Self-determination is a peoples' right to freely determine their political, economic and cultural destiny without external interference. However, the cultivation of a culture of respect for self-determination remains the greatest challenge to post-colonial Africa. Dictatorships and other oppressive regimes very substantially affected Africa's efforts to develop a culture of constitutionalism and respect for the right of peoples to selfdetermination. Most African countries typify the failed effort of trying to establish an enduring democracy and respect for the right of peoples to take part in the government. After five decades of transition from colonialism to constitutional democracy, most African peoples are still under the yoke of governments they consider undesirable or oppressive. This work primarily sets out to investigate if the denial of the right of peoples to self-determination justifies the use of force to secure such a right. Since independence, Africa has experienced armed rebel groups seeking either to effect radical transformation of the whole state or to separate from the state to which they belong in order to create a new state. In the main, this study explores the extent to which rebel groups acting on behalf of peoples are or are not allowed to use force for the attainment of self-determination. The thesis begins with an historical development of the right to self-determination in international law. It initially examines how self-determination has developed from a political principle to a legal right. Despite the fact that self-determination is one of the core principles of the UN Charter, there are still many controversies over its precise meaning, scope and application. The thesis considers the two aspects of selfdetermination: external self-determination and internal self-determination. The external aspect implies the right of people to form a new, sovereign and independent state, whereas the internal aspect implies the right of people to participate in the political framework of an existing state. The thesis also assesses the state of the academic literature over the right of peoples to self-determination, with a view to determining whether the right can be used by a group of people whose internal self-determination has been denied to effect secession from the state. It advocates that, outside the colonial context, the right of self-determination does not equal to a "right to secession and independence". The thesis argues, however, that in exceptional circumstances such as gross violations of human rights and the denial of internal self-determination, people should be endowed with a right to secession in the manifestation of a right to unilateral secession as a remedy of such injustices. The thesis further turns to the mechanisms for the protection of the peoples' right to self-determination, the problems and challenges in Africa. The challenges do not only include the legality of the use of force by rebel groups and national liberation movements in seeking to attain self-determination, but also the right of other states to assist them in their struggles. The work probes the nature of international law and critically assesses whether the persistent denial of demands for self-determination led to calls for drastic remedies, including the use of armed force. Before this theory is critically assessed, the thesis defines the differences between national liberation movements and rebel groups. It argues that as far as self-determination struggles are concerned, there must be representative organisations acting on behalf of people whose right of self-determination has been denied. In the light of these contentions, the study examines the general ban on the use of force as laid down by the UN Charter, and finds that the Charter does not expressly refer to self-determination as a situation where people may resort to the use of force for the attainment of such a right. It then turns to the history of and circumstance surrounding the use of force, examines the jus ad bellum regarding "liberation struggles", and concludes that the use of force by national liberation movements against colonial and racist regimes has strong theoretical foundations and support in state practice. Outside of the colonial and apartheid contexts, however, the argument that rebels acting on behalf of oppressed peoples may legitimately use force in pursuit of selfdetermination thus remains ambiguous. In that context, this thesis examines the practice relating to the use of force by rebel groups and the laws of war provisions that apply in civil wars, and concludes that none of them proves that the international community of states accepts rebels' right to use force as a legal entitlement. Finally, based on the lessons learned from and lacunae identified in all norms relating to the enforcement mechanisms of the right of self-determination, this study concludes with a set of suggestions and recommendations. / LLD (Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Self-determination is a peoples' right to freely determine their political, economic and cultural destiny without external interference. However, the cultivation of a culture of respect for self-determination remains the greatest challenge to post-colonial Africa. Dictatorships and other oppressive regimes very substantially affected Africa's efforts to develop a culture of constitutionalism and respect for the right of peoples to selfdetermination. Most African countries typify the failed effort of trying to establish an enduring democracy and respect for the right of peoples to take part in the government. After five decades of transition from colonialism to constitutional democracy, most African peoples are still under the yoke of governments they consider undesirable or oppressive. This work primarily sets out to investigate if the denial of the right of peoples to self-determination justifies the use of force to secure such a right. Since independence, Africa has experienced armed rebel groups seeking either to effect radical transformation of the whole state or to separate from the state to which they belong in order to create a new state. In the main, this study explores the extent to which rebel groups acting on behalf of peoples are or are not allowed to use force for the attainment of self-determination. The thesis begins with an historical development of the right to self-determination in international law. It initially examines how self-determination has developed from a