Kant attributes the power to awaken one from dogmatic slumber to skepticism and to the antinomy of pure reason; in his accounts of his own awakening and the origin of the critical philosophy, he credits the antinomy and his memory of David Hume. This essay suggests that Kant’s primary aim in the first Critique was to find a resolution to the antinomy; an examination of this resolution shows Kant’s memory of Hume critical to Kant’s enterprise. Kant’s resolution to the antinomy exploits metaphors of war, jurisprudence, slumber, and historical development, as well as his Transcendental Deduction and explanation of transcendental illusion, to unravel the riddle of metaphysics and provide for both the possibility of objective knowledge and the possibility of freedom.

Of the questions concerning the many great minds of the European Enlightenment, the question of what constitutes right and proper government perhaps had the most enduring influence on the world stage. Both Thomas Jefferson and Immanuel Kant attempted to answer the question of what constitutes right government, in particular by basing the system upon the idea of human freedom as an inalienable right. This project is an attempt to compare the systems proposed by these two authors, as well as to critique each on its ability to protect and foster individual freedom. It is my opinion that neither manages to do what it is constructed to do, as each fails to fully protect individual freedom, and each has as part of it a component which conflicts with individual freedom.

This thesis engages in an interpretative debate over Kant’s general aims in the first Critique. I argue that a defense of the rational legitimacy of religious faith is at the very center of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, I argue that Kant’s defense of faith is inextricably bound up with his views on the legitimacy of science. On my account, Kant’s Critique not only demonstrates that science is fully consistent with religious faith, but also that science, when properly understood, actually favors religious belief over non-belief.

At present two options are available that can lead to a determination of how moral education may be possible in practice. One takes its formulation from the work of Kant, the other stands in the tradition of Aristotle. Kant emphasizes the importance of duty mid obligation. In contrast, Aristotle attempts to construct a theory of moral life on the practice of virtue. Both theoretical perspectives have debilitating deficiencies. A spectrum of moral experience is presented that represents the wood opportunities available to the agent in life experience. The polarities of this spectrum pull most naturally towards either an Aristotelian or a Kantian perspective, although neither perspective is capable of addressing the requirements of the entire spectrum. The Aristotelian perspective is associated with the life of non-dilemmic virtue, undertaken in community, where relational realities and the contextual contingency of moral life is emphasized. The Kantian perspective is associated with dilemmic situations to be resolved by a process of moral The central problem of the dissertation acknowledges the antithetical nature of these perspectives, and the dichotomous nature of their philosophical roots. The central task of the dissertation is the establishment of a dialogic process that has the potential to reconcile this dichotomy, and to allow these perspectives to mutually inform and reinforce each other. This task is accomplished by providing responses to a central research question that is accompanied by a series of subsidiary questions. From an analysis of various theories of moral education, Kohlberg's theory of structural developmentalism is chosen for reformulation as it is informed by the exploration of the requirements of the dialogic process. To address the research questions, additional Spectra are offered to provide an epistemological and ontological basis for a five-step dialogic treatment that combines, through a developmental climacteric, the Magistral dialogue of Vvgotsky Socratic dialogue of Bakhtin. The five-step model is comprised of a recursive loop through the four steps of the Magistral dialogue prior to an entrance into a Socratic dialogue. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Denna uppsats rör den moral som presenteras för oss i amerikanska äventyrsfilmer. Tre filmer, King Arthur, Robin Hood och Gladiator, presenteras och analyseras. Hjältens handlingar är i fokus men även antagonisten och andra bikaraktärers handlingar är av vikt. Detta ställs mot den traditionella pliktetiken då vi får se om hjältens handlingar är förenliga eller strider mot den. En diskussion följer också kring filmernas upplägg och vad lockelsen med denna typ av film egentligen är.

