This thesis is concerned with the power of ideas in political philosophy and practice. It argues firstly that Kant???s ideas of reason, as he originally defines them as regulative in the First Critique, play an important role in his political philosophy and his dynamic approach to politics. Secondly, because it is fundamentally concerned with political transition and improvement, Kant???s approach to politics is therefore one that has continuing relevance. Evidence for this is provided via an examination of Rawls??? political liberalism and the manner in which the idea of the reasonable fulfils the role of an idea of reason. The thesis begins with an examination of the regulative use of ideas of reason in the Dialectic of the First Critique: the ideas of soul, world and God become guides for practice, insofar as they are not bearers of truth but instead create essential conditions necessary for human life and meaning. Chapter Two then demonstrates how ideas of reason figure in Kant???s political texts. They condition politics by inspiring the practice of their objects, for example, the establishment of a rightful condition, the security of private property, the perpetuation of peace. That they look to the status quo in order to effect politics, demonstrates their concern with social progress. Chapter Three argues that publicity forms the primary political idea of reason as it enables the polity to use ideas of reason. Because publicity provides the test of efficient and rightful politics, we can say that it is through publicity that Kant???s politics is grounded. Chapter Four investigates Rawls??? political liberalism and observes that the primacy of the idea of the reasonable in his theory works according to a system of ideas of reason as proposed by Kant. Chapter Five then makes a final comparison between Kant and Rawls to demonstrate that ideas of reason, in particular the pre-eminent political idea of public reason, is central to both their conceptions of the political condition.

This thesis is concerned with the power of ideas in political philosophy and practice. It argues firstly that Kant???s ideas of reason, as he originally defines them as regulative in the First Critique, play an important role in his political philosophy and his dynamic approach to politics. Secondly, because it is fundamentally concerned with political transition and improvement, Kant???s approach to politics is therefore one that has continuing relevance. Evidence for this is provided via an examination of Rawls??? political liberalism and the manner in which the idea of the reasonable fulfils the role of an idea of reason. The thesis begins with an examination of the regulative use of ideas of reason in the Dialectic of the First Critique: the ideas of soul, world and God become guides for practice, insofar as they are not bearers of truth but instead create essential conditions necessary for human life and meaning. Chapter Two then demonstrates how ideas of reason figure in Kant???s political texts. They condition politics by inspiring the practice of their objects, for example, the establishment of a rightful condition, the security of private property, the perpetuation of peace. That they look to the status quo in order to effect politics, demonstrates their concern with social progress. Chapter Three argues that publicity forms the primary political idea of reason as it enables the polity to use ideas of reason. Because publicity provides the test of efficient and rightful politics, we can say that it is through publicity that Kant???s politics is grounded. Chapter Four investigates Rawls??? political liberalism and observes that the primacy of the idea of the reasonable in his theory works according to a system of ideas of reason as proposed by Kant. Chapter Five then makes a final comparison between Kant and Rawls to demonstrate that ideas of reason, in particular the pre-eminent political idea of public reason, is central to both their conceptions of the political condition.

