meio do uso da linguagem, atribuem significados variados aos conceitos centrais que arquitetam o entendimento acerca desta nova prática, ainda sem conceituação formal e jurídica na diplomacia e na academia das relações internacionais. O ponto de partida para a presente análise é a constatação da falta de definição das práticas de intervenção, assim também, a ausência de critérios que qualifiquem os casos de violação de direitos humanos para uma intervenção de caráter humanitário. No entanto, enquanto a maioria dos praticantes e estudiosos de relações internacionais aponta para os efeitos negativos da ausência de definição conceitual da prática, o presente trabalho ressalta a condição natural da indeterminação da linguagem e enfatiza que apenas devido à natureza porosa das palavras e o funcionamento dinâmico e interativo da linguagem novos caminhos de significação às práticas humanas podem ser traçados. / [en] The present work focuses on how the use of language by the Member States of the United Nation´s Security Council during the decision making for humanitarian interventions in the post Cold War period, can come to mean different things in different scenarios. For this job we have used analytical tools concepts from Wittgenstein´s Philosophy of Language, such as language games, in order to investigate the relationship between language and things within the dynamics process of meaning constructing. The investigation space is represented by the Security Council forum and the negotiations of the possibility of interventions and its terms are the main focus of the work. The dissertation starts out by characterizing the practice of humanitarian interventions, and in addition, pointing out the absence of a conceptual definition for its identification. According to the theoretical framework adopted in the present work, language carries within its words a natural open texture when investigated the relationship between words and things, and therefore, meaning can only be constructed within a language game. By following Wittgenstein´s idea of the language games dynamics we can begin to understand how can the same words, such as the main concepts that construct the meaning of the practice of humanitarian interventions, can mean different thing in different contexts, and therefore, start to wonder if a codification of a rule for humanitarian intervention can possibly do more harm then the absence of it.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-10-10T10:09:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Afonso Grisi Neto.pdf: 1029283 bytes, checksum: 76d2cd12bd98dbcca2078f9ceea836f5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-10T10:09:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Afonso Grisi Neto.pdf: 1029283 bytes, checksum: 76d2cd12bd98dbcca2078f9ceea836f5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-10 / During the last two decades, the matter of States’ internal conflicts has been becoming important as well as their adverse consequences, which come from the survival conditions of their populations, bringing the discussion of a theme which, for a long time, has been deserving the attention of International Relations and International Law scholars and which consists of the pursuit of a system composed of principles and rules meant to promote, in the broadest way possible, the protection and defence of dignity and rights of the human person. Associated to this matter and to its corollary, there is place for one of the most burning and controversial themes of politics and international relations, which is the admissibility of interventions practiced by States and International Organizations in States in which situations of flagrant contempt of the minimal conditions of human dignity can be verified. The discussion around an intervention undertaken on the conditions already mentioned before is inserted in a broader debate involving two significant issues about international relations, which are State’s sovereignty and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. The classical concept of sovereignty states that it means absolute power of the State over people and things within its territory and, in this sense, an intervention in a particular State, even if aimed towards humanitarian ends, would represent an affront to its sovereignty. During the last two decades, however, by the proliferation of internal conflicts in several States, discussion has arisen on whether the State, in the name of its sovereignty, had the right to inflict suffering and, in many cases, even to kill its population. In 2001, the United Nations (UN), upon the study of a specialized commission, released the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. According to this doctrine, the State is responsible for giving protection and assistance to its population and if, somehow, it does not comply with its obligation or is incapable of doing so, the international community will supply this State’s deficiency, intervening in order to reorganize it, restoring peace and stability to its population. According to the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, State’s sovereignty, formerly seen as a State’s “right”, becomes its “responsibility” to