Univ., Diss.--Toronto.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 129-136) and index.

Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala universitet. / Summaries in German and English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 283-293) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2006. / Thesis directed by Karl Ameriks for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-245).

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T21:37:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_ManuelMoreirada_D.pdf: 2350055 bytes, checksum: 907e35ab7b843be27fe3dd9d45340738 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: A presente tese propõe-se a uma dedução especulativa da Intersubjetividade a partir da dirempção da Subjetividade na Lógica de Hegel. Para isso, busca retomar e desenvolver o programa da Lógica enquanto Filosofia especulativa pura, esboçado na Anotação ao § 17 da Enciclopédia de 1817 e no significado mais preciso da Lógica, aludido nas Preleções sobre Lógica e Metafísica ministradas em 1817. Assim, mediante a sistematização de tal significado e de uma reconfiguração dos silogismos da Filosofia, o trabalho desenvolve os significados fundamentais da Lógica como Ciência universal-formal, subjetiva e primeira, como Ciência universal-real, objetiva ou última e como Teologia especulativa. Com isso, o estudo pretende mostrar que a Intersubjetividade resulta essencialmente da dirempção do Espírito em diversos Si mesmos livres em si e para si; a qual, enquanto um momento da realização do Conceito ou da Ideia, suprassume-se imediatamente a si mesma. Desse modo, cada Si mesmo livre em si e para si suprassume sua singularidade particular desigual, com o que sua objetividade se sabe como subjetividade idêntica a si ou como universal na universalidade efetiva do outro Si mesmo, elevando-se assim à Ideia e, por conseguinte, à Comunidade ideal do Espírito. Nesta, mediante o reconhecimento do sujeito como seu membro ou enquanto cidadão do Reino de Deus, se suprassume enfim a oposição da Subjetividade e da Intersubjetividade, permitindo a emergência, ou antes, o estabelecimento da Ideia de um Idealismo especulativo da Subjetividade e da Intersubjetividade / Abstract: The present thesis proposes a speculative deduction of Intersubjectivity from diremption of Subjectivity in Hegel's Logic. For this, it searchs to retake and to develop the program of the Logic as pure speculative philosophy, sketched in the Annotation to § 17 of the Encyclopedia of 1817 and more precise meaning of Logic, alluded in Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics taught in 1817. Thus, by means of the systematization of such meaning and a reconfiguration of the syllogisms of Philosophy, this thesis provides the fundamental meanings of Logic as subjective, universal-formal and first science; as objective, universal-real or ultimate science and as speculative theology. With this, the study aims to show that the Intersubjectivity results essentially from diremption of the Spirit in divers free Selves in and for itself, which, as a moment of realization of the Concept or the Idea, immediately sublates itself. In this manner, each free Self in and for itself sublates its unequal particular singularity, with what its objectivity if knows as identical subjectivity with itself or as universal in the effective universality of the other Self, rising like the idea, and therefore for the ideal Community of the Spirit. In this, by recognizing of the subject as a member this Community or as a citizen of the Kingdom of God is finally sublates the opposition of Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, allowing the emergence or before the establishment of the Idea of a speculative Idealism of Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity / Doutorado / Historia da Filosofia Contemporanea / Doutor em Filosofia