This thesis is concerned with the power of ideas in political philosophy and practice. It argues firstly that Kant???s ideas of reason, as he originally defines them as regulative in the First Critique, play an important role in his political philosophy and his dynamic approach to politics. Secondly, because it is fundamentally concerned with political transition and improvement, Kant???s approach to politics is therefore one that has continuing relevance. Evidence for this is provided via an examination of Rawls??? political liberalism and the manner in which the idea of the reasonable fulfils the role of an idea of reason. The thesis begins with an examination of the regulative use of ideas of reason in the Dialectic of the First Critique: the ideas of soul, world and God become guides for practice, insofar as they are not bearers of truth but instead create essential conditions necessary for human life and meaning. Chapter Two then demonstrates how ideas of reason figure in Kant???s political texts. They condition politics by inspiring the practice of their objects, for example, the establishment of a rightful condition, the security of private property, the perpetuation of peace. That they look to the status quo in order to effect politics, demonstrates their concern with social progress. Chapter Three argues that publicity forms the primary political idea of reason as it enables the polity to use ideas of reason. Because publicity provides the test of efficient and rightful politics, we can say that it is through publicity that Kant???s politics is grounded. Chapter Four investigates Rawls??? political liberalism and observes that the primacy of the idea of the reasonable in his theory works according to a system of ideas of reason as proposed by Kant. Chapter Five then makes a final comparison between Kant and Rawls to demonstrate that ideas of reason, in particular the pre-eminent political idea of public reason, is central to both their conceptions of the political condition.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía, mención en Metafísica / El escrito a continuación, tiene como principal objetivo revisar críticamente la formulación del imperativo categórico kantiano, en vistas de desestimar la generalizada –y parcial- comprensión de éste. En la primera parte, se analizan las críticas más recurrentes (universalidad, rol de cirterio moral y rigorismo), además de una revisión general a los comentarios de H. J. Paton, A. R. C. Duncan y Thomas W. Pogge. En la segunda parte del escrito, se analizan las dificultades planteadas por Paul Ricoeur (apelando a una hermenéutica derivada de los postulados freudianos) y de Hegel. El análisis, entregará evidencias suficientes para desarrollar una una interpretación contamporánea a los postualdos kantianos, en vistas de asumir las críticas y los comentarios anteriormente revisados. El trabajo finaliza con una propuesta concreta que, a mi juicio, asume tanto las críticas como los puntos fundamentales de la formulación del i.c. kantiano.

We are faced with a choice between three philosophical methods: the examination of natural languages to find what features they share; piecemeal conceptual analysis; and conceptual analysis which justifies the interest of its subject-matter by setting out conditions for experience. The third method is Kant's.

El desarrollo científico-técnico propio de la modernidad deja en evidencia, por una parte, la necesidad de una fundamentación racional de la ética, la cual permita regular las acciones de los hombres en un mundo globalizado donde los adelantos científicos han llegado a poner en riesgo la propia vida en el planeta; y por otra parte, esta racionalidad cientificista de algún modo bloquea a priori y desde adentro la posibilidad de dicha fundamentación, en tanto que relega todo pensamiento ético en última instancia a un mero decisionismo, emotivo, subjetivista, no susceptible de fundamentación racional ulterior alguna.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Curso de Mestrado em Direito, 2013. / Submitted by Tania Milca Carvalho Malheiros (tania@bce.unb.br) on 2013-04-17T15:32:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JoaoCostaRibeiroNeto_Parcial.pdf: 965545 bytes, checksum: dc9e1cd6f189b325fcf4ae5969b9f42a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza(jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2013-04-24T13:57:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JoaoCostaRibeiroNeto_Parcial.pdf: 965545 bytes, checksum: dc9e1cd6f189b325fcf4ae5969b9f42a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-24T13:57:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2013_JoaoCostaRibeiroNeto_Parcial.pdf: 965545 bytes, checksum: dc9e1cd6f189b325fcf4ae5969b9f42a (MD5) / A dignidade humana (Menschenwürde) é um conceito presente em muitas Constituições mundo afora. Este texto tenta identificar o seu conteúdo e extensão, a fim de determinar uma compreensão coerente deste conceito. Ao mesmo tempo, ajuda a evitar que essa ideia setorne uma reserva de equidade (Billigkeitsreserve), ou