political principle to a legal right. Despite the fact that self-determination is one of the core principles of the UN Charter, there are still many controversies over its precise meaning, scope and application. The thesis considers the two aspects of selfdetermination: external self-determination and internal self-determination. The external aspect implies the right of people to form a new, sovereign and independent state, whereas the internal aspect implies the right of people to participate in the political framework of an existing state. The thesis also assesses the state of the academic literature over the right of peoples to self-determination, with a view to determining whether the right can be used by a group of people whose internal self-determination has been denied to effect secession from the state. It advocates that, outside the colonial context, the right of self-determination does not equal to a "right to secession and independence". The thesis argues, however, that in exceptional circumstances such as gross violations of human rights and the denial of internal self-determination, people should be endowed with a right to secession in the manifestation of a right to unilateral secession as a remedy of such injustices. The thesis further turns to the mechanisms for the protection of the peoples' right to self-determination, the problems and challenges in Africa. The challenges do not only include the legality of the use of force by rebel groups and national liberation movements in seeking to attain self-determination, but also the right of other states to assist them in their struggles. The work probes the nature of international law and critically assesses whether the persistent denial of demands for self-determination led to calls for drastic remedies, including the use of armed force. Before this theory is critically assessed, the thesis defines the differences between national liberation movements and rebel groups. It argues that as far as self-determination struggles are concerned, there must be representative organisations acting on behalf of people whose right of self-determination has been denied. In the light of these contentions, the study examines the general ban on the use of force as laid down by the UN Charter, and finds that the Charter does not expressly refer to self-determination as a situation where people may resort to the use of force for the attainment of such a right. It then turns to the history of and circumstance surrounding the use of force, examines the jus ad bellum regarding "liberation struggles", and concludes that the use of force by national liberation movements against colonial and racist regimes has strong theoretical foundations and support in state practice. Outside of the colonial and apartheid contexts, however, the argument that rebels acting on behalf of oppressed peoples may legitimately use force in pursuit of selfdetermination thus remains ambiguous. In that context, this thesis examines the practice relating to the use of force by rebel groups and the laws of war provisions that apply in civil wars, and concludes that none of them proves that the international community of states accepts rebels' right to use force as a legal entitlement. Finally, based on the lessons learned from and lacunae identified in all norms relating to the enforcement mechanisms of the right of self-determination, this study concludes with a set of suggestions and recommendations. / LLD (Law), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Que devient le principe à l’heure de la mondialisation ? S’il se transforme, une nouvelle règle émerge-t-elle? Quelles en sont les causes et comment cela se traduit-il dans les formes politiques, les structures de droit public et au-delà ? Pour y répondre, la Nouvelle-Calédonie et le Nunavut servent de champ d’investigation intéressant car ils représentent deux formes ou « modèles » d’évolution du principe. Avec une approche comparative, l’étude tente de montrer que le principe se transforme et que son évolution est due au nouveau contexte international, à ses propres contradictions et à son rapport dialectique avec la souveraineté des États. Elle démontre que l’autodétermination est facteur de « restriction » de la souveraineté, en même temps qu’elle en est protectrice, bénéficiaire et tributaire. L’autodétermination protège la souveraineté car elle est reconnue au peuple-État mais la souveraineté conditionne et transforme à son tour l’autodétermination. Le droit des peuples a rendu beaucoup de services, mais il a aussi déçu. Destiné à l’origine aux seuls peuples coloniaux, constitués en États ou non, on l’a cru tombé en désuétude après la dernière vague de décolonisation des années 60-70. Il semble pourtant connaître unenouvelle vie depuis la fin de la bipolarisation. Bien que la priorité reste accordée à ces peuples, il est invoqué fréquemment par d’autres « peuples », notamment les peuples autochtones, et tend à devenir un droit identitaire et un droit au partage des pouvoirs. Une nouvelle conception du principe émerge, qualifiée de postmoderne, influencée par la mondialisation et marquée par une affirmation forte des droits de l’homme et de l’identité, et par des avancées notables en matière de démocratie pluraliste.Elle se matérialise par la mise en selle du droit à ne pas devenir un État, l’autre versant du droit des peuples, par la mise en valeur de l’option du libre choix de n’importe quel statut reconnue par l’ONU mais longtemps négligée, par l’émergence d’un droit à la démocratie pour l’ensemble de la population et d’un droit à l’autonomie, et surtout par l’évolution même du concept d’autodétermination qui se dédouble en autodétermination externe et autodétermination interne. Cette transformation s’appuie sur une reconnaissance du pluralisme et une évolution normative, certes lente et partielle, mais effective au plan international. Au plan interne, l’obstacle de la souveraineté perdure mais celle-ci est peu à peu battue en brèche avec la transformation des principes constitutionnels, celle de l’organisation des pouvoirs, le développement du pluralisme juridique et l’apparition de nouvelles formes de démocratie et de citoyenneté que les États concèdent eux-mêmes en leur sein. Le concept du droit des peuples n’est donc pas « mort » ; il n’est pas en crise non plus. Il se métamorphose. Il reste un concept de « combat », à la rationalité imparfaite, mais il évolue du fait d’une double dialectique, interne et externe. / Pas de description en anglais