protect its population. As it is seen, the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine has a double objective: 1) it grants the first responsibility to protect its population to the respective State; 2) it enables, additionally, the UN’s intervention in this State, as an institution representing the international community. The alluded doctrine comes to support a mechanism from the UN’s Letter, which forbids the intervention practiced in a State, unilaterally, by another State or by groups of States, without a warrant from that entity. Therefore, it is through the sense of dignity as a human person’s essence, as his or her intrinsic value, that it is developed, in the present work, the idea that every aggression to this fundamental value, coming from the own State, coming from radical groups established in it, is framed as an international illegal act. In this sense, the UN, with all its flaws and imperfections, is still the representative body of international community. Thus, the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine can be considered a significant step towards the search for means and instruments, which legitimize and justify humanitarian interventions / Nas duas últimas décadas, vem ganhando vulto a questão dos conflitos internos dos Estados e das nefastas consequências deles advindas quanto às condições de sobrevivência de suas populações, trazendo à discussão um tema que de há muito vem merecendo a atenção de estudiosos das Relações Internacionais e do Direito Internacional e que consiste na busca de um sistema de princípios e normas destinado a promover, da forma mais ampla possível, a proteção e a defesa da dignidade e dos diretos da pessoa humana. Associada a essa questão e como seu corolário, tem lugar um dos temas mais candentes e polêmicos da política e das relações internacionais, que é o da admissibilidade de intervenções levadas a efeito por Estados e por Organizações Internacionais em Estados nos quais se verifique situações de flagrante vilipêndio das condições mínimas de dignidade humana. A discussão em torno de uma intervenção empreendida nas condições antes referidas insere-se em um debate mais amplo envolvendo duas questões de relevo nas relações internacionais, quais sejam, a soberania do Estado e a legitimidade das intervenções humanitárias. O conceito clássico de soberania diz que esta significa o poder absoluto do Estado sobre as pessoas e coisas dentro de seu território e, nesse sentido, uma intervenção em determinado Estado, ainda que levada a efeito com fins humanitários, representaria uma afronta a sua soberania. Nas duas últimas décadas, no entanto, com a proliferação dos conflitos internos em diversos Estados, passou-se a discutir se o Estado, em nome de sua soberania, tinha o direito de infligir sofrimento e, em muitos casos, até de matar sua população. Em 2001, a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU), após o estudo de uma comissão especializada, lança a doutrina da “Responsabilidade de Proteger”. Segundo essa doutrina, compete ao Estado dar proteção e assistência a sua população e se, de algum modo, aquele não cumprir com esta obrigação ou não tiver condições de fazê-lo, a comunidade internacional suprirá essa deficiência do Estado, intervindo neste para o fim de reorganizá-lo, devolvendo a paz e a estabilidade a sua população. De acordo com a doutrina da “Responsabilidade de Proteger”, a soberania do Estado, antes entendida como um “direito” do Estado, passa a ser uma “responsabilidade” deste de proteger sua população. Como se vê, a doutrina da “Responsabilidade de Proteger” visa a um duplo objetivo: 1) confere a responsabilidade primeira de proteger sua população ao respectivo Estado; 2) permite, subsidiariamente, a intervenção por parte da ONU nesse Estado, como instituição representativa da comunidade internacional. A aludida doutrina vem corroborar dispositivo da Carta da ONU, que veda a intervenção levada a efeito em um Estado, unilateralmente, por outro Estado ou por grupos de Estados, sem mandato daquela entidade. Portanto, é na acepção de dignidade como essência da pessoa humana, como seu valor intrínseco, que se desenvolve, no presente trabalho, a ideia de que toda agressão a esse valor fundamental, seja por parte do próprio Estado, seja por parte de grupos radicais nele estabelecidos, configura um ilícito internacional. Nesse sentido, a ONU, com todos os seus defeitos e imperfeições, ainda continua a ser o órgão representativo da comunidade internacional. Desse modo, a doutrina da “Responsabilidade de Proteger” pode ser considerada um passo significativo na busca de meios e instrumentos que legitimem e justifiquem as intervenções humanitárias