seja, um conceito vago utilizado pelos juízes para decidir casos difíceis, no sentido que quiserem, de acordo com seus sentimentos pessoais. O Tribunal Constitucional Federal da Alemanha (Bundesverfassungsgericht) tem sido um dos intérpretes mais importantes do conceito de dignidade humana. Não apenas cauisticamente, mas também conceitualmente. Além disso, há bons motivos para acreditar que as origens históricas e filosóficas da dignidade humana, especialmente as que vêm de Immanuel Kant, são ainda importantes para como os doutrinadores e os juízes compreendem essa noção. Nesse sentido, este trabalho está dividido em, basicamente, cinco partes. Primeiro, tenta-se epitomar as origens histórico-filosóficas da dignidade humana até a época de Kant. Em seguida, mostra-se como a ideia é compreendida por juristas, principalmente da Alemanha. Na terceira parte, uma amostra das decisões do Bundesverfassungsgericht é analisada, a fim de mostrar como o Tribunal alemão moldou a noção de dignidade humana. Nas quarta e quinta partes, faz-se o mesmo com as decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal e do Tribunal Europeu de Direito Humanos, respectivamente. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / Human dignity (Menschenwürde) is a concept present in many Constitutions throughout the world. This text tries to grasp its content and extension, in order to determine a coherent understanding of this concept. At the same time, it helps to prevent this idea from becoming a reserve of equity (Billigkeitsreserve), namely, a vague concept used by judges to decide hard cases in any direction they want, according to their personal feelings. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has been one of the most important interpreters of the concept of human dignity, not only in a case-to-case basis, but also conceptually. Furthermore, there are very good grounds to believe that the historical and philosophical origins of the human dignity, especially theones that come from Immanuel Kant, are still important to how law scholars and judges perceive this notion. Accordingly, this work is divided in five main parts. First, it attempts to epitomize the historical-philosophical origins of the human dignity up until the time of Kant. Then, it shows how the idea is understood by legal scholars, mainly from Germany. In the third part, a sample of decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is analyzed, in order to show how the Court has shaped the notion of human dignity. In the fourth and fifth parts, the same is done, respectively, to the decisions from the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) and the European Court of Human Rights.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasilia, Departamento de Filosofia, 2010. / Submitted by Raquel Viana (tempestade_b@hotmail.com) on 2011-06-16T20:13:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_SergioGomesSilva.pdf: 483868 bytes, checksum: e6768774a2665e504cc99cd8fbaaac91 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guilherme Lourenço Machado(gui.admin@gmail.com) on 2011-06-17T13:11:22Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_SergioGomesSilva.pdf: 483868 bytes, checksum: e6768774a2665e504cc99cd8fbaaac91 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-17T13:11:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_SergioGomesSilva.pdf: 483868 bytes, checksum: e6768774a2665e504cc99cd8fbaaac91 (MD5) / A dissertação parte da crítica, presente na Crítica da razão pura, à possibilidade da metafísica como ciência. Desta forma, demonstra o questionamento kantiano da concepção de Deus enquanto objeto da teologia racional. A dissertação também problematiza a crítica kantiana à possibilidade da concepção de Deus como objeto metafísico. Além disso, aborda as fronteiras impostas pela crítica à metafísica e, consequentemente, às noções a priori de Deus. Imediatamente chega-se à conclusão de que a noção de Deus encaminha-se para o âmbito prático. No entanto, o problema que o sistema kantiano apresenta é a dedução da lei moral, visto que só a partir dessa dedução é possível identificar a função de Deus na dimensão prática. A dissertação destaca que, na primeira Crítica, a dedução da lei moral é impossível. Por sua vez, na Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes, essa dedução ainda é metafísica, isto é, a dedução é realizada a partir do conceito negativo de liberdade. Somente na segunda Crítica, por meio do fato da razão, a dedução da lei moral torna-se possível. Estabelecido o âmbito da moralidade, tem-se um terreno apropriado para a religião. Ademais, ressalta-se que Kant pretende analisar Deus e a religião a partir da simples razão. Assim sendo, tanto as noções de Deus como de religião são reinseridos dentro da perspectiva da razão prática pura. A partir desse contexto, depois de ter demonstrado a fragilidade dos argumentos que sustentavam a teologia racional, o filósofo questiona a teologia revelada. Por fim, o filósofo propõe a possibilidade das noções de Deus e de religião sob a perspectiva da teologia