Amidst the upheaval of the French Revolution, the British parliamentarian and political theorist Edmund Burke received a vibrant reception in German-speaking Europe. Anxious to uncover the ideological roots of the anarchy that enveloped France – and worried that their own society might be vulnerable to a similar fate – a series of important German thinkers began studying his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). This dissertation brings into focus the diverse interpretations of Burke that were assembled in this turbulent era, and explains them vis-à-vis contemporary debates among German idealists (Kant and his heirs) about the philosophical nature of freedom. This dissertation centers on Burke’s three most perceptive and influential students: the civil servant and philosopher August Wilhelm Rehberg; the journalist, translator, and diplomat Friedrich Gentz; and the political economist and cultural critic Adam Müller. For many decades, both German- and English-speaking intellectual historians have shoehorned these thinkers into a rigid ideological box labeled ‘conservatism’. Inspired by Burke, they are said to have turned away from the ideals of Enlightenment, theorizing an illiberal form of politics that was traditionalistic, authoritarian, and reactionary. A careful, contextualized reconstruction of their engagements with Burke, however, renders this thesis untenable. Far from triggering a monolithic backlash against Enlightenment, Burke in fact inspired a series of divergent, and often incompatible, analyses of the Revolution’s origins, grounded in different readings of his Reflections. Rehberg, for instance, saw Burke as a principled skeptic: he admired the Reflections as an incisive critique of the revolutionaries’ philosophical dogmatism. Gentz, an erstwhile student of Kant, disagreed completely, arguing that Burke’s politics were entirely compatible with Kantian metaphysics. In his view, the Reflections’ central insight was that it takes political prudence to realize the rights of man in practice. Müller, finally, read the Reflections as a lament for the fall of Christendom, and as a diagnosis of the social alienation and moral confusion that had followed its demise. In other words, whereas Rehberg was a Humean skeptic and Gentz was a Kantian liberal, Müller was a Trinitarian Christian. Each of these men, moreover, claimed Burke as an ally. What this means is that Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller cannot have jointly invented a single thing called ‘conservatism’, and Burke cannot have inspired it. This becomes clear only after we recognize that at the turn of the nineteenth century, neither the meaning of Enlightenment nor the crux of Burke’s Reflections was clear: these were not fixed variables, but points of contemporary debate. By recapturing the diversity of Burke’s German reception, this thesis invites scholars to consider the ways that his students shepherded their differing visions of Enlightenment through the fires of the Revolution, down into the nineteenth century.

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T07:16:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Martin_LuizFernandoBarrere_D.pdf: 1287336 bytes, checksum: 3ebead21d8c89e099eda7dc86e5477f6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Trata-se, inicialmente, de neste trabalho analisar a leitura hegeliana da filosofia cética, especificamente, o ceticismo pirrônico. Dessa maneira, será possível começar a avaliar em que medida o ceticismo é importante para a filosofia de Hegel em geral e, em particular, para a constituição de seu método dialético especulativo. Percorreremos textos, de várias fases da filosofia de Hegel, no qual o ceticismo ou é tema central ou aparece dentro de um contexto que também nos interessa, a saber, a discussão acerca do método. No que respeita a este último, objeto da segunda parte da tese, examinaremos na Ciência da Lógica os momentos onde podemos observar de modo privilegiado a constituição do método dialético hegeliano, a saber, a seção dedicada na Doutrina da Essência às determinações de reflexão e a seção intitulada Idéia Absoluta, último capítulo do livro. A partir desse estudo da Ciência da Lógica, poderemos então julgar com maior exatidão no que o método filosófico hegeliano é devedor da filosofia cética, isto é, como esse método é formulado de modo que o ceticismo seja integrado a ele. A idéia central é mostrar que não há, da parte de Hegel, uma simples refutação do ceticismo, mas antes, que o ceticismo é a filosofia, incontornável, da qual se deve partir para que a filosofia não caia vítima das aporias céticas. Essa é a via que Hegel encontra para não se tornar cético pirrônico e, ao mesmo tempo, não ser alvo da crítica cética / Abstract: First it means to analyse Hegel's reading of the skeptical philosophy, specifically pyrrhonian skepticism. Thus it will be possible to assess to what extent the skepticism is important to Hegel's philosophy in general and, in particular, for the formation of his speculative dialectical method. We will cover texts from many phases of Hegel's philosophy, in which skepticism is focus or appears within a context that also interests us, namely the discussion of the method. Regarding this last one, subject of the second part of the thesis, we examine in Science of Logic the moments where we can observe in a special way the formation of hegelian dialectical method: the section in Doctrine of Essence that is dedicated to the determinations of reflection and the section entitled Absolute Idea, the last chapter of the book. From this study of Science of Logic we can judge more accurately what the Hegelian philosophical method is liable to the skeptical philosophy, which means, how this method is formulated in a way that skepticism is a part of it. The main idea is to show that Hegel does not try a simple refutation of skepticism, more than this he shows that skepticism is the philosophy, unavoiable, which preserves the philosophy from fall victim of skepticals aporias. This is the way that Hegel finds to not become skeptical pyrrhonian and also the subject of skeptical criticism / Doutorado / Mestre em Filosofia

