Student Number : 0114064T - MA Dissertation - School of Social Sciences - Faculty of Humanities / This dissertation looks at the ontology of ideas as a philosophical paradigm. It traces the ontology from its origins in Descartes to its adoption by the British Empiricists through to the writings of Frege and Moore. It argues that the ontology is unable to provide an object category independent of the subject with the consequence that all objects that fall within the ontology are subjective. An ontology of subjective objects cannot adequately account for external reality since it cannot account for difference and otherness. The ‘problem of the external world’ to which this ontology gives rise, attests to this. I argue that the intentionality thesis served as a corrective to the ontology of ideas by providing a metaphysic that could account for these elements and that allowed for an adequate treatment of external or corporeal objects.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universidad de Barcelona, 1960. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [215]-228).

When we consider the active involvement of a subject of an emotional state, we have to say that intentionality of emotional states is conative rather than cognitive. Emotion is much closer to desire or a conative state than a belief or perception. Since a conative state is successful when it is carried out, a conative intentional state is more related to action toward others and events rather than passive perception. So it is important to examine the relation between emotion and action to see emotion as an active response. In the first, second and third chapter of my thesis, I will argue that since perception is too passive to be emotions, it is wrong to insist that emotions are a kind of perception. In the fourth chapter, I will show that it is impossible to have emotions without self-involvement. In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the relation between emotions and action through the cases of brain damaged patients and the Confucianist theory of emotion. / text

I argue that there are irreducibly non-propositional intentional states, mental states that are about things (states such as fearing snakes, liking ice-cream, and so on) but which do not have a propositional content. I provide a positive account of such states and offer philosophical insights concerning concepts and content that emerge once they are recognized. / text

published_or_final_version / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Intentionality is the concept of how mental states and their content relate to each other. Although intentionality was re-introduced to philosophy by the psychologist Franz Brentano, psychology has not empirically researched the concept. The present study reviews the history of intentionality, as it relates to psychology, and argues that people recognize their own and other people's intentionality through a logic-desire-belief structure. The logic-desire-belief structure was tested by having participants in an experiment read situations containing the structure and an intentional state. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the logic-desire-belief structure, and the structure may allow people to recognize intentionality. / Department of Psychological Science

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Universidad de Barcelona, 1960. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [215]-228).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.