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Henrique Candido da Silva.pdf: 950188 bytes, checksum: 6bb142ee2cd262b1efbc6e6bebd06ec1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-02 / The background to this paper is the challenging field of the human security, where the objects of reference are the State and the sovereign decision; and the main issue is the use of emergency measures, such as the humanitarian intervention. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion about the priority between the safety of States or of human beings, especially when it comes to the paradox of the defence of Human Rights through force, or, in other words, protection of life through the production of death. In order to do so, the ontogenetic analysis of the state of exception will be employed, showing that the permission to the use of force, concretized through the humanitarian intervention, exposes man s humanity to something that can, simultaneously, save it and destroy it, constituting an autoimmune malfunction of the Law s autopoietic system. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the sedimentation of the idea of prevention in the global community is the most appropriate element to the safeguard of the Human Rights, and that the considerations on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention prove themselves to be useless, be it because they constitute an immunizer instrument that searches its legitimation in the inclusion of life through its suspension, be it because it constitutes a pretentiously juridical action occurring in an anomic field where the corpus won the battle against the free man / O presente trabalho tem como pano de fundo o campo desafiador da segurança humana, onde o Estado e a decisão soberana são os objetos de referência; e o uso de medidas de emergência, como a intervenção humanitária, a preocupação central. Objetiva este trabalho contribuir com a discussão sobre a prioridade entre segurança dos Estados ou dos seres humanos, especificamente sobre o paradoxo da defesa dos Direitos Humanos através da força, ou melhor, da defesa da vida pela produção da morte. Para tanto, lançaremos mão da análise ontogenética do fenômeno estado de exceção, verificando que a permissão do uso da força, concretizada pela intervenção humanitária, expõe a humanidade do homem àquilo que pode simultaneamente salvá-la e aniquilá-la, constituindo, assim, uma disfunção autoimune do sistema autopoiético do direito. Concluiremos, portanto, que a sedimentação da ideia de prevenção na comunidade mundial é o elemento mais apropriado para a salvaguarda dos Direitos Humanos, e que restam inúteis as considerações de legalidade da intervenção humanitária, seja por se tratar de um instrumento imunizador que busca sua legitimação através da inclusão da vida por meio da sua suspensão, seja por constituir uma ação pretensamente jurídica incidente em um campo anômico onde o corpus ganhou a batalha contra o homem livre

A decisão política e moral entre fazer algo e não fazer nada diante de emergências humanitárias, como genocídio, assassinatos em massa e limpeza étnica ao redor do mundo, permanece como um dos principais dilemas decisórios das relações internacionais e como tema controverso tanto para a Teoria Política quanto para a Teoria de Relações Internacionais. A complexidade e controvérsia deste fenômeno serão analisadas a partir da perspectiva de que as intervenções humanitárias reivindicam o lugar negligenciado das considerações morais tanto pela prática política quanto pelas reflexões teóricas de mainstream das relações internacionais. Desse modo, o principal objetivo desta pesquisa é a análise das intervenções humanitárias a partir da relação entre ordem e justiça sob a perspectiva normativa. É da reflexão sobre a conexão e a combinação dessas duas idéias tão cruciais ao entendimento prático e teórico das relações internacionais que se pretende buscar novas interpretações normativas a respeito desse fenômeno. Para tanto, a reflexão teórica e normativa das intervenções humanitárias será ilustrada com exemplos empíricos de intervenções durante e após o período de Guerra Fria, a fim de investigar as possibilidades de uma mudança no relacionamento entre ordem e justiça desde o início da década de 1990 até os dias mais contemporâneos. / The moral and political decision between doing something and doing nothing at the occasion of humanitarian emergencies, such as genocide, mass murders and ethnic cleansing all around the world remains to be the principal dilemma of decision making in the area of international relations and as a controversial subject as well as for the Political Theory as for the Theory of International Relations. The complexity and controversy of this phenomenon will be analyzed from the perspective that the humanitarian interventions demand the neglected place of moral considerations as well as for the political practice as for the theoretical reflections of the mainstream of international relations. In this manner, the main objective of this research is the analysis of humanitarian interventions from the relation between order and justice on a normative perspective. It is the reflection of connection and combination between this two ideas so much essential for the practical and theoretical understanding of international relations, that will be the groundwork for the search for new normative interpretations in relation to this phenomenon. As such, the theoretical and normative reflection of humanitarian interventions will be illustrated on empirical examples of interventions during and after the period of Cold War, to investigate the possibilities of changes in relation between order and justice since the beginning of the decade of 1990 until the more recent past.

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia created an understanding of state sovereignty free from external interference that remained largely unaltered until the last century. The horrors of the Holocaust and the significant humanitarian crises of the 20th century have presented the international community with a new type of threat to international peace and security and have sparked an ongoing conversation about the limitations of traditional sovereignty. Russia has positioned itself as a firm supporter of a strict adherence to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, but my thesis argues that Russians do not value this interpretation as much as they claim to, and that in fact Moscow recognizes that this definition is a thing of the past. I examine Russian actions surrounding the 2011 UN-sanctioned intervention in Libya and the ongoing conflict in Syria, particularly focusing on the major differences between Russian decision-making in the two cases. I analyze transcripts of Security Council meetings in order to demonstrate that there is far more to Russian actions in Syria than Moscow’s public position suggests, and I subsequently offer a number of alternative explanations for Russian decision-making surrounding Syria. These alternative explanations demonstrate that even the Russians, who have portrayed themselves as the great defenders of traditional state sovereignty, recognize the modern limitations to strict Westphalian sovereignty and understand that this traditional definition is a thing of the past. This conclusion is significant because in demonstrating that traditional sovereignty’s greatest champion acknowledges the modern shift in the concept, I prove that the departure from strict Westphalian sovereignty is not merely a theory, but a reality.

<p>Abstract</p><p>This essay has as its purpose to discuss the current legal regulation of the concept of humanitarian intervention. The inconsistencies in the debate over the legal status of this concept, and the legal uncertainty it brings to the acts of states and the lives of their nationals is a motivating factor for the writing of this essay. However, it has been clear from the outset that the concept of humanitarian intervention is intricately connected to political and moral ideas and values. Thus, the attitude taken towards this doctrine will be highly dependent on the perspectives of the state, government or single author representing it.</p><p>Following this starting point, the aim of this essay is not to present a single answer as to whether humanitarian intervention is, or is not, legal, but to research, compare and analyze the different arguments put forward in this subject in international law today. Hopefully, this will provide the reader of this essay with some insight into the sources of international law of today and how the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, the prohibition of force and the protection of human rights relate to the concept of humanitarian intervention.</p><p>A frank overview of the UN Charter does not support use of force except in the case of self-defence or without a Security Council mandate. Because of the unique character of the Charter and the UN system itself, any interpretation of the Charter will have to consider not only the letter of the Charter but its founding purposes and principles, as well as its function and tasks in international society today. Taking into account this wider perception of the Charter, there have been propositions to interpret the key articles and principles on the use of force in the Charter in such a way that the concept of humanitarian intervention completely circumvents the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. This interpretation, however, has been rejected by the currently most authoritative writers in international law and has received a, to say the least, mixed support among the community of states. The main reason for this is that such an interpretation of the Charter overlooks the travaux preparatoires of the Charter as well as the purposes and functions of the UN, and would produce a result contrary to the peace-building aims of the UN.</p><p>As regards the state practice connected to the relevant regulations of the UN Charter, this essay has shown that the consistency, generality and uniformity of this practise is not sufficient to conclude that a new interpretative regime has been accepted by the states that would allow for humanitarian intervention beyond what is provided for today by the explicit support of the UN Charter. Neither has the claims of a customary rule allowing humanitarian intervention, independent of the rules of the UN Charter, been proved to exist as a result of consistent state practice and an accompanying opinio juris. Still, states have been seen to resort to the use of force claiming a right to humanitarian intervention, and there is recognition of such a doctrine in the writing of several authors. This perception may partly be a consequence of the American dominance in the writing on the subject, and the selectivity that such a limited perspective brings to the overview of the legal position of humanitarian intervention. However, there is proof in the practice of the UN and the instruments concluded by states within the UN system of a new perspective of the state and its responsibility towards its own citizens. Coupled with the emergence of human rights instruments within the UN, there is a possibility that this perspective will bring changes in the values and workings of the UN system and the community of states as a whole. This change may perhaps in the future allow for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme humanitarian distress.