The thesis of this essay is to show that there is a complex and deep ground in Hannah Arendt ́s political thinking. A ground that, thru Immanuel Kant ́s first and third critiques, is going back to the thinking of the ancient Greek ideas of insight, nous, a concept used especially by Aristotle, but also by Parmenides. My idea is that Arendt ́s attempt to establish her political thinking in the idea of common sense, or in Latin:sensus communis, needs a deeper understanding, thou the use and interpretation of common sense as a concept today is deeply under influence of a liberal ideological preunderstanding; meaning the (moral) things everyone knows without any special efforts. In my view there is no chance that Arendt joins, or supports that kind of shallow interpretation of the idea of common sense, thou that would make her political thinking as banal as she accuses most of the modern politics to be, which of course is very contradictive. In other words must her understanding of the concept of common sense, sensus communis, be founded on a much deeper level, a level which we can find in her essays if we look real hard, and read as open as a real reading must be based on. Her language and her recurring references to time, gives us the leads to where to dig; to where, and through which thinking, we can find her deeper ground, a ground that hopefully will make all her political thinking clearer.

My aim in this thesis is to demonstrate that common interpretations of Kant’s theory of respect do not account for the motivation a subject feels to follow the moral law. A large number of interpreters focus on Kant’s early ethical works—such as the Grounding and the Critique of Practical Reason—to justify how the moral law alone motivates a subject to act rightly. However, by the time he published Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant had discovered the problem of radical evil—the fact that people tend to feel more motivated by the inclinations than by the moral law. Kant’s solution to this challenge comes in the form of moral education: the contingent practices of historical institutions (factors that are extraneous to the moral law) are required to learn respect for the law. By the end of the Religion, it will be asked whether duty for duty’s sake is ever achieved.

<p> Nicholas Wolterstorff, working within the context of Reformed Epistemology, has come to an understanding of knowledge which more accurately reflects the process of knowledge and belief that people experience than the foundational system to which he responds. He reacts to Immanuel Kant and John Locke, using arguments put forward by Thomas Reid, and building on these arguments with his own understanding.</p> <p> Kant, Wolterstorff argues, had put distance between a person and what she could perceive about and attribute to God. Since she cannot have an experience of God, she experience5what Wolterstorff calls the 'Kantian agony'-she cannot discuss God without first discussing God's existence.</p> <p> Locke, Wolterstorff argues, had put distance between a person and what she could believe. Locke, to whom Wolterstorff responds quite extensively, had argued that a person must use reason to govern her beliefs, and base her system of knowledge on propositions which can be known with certainty. </p> <p> Reid responded to this system, which he called the 'theory of ideas', arguing that it entailed a skepticism about the world which no one could live by. He argued that people must assume things about the world, such as that it exists, in order to be able to live and work in it. Responding directly to the way that the way of ideas theorists understood perception.</p> <p> Wolterstorff takes this understanding of perception and Reid's notion of belief-producing dispositions, and sets up a non-foundation account of knowledge which has room for religious faith. His system is a situational system, in which every person must govern their beliefs based on the system of beliefs in which they find themselves. This system, he argues more accurately reflects the way in which people come to knowledge, rather then the Kantian or Lockean (foundational) system.</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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[pt] A filosofia crítica de Kant refuta o dogmatismo e o ceticismo tomados exclusivamente, mediante o critério do autoconhecimento da razão. Entretanto, o dogmatismo não pode ser simplesmente superado. A conversão da postura dogmática para a crítica não exclui o que há de necessário no procedimento dogmático, tanto para a razão quanto para a filosofia. O mesmo vale para o ceticismo. A hipótese que serve de guia para essa dissertação é a de que como o procedimento dogmático e o método cético são necessários para o conhecimento, eles não podem ser superados, mas devem ganhar uma nova versão crítica. Podese afirmar que a coexistência em certa medida de ceticismo e dogmatismo em um único sistema filosófico caracteriza o pensamento moderno. Essa síntese, desse modo, pode ser considerada uma marca da modernidade e, para Kant, contrapor o método cético ao procedimento dogmático é um modo de manter a saúde da razão e o vigor do pensamento, sendo Kant o primeiro pensador moderno a sustentar e a elaborar essa síntese como uma tarefa permanente para a filosofia. / [en] Kant´s critical philosophy refutes dogmatism and also scepticism taken exclusively, through the criteria of the self-knowledge of reason. However, dogmatism cannot be simply surpassed. The conversion from the dogmatic posture to the critical does not exclude what is necessary in the dogmatic procedure, for reason as well as for philosophy. The same goes for scepticism. The hypothesis guiding this work is that the dogmatic procedure and the sceptical method are both necessary for knowledge; they cannot be surmounted, but must instead receive a critical version. It is right to say that the synthesis in some measure of scepticism and dogmatism in a single philosophical system characterizes modern thought. This synthesis, therefore, can be considered as a mark of modernity, and, for Kant, to oppose the sceptical method with the dogmatic procedure is a means of keeping reason healthy, and thought, vigorous, being Kant the first thinker in modernity to hold and elaborate this synthesis as a permanent task for philosophy.

