Thesis (doctoral)--Freiburg im Breisgau, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-253) and indexes.

Undergraduate honors paper--Mount Holyoke College, 2007. Dept. of Philosophy. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-107).

Submitted by Marilene Donadel (marilene.donadel@unioeste.br) on 2017-09-19T00:25:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno_F_de_Oliveira_2016.pdf: 1021805 bytes, checksum: 05b3e2f46eb261da8a6856dbb7cd1189 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-19T00:25:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruno_F_de_Oliveira_2016.pdf: 1021805 bytes, checksum: 05b3e2f46eb261da8a6856dbb7cd1189 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-23 / Fundação Araucária de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico do Estado do Paraná (FA) / This dissertation aims to introduce and investigate the problem of meaning in the sphere of semantic externalism, propose by Hilary Putnam, and the internalist criticism of John Searle. Such proposal aims to show Putnam’s contribution in favor of the externalism and the internalist theory developed by Searle. The discussion that will be developed looks for the relation between the human mind and the world, in which the externalism defends a causal external relation as essential for the determination of meaning, whereas the internalism defends that the intentionality does not depend of a relation with the social/physical world in order to form a meaning. According to Searle, the meaning, the conscience, the intentionality and the states of mind are biological processes of the mind, therefore, any explanation about these states of mind should explain how the mind’s organism relates with reality. In The Meaning of “meaning”, Putnam presents her thesis of the semantic externalism and critics the individualism. The main goal is to basically refute the theories that supports that the states of mind and meaning of words are electrochemical processes of the mind, and as such, do not depend of the external world. With the objective of refuting the externalist theory, Searle develops the theory of intentionality as a solution for the most discussed problems in the history of philosophy, such as the theory of meaning, reference and mind-body problem. According to Searle, the intentionality does not require a relation with the social/physical world to form a meaning. Summarizing it, the internalist theory of Searle seeks to show that the world is not necessary in order to men attribute meaning to terms. However, the argument presented by the philosopher that meaning is nothing but a biological property of the brain leaves the issue language versus world to be explained. / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo apresentar e investigar o problema do significado no âmbito do externismo semântico, proposto por Hilary Putnam, e as críticas internistas de John Searle. Tal proposta tem a intenção de mostrar a contribuição de Putnam a favor do externismo e a teoria internista desenvolvida por Searle. A discussão que se realizará tem em vista a relação da mente humana com o mundo, na qual, o externismo defende uma relação causal externa como essencial para a determinação do significado, enquanto, o internismo defende que a intencionalidade não depende de uma relação com o mundo físico/social, para que se possa formar o significado. Segundo Searle, o significado, a consciência, a intencionalidade e os estados mentais, são processos biológicos da própria mente, ou seja, qualquer explicação acerca desses estados mentais deve-se explicar como o organismo da mente se relaciona com a realidade. Em The Meaning of ‘meaning’, Putnam apresenta suas teses a favor do externismo semântico e críticas ao individualismo. O objetivo fundamental é de refutar, basicamente, as teorias que, em particular, sustentam que os estados mentais e os significados das palavras são processos eletroquímicos da mente, isto é, não dependem do mundo externo. Com o objetivo de refutar a teoria externista, Searle desenvolve uma teoria da intencionalidade como solução para os problemas mais discutidos da história da filosofia, dentre eles: a teoria do significado, da referência e problema mente-corpo. Segundo Searle, a intencionalidade não precisa ter relação com o mundo físico/social, para que se possa formar o significado. Em suma, a teoria internista, de Searle, pretende mostrar que o mundo não é necessário para atribuirmos significados aos termos. No entanto, o argumento que o filósofo apresenta a favor dos significados serem propriedades biológicas do cérebro, deixa a questão linguagem versus mundo a explicar.

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Este estudo aborda a produção brasileira de historiografia da química em artigos de periódicos, no período de 1974 a 2004. O pressuposto investigado é a interligação entre a atividade química industrial desenvolvida no país e a quantidade de artigos produzida. A discussão do debate internalista/externalista foi escolhida para iluminar alguns aspectos dessa produção, ao longo do período. Para isso, realizamos levantamentos dos artigos nos principais periódicos brasileiros que abrigam a historiografia da química, bem como a produção industrial do setor químico nacional no período estudado. A análise desse conjunto de dados nos revelou que existe uma inter-relação entre a produção industrial e a historiografia da química / This study broaches the Brazilian production of chemistry historiography in articles from periodicals embracing the period from 1974 to 2004. The presupposition under investigation is the interconnection between the industrial chemical activity developed in the country and the quantity of articles produced. The discussion on the internalist/externalist issue was chosen to highlight some aspects of that production during that period. In order to achieve that we carried out a survey of articles in the major Brazilian periodicals that cover chemistry historiography as well as the national chemical sector industrial production during the studied period. The analysis of that data has revealed that there is an interconnection between the industrial production and chemical historiography

Este estudo aborda a produção brasileira de historiografia da química em artigos de periódicos, no período de 1974 a 2004. O pressuposto investigado é a interligação entre a atividade química industrial desenvolvida no país e a quantidade de artigos produzida. A discussão do debate internalista/externalista foi escolhida para iluminar alguns aspectos dessa produção, ao longo do período. Para isso, realizamos levantamentos dos artigos nos principais periódicos brasileiros que abrigam a historiografia da química, bem como a produção industrial do setor químico nacional no período estudado. A análise desse conjunto de dados nos revelou que existe uma inter-relação entre a produção industrial e a historiografia da química / This study broaches the Brazilian production of chemistry historiography in articles from periodicals embracing the period from 1974 to 2004. The presupposition under investigation is the interconnection between the industrial chemical activity developed in the country and the quantity of articles produced. The discussion on the internalist/externalist issue was chosen to highlight some aspects of that production during that period. In order to achieve that we carried out a survey of articles in the major Brazilian periodicals that cover chemistry historiography as well as the national chemical sector industrial production during the studied period. The analysis of that data has revealed that there is an interconnection between the industrial production and chemical historiography

It is widely accepted, amongst epistemologists, that evidence plays an important role in our epistemic life. Crucially, there is no agreement on what evidence is. Following Silins, we can cash out the disagreement around the notion of evidence in terms of the opposition between Evidential Internalism and Evidential Externalism (Silins, 2005). Evidential internalists claim that evidence supervenes on one's non-factive mental states, such as, beliefs, impressions (BonJour, 1999, Audi, 2001). Evidential Externalists deny that. In this Thesis, first, I contrastively assess the plausibility of two prominent contemporary externalist theories: Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism, the thesis on which one's evidence in perceptual cases is truth-entailing and reflectively accessible (Pritchard, 2012), and Timothy Williamson's E=K, the thesis on which one's evidence is all and only the propositions one knows (Williamson, 2000). Second, I develop a novel externalist account of evidence that I call Ecumenical Evidentialism. I show how Ecumenical Evidentialism is able to bring together some of the benefits of both Pritchard's Disjunctivism and Williamson's E=K. This Thesis is structured into three sections, each of which addresses the following three questions respectively: Does the Access Problem represent a real threat to Evidential Externalism? Is Evidential Externalism committed to a sceptical variety of Infallibilism? How does Evidential Externalism understand the relation between evidence and epistemic justification? I argue that neither Epistemological Disjunctivism nor E=K are fully satisfying Externalist accounts of evidence. On one hand, I argue that Disjunctivism captures the orthodox intuition on which justification is a matter of being evidence-responsive, but it does so on pain of facing the so-called Access Problem. On the other hand, by rejecting any strong accessibility thesis, Williamson's E=K is better positioned to resist both the Access Problem as well as the Infallibility Problem, but it does not vindicate the orthodox intuition on which justification is a matter of being evidence-responsive. Finally, I show that, while retaining the main commitments of Williamson's theory of evidence, such as, E=K, my Ecumenical Evidentialism is able to capture the orthodox responsiveness intuition about epistemic justification.

The thesis comprises three foundational studies on the topics named in its title, together with an introduction. Ch. 1 argues against a popular combination of views in the philosophy of language: Propositionality, which says that the semantic values of natural language sentences (relative to contexts) are the propositions they express (in those contexts) and Compositionality, which says that the semantic value of a complex expression of a natural language (in a context) is determined by the semantic values its immediate constituents have (in that same context) together with their syntactic mode of combination. Ch. 1 argues that the Naïve Picture is inconsistent with the presence of variable-binding in natural languages. Ch. 2 criticizes the strategy of using “operator arguments” to establish relativist conclusions such as: that the truth values of propositions vary with time (Time Relativism) or that they vary with location (Location Relativism). Operator arguments purport to derive the conclusion that propositions vary in truth value along some parameter P from the premise that there are, in some language, sentential operators that operate on or “shift” the P parameter. I identify two forms of operator argument, offer a reconstruction of each, and I argue that both they rely on an implausible, coarse-grained conception of propositions. Ch. 3 is an assessment of the prospects for semantic internalism. It argues, first, that to accommodate Putnam’s famous Twin Earth examples, an internalist must maintain that narrow semantic content determines different extensions relative to agents and times. Second, that the most thoroughly worked out version of semantic internalism – the epistemic two-dimensionalism (E2D) of David Chalmers – can accommodate the original Twin Earth thought experiments but is refuted by similar thought experiments that involve temporally or spatially symmetric agents.

<p>“What characterizes an acceptable theory of self-realization?” The thrust of the present dissertation is towards seeking an answer to this central problem, which stems from the fundamental human experience that life involves change, and that in a modern society such change is often expected to be towards a realization of potentials and the good life for the individual. </p><p>The dissertation has a three-fold purpose. The first is to clarify the content of five modern theories of self-realization from three academic fields. The theories are those of the psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, the philosophers Charles Taylor and Alan Gewirth, and the theologians Reinhold Niebuhr and Bernard Lonergan. These are methodologically studied by the help of seven analytical questions. The second purpose is to perform a lengthwise comparatative analysis of the five theories, the results of which lead to the third; namely to critically discuss several elements of the reality of human life which have proven to be missing or supressed in much of the material.</p><p>The theoretical framework for the dissertation runs along two axes: one concerns what is developed as a distinction between internalism and relationalism, and the other is to cast a critical light on the lack of attention paid by the the theories of self-realization to experiences which run counter to optimistic ideas of individual development, such as death, loss and dependence. </p><p>The dissertation concludes with an outline for a constructive position based on the necessity of a theory’s closeness to experience, and on the need for reconcilitation of what may seem to be unabridgeble in human life. A theory of self-realization must do more than formulate positive conditions for change. It must also take into consideration conditions that are not directly related to, and sometimes even run contrary to, realization of the self.</p>

This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the central ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning. Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world. The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning. It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.