</p><p>However, the risks of misuse of such a new right, as well as the difficulties of formulating a set of criteria for this doctrine that would encompass the will and interests of all states demand that such a development, however mindful of the urgency of the human suffering necessary to counter with such a doctrine, will have to take its time and be conducted with great care to produce a sustainable result.</p>

Abstract This essay has as its purpose to discuss the current legal regulation of the concept of humanitarian intervention. The inconsistencies in the debate over the legal status of this concept, and the legal uncertainty it brings to the acts of states and the lives of their nationals is a motivating factor for the writing of this essay. However, it has been clear from the outset that the concept of humanitarian intervention is intricately connected to political and moral ideas and values. Thus, the attitude taken towards this doctrine will be highly dependent on the perspectives of the state, government or single author representing it. Following this starting point, the aim of this essay is not to present a single answer as to whether humanitarian intervention is, or is not, legal, but to research, compare and analyze the different arguments put forward in this subject in international law today. Hopefully, this will provide the reader of this essay with some insight into the sources of international law of today and how the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, the prohibition of force and the protection of human rights relate to the concept of humanitarian intervention. A frank overview of the UN Charter does not support use of force except in the case of self-defence or without a Security Council mandate. Because of the unique character of the Charter and the UN system itself, any interpretation of the Charter will have to consider not only the letter of the Charter but its founding purposes and principles, as well as its function and tasks in international society today. Taking into account this wider perception of the Charter, there have been propositions to interpret the key articles and principles on the use of force in the Charter in such a way that the concept of humanitarian intervention completely circumvents the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention. This interpretation, however, has been rejected by the currently most authoritative writers in international law and has received a, to say the least, mixed support among the community of states. The main reason for this is that such an interpretation of the Charter overlooks the travaux preparatoires of the Charter as well as the purposes and functions of the UN, and would produce a result contrary to the peace-building aims of the UN. As regards the state practice connected to the relevant regulations of the UN Charter, this essay has shown that the consistency, generality and uniformity of this practise is not sufficient to conclude that a new interpretative regime has been accepted by the states that would allow for humanitarian intervention beyond what is provided for today by the explicit support of the UN Charter. Neither has the claims of a customary rule allowing humanitarian intervention, independent of the rules of the UN Charter, been proved to exist as a result of consistent state practice and an accompanying opinio juris. Still, states have been seen to resort to the use of force claiming a right to humanitarian intervention, and there is recognition of such a doctrine in the writing of several authors. This perception may partly be a consequence of the American dominance in the writing on the subject, and the selectivity that such a limited perspective brings to the overview of the legal position of humanitarian intervention. However, there is proof in the practice of the UN and the instruments concluded by states within the UN system of a new perspective of the state and its responsibility towards its own citizens. Coupled with the emergence of human rights instruments within the UN, there is a possibility that this perspective will bring changes in the values and workings of the UN system and the community of states as a whole. This change may perhaps in the future allow for a doctrine of humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme humanitarian distress. However, the risks of misuse of such a new right, as well as the difficulties of formulating a set of criteria for this doctrine that would encompass the will and interests of all states demand that such a development, however mindful of the urgency of the human suffering necessary to counter with such a doctrine, will have to take its time and be conducted with great care to produce a sustainable result.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law