La thèse traite du débat sur l'origine et la nature du polythéisme qui anima la pensée française au XVIIIe siècle. Depuis le début du siècle, ce débat commence à déborder le périmètre théologique auquel il se limitait auparavant. Le polythéisme cesse d’être une question d’exégèse scripturaire et devient un problème historique, puis philosophique. La thèse a pour objet d'éclaircir les différentes étapes de cette évolution. On montre en particulier que le remplacement progressif du modèle du monothéisme originel par celui du polythéisme primitif provoque un changement du statut de la question : d'enquête principalement antiquaire sur un sujet spécifique, elle devient une réflexion philosophique sur l'origine et la nature de la croyance religieuse tout court. La première des deux parties de la thèse est consacrée aux recherches sur les religions païennes des érudits, des antiquaires et des historiens : on y examine les principales théories sur l'origine du paganisme nées dans ce contexte (évhémérisme, allégorisme, théories de l'origine de l'idolâtrie des arts visuels et des signes de l'écriture) afin de montrer qu'elles préparèrent la réflexion des philosophes, en proposant un nouveau regard historique sur le polythéisme. La deuxième partie porte sur les aspects plus proprement philosophiques du débat ; l'attention est concentrée sur les deux figures-clés de Pierre Bayle et de David Hume et sur deux axes théoriques principaux : un axe logique ou gnoséologique, touchant à ce que signifie penser la divinité en tant que plurielle ; et un axe anthropologique ou psychologique sur l'origine de la croyance en plusieurs dieux. / The subject of this thesis is the debate on the origin and nature of polytheism, which took place in France in the Eighteenth century. From the beginning of the century, this debate started to unfold outside of the theological frame within which it had been confined earlier. Polytheism stopped being an issue of biblical exegesis to become a question of historical and then philosophical nature. This thesis aims to shed light on the steps of this change. In particular, it is shown that the gradual substitution of the orthodox model of original pure monotheism with that one of primitive polytheism changed the nature of the issue: from a specific question mainly of antiquarians' interest, it became a philosophical inquiry on the origin and nature of religious belief in general. The first part of the thesis is about the researches on pagan religions conducted by antiquarians and historians: the main theories on the origin of paganism which arose in this context are examined (Euhemerism, allegorism, theories of the origin of idolatry from visual arts and writing signs), aiming to show that these theories paved the way to the reflection of philosophers, proposing a new historical approach to polytheism. The second part of the thesis deals with more strictly philosophical aspects of the debate, focusing on two key figures ‒ Pierre Bayle and David Hume ‒ and on two fundamental theoretical lines: a logical or gnoseological one, about what it means to conceive divinity as multiple; and an anthropological or psychological one, on the origin of the belief in several divinities.

As a practical moralist and political theorist concerned with reforming a factious and religious public, Hume recommends a particular outlook that is fit for civilized society. In this dissertation, I present Hume as a contributor to the post-scholastic contest of philosophical systems, as an innovative thinker who revised the modern Epicurean outlook of Hobbes and Mandeville and challenged both the austere Christian Stoicism of Francis Hutcheson and the Platonic rationalism of Samuel Clarke. I argue that the political mentality that Hume presented as suitable for sustaining the prevailing social order constitutes one more step in the development of the modern Epicurean mentality. This mentality, moreover, is not strictly political, but incorporates metaphysical, epistemological, and moral judgments that, in light of the contest of systems, are rightly regarded as a restatement of modern Epicurean positions. Hume, in accord with the principles of the new political science, sought to protect the gains of civilization from the vestiges of barbarism, which, for Hume, were manifested in the superstitious tribalism of religionists and political partisans. Hume replaces Christian, Whig, and Tory myths—i.e. grand narratives situating human beings as moral and political subjects—with the Epicurean myth of the progress of human society. The end of political society, from this perspective, is neither piety nor moral improvement, but prosperity, ease, and comfort, which, together, serve as the measure of progress and the reason for popular consent to the exercise of public political authority. This mentality, I argue, sheds light on the normative dimensions of Hume’s liberal political science.

No description available.

Les travaux de Tversky et Kahneman à propos du raisonnement probabiliste ont déclenché un débat qui s'est transposé aux normes du raisonnement en général. Les tentatives de naturalisation de ces normes entreprises par les psychologues évolutionnistes (en particulier Gigerenzer) avaient comme objectif d'expliquer les normes en fonction du contexte pour lequel elles avaient évolué. Nous présentons les travaux de Tversky et Kahneman ainsi que leur interprétation et celle de la psychologie évolutionniste. Par contre, un problème majeur émerge de ces tentatives. Considérer les normes dans leur adéquation à un contexte particulier a comme conséquence de relativiser ces normes. Or, nous souhaitons, lorsque nous entreprenons une étude normative, expliquer aussi les normes générales du raisonnement et conserver cet aspect de généralité. Il est possible d'expliquer les normes générales du raisonnement à l'intérieur d'un modèle naturaliste. Stanovich réalise cette explication à l'aide de la théorie des mèmes. Nous présentons les arguments de Stanovich. Nous remarquons, ensuite, que malgré la justesse des arguments de Stanovich un second problème demeure en suspens. Ce problème peut être appelé le problème du processus motivationnel qui pousse les individus à accepter et à intégrer les normes générales du raisonnement. Nous faisons alors l'hypothèse selon laquelle il peut être pertinent de regarder du côté de l'histoire de la philosophie, et plus précisément de David Hume, pour trouver des pistes de solution au problème de la motivation. Dans un premier temps nous revoyons les lignes directrices de la théorie de l'esprit et de la croyance de Hume. Nous présentons ensuite sa théorie normative naturaliste et terminons en dressant un tableau comparatif entre Hume et les théories contemporaines. Si nous acceptons de prendre en considération le fait que l'entreprise philosophique de Hume se déploie dans un contexte historique et philosophique différent, nous pouvons accepter que les pistes de solutions qu'il avance demeurent pertinentes. Cette thèse peut être vue comme un complément au débat contemporain. Les deux idées principales de cette tentative de solution sont 1) l'importance des sentiments dans le processus de formation de la croyance (incluant les croyances à propos des normes générales du raisonnement) et 2) la volonté naturelle de s'adapter à notre environnement social, ce qui nous pousse parfois à adopter un point de vue général afin d'éviter les conflits. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : normativité, raisonnement, raisonnement probabiliste, motivation, naturalisme, Hume.

This work, the Nature and Value of Scepticism, shows that the metaphilosopby arising from what David Hume calls "true scepticism," is of use and value, refuting three standard objections to sceptical philosophy: the charges of unlivability, of idleness and of being dangerous and destructive. / The unlivability charge is refuted with an examination of the work of a self-proclaimed extreme sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. The idleness charge is answered by questioning its assumption that if scepticism does not lead to an extreme conclusion, it must be idle and without philosophical interest. The destructive charge, that the acceptance of scepticism would result in the death of rationality, is countered in reviewing the work of Hume and Ludwig Wittgenstein, showing that their outlook is not against philosophy but only a particular type of philosophy, namely dogmatic philosophy. / Chapter 1 argues that two reasonable interpretations of Sextus's writings yield a scepticism that is livable and philosophically important. Chapter 2 shows Hume's philosophy is livable and not destructive. Chapter 3 examines the connection between Hume's philosophy and his sceptical approach, arguing that his true scepticism informs his philosophical outlook. Chapter 4 argues that Wittgenstein shares much with Hume's "true scepticism," and that his work is not anti-philosophical as widely supposed. Chapter 5 provides examples of how a sceptically informed metaphilosophy can help address questions in epistemology and metaethics.

This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc. / Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--referred to as "the classical British empiricists"--are examined for the extent to which a doctrine, called 'imagism' by Price, played a formative role in their philosophies. Imagism as defined has two main varieties, the polemical version and the constructive version. According to the former, images are the primary symbols in thinking and all other symbols are secondary and derivative. According to the latter, thought is the manipulation of mental images. It is this latter doctrine which is demonstrated as applicable to the classical British empiricists; so far as the former doctrine appears at all, it is an aberrant doctrine.[TRUNCATED]

Submitted by Estanislau Santana (estanislaufaustodantas@gmail.com) on 2017-10-03T04:59:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação de Estanislau Fausto.pdf: 968753 bytes, checksum: d7305c6ddcbbc9c38311d04f3b69703b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Biblioteca Isaías Alves (reposiufbat@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-03T13:22:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação de Estanislau Fausto.pdf: 968753 bytes, checksum: d7305c6ddcbbc9c38311d04f3b69703b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-03T13:22:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação de Estanislau Fausto.pdf: 968753 bytes, checksum: d7305c6ddcbbc9c38311d04f3b69703b (MD5) / CAPES / Pretendemos analisar como a estrutura da alma na obra de Descartes, a crítica humeana ao eu e a concepção husserliana da consciência podem estar interligados. Com mais exatidão, queremos averiguar qual foi a resolução dada por Husserl para o conflito entre a posição cartesiana e a humeana sobre a concepção do eu. / We intend to analyze how the structure of the soul in the Descartes´ work, the Hume´s critique about the self and the Husserlian conception of consciousness are intertwined. With more precision, we want to find out what was the solution given by Husserl to the conflict between the positions of Descartes and Hume about the self.

Dissertação (mestrado)-Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, 2016. / Submitted by Camila Duarte (camiladias@bce.unb.br) on 2016-10-10T16:23:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AlexandreMadrugadaCostaAraújo.pdf: 865456 bytes, checksum: ad171739a4acd3e0377ec863ff7ef625 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Patrícia Nunes da Silva(patricia@bce.unb.br) on 2017-01-02T20:40:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AlexandreMadrugadaCostaAraújo.pdf: 865456 bytes, checksum: ad171739a4acd3e0377ec863ff7ef625 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-02T20:40:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AlexandreMadrugadaCostaAraújo.pdf: 865456 bytes, checksum: ad171739a4acd3e0377ec863ff7ef625 (MD5) / Esta dissertação visa apresentar uma crítica e uma alternativa ao problema da negação da identidade pessoal levantado por Hume, a partir de alguns elementos presentes na Antropologia Filosófica de Henrique Vaz, especialmente centrada no conceito de pessoa. Trata-se do confronto de duas propostas bem distintas: a primeira de cunho empirista e cético, e, a segunda, ancorada em categorias metafísicas. _______________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This dissertation aims to present a critique and an alternative to the problem of personal identity's negation raised by Hume, based on some elements present in Henrique Vaz's philosophical anthropology, which are specially focused on the concept of person. It is about the confrontation of two very different proposals: the first one, with a skeptical and empiricist hallmark and the second one, anchored in metaphysical categories.