Chan Ying Leung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-89). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Importance of Reverse Auctions --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- A Research Gap in Existing Literatures --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Focus --- p.4 / Chapter 1.4 --- Contributions of This Thesis --- p.5 / Chapter 1.5 --- Organization of This Thesis --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Background and Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Review of Reverse Auctions --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Benefits of Reverse Auctions to Buyers --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Types of Reverse Auctions --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Implementation of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2 --- Linkage between the Entry-fee Reverse Auction and the Multi- period Inventory Replenishment Model --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Multi-period Inventory Replenishment Model with TOQC --- p.17 / Chapter 3 --- The Basic Models --- p.18 / Chapter 3.1 --- Strategic Sourcing Methodology - The Entry-fee Reverse Auc- tion --- p.18 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Numerical Example --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- Operational Procurement Methodology ´ؤ The Multi-period Inventory Replenishment Model with TOQC --- p.29 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Numerical Example --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.34 / Chapter 4 --- Modifications Required for Integrating the Entry-fee Reverse Auction and the Multi-period Replenishment Model with TOQC --- p.36 / Chapter 4.1 --- Formulation of the Buyer's Expected Profit Function in the Multi-period Setting --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Existence of Optimal TOQC --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Convexity of the Last-period Optimality Equation --- p.39 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Convexity of the Two-period Problem --- p.41 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Convexity of the N-period Problem --- p.44 / Chapter 4.3 --- The Computability of the Optimal TOQC --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.47 / Chapter 5 --- The Revised Model --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1 --- The Entry-fee Reverse Auction in the Multi-period Setting with TOQC --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Numerical Example --- p.55 / Chapter 5.2 --- Chapter Summary --- p.59 / Chapter 6 --- Numerical Analysis --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1 --- Comparison between the Fixed-quantity Reverse Auction and the Entry-fee Reverse Auction --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Number of Supplier --- p.63 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Retail Price --- p.65 / Chapter 6.1.3 --- Coefficient of Variation for Demand Distribution . --- p.66 / Chapter 6.1.4 --- Average Improvement --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Duration of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction Cycle --- p.68 / Chapter 6.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.76 / Chapter 7 --- Factors of Success for Holding the Entry-fee Reverse Auction --- p.77 / Chapter 7.1 --- Internal Organizational Infrastructure of the Buyer --- p.77 / Chapter 7.2 --- Supplier's Qualifications and Control --- p.78 / Chapter 7.3 --- Attractions of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction for Suppliers . . --- p.78 / Chapter 7.4 --- Procedural Fairness --- p.81 / Chapter 7.5 --- Total Cost Analysis --- p.81 / Chapter 7.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.83 / Bibliography --- p.85 / Chapter A --- Order Statistics --- p.90 / Chapter B --- Conditional Order Statistics --- p.92 / Chapter C --- Virtual Marginal Cost of Procurement --- p.93

In the first model, we study the optimal procurement strategy in a two-period framework when both the spot market and the forward contract are considered. The forward contract is agreed upon in the first period, and is then delivered in the second period, when the spot market is also available. This is followed by production and demand. The objective of the buyer is to minimize his expected cost. We study the problem for two scenarios: the buyer cannot and can sell to the spot market. Through our analysis, when the buyer can not sell to the spot market, there exists a threshold forward price, under which the buyer will enter into the forward contract. This threshold is lower than the expected spot price. Furthermore, we analytically show that the optimal order quantities via forward contract increase in the mean of the spot price, but decrease in the variability of the spot price. However, the buyer only speculates using the forward contract when he can sell to spot market. / In the second model, we consider a problem in which a buyer makes procurement decisions when he faces periodic random demand and two supply sources, one is a long-term contract supplier and the other is a spot market. When he procures from the contract supplier, a fixed unit price is charged and a predetermined minimum quantity for each period must be committed, and when he procures from the spot market, a stochastic spot price plus a fixed setup cost is charged. The spot price is only realized at the beginning of each period. We show that the optimal policy consists three different (s, S) type policies. More important, we identify certain conditions under which there exist monotone properties between the policy parameters and the current spot price for a general Markov spot price process. Then, we can divide the price space into three regions, each of which corresponds to a specific policy, for each period. We also conduct numerical analysis to gain more insights into how the spot market impacts the buyer's performance. We find the buyers benefits from a more volatile market. / The last model extends the second model by incorporating an important feature that is widely seen; i.e., the procurement from the contract supplier should fulfill a total order quantity commitment (TOQC). The TOQC requires the buyer to procure no less than the predetermined commitment during the contract period, which we call the planning horizon. Thus, in each period, the buyer trades off between the possible lower cost now (by procuring from the spot market) and the reduced cost in the future (by reducing the remaining commitment). Two types of commitment contracts are considered: a minimal TOQC contract and a definite quantity contract. Our analysis characterizes an optimal procurement policy which depends on the spot price in each period and an optimal virtual remaining commitment level. Such a structured policy can be viewed as a combination of some policies of base-stock type, each of which can be computed through an equivalent system without any commitment. Moreover, some of these equivalent systems are of simple multiple-period newsvendor type. This greatly simplifies the computation of the optimal policies. We also numerically analyze how the TOQC and the spot market affects the buyer's performance. / This research develops mathematical models for inventory and procurement management in the presence of spot markets. More specifically, we consider those models by incorporating different types of supply contracts. Particular attention is paid to the quantity flexible contracts. This research is an attempt to understand how firms should adopt their operating policies in the presence of fluctuating commodity prices. In this thesis, we mainly consider the following three models. / Xue, Weili. / Adviser: Youhua Chen. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-11, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 122-134). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web.