Philosophy is traditionally defined against rhetoric. The traditional difference between philosophy and rhetoric is based on a distinction between truthful and persuasive speech. The history of philosophy offers a number of examples how to approach the relationship between truth and persuasiveness. However, this relationship was traditionally taken in such a way so that philosophy could be defined against rhetoric. This approach can also be found in the texts of Immanuel Kant. From this point of view, Kant's project of critical philosophy can be interpreted as an attempt to purify philosophy and separate it from rhetoric. But when Kant defines the philosophy against rhetoric, he falls into obvious contradiction. As the critical philosophy helps to realize the ideas of the Enlightenment, thus, it also helps to spread the light of reason. However, the spread of general enlightenment requires an effective link between philosophy and rhetoric, i.e. between truth and persuasiveness. Since the critical philosophy is the instrument of enlightenment, it acquires its rhetorical dimension. A closer examination of the rhetorical dimension of Kant's critical philosophy, which still represents a certain desideratum of Kant Studies, thus opens up completely new research and interpretation possibilities.

O propósito deste trabalho é examinar a constituição sistemática e histórica da teoria da linguagem de Habermas. Seguindo as indicações do próprio Habermas, segundo as quais essa teoria constitui-se como uma \"pragmática formal apoiada em Kant\", uma \"pragmática formal de herança kantiana\" ou, ainda, um \"kantismo lingüístico\", analisamos em um primeiro momento a maneira como ela promove a convergência de duas linhagens filosóficas aparentemente inconciliáveis: a filosofia kantiana e da virada lingüística. Dito de uma maneira mais específica, analisamos a maneira como ela atualiza o motivo da \"transformação pragmática da filosofia kantiana\", central para a segunda linhagem. Em seguida, comentamos a exposição da teoria da linguagem na década de 1970, quando esta assume a forma de uma teoria da competência comunicativa, associada a uma teoria da verdade como consenso. Por fim, comentamos as modificações que Habermas propõe para sua teoria sobretudo na década de 1980, mostrando como ele procura responder às críticas a que foi submetido. / The aim of this work is to examine the systematic and the historical constitution of Habermas\'s theory of language. By following his own suggestions, according to which it constitutes itself as a \"formal pragmatics tied to Kant\", a \"Kantian formal pragmatics\" or a \"linguistic Kantianism\", we analyze at the first moment how it promotes the convergence of two apparently incompatible philosophical lineages: the Kantian philosophy and the linguistic turn. More specifically, we analyze how it up dates the motive of the \"pragmatic transformation of Kantian philosophy\", fundamental for the second lineage. Later on, we comment on the presentation of the theory of language in the 1970s, when it assumes the form of a theory of communicative competence, associated to a consensus theory of truth. Finally, we comment on the modifications that Habermas proposes to his theory mainly in the 1980s, showing how he tries to respond to the criticism to which he had been exposed.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marco Antonio Chabbouh Junior.pdf: 1163932 bytes, checksum: a475e7e1b94aa998f468457e35783e1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-29 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / One of the best-known teachings of the Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant is that of the ideality of space and time. The present work aims at discussing the relations between the proofs of the apriority of space and time and the proofs of their subjective character. To achieve this aim, the present text takes the form of a comparative and commented exposition of the readings by Norman Kemp Smith, Herbert James Paton and Patricia Kitcher. This exposition is made in three main chapters. The first one is intended to make an approach to the main problem, the second one is a detailed discussion of the mentioned readings and the third one is constituted by the position taking from the offered debate. It intends then, to demonstrate that Paton s interpretation is the most successful among the three, because it is able to solve pressing problems enunciated by Kemp Smith without trespassing, as Kitcher did, the boundaries of the critical text. Hence, it is also shown that the ideality of space and time intended by Kant is not made through a doctrine of innate ideas similar to the rationalist ones, but is only a doctrine that states the existence of an innate capacity responsible for the production of pure spacial and temporal contents once experience begins / Um dos mais célebres ensinamentos da Crítica da Razão Pura de Immanuel Kant é o da idealidade do espaço e do tempo. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo discutir as relações existentes entre as provas a favor da aprioridade do espaço e do tempo e as provas a favor de seu caráter subjetivo. Para levar a cabo a tarefa citada, o presente texto toma a forma de uma exposição comparativa e comentada das interpretações de Norman Kemp Smith, Herbert James Paton e Patricia Kitcher. Essa exposição faz-se em três capítulos. O primeiro é uma aproximação ao problema central, o segundo constitui-se de uma discussão em detalhe das interpretações analisadas e o terceiro consiste na tomada de posição a partir da discussão oferecida. Pretende-se mostrar que a leitura feita por Paton é a mais bem sucedida dentre as três por conseguir dar conta de importantes questões postuladas por Kemp Smith sem extrapolar, como fez Kitcher, os limites textuais. Sendo assim, evidencia-se que a idealidade do espaço e do tempo pretendida por Kant não se constitui a partir de uma doutrina que afirma a existência de ideias inatas nos moldes racionalistas dogmáticos, mas que afirma unicamente a presença de uma capacidade inata responsável por produzir conteúdos espaciais e temporais puros mediante a experiência

Zugl.: Wuppertal, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007.

Habilitationsschrift--Münster, 1973. / Includes indexes. Bibliography: p. [171]-177.