La thèse s’intéresse au sens et à l’usage du langage chez Hegel à travers une reconstruction de la dialectique et de ses dialectes. <p>Dans la première partie, nous avons reconstruit la théorie implicite du langage à partir des occurrences du thème et de la structure de la philosophie hégélienne. Après une étude génétique et systématique du langage chez le philosophe, nous avons abordé le rapport du langage à la logique. Nous avons alors montré que Hegel essaye moins de construire un langage pour la pensée comme c’est souvent le cas dans les formalismes logiques que de montrer comment la pensée se fait discours dans le langage. A l’issue de cette première partie, il est donc apparu que le langage était moins étudié comme un objet à décrire analytiquement que comme l’élément dans lequel la pensée devenait le discours de l’auto-constitution du sens.<p><p>Une fois ce sens du langage dégagé, nous avons analysé dans la seconde partie, la façon dont Hegel usait du langage pour faire ressortir son discours visant à articuler le sens en son absoluité. Notre démarche essentiellement propédeutique a alors pris un tour problématique, puisque nous avons fait ressortir qu’il y avait une tension entre les textes de philosophie et les textes sur la philosophie. En effet, si le discours philosophique exprime le sens tel qu’il se forme dans le langage, il semble inopportun de faire précéder ce discours de textes tels que des préfaces où des introductions qui ne donnent qu’un point de vue indirect sur la chose. Plus précisément, la dialectique du savoir se formant dans le langage semble perdre dans les textes en marge du système l’intimité requise d’un sens se faisant expérience. Hegel en formulant la philosophie première comme une dialectique autoréférentielle du concept serait pris dans le dilemme suivant :le système interdirait tout texte référentiel (préface, introduction) tout en les nécessitant pour se laisser communiquer. En bref, l’autoréférence au fondement de l’horizon du sens chez Hegel se contredirait dans la communication que vise à établir l’aspect dialogique des préfaces et des introductions. La question que nous avons alors essayé de résoudre est celle de savoir si dialectique et dialogique étaient vraiment à opposer. Après avoir montré que des penseurs comme Schlegel ou Schleiermacher pensaient ces deux concepts ensemble, nous avons fait apparaître que le concept de dialogique pensé dans son historicité s’était vu délimiter concurremment à la grammaire et à la rhétorique des bornes variables. Nous avons alors soutenu la thèse selon laquelle cette plasticité pouvait également s’attacher à la notion de dialogique. Plus précisément, l’opposition apparente de ces deux termes chez Hegel a été mitigée à l’aune d’un concept de dialogique basé sur une relation « Je-Nous ». En montrant que chez Hegel le dialogique des préfaces référait à un « Nous » englobant, le problème de la communication de sa philosophie à travers des textes exotériques n’est plus apparue comme contredisant la structure autoréférentielle du système. Nous avons, par là, fait apparaître que la dialectique de l’élaboration dans le langage pouvait se décliner en des dialectes dialogiques qui, prenant place dans l’espace autoréférentiel de la relation « Je-Nous », n’infirmaient pas le concept d’expérience du sens. <p><p>En guise de conclusion, nous avons esquissé de façon prospective le potentiel d’une telle théorie dans un contexte plus contemporain. Nous avons à cet égard voulu répondre aux critiques de Habermas ou de Gadamer taxant le système hégélien de monologue de l’absolu oublieux du caractère dialogique de la parole et de la communication en montrant l’intérêt qu’une vue plus nuancée sur la pensée dialectique hégélienne pouvait avoir pour la pensée contemporaine.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished