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171	Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism Saunders, Josiah Paul January 2007 (has links) This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism. Philosophy Kant (Immanuel) Hume (David) naturalism science ethics morals morality normativity agency freedom desire reason rationality autonomy heteronomy sympathy justice ends means ideal happiness duty right wrong inclination motive metaphysics of morals moral epistemology kingdom of ends Blackburn (Simon) Korsgaard (Christine) Allison (Henry) Darwall (Stephen) Förster (Eckart) Kuehn (Manfred)
172	Role empatie v etickém jednání / The Role of Empathy in Ethical Behaviour Novák, Lukáš January 2018 (has links) More than two hundred years ago David Hume together with his fellow philosopher Adam Smith posited, that ethical behaviour arises from so called: "moral sense". In the other words, they share the same idea, that passions are principle evoking and guiding human behaviour. Hume claim: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" (…). It is possible that this statement - among others - woke up from the 'dogmatic dream' one of the greatest philosophers of all time - Immanuel Kant, who propose, - contrary to Hume - that reason but not necessary passions can determinate human actions. In the question of what rule the passions in ethics have, it seems to be helpful to use the knowledge which follows from recent science. During this thesis we will use methods such as: comparison, analysis and synthesis. Main aim of this thesis will be to deal with the following question: what relationship can be observed between empathy, "moral sense" and ethical behaviour in perspective of recent science. This enquiry will therefore try to deal with the old question: what the the relationship between reason, passions and ethical behaviour is.

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Kant's Departure from Hume's Moral Naturalism

Role empatie v etickém jednání / The Role of Empathy in Ethical Behaviour