What space does the mind occupy? A standard response to this question might be to locate the mind within the brain. However some argue that our mental processes also extend beyond the boundaries of the brain. Gallagher & Zahavi (2008) have termed these two views of the mind: internalism and externalism. In cinema, the role of editor as mediator between the cognitive activities of filmmakers, audiences and the editing equipment, makes their practice particularly suited for investigating these two seemingly incompatible views. When editors cut or join chunks of sound and image, they assemble externally what some would recognise internally as the mind’s fluctuations between one object of attention and the next. Their activities reveal a side of cinema, but also of the mind, which is usually hidden from view. The purpose of this thesis will therefore be to show how studying the process of editing contributes to our understanding of the relationship between mind and world. In order to address the question of where the editor’s mental processes are located, this study applies a phenomenographic methodology. Rather than attempt to understand cognition from a preconceived or objectively constituted position, phenomenography starts by examining variation in how a group of individuals view a particular process. This leads toward research findings that are presented from a ‘second-order perspective’ (Marton, 1981). In this thesis an understanding of how audiovisual material is selected and sequenced is revealed through fourteen interviews with British editors and directors. From the analysis of these interviews a framework emerged of five critical interrelated ways to approach the editing process. This evidence suggests that the cognitive process occurs in virtue of an editor’s physical activities, the editing equipment, plus a broader network of social and cultural relations that support the filmmaking environment. Refuting the belief that the mind is separate from the world, the editor’s mental processes are to be found distributed amongst a variety of internal and external features of their environment. The outcome of this thesis is a phenomenographic perspective on the editing process. This, I conclude, will help to inform cognitive scientists of the kinds of mental processes that editors are aware of. It also provides a wider audience of scholars with a framework for further research on variation in the process and practice of editing.

Orientador: Mariana Claudia Broens / Banca: João Queiroz / Banca: Michael Beaumont Wrigley / Resumo: Neste trabalho propomos a análise da natureza dos estados mentais, um tema central nos estudos em Filosofia da Mente. Para isso, sugerimos um percurso investigativo que começa com a análise da noção cartesiana de dualismo substancial definido por postular uma mente distinta do corpo e responsável pela produção de estados mentais. Em seguida, procuramos problematizar a concepção cartesiana tendo como base as críticas que Ryle dirige à por ele denominada 'doutrina oficial'. Com esse propósito, é considerado, em especial, o conceito de disposição sugerido por Ryle (2000) para combater o que ele denomina concepções intelectualistas de mente. Por fim, analisamos algumas das principais teses externalistas, iniciadas com o trabalho de Putnam (1975), sobretudo a perspectiva representacional concebida por Dretske (1997) a respeito da relação do indivíduo com o meio ambiente. Procuramos mostrar que o conceito de disposição sugerido por Ryle fornece subsídios para uma teorização externalista dos estados mentais, servindo como base para uma concepção externalista de indivíduo muito diversa da cartesiana. / Abstract: In this dissertation we propose the analysis of the nature of the mental states that is a very main issue in the studies of Philosophy of Mind. In order to this, we suggested doing a research which begins with the analysis of the cartesian notion of the substantial dualism, defined by postulating a distinct mind from the body and responsible for producing mental states. Afterwards we tried to argue about the cartesian conception based on the criticisms whose Ryle refers himself as being designated "official doctrine". With this purpose, it is considered, in special, the concept of disposition, suggested by Ryle (2000) in opposition to what he designates as intellectual conceptions. Finally, we analysed some of the main externalists theses which were started with Putnam (1975), above all the representational perspective conceived by Dretske (1997) as far as the relationship between the person and the environment is concerned. All things considered we tried to show that the concept of disposition suggested by Ryle supports an externalist theorisation of the mental states, considering itself as the basis for an externalist conception of the person which is very different from the cartesian conception. / Mestre

Au 20ème siècle, la position traditionnelle de l’épistémologie cartésienne a reçu de nombreuses critiques. La transparence de l’esprit et notre accès authentique à nos propres états mentaux sont couramment attaqués par les arguments selon lesquels nos jugements prétendument fondamentaux ne sont point infaillibles. Le problème de la « poule tachetée » proposé par Chisholm est ici un bon exemple. D’autres épistémologues ont proposé des scénarios où les cognitions fondamentales sont les victimes, soit des processus cognitifs étranges, soit des environnements défavorables. On a aussi constaté qu’il y a de cognitions fondamentales qui sont obscures ou fausses. Ces trois groupes d’objections faillibilistes ne sont pas irréfragables, mais il n’y a pas non plus de réponse systématique et suffisamment solide de la part de ceux qui défendent la thèse de l’infaillibilité fondamentale. Dans le présent travail, nous reconstruirons un modèle de l’intuition à l’inspiration des Regulae ad directionem ingenii. Nous réfuterons avec ce modèle la plupart des objections contemporaines, et proposerons en même temps une nouvelle interprétation des textes principaux de Descartes. / During the 20th century, the position of Cartesian epistemology has been much criticized. The transparency of the mind, as well as our authentic access to our own mental states, have been continuously attacked by arguments that attempt to reveal the fallibility of our putatively foundational cognitions. The famous problem of the speckled hen is representative; some epistemologists have also configured fictional scenarios where our foundational cognitions suffer from strange cognitive process or unfavorable epistemic environment, so that the relevant cognitions are no longer reliable, a fortiori infallible; others directly state that there are fundamental cognitions that are actually mistaken. These three groups of fallibilist objections are not flawless, but there are no systematic and sufficiently solid responses that defend the infallibility thesis either. In this dissertation, we shall reconstruct a model of intuition on the basis of Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii. The model will be used to refute most of the contemporary anti-Cartesian objections. It also provides a new interpretation of Descartes’ Meditations and other related texts.

This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as well as dilemmas proposed by Jack Lyons and Michael Bergmann targeting internalism. Acquaintance foundationalism is what I will call any theory of justification that is internalist in what may justify us, foundationalist in the structure of justification, and relies on the concept of acquaintance in justifying our basic beliefs. Internalism requires that what justifies us improves the belief from the perspective of the believing subject. Foundationalism states that the justification for all beliefs depends ultimately on basic beliefs. Finally, acquaintance is a relation between a person and other things such that these other things are before the “mind’s eye” of the subject. The general idea behind each of these dilemmas, so I will argue, is to claim that acquaintance foundationalism cannot provide epistemic reasons for basic beliefs, where epistemic reason means something that contributes to justification from the subject’s perspective. Each dilemma will ask whether the alleged justifier has some feature x. However, each dilemma contends that, whether the alleged has the feature x or not, it cannot serve as an epistemic reason. For example, BonJour will ask whether our allegedly basic beliefs are cognitive or not. He argues that if they are cognitive, they need justification (and so cannot be basic), but if they are not cognitive, they cannot provide justification. Thus, no allegedly basic belief can serve as an epistemic reason. I argue that the notion of acquaintance allows us to escape such dilemmas because our states of acquaintance allow us to justify our basic beliefs without requiring justification themselves. I do so by borrowing, in part, Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, plus adding on a few epicycles to allow us to base our basic beliefs on our acquaintances. The first chapter sets up the issues of the dissertation: it gives context to the project, defines acquaintance foundationalism and epistemic reason, and discusses our dilemmas in broad outline. It also summarizes the rest of the essay. I use epistemic reasons in a specialized sense in the dissertation, which necessitates an extended discussion. This is the focus of chapter two. I argue that an epistemic reason is a mental complex that consists of Fumertonian acquaintances. When we have an epistemic reason, we have a mental complex that is related in the appropriate way to a belief. This is just what provides justification for the belief. This chapter explicates this notion. It includes an extended discussion of Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, which I follow in outline but diverge from in detail. This discussion focuses on his notion of acquaintance, and the items with which we may be acquainted. I then move to a discussion of the metaphysics of epistemic reasons, explaining how they consist of these acquaintances. I also discuss the relationship between epistemic reasons and epistemic justification. The third chapter is historical in focus. I examine Sellars’s famous dilemma for foundationalism, and contend that it can be best understood as an attempt to deny the foundationalist epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I also examine Laurence BonJour’s later formulation of the Sellarsian dilemma, and again argue that it is best understood as denying epistemic reasons to foundationalists. I then review the options that an acquaintance foundationalist has to respond to these dilemmas, as these responses will allow us to see where our more recent dilemmas go wrong. Chapter four address Jack Lyons’s dilemma. I consider what Lyons says about his dilemma at some length. I then argue that it is structurally similar to the Sellarsian dilemma, and tries to undermine the internalist’s (including the acquaintance foundationalist’s) ability to offer epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I then argue that Lyons’s dilemma only seems persuasive because he misunderstands what is required for experience to provide us with an epistemic reason. When properly understood, his dilemma fails to tell against the acquaintance foundationalism. I also argue that Lyons’s version of externalism is much more radical than it might initially appear, helping to motivate acquaintance foundationalism. The fifth chapter focuses on Michael Bergmann. I give his dilemma an extended discussion, which I follow up by reframing it in terms of epistemic reasons. I argue that his dilemma, while seemingly persuasive, fails to trouble the acquaintance foundationalism. I argue that we may be strongly aware (a Bergmannian technical notion) of our epistemic reasons without starting a regress, which vitiates his dilemma. I conclude with some short remarks on possibility of skepticism.

This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.

Lawrence Bonjour supported coherentism in the early period, but turns to foundationalism in the later period. In this paper I shall focus on two sides in relation to his epistemology. To understand his early and later positions, first, I shall explain his coherentism and foundationalism. Second, I shall consider what objections have been raised to each position. Thus we can evaluate why Bonjour abandoned his coherentism and why his foundationalism succeeds as a plausible theory for empirical justification.

The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced. / Disertacijoje nagrinėjama su sveiko proto morale suderinamos moralės teorijos galimybė. Sveiko proto moralė apribojama dviem pamatinėm prielaidom, arba savybėm: moraliniai sprendiniai turi teisingumo reikšmes ir yra praktinio pobūdžio, t.y. jie yra kažkuria prasme objektyviai teisingi arba klaidingi ir būtinai kreipia mūsų veiksmus. Šiandienėje filosofijoje šios dvi pamatinės sveiko proto moralės savybės atrodo esančios nesuderinamos: juk teisingumo reikšmes gali turėti tik deskripcijos, o deskripcijos nėra preskripcijos, arba iš to, kaip yra, tiesiogiai neseka tai, kaip turėtų būti. Vis dėlto nagrinėjant metodologines, ontologines, epistemologines bei semantines moralės teorijų galimybes, disertacijoje į pagrindinį klausimą atsakoma teigiamai: abi pamatines sveiko proto moralės savybes įkūnijanti moralės teorija yra galima, tik jei ji padaro koherentiškumą savo konstituojančia vertybe ir naudoja racionalistinio internalizmo prieigą. Darbe aptariamos pagrindinės šiandienės metaetikos kontroversijos bei skirtys (moralinis realizmas/antirealizmas, motyvacinis internalizmas/eksternalizmas), išskleidžiama bei papildoma racionalistinio internalizmo teorija.

Disertacijoje nagrinėjama su sveiko proto morale suderinamos moralės teorijos galimybė. Sveiko proto moralė apribojama dviem pamatinėm prielaidom, arba savybėm: moraliniai sprendiniai turi teisingumo reikšmes ir yra praktinio pobūdžio, t.y. jie yra kažkuria prasme objektyviai teisingi arba klaidingi ir būtinai kreipia mūsų veiksmus. Šiandienėje filosofijoje šios dvi pamatinės sveiko proto moralės savybės atrodo esančios nesuderinamos: juk teisingumo reikšmes gali turėti tik deskripcijos, o deskripcijos nėra preskripcijos, arba iš to, kaip yra, tiesiogiai neseka tai, kaip turėtų būti. Vis dėlto nagrinėjant metodologines, ontologines, epistemologines bei semantines moralės teorijų galimybes, disertacijoje į pagrindinį klausimą atsakoma teigiamai: abi pamatines sveiko proto moralės savybes įkūnijanti moralės teorija yra galima, tik jei ji padaro koherentiškumą savo konstituojančia vertybe ir naudoja racionalistinio internalizmo prieigą. Darbe aptariamos pagrindinės šiandienės metaetikos kontroversijos bei skirtys (moralinis realizmas/antirealizmas, motyvacinis internalizmas/eksternalizmas), išskleidžiama bei papildoma racionalistinio internalizmo teorija. / The dissertation explores the question of the possibility of a moral theory compatible with common sense morality. Common sense morality is limited to its two fundamental features, or suppositions: moral judgements are truth apt and practical, i.e. they are at the same time in some sense objectively right or wrong and necessarily action guiding. In contemporary philosophy, the two fundamental features of common sense morality seem to be incompatible: only descriptions can have truth values, but descriptions are not prescriptions, or, to put it otherwise, from the way the things are, it does not follow straightforwardly how the things should be. However, analyses of the methodological, ontological, epistemological and semantic possibilities of moral theories enable a positive answer: a moral theory which embodies the two fundamental features of common-sense morality is possible, only if it makes coherence its constitutive value and uses the approach of rationalist internalism. In this research, the main controversies and distinctions of contemporary meta ethics (moral realism/anti realism, motivational internalism/externalism) are discussed and an account of rationalist internalism is explicated and enforced.

This thesis engages with epistemology???s value problem. That is, is knowledge epistemically preferable to true belief? If so, how is that the case? The issue under discussion is whether epistemic justification can account for a value discrepancy between true belief and knowledge. First of all, the contours of the justificatory landscape are presented???in particular, the division between externalist and internalist styles. The thesis then considers whether solely truth-directed justification (which includes externalism) can possibly account for a value unique to knowledge. The preliminary conclusion is that solely truth-directed justification cannot solve the value problem. A discussion of internalism then ensues. The discussion does not focus explicitly on which benefits internalism may offer in terms of value; instead, the focus is on whether internalism qua internalism can solve the value problem. It is concluded that, if internalism is the sole provider of the value of knowledge (above that of true belief), then epistemology must forgo the belief that knowledge is preferable to a Gettiered belief. I do not accept such a concession; therefore, I reject the thesis that internalism exclusively solves the value problem. Throughout the thesis, the importance of externalism to epistemology becomes apparent. This feature invites a reconsideration of the value of externalism (in particular, of reliabilism). The thesis closes by reconsidering the value of reliabilism and concludes that the value problem can be solved, but only by an appeal to externalist justification.

Thesis (Revise). / Includes bibliographical references.