(in English): The diploma work Husserl's phenomenology of attention systematically presents Husserl's conception of attention. The first part deals with the presentation of Husserl's static phenomenology of attention, taking into account in particular of Logical Investigations and Ideas I. The second part is devoted to genetic phenomenology of attention, which is reconstructed mainly upon Experience and Judgment and Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. In it's conclusion the work offers other possible perspectives of investigation of the phenomenon of attention from the phenomenological positions.

The aim of this paper is to explore the theme of history in Husserl’s phenomenology, a theme to which he had a complex relation. While in his programmatic text, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, he opposed himself to the so-called “historicism” of some of his contemporaries, claiming that it leads to relativism, he later in his career sought to incorporate historical reflections into the core of the phenomenological method. The challenge, then, is to understand, or perhaps to reconcile, the tension between Husserl’s early anti-historicism and his later turn toward history and historical reflections. By highlighting some of the key points in the development of his phenomenology, such as the distinction between static and genetic analysis, this tension is shown to be nothing but apparent. By expanding the scope of his notion of essences to also include motivations, origins, and ideals, the later Husserl gives to phenomenology a fundamentally historical and temporal dimension. A central component in this development, it is argued, is the notion of sense-reflection (Besinnung), connecting phenomenology both to historical and ethical concerns. In later texts such as Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, sense-reflection is used in a variety of contexts: as indicating the retrieval of historically lost meaning (such as that within the sciences); as indicating the Socratic ethos of self-knowledge (Selbstbesinnung); and lastly, as indicating the process of performing the phenomenological reduction. Ultimately, according to Husserl, only by engaging in historical sense-reflections can phenomenology become a truly rigorous science, seeking to clarify the meaning of science as an intersubjective project aiming toward the realization of human rationality and reason.

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.

This work aims to pursue the roots and sources of intentionality. Intentional structure of consciousness is the very core of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and plays the main role since his Logical investigations. The problem of intentionality is complicated and complex and resonates through the Husserl lifelong work Our starting point is Husserl's late work Erfahrung und Urteil. The reason why we choose this work is twofold. First, this work shows the thoughts which result from the life long investigation of problematics. And the second reason is, this work hasn't been the subject of examination as much as Husserl's earlier works so far. The key to our work is the perspective in which every phenomenon shows. That's the reason, why we follow intentionality in three perspectives, which gradually uncovers itselves. The first perspective is the descent from acts of judgment to the original layers of intentionality. This brings us to the second perspective, which is the instinctive intentionality. This is the subject of following part of our work. The exposing of instinctive intentionality underlines the role of embodiment. The importance of embodiment in regard to intentionality is the final perspective. We investigate this with help of Maurice Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of perception. This will...

本文試圖討論的問題乃是在胡塞爾現象學中，「客觀世界」是如何構成的。其問題意識乃是來自於其自身現象學方法的操作後果。在其著作《笛卡爾式的沈思》中，表明了其現象學被批評為「獨我論」的可能，故進而在此《沈思》的第五章中，透過一系列在其現象學中對「他人」的討論，試圖突破自身陷入獨我論框架。其進行的方式主要有兩個步驟：「特殊的主題性懸擱」以及「移情」。而具有「客觀性」的世界便是在「移情」的諸階序上漸次構成的「主體際」世界。而在此諸步驟的討論中，我關注的是「現象學式的獨我自我」到「他人構成」的「初步」關係如何可能。 而對此步驟的可能性討論及解讀，在本文中以舒茲 (A. Schutz)、呂格爾 (P. Ricoeur) 以及李南麟 (Lee Nam-In) 的三篇文獻做為主要對談者。通過舒茲的強力批判、呂格爾往肉身存有的解讀方式，以及李南麟以靜態、發生現象學的途徑試圖解釋胡塞爾被批判的困境，我們可以發現，雖然胡塞爾通過上述兩個步驟所進行的客觀世界構成可能，是無法成功的，但一般稱為「意識哲學」的胡塞爾現象學，其哲學意圖、深度及可能的發展，即已有後續哲學家往「世俗 (mundane)」、「存有論」發展的走向，進而給予我們不管在對胡塞爾自身或後來的哲學發展有更深刻的理解。