L’ouverture de l’économie colombienne, décidée en 1990, fut présentée comme un promoteur de croissance et développement sur la base des exportations (et des Investissements Directs Etrangers). Cette thèse soutient que l’ouverture n’a pas été décidée afin de favoriser la croissance et le développement et que ces deux phénomènes n’ont pas été à la hauteur de ce qui était anticipé. Ce résultat est fondé sur une analyse en termes d’Economie Politique Internationale : les relations de pouvoir peuvent être utiles pour répondre à des questions d’ordre économique. Le premier chapitre montre que les caractéristiques structurelles de l’économie colombienne rendaient son ouverture impropre à générer croissance et développement sur la base des exportations. Cette proposition s’appuie sur l’analyse de la compétitivité sectorielle et des carences institutionnelles de l’économie colombienne, ainsi que sur l’accroissement potentiel des inégalités spatiales de développement suite à l’ouverture. Le deuxième chapitre s’attache alors à mettre en évidence que l’ouverture répond à des objectifs propres aux Etats-Unis. Ces objectifs sont à dominante économique (typiquement la création des débouchés extérieurs et l’accès à des matières premières) ou politique (lutte contre les guérillas d’inspiration communiste dans le cadre de la politique étrangère américaine). Le deuxième chapitre expose une série des moyens à la disposition des Etats-Unis afin d’obtenir l’ouverture du gouvernement colombien de l’époque. Ces moyens vont de la coercition (par exemple la menace de sanction) à la légitimation (favoriser l’élection d’un gouvernement pro-ouverture). Le troisième chapitre montre que l’ouverture n’a pas instauré un régime de croissance fondé sur les exportations. Au contraire, elle a instauré un régime instable fondé sur une dynamique spéculative sur les actifs immobiliers à partir des flux de capitaux étrangers venant nourrir l’achat de ces actifs à crédit. Lorsque ces capitaux finissent tôt ou tard par manquer, de tels achats sont pénalisés et viennent interrompre la dynamique. Celle-ci ne peut plus tirer la croissance via des effets d’entrainement du secteur de la construction sur le reste de l’économie. Mais pris au piège de la relation de pouvoir exercée par les Etats-Unis, le gouvernement colombien n’a pas cherché à stabiliser la conjoncture. Il a dû privilégier les dépenses en équipement militaire américain pour lutter contre les guérillas colombiennes. L’intensification subséquente du conflit armé a accentué la violence au sein du territoire. Il en résulta la destruction d’infrastructures, ainsi qu’une migration de travailleurs qualifiés. La récession en a été d’autant plus accentuée. Ainsi l’ouverture débouche-t-elle sur la pire crise économique du XXème siècle en Colombie, avec une récession de -5% en 1999. Le quatrième chapitre enquête sur les changements des structures de production et d’échange suite à l’ouverture, pour ainsi montrer que ces changements n’ont que peu favorisé le développement. La Colombie tend à négliger sa spécialisation internationale historique dans le café et la plupart des cultures transitoires (blé, riz, orge, sorgo, coton, etc.) pour privilégier d’autres cultures dont les effets positifs sur le développement sont moindres. Bien que les hydrocarbures et d’autres matières brutes bénéficient d’un certain potentiel d’exportation, le développement des territoires où l’extraction a lieu reste faible. Se pose en outre un problème de soutenabilité de l’extraction. Enfin, si l’industrie manufacturière a pu croitre au rythme du régime de croissance, elle le doit à la protection dont elle bénéficie encore dans le cadre du traitement différentiel des pays en développement à l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et moins aux opportunités d’exportation données par l’ouverture. Le jour où ce traitement sera diminué voire supprimé, toute une partie de l’économie colombienne est menacée. / The opening of the Colombian economy, decided in 1990, was supposed to promote a new model of growth and development based on exports (and Foreign Direct Investment). This dissertation argues that the opening was not made in order to promote growth and development, and that these two phenomena did not live up to what was expected. This result is based on an International Political Economy approach: taking into account power relationships may give a better explanation of economic phenomena. The first chapter shows that the structural characteristics of the Colombian economy made its opening unable to generate growth and development. This assertion is based on the analysis of the lack of competitiveness and of the institutional flaws of the Colombian economy, as well as on the potential increase in the spatial inequalities of development resulting from the opening. The second chapter thus highlights that the opening aimed at achieving some objectives peculiar to the United States. These objectives are made of economic considerations (typically the access to foreign markets and to raw materials) as well as political ones (dealing with the threats caused by Marxist guerrilla groups within the framework of the American foreign policy). This second chapter explains a series of means at the disposal of the United States to obtain the opening. These means go from coercion (such as sanction threats) to legitimation (to give rise to a Colombian pro-opening government). The third chapter shows that the opening did not lead to an export-led growth. On the contrary, it led to an unstable growth regime. The latter is based on the foreign capital flows. The latter feed the purchase of real estate assets by credit. The housing sector is thus stimulated, which in turn stimulates other economic activities, within the framework of spill-over effects. However, when foreign capital flows lack, real-estate asset purchases are penalized, thus preventing the expansion of the housing sector and eventually of aggregate production itself (spill-over effects no longer work). However, given the power relationship exercised by the United States, the Colombian government had to purchase American military equipment massively, in order to fight against the Colombian guerrillas. By doing so, the economic policy could not stabilize the economy at that time. Besides, the subsequent intensification of the conflict increased the violence within the Colombian territory, thus leading to the migration of skilled workers and to the destruction of infrastructures. The recession had thus been exacerbated. This scenario occurred a few years after 1990, resulting in the worst economic crisis of the 20th century in Colombia with a -5 % recession in 1999. The fourth chapter questions the changes followed by the production and exchange structures because of the opening, to show that these changes did not really contribute to development. Colombia tends to neglect its historic international specialization in coffee and other cultures like wheat, rice, barley, sorghum or cotton, to privilege other cultures whose positive effects on development are lower. As regards the industries of extraction of raw materials (in particular hydrocarbons), they are oriented toward exportation but they promote few development. In addition, the Colombian productive system may lack of this type of input in the future. Finally, if the manufacturing industry was able to increase at the rate of the growth regime, it owes it to the protection still remaining with the differential treatment for developing countries in the World Trade Organization, and less to the export opportunities given by the opening. When this treatment will be eliminated or at least decreased, a whole part of the Colombian economy will be threatened.