Zhang, Nianbing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-118). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Overview --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Motivation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Research Scope and Main Results --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- The Mechanism --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Statement of Problem --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Main Results --- p.11 / Chapter 1.4 --- Structure of Research --- p.13 / Chapter 2 --- Survey of the Literature --- p.15 / Chapter 2.1 --- Overview --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2 --- E-business --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- Auction --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Introduction --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Auction Theory --- p.20 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Online Auctions --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4 --- Combination of Auction and Other Transaction Methods --- p.24 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Auction with Posted Price --- p.24 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Auction with Negotiation Process --- p.26 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Auction with Noncompetitive Contract --- p.28 / Chapter 3 --- Single Unit Noncompetitive Contract --- p.29 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Model --- p.29 / Chapter 3.2 --- Strategy of Suppliers in the Auction --- p.31 / Chapter 3.3 --- Strategy of Selected Suppliers --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Selected Supplier of No-Information Case --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Supplier in Information Case --- p.40 / Chapter 3.4 --- Buyer´ةs Consideration --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Buyer's Cost in No-Information Case --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Buyer's Cost in Information Case --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Comparison of Costs in the Two Information Scenarios --- p.47 / Chapter 4 --- Buyer´ةs Strategy: Lower Cost and More Flexibility for Suppliers --- p.49 / Chapter 4.1 --- Is the Noncompetitive Contract Necessary --- p.50 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.50 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Information Case --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2 --- Flexibility of Re-Entrance to Auction --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Information Case --- p.58 / Chapter 4.3 --- Flexibility of Making Decision After the Auction --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.66 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Information Case --- p.69 / Chapter 5 --- Multiple Noncompetitive Contracts --- p.73 / Chapter 5.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.74 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Suppliers's Strategy --- p.74 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Buyer´ةs Consideration --- p.76 / Chapter 5.2 --- Information Case --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Supplier's Strategy --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Computation of Buyer's Cost --- p.81 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Comparison with the Case of One Noncompetitive Contract --- p.85 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- The Effect of Supplier´ةs Information --- p.89 / Chapter 5.3 --- General Number of Noncompetitive Contract --- p.91 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.91 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Information Case --- p.94 / Chapter 6 --- Alternative Forms of Contracts --- p.96 / Chapter 6.1 --- SBIB Model --- p.97 / Chapter 6.2 --- SNIB Model --- p.98 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Supplier's Strategy --- p.98 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Buyer´ةs Cost in No-Information Case --- p.100 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Buyer's Cost in Information Case --- p.103 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Multiple Units Offered --- p.105 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.110

Thesis (MPA.) -- University of Limpopo, 2012 / The main aim or purpose of this study was to examine the impact of the supply chain management on service delivery on the Limpopo Department of Economic, Development, Environment and Tourism (LEDET). The field survey was conducted in LEDET in the supply chain management directorate after gaining permission from the Head of Department of LEDET. The study was qualitative in design. Semi-structured interviews and questionnaires were used. The questionnaire has both open ended and closed ended questionnaires. The supply chain management directorate plays an important role in all the departments in South Africa as a whole. Supply chain management in South Africa was created to improve the lives of the communities such as historically disadvantaged individuals, disabled and women, but it is no longer serving its purpose because nowadays it is serving the few politicians, public officials and the friends and relatives of the public officials. One of the findings of this study is that the supply chain management directorate cannot function properly if the public officials who are appointed does not have relevant qualifications, training and experience towards supply chain management. There should always have uniformity of supply chain management in the three spheres of government to prevent corruption. Supply chain management must be centralised. This means that all the tender contract of the three spheres of government must be done in one centralised unit. Linking of the databases in the three spheres of government can also help the supply chain management not to appoint the same service providers in the tender contract. Appointment of service providers must be done electronically to minimize all forms of corruption. To improve service delivery the public officials must know how to interpret the acts, rules, regulations and policies governing supply chain management. They must also monitor and evaluate the entire contract from the start to the end of the contract The public officials working in the supply chain management must be paid competitive salaries, because they are compelled by the low salaries to corruption such as bribery, fraud, nepotism, extortion, embezzlement and conflict of interest become common in place. It is further recommended that the officials working in the supply chain management, who are getting lower salaries must also be evaluated and upgraded to the higher salary, depending on their qualification, experience and training.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 280-293). Also available in electronic version.