The aim of this study is to make a comparison between Rousseau&rsquo / s and Kant&rsquo / s theory of justice. This thesis defends the arguments of Rousseau&rsquo / s democratic political theory against the claims raised by Kant. Rousseau and Kant formulate how to relieve the tension between individual and society. This tension is the one between individual and political freedom. Rousseau calls it the tension between moral and political freedom and Kant terms it as internal and external freedom. However, Rousseau ensures continuity between two concepts of freedom, whereas Kant seems inconsistent. The main argument of this thesis is that the critical potential of Rousseau&rsquo / s notion of the social contract is jeopardized by Kant&rsquo / s Idea of original contract in which the sovereign authority is taken away from people since Rousseau&rsquo / s notion of the social contract turns into Idea of original contract in Kant&rsquo / s theory of justice. In this regard, this thesis particularly seeks to answer the question of what constitutes the legitimacy of the contract in their theory of justice.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, Aug. 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

El trabajo se propone descubrir el ángulo exacto que permite una clara visión del pensamiento de Karl Jaspers. Seguimos en esto la consigna del propio filósofo que considera a la "situación" como un existenciario irrenunciable. En oposición al cogito cartesiano -despojado de mundo y de historia, como decía Ortega- se trata de poner al descubierto las raíces vivientes que nutren el nuevo pensamiento. Mi indagación encontró que los tres tomos de la principal obra de Jaspers, la Philosophie, se iluminan viéndolos como versiones actualizadas de las tres "ideas" de la metafísica clásica, cuyo "conocimiento" Kant demostró imposible. Dios, la libertad, el mundo- son Ideas "regulativas", que guían la marcha del pensamiento y de la acción, pero no constituyen objetos de conocimiento. Jaspers hablará de "Cifras", saberes simbólicos no reductibles a la ciencia-. Hay primero una aprehensión general de los resultados de las ciencias (Tomo 1§: "Orientación en el mundo", de la idea kantiana de mundo) . Esta reflexión conduce a la experiencia del límite, y lleva a la "Aclaración de la existencia" (Tomo 2§) que transpone en nuevo lenguaje existencial la idea kantiana del alma o de la libertad. -Por último (tomo 3§), la "Metafísica", analiza los modos en que la libertad se refiere a la Trascendencia y muestra el lenguaje cifrado de esa misma Trascendencia. Desde este centro en que nuestra tesis sitúa a Jaspers, pasamos luego a exponer su peculiar interpretación del mundo entorno, das Umgreifende, lo abarcador o englobante; así como el lenguaje indirecto; la relación con la teología, etc. En el curso de la exposición, Jaspers es confrontado con la fenomenología de Husserl y con las mal llamadas "filosofías de la existencia" de su colega alemán Heidegger y de su colega francés Gabriel Marcel.

Traditionally, the central threat to the defensibility of the range of practices and attitudes constitutive of moral criticism has been seen to be posed by the Causal Thesis, the view that all actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that govern other events in the universe. In such a world, agents lack the sort of underived origination and agency required for the appropriateness of moral criticism. However, Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” marks a move away from a metaphysical conception of agency and conditions of the appropriateness of moral criticism. On Strawson’s account, the problem of moral responsibility is centrally a normative problem, a problem about the moral norms that govern interpersonal relationships, and the conditions of appropriateness of the range of attitudes and sentiments occasioned by the agents’ fulfillment or non-fulfillment of these norms. In this dissertation I argue that the success of normative conceptions of conditions of appropriateness of moral criticism is contingent of the amelioration of the tension between two strategies in “Freedom and Resentment.” Naturalist interpretations hold that sentiments and practices constitutive of moral criticism are natural features of human psychological constitution, and therefore neither allow nor require justification. Rationalist interpretation, by contrast, are based on an analysis of conditions under which moral criticism can be justifiably modified or suspended. Both of these strategies, I argue, are false. The naturalistic interpretation is false not because of its inability to offer a plausible account of the conditions of justifiability of reactive attitudes, but rather because of its inability to offer a principled account of the way moral norms are grounded. The rationalistic interpretation, in turn, not only relies on an implausible psychological account of conditions of responsible agency, but puts an unacceptable emphasis on the agent’s intention. A plausible interpretation of the normative strategy requires emphasizing not only the significance of attitudes and feelings, but also the role reasons play in constituting moral norms and justifying moral criticism / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-07-05 16:42:43.601

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