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Rule-following has been a controversial issue in professional philosophical literature since Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Many authors have developed accounts of rule-following along different lines, including those that naturalistically reduce rule-following to non-normative phenomena and those that take rule-following to be an irreducible aspect of cognition and agency. Hannah Ginsborg, a prominent contributor to rule-following literature, has developed a partially reductive account of rule-following, combining features of both reductionist and nonreductionist accounts. But naturalizing or internalistic theories of rule-following, or even Ginsborg's partial reduction of rule-following, ignore important facets of what it is to follow a rule, particularly its social aspect. In this thesis I reject Ginsborg's partial reductionism, holding that her hybrid theory does not escape the particular problems of naturalistic reductionism or nonreductionism about rule-following. I argue instead that certain social concepts are necessary for a satisfactory theory of rule-following. The first concept is how an individual is "enculturated" into her various social and cultural networks. The second is one's "normative identity," the accumulated concepts and behaviors one has as part of a social and cultural network. I develop these notions with inspiration from Wittgenstein and other social contributors to rule-following literature.

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In this dissertation, I develop and defend a kind of somatic theory of the emotions; namely, a somatic-perceptual theory of the emotions. On this account, emotions are perceptions of physiological changes. The majority of emotion theorists, however, hold some kind of a cognitive theory of the emotions. I argue, in opposition to these theories, that cognition is never necessary for emotion. Somatic theories of the emotions have never been well-received in philosophy and psychology. This is mainly because they are often perceived as being ill-equipped to explain many of the things that a theory of the emotions ought to account for. In particular, it is argued that somatic theories of the emotions fail to take into account the fact that emotions are typically directed toward an intentional object. Somatic theories, it is argued, are also unable to explain how to distinguish between different emotions associated with identical physiological responses. Moreover, since on my view emotions are a form of perception, my view would seem to allow for the bodily perceptions constituting emotions to occur unconsciously. However, in philosophy, the notion of unconscious emotions is problematic, because in ordinary language, emotions just are feelings – and feelings are, by definition, conscious. Using philosophical arguments and empirical evidence from neuroscience and psychology, I argue that my somatic-perceptual theory of the emotions is able to account both for the intentional nature of the emotions and the distinctiveness of different emotions just as well as leading cognitive theories of the emotions. This is significant because these objections have not yet been adequately met by other somatic theories of the emotions. I also embrace the implication that on my view, emotions can be unconscious, and show that my somatic-perceptual theory provides a framework for thinking about poorly understood psychological conditions, such as alexithymia. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Thesis advisor: Jeremy D. Wilkins / This dissertation draws upon the work of Thomas Aquinas and Bernard J. F. Lonergan in order to put forward an integrated theorem of the imago Trinitatis. The theorem of the imago Trinitatis, in Catholic theology, is a theorem about how human persons imitate and reflect the triune God. In Aquinas and Lonergan, the imago Trinitatis is identified with the intelligent emanations of word and love that occur within the human mind. But, according to Aquinas, the imago Trinitatis can be considered in two respects: first, as a likeness by analogy—that is, an analogical likeness—and, second, as a likeness by conformity between the human and the divine. The first two chapters explain each of these likenesses in Aquinas, and the next two chapters explain each of these likenesses in Lonergan. The final chapter of this dissertation proposes a complementary analogical likeness of the Trinity in humans: an analogical likeness based upon shared intentionality. It further explains how this likeness is related to the analogical likeness based upon intelligent emanation in Aquinas and Lonergan. In doing so, this dissertation defends an integrated conception of the analogical likeness of the Trinity in human beings, as it unites the analogical likeness based upon intelligible emanation occurring in the human mind and the analogical likeness based upon shared intentionality as interpersonal, coordinated activity. The imago Trinitatis, then, is at once personal and interpersonal, and the analogues for the Trinity in humans are both psychological and communal. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Within the Philosophy of Mind two features of our mental life have been acknowledged as the most perplexing - consciousness, the phenomenal "what it is likeness" of our mental states, and intentionality, the aboutness or directedness of our mental states. As such, it has become commonplace to develop theories about these phenomena which seek to explain them naturalistically, that is, without resort to magic or miracles. Traditionally this has been done by analyzing consciousness and intentionality apart from one another. However, in more recent years the tide has turned. In contemporary theories these phenomena are typically analyzed in terms of the other. This results in two competing views: Representationalism, which seeks to ground consciousness in intentionality, and Phenomenalism, which seeks to ground intentionality in consciousness. David Chalmers has proposed an alternative view to these which takes consciousness and intentionality as essentially interdependent, neither more fundamental than the other. This thesis explores the motivations for Representationalism and Phenomenalism, outlines their extraneous commitments, and analyzes their merits - as well as assessing whether Chalmers' view is a defensible middle ground. This involves an analysis of the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and the nature of mental content. I argue that the view which Chalmers advocates is the best supported. Yet, I argue, it could benefit by adopting a thoroughgoing externalism of mental content.

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.

This work aims to pursue the roots and sources of intentionality. Intentional structure of consciousness is the very core of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and plays the main role since his Logical investigations. The problem of intentionality is complicated and complex and resonates through the Husserl lifelong work Our starting point is Husserl's late work Erfahrung und Urteil. The reason why we choose this work is twofold. First, this work shows the thoughts which result from the life long investigation of problematics. And the second reason is, this work hasn't been the subject of examination as much as Husserl's earlier works so far. The key to our work is the perspective in which every phenomenon shows. That's the reason, why we follow intentionality in three perspectives, which gradually uncovers itselves. The first perspective is the descent from acts of judgment to the original layers of intentionality. This brings us to the second perspective, which is the instinctive intentionality. This is the subject of following part of our work. The exposing of instinctive intentionality underlines the role of embodiment. The importance of embodiment in regard to intentionality is the final perspective. We investigate this with help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of perception. This will...