moral. _______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The thesis starts with the criticism present in the Critique of Pure Reason and it goes through the possibility of having metaphysics as a science. Thus, it demonstrates Kantian issues about the conception of God as an object of rational theology. The research also problematizes the Kantian criticism on the possibility of a conception of God as a metaphysical object. In addition, it discusses the boundaries imposed by criticism on metaphysics and, consequently, the a priori notions of God. Immediately, it is possible to conclude that the concept of God heads for the practical scope. However, the problem that the Kantian system presents is the deduction of the moral law, since, only from such deduction, it is possible to identify the role of God in the practical dimension. The thesis emphasizes that in the first Critique, the deduction of the moral law is impossible. On the other hand, in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, this deduction is still metaphysical, in other words, the deduction is made from the negative concept of freedom. Only in the second Critique, through the fact of the reason, the deduction of the moral law becomes possible. Having the morality scope established, there is a place for religion. Furthermore, it highlights that Kant intends to analyze God and religion from simple reason. Therefore, both the notions of God as well as of religion are reintegrated into the perspective of Critique of Practical reason. From this context, having demonstrated the frailty of the arguments that supported the rational theology, the philosopher questions the revealed theology. Finally, the philosopher proposes the possibility of notions of God and religion under the perspective of the moral theology.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía / La mayoría de las veces que se estudia la Crítica de la Razón Pura, las lecturas entabladas se entrampan en la complejidad de momentos como la “Estética Trascendental” o en la intrincada “Deducción Trascendental de las Categorías”, lo que pareciera dejar de lado la importancia del camino que Kant está tomando a lo largo del desarrollo de tal obra. Por ello mismo, se ha llegado muchas veces a la opinión general de la poca consistencia de la visión que el filósofo de Königsberg tenga acerca de asuntos más bien relativos a la aplicación de su teoría del conocimiento a temas de corte metafísico. Por lo mismo, este trabajo recoge una de las punzantes críticas que se han imputado a la filosofía crítica, por la cual se la culpa de amputar todo ámbito de la experiencia al encerrar sus postulados en meras abstracciones. Esto, con el fin de ampliar el punto de vista respecto al cual se pueda hacer una revisión más aclaratoria de lo que significa el nóumeno, en tanto que fundamento de todo aquello cuanto la razón humana sólo puede pensar, pero no conocer. Es decir, abriremos aquí una noción de nóumeno que nos permita comprenderlo como fuente de referencia sobre la cual se podría inspirar toda inclinación metafísica en el sujeto. Será capital, en este sentido,preguntarse por las condiciones de posibilidad de nuestras inevitables aspiraciones metafísicas, lo cual nos exige, quizás, revisar la Crítica de la Razón Pura de maneras poco usuales y, más bien, lejanas a la tradición.

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-03T15:34:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Faggion_AndreaLuisaBucchile_M.pdf: 7017170 bytes, checksum: ed2d13377806dbe0d4ec4d59dd844d48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / Resumo: A fim de analisar o papel que o facto da razão desempenha no problema da fundamentação da moralidade em Kant. a dissertação discute a dedução da fórmula do princípio moral na Fundamentação I e n, pois é importante que se saiba o que estaria para ser fundamentado. Segue-se a análise da suposta fundamentação que Kant ofereceria para tal princípio na m seção da mesma obra. Por fim, lidamos diretamente com a exposição da doutrina do facto da razão, na Critica da Razão Prática, examinando se ela pretende ser uma fundamentação do princípio moral, se teria sucesso enquanto tal e se é ou não compatível com a m seção da Fundamentação, bem como com a idéia de uma filosofia crítica / Abstract: In order to analyse the role that the fact of reason has in the problem of Kant's morality statement, this dissertation first addresses the deduction of the formula of the moral principle in Groundwork I and lI, once it is important to know what is to be stated. Secondly, an analysis of the justification that Kant supposedly would offer for such principle in section m of the same work is made. We finally deal directly with the exposition of the doctrine of the fact of reason, in the Critique of Practical Reason, examining whether it intends to be a foundation of the moral principle, whether it would be sucessful as such and whether it is or not compatible to Groundwork III and to the idea of a critical phi1osophy / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia