Dans le premier livre du Traité de la nature humaine (1739), David Hume avance plusieurs arguments paraissant avoir des conséquences sceptiques radicales à l'effet que les procédures inférentielles à la base de nos croyances tant empiriques que non empiriques ne sont pas fondées par la raison, en conséquence de quoi ces croyances ne sont pas épistémiquement justifiées. Pourtant, le Traité poursuit un projet positif de type naturaliste, celui de construire une science de la nature humaine par la méthode expérimentale, et ce projet amène Hume à défendre des principes théoriques empiriques se voulant de bonnes explications des phénomènes cognitifs, passionnels et moraux humains. Or, il semble que Hume ne puisse pas défendre une telle théorie sans se commettre à la thèse que certains procédés inférentiels sont fondés et permettent de produire des croyances justifiées, ce que semble contredire son scepticisme. Comment Hume peut-il tenir une position philosophique cohérente en défendant à la fois un scepticisme épistémique radical et une théorie de la nature humaine? Notre étude de ce problème s'intéresse à deux arguments de type sceptique présentés par Hume: son argument sur les croyances causales, couramment désigné comme son argument sceptique sur l'induction, et son argument sceptique sur la raison basé sur la faillibilité de nos facultés inférentielles. Nous présentons une analyse de ces arguments montrant en quoi ce sont des arguments sceptiques radicaux mettant en cause la justification de nos croyances. Nous montrons ensuite que le texte de Hume ne permet pas de trancher clairement la question interprétative de savoir comment celui-ci envisage de défendre la poursuite de son projet d'une théorie de la nature humaine face à ses arguments sceptiques, mais que seulement deux possibilités demeurent à cet égard: la possibilité que Hume soit conduit à une conception non épistémique du fondement normatif des croyances, et la possibilité que Hume croie pouvoir encore, malgré ses arguments sceptiques, défendre le caractère raisonnable des croyances issues de sa recherche en référence à des caractéristiques qui différencient épistémiquement sa méthode philosophique expérimentale de ses concurrentes. Nous montrons toutefois qu'aucune de ces deux possibilités ne semble épargner à Hume des difficultés importantes. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Hume, Scepticisme, Croyances, Justification, Théorie de la connaissance.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-232).

No description available.

Bibliography: leaves 397-406 / 406 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1986

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-90). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 2007

Inaug.-diss.--Halle. / Lebenslauf. "Litteratur": p. [123]-124.

I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000426333-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 479070 bytes, checksum: 3b9dab1b30f46509f30147a4068fa0eb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / This study we proposed an investigation of the criticisms of David Hume about 'Argument from Design', existing in his book Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. These criticisms are aimed to point out the weaknesses of that argument, as the foundation of the theory that advocates the creation of the world from God. We also aim to clarify the dialectical and argumentative Humean way, which, from an empiricist perspective, proposes that all knowledge can, only, comes from a sensitive experience. Hume is unable or refute and destroy this argument, if propose an alternative to replace, is what we examine in the present. The book is composed by four chapters, and we begin by presenting the 'Argument from Design', in the form that became known. Then, we will effectively contact the book Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, going through approach the construction of the criticisms developed by Hume (Philo) to finally demonstrate that, despite appearing to have Philo, has failed in dialogue - a feat that only confirms the mastery of language Hume - ratified under a veil of discretion, the position taken throughout the dialogue. / Neste estudo nos propusemos a uma investigação das críticas de David Hume ao ‘Argumento do Desígnio’, existente em seu livro Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural. Críticas essas que têm por finalidade apontar as fragilidades do referido argumento, como fundamento da teoria que defende a criação do mundo a partir de Deus. Objetivamos também, explicitar o caminho dialético e argumentativo humeano, que a partir de uma perspectiva empirista, propõe que todo o conhecimento pode, somente, provir da experiência sensível. Se Hume consegue ou não refutar e destruir esse argumento e, se propõe ou não alguma alternativa para substituição, é o que examinaremos no presente. De um total de quatro capítulos, começaremos por apresentar o ‘Argumento do Desígnio’, na forma em que ficou conhecido. A seguir entraremos, efetivamente em contato com o livro Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural, passando então à abordagem da construção das críticas elaboradas por Hume (Filo) para, finalmente demonstrarmos que, apesar de parecer ter Filo, sido vencido no diálogo - num feito que só corrobora a maestria linguística humeana - ratifica, sob um véu de discrição, a posição assumida durante todo o diálogo.

Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.