While there is an ever increasing adoption of e-sourcing, where a buyer auctions off procurement contracts to a small group of pre-qualified suppliers, there is a lack of understanding of the impact of dynamic bidding process on procurement outcomes and bidding behavior. To extend the knowledge of this important issue, in this thesis, we explore empirically the value of online procurement auction on cost reduction, quality management, and winner selection from the buyer's perspective. We also explore how incumbent status affects the procurement outcomes. From suppliers' perspective, we characterize their bidding behavior and examine the effect of incumbent status on bidding. First, we collect detailed auction and contract awarding data for manufacturing goods during 2002-2004 from a large buyer in the high-tech industry. The rich data set enables us to apply statistical model based cluster technique to uncover heterogeneous bidding behavior of industry participants. The distribution of the bidding patterns varies between incumbent and non-incumbent suppliers. We also find that the buyer bias towards the incumbent suppliers by awarding them procurement contracts more often and with a price premium. Next, focusing on recurring auctions, we find that suppliers bid adaptively. The adaptive bidding is affected by the rank of suppliers' final bids. Finally, with field data of procurement auction for legal services, we demonstrate that service prices are on average reduced after dynamic bidding events. Most interestingly, the cost savings are achieved without the sacrifice of quality. Incumbent winners' quality is higher, on average, than the quality of buyer's supplier base before the auctions, while non-incumbent winner's quality is lower. These findings imply that the main value of online procurement auctions for business services comes from incumbents in the form of reduced price and enhanced quality. We find that after adjusting for incumbents' higher quality, incumbent bias disappears. Our results also imply that the buyer might possess important information about the incumbents, through past experiences, that cannot be easily included in the buyer's scoring function due to uncodifiability.

published_or_final_version / Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering / Master / Master of Philosophy

The construction industry in South Africa is envisaged to play a pivotal role in the reconstruction of the South African economy, via the delivery of economic and social infrastructure. The skewed ownership I patterns prevalent in the construction sector, resulted in the South African government utilising public sector procurement as a mechanism to address these imbalances, and to promote wider participation I in public sector construction opportunities. This dissertation analyses the role of the construction industry in South Africa, and explores the rationale behind utilising public sector procurement as a mechanism to promote wider participation in the construction industry in South Africa. The research then focuses on the application of the Affirmative Procurement Policy (APP) on construction projects procured by the National Department of Public Works, in order to evaluate the impact which this policy has had on the growth and development of Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABEs). The research evaluates the primary policy outcomes, via the development of appropriate indices and a diagnostic quadrant comparator, and concludes that the application of the APP has had a positive impact on ABE participation, with levels of participation varying across construction sub sectors and categories. It was also found that financial premiums, borne by the State in adopting this policy, were nominal when compared with the initial projected outcomes and the overall benefits. The overall performance of ABEs, measured against that of non-ABEs, was then tested to ascertain whether the adoption of the APP was a necessary and sufficient condition for ABE enablement and empowerment. The research concludes that there is a difference in overall performance between J ABEs and non-ABEs, and that supply side interventions and capacitation programmes are required to mitigate the increased risk exposure by the State, when engaging ABEs on construction projects. The : research also analyses the variation in the levels of participation of ABEs, in the different construction sub sectors and concludes that the manner in which ABEs are structured and their internal business processes tend to establish operational limitations, which influence their scope of activitiies to a larger extent than the existence of eternal sub sector thresholds. Similar characteristics were,observed in non-ABEs of a similar size, inferring that the problems encountered relate to business development and growth of small and medium enterprises, in general. The research also. analyses the impact that the APP has had on subcontracting relationships and the promotion of structured joint ventures. It concludes that whilst the requirements of the APP has seen the development of formalised subcontracting relationships, the form of subcontracts that are currently utilised do not comply with the requirements outlined in the APP, which are aimed at eradicating unfair subcontracting conditions. The adoption of the APP has seen an increase in structured joint ventures between ABEs and larger established contractors. The analysis of these joint ventures concludes that they provide an effective means of transferring expertise, provided that they are structured appropriately. The dissertation concludes with recommendations on APP policy refinements, mechanisms to enhance compliance and opportunities for international application. The recent enactment of the Preferential Procurement Policy Act (Act 5 of 20(0) in South Africa indicates that several elements of the APP are likely to be prescribed as mandatory requirements for public sector procurement by different government institutions and across the different industrial sectors. It is therefore important that the areas identified for further research be pursued, to ensure optimal policy outcomes across a range of industrial sectors. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2000.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (M.Com.)-University of Natal, 2004.