[pt] Esta dissertação é um estudo acerca dos efeitos do comércio internacional sobre o bem-estar interno dos países. O trabalho parte da evidência de que há países com estruturas econômicas similares, inclusive um alto grau de abertura econômica, que, no entanto, têm um desempenho muito diferente em seu IDH, utilizado como taxa representativa do bem-estar . São examinados os casos de Chile e Venezuela nos anos 90 e chega-se à conclusão de que, embora em países com uma alta exposição ao comércio exterior este seja em grande parte responsável pela evolução das economias nacionais, a forma como ele se reflete no bem-estar depende da intervenção do Estado, por meio da implementação de políticas públicas. A pesquisa é feita em um enquadramento teórico de Economia Política Internacional (EPI). A proposta de Susan Strange de analisar as questões da EPI em função de diferentes estruturas de poder é aplicada ao nível nacional, e os efeitos do comércio internacional sobre o IDH são examinados como os de uma estrutura do comércio particularmente influente sobre uma estrutura do bem-estar. / [en] This thesis is a study of the effects of international trade on social welfare within countries. The analysis starts from the evidence that there are countries with similar economic structures, including a high level of economic openness which, however, have a very different performance on their HDI, taken as a proxy for their welfare. The cases of Chile and Venezuela in the 1990s are examined. The conclusion is that, although trade, in countries highly exposed to it, is to a great extent responsible for the evolution of national economies as a whole, the way it affects welfare depends on the intervention of the state, through the implementation of policies. The research is done within an International Political Economy (IPE) framework. Susan Strange's proposition of analyzing the questions of IPE as the work of different power structures is applied at the national level, and the effects of international trade on HDI are examined as those of a particularly strong trade structure on a welfare structure.

What explains IMF behavior in Europe between 2008 and 2012? Harshly criticized in Greece, yet tentatively praised in Hungary, the institution found itself playing different roles as it responded to a string of financial crises. Its programs varied substantially in terms of conditionality, financing, and private sector involvement. This thesis explores why, highlighting the changing global financial safety net, which is both expanding and becoming more decentralized due to the spectacular rise of regional financing arrangements (RFAs). Existing theories of IMF behavior assume the Fund to be a stand-alone institution and analyse financial assistance as the outcome from the interplay between creditors, borrowers, and staff. By focusing on dynamics within the IMF, however, they miss how developments outside the institution are increasingly shaping its behavior. This thesis brings in the role of changes in the institutional environment by drawing on the literature on regime complexity. The proliferation of RFAs alters the outside options of all actors, which affects their bargaining power. This opens the way for new strategies, through which creditors can entangle institutions by creating overlaps, borrowers can engage in confrontation between alternative financing institutions, and the IMF can find means to co-work with RFAs. These in turn affect whose preferences shape program design. This argument is tested empirically through process-tracing and comparing three cases of IMF-RFA cooperation in Europe. In Hungary, the IMF led the way in shaping a surprisingly 'generous' program with little constraint from the EU. However, in Latvia, the Fund found itself a 'junior partner' in a program driven by local authorities with the support of an European RFA. In Greece, the interests of creditors were paramount, securing IMF acquiescence through the threat of exclusion. These findings point to significant challenges for the Fund going forward. As RFAs continue to proliferate around the world, the IMF needs to avoid the temptation of striking even more Faustian bargains that keep it at the table of financial assistance at the cost of becoming a junior partner.

This Bachelor thesis focuses on examining the Ghanaian state's policies regarding inward Foreign Direct Investments and furthermore the policy implementation to attract and receive FDI, the question asked is What policy choices have been implemented by Ghana to attract Chinese FDI? This thesis employs a single case study design with a qualitative approach as it seeks to draw upon Liberal IPE and RAM to understand the policy choices in attracting FDI, more specifically how Ghana has shaped their policies. When conducting the analysis, the thesis assembles documents, both primary and secondary data to be able to answer the research question. The documents used for gathering data is from Ghana's government as well as governmental organisations, governmental policies and official statistics to peer reviewed articles and organisational data. This enables the thesis to find empirical evidence to support the aims of the conducted research. Moreover, secondary data will be used to situate, contextualize and present the findings. The main problem seen is how the policy behaviour of governments is conducted to receive FDI in this trudge. The solution to the problem is presented to be the policy decision taken to open markets and welcoming Foreign Direct Investment, through reforms aimed at both domestic companies and market as well as to the global markets and actors.

La relance du processus de réformes en République populaire de chine en 1992 a conduit à une profonde évolution et redéfinition de l’Etat. Loin de chercher à satisfaire les exigences d’un modèle communiste, l’Etat chinois semble davantage être pensé dans une optique nationaliste, celle du fuguo bingqiang [???? : un Etat riche et une armée forte]. Les réformes sont donc pensées afin de réaliser cet objectif. Mais les réformes économiques impliquent aussi une dynamique propre qui conduit à une évolution du mode de gouvernance. Cet objectif du fuguo bingqiang cherche à relever le défi du développement. Mais, au-delà de la problématique interne, l’Etat est pensé comme un moyen de donner à la Chine la place qu’elle estime être la sienne sur la scène internationale, celle de grande puissance / In 1992, the new stage of reform in People’s Republic of China (PRC) led to a deep evolution and a deep redefinition of the state apparatus. Chinese state seems, nowadays, to be thought more in a nationalist perspective than a socialist one. The concept of fuguo bingqiang [???? : a rich country and a strong army] seems to be the leitmotiv of reforms. But reforms also imply an inner dynamic which brings an evolution in governance. The concept of fuguo bingqiang implies the question of development. Beyond this domestic problematic, state is thought as a medium to ensure that the PRC will meet its goal of economic take-off and sustainable development and Beijing’s ambition to be a superpower

This thesis presents a case study of Sweden’s foreign relations with Mozambique. It has been conducted in a deductive way departing from Arturo Escobar’s post-development theory, and with qualitative textual and content analysis combined with a semi-structured interview as methods. The aim of the study has been to test post-development theory on a least likely case, i.e. a case least likely to prove the theory right. The question being posed is whether countries giving foreign aid are doing so with altruistic or egoistic motives, and the starting point for this case study is the supposition that Sweden might exhibit a degree of altruism in its foreign policy. Sweden has been chosen as an example of an odd man out-state in international perspective, in order to ascertain whether structuralist critiques of the Western establishment and its development practices hold true or not. The results of this study show a mixed picture, where certain criteria of Escobar’s theory are found even in this least likely case; however, they are not fulfilled to the maximum, and the study also shows deep flaws in Escobar’s theory. The thesis presents a scrutiny of the historical relations between Sweden and Mozambique and moves on to a reading of official documents from Swedish authorities. Escobar’s cynical view of the Western establishment as consisting exclusively of malicious plutocrats is challenged, acknowledged and questioned at the same time. The study teaches us that there are exceptions to the rule, and that it might be dangerous to be so categorical in one’s assessments.

No description available.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether some positions in democratic theory should be adjusted or abandoned in view of internationalisation; and if adjusted, how. More specifically it pursues three different aims: to evaluate various attempts to explain levels of democracy as consequences of internationalisation; to investigate whether the taking into account of internationalisation reveals any reason to reconsider what democracy is or means; and to suggest normative interpretations that cohere with the adjustments of conceptual and explanatory democratic theory made in the course of meeting the other two aims.</p><p>When empirical methods are used, the scope of the study is restricted to West European parliamentary democracies and their international affairs. More particularly, the focus is on the making of budget policy in Britain, France, and Sweden after the Second World War, and recent budget policy in the European Union. The aspects of democracy empirically analysed are political autonomy, participation, and deliberation. The material considered includes parliamentary debates, official statistics, economic forecasts, elections manifestos, shadow budgets, general election turnouts, regulations of budget decision-making, and staff numbers in government and parliament budgetary divisions. </p><p>The study reaches the following conclusions among others. (i) The fact that internationalisation increases the divergence between those who make and those who are affected by decisions is not by itself a democratic problem that calls for political reform. (ii) That international organisations may have authorities delegated to them from democratic states is not sufficient to justify them democratically. Democratisation still needs to be undertaken. (iii) The fear that internationalisation dissolves a social trust necessary for political deliberation within nations seems to be unwarranted. If anything, views argued by others in domestic budgetary debate are taken increasingly serious during internationalisation. (iv) The major difficulty with deliberation seems to be its inability to transcend national boundaries. International deliberation at state level has not evolved in response to internationalisation and it is undeveloped in international institutions. (v) Democratic political autonomy diminishes during internationalisation with regard to income redistribution and policy areas taken over by international organisations, but it seems to increase in public spending. (vi) In the area of budget policy-making there are no signs that governments gain power at the expense of parliaments during internationalisation. (vii) To identify crucial democratic issues in a time of internationalisation and to make room for theoretical virtues like general applicability and normative fruitfulness, democracy may be defined as a kind of politics where as many as possible decide as much as possible.</p>

Theories in the international political economy literature, economic liberalism and dependency, are explored in order to test the effect of U.S. aid, trade, and investment on human rights conditions in recipient states. Two measures of human rights conditions serve as dependent variables: security rights and subsistence rights. The data cover approximately 140 countries from 1976-1996. Pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel corrected standard errors, is employed due to the temporal and spatial characteristics of the data. The results indicate that foreign assistance and economic policy may not be the best approaches to altering poor human rights practices in the area of security rights. Economic and military aid is negatively associated with levels of security rights, supporting the traditional dependency perspective. While the results from trade and investment are generally in the positive direction, the lack of consistent statistical evidence suggests that increased trade and investment relationships do not dramatically improve security rights. We can conclude, however, that trade and investment fail to have the negative effect on security rights in less developed countries which critics of globalization suggest. Economic aid has a statistically significant negative effect on subsistence rights, while military aid seems to benefit the human condition in recipient states. However, extreme negative effects on security rights accompany any benefit realized in the area of subsistence rights from military aid. Trade and investment have a positive and statistically significant effect on basic human needs providing support for the liberal perspective. It appears that American businesses and politicians can forge ahead with seemingly self-interested motivations and economic policies as American economic gain ironically serves to benefit the well being of citizens in other states. However, in spite of political rhetoric and even sincere intentions regarding foreign assistance policy, it appears that the road to human rights hell is paved with good intentions.

In July 2014, Argentina entered selective default, even as the country remained financially solvent. The default stemmed not from economic woes, but rather from protracted international litigation between Argentina and a group of hedge funds who, for years, refused to negotiate with Argentina over their bond holdings in the wake of the country’s first default in 2001. These holdouts stalled negotiations and locked Argentina out of international credit markets, damaging the country’s economy and financially harming other creditors and Argentinian citizens alike. Argentina ended up in such a dilemma because of the current sovereign debt restructuring process. No international arbitrator of sovereign debt currently exists. Instead, a country must negotiate with creditors on an ad-hoc basis, gathering support from 100% of creditors before it can restructure its debt and reenter international credit markets, an extremely inefficient system. This paper will assess the current system of sovereign default renegotiations, identifying inefficiencies in the current system, reviewing past proposals for improvements to the system, and ultimately proposing an international arbitrator for default negotiations. This text uses the development of the US Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 as a guide for an international bankruptcy court. Prior to the passage of the law, municipalities faced many of the same challenges faced by defaulted nations today, including powerful holdouts and a lack of structure in the negotiation system. Given the similarities between the two cases, the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act serves as an ideal framework for sovereign default arbitration internationally.