This thesis examines Hezbollah’s transition from their violent forms of political expression after their founding in 1984, to their involvement in the Lebanese electoral system in 1992. Drawing on the instrumental and organizational approaches for studying group behavior, this thesis examines the external instrumental factors and internal organizational factors that contributed to the political evolution of Hezbollah from an organization focused primarily on violent forms of political expression to an organization that primarily uses the parliamentary process. Examining Hezbollah’s transition and using it as a point of reference, the thesis exposes weaknesses of conventional International Relations analytical approaches to studying terrorist organizations and provides a more objective approach to studying political violence. It argues that the pejorative nature of the term terrorism, combined with problems developing a consensus on defining terrorism, limit the term’s usefulness for academics attempting to objectively examine political violence.

At the outset the International Criminal Court (ICC) was heralded as a revolution within international society, but it has since found itself at the centre of much controversy and debate. According to the Rome Statute’s Preamble, a broad aim of the ICC is: “to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice”. However, a review of the critical literature surrounding the ICC uncovered a noticeable lack of discussions applying theoretical understandings of justice to neither the Court’s design nor operations; a gap in the literature that the thesis aims to address. Moreover, the review identified that the primary concerns regarding the ICC’s performance all focussed on stakeholder practices. Combining these two observations, the thesis hypothesised that the controversies and issues facing the ICC emerged because the practice of the Court’s primary stakeholders has been incompatible with the demands of justice. In order to test this hypothesis, the thesis analyses the compatibility of the ICC with what the thesis identifies as the core theoretical demands of justice across three areas: purpose, procedure, and stakeholder practice. It does this by building a theoretical framework from the justice literature which is then used to analyse and critique data relating to the ICC’s purposes, procedures and stakeholder practices gathered from empirical observations, interviews, official documents and speeches. The thesis concludes that, for the most part, it is the practice of ICC stakeholders that have been incompatible with the demands of justice, not the Court’s purposes or procedures.

This paper addresses a utilitarian perspective on the following moral dilemma (the SNR dilemma): if two states share a natural resource, what moral obligations does one state have towards the other population regarding the use of the shared natural resource? I assert that there are two intuitive moral claims that will generate the intuitive verdict (the IV) regarding the SNR dilemma: (1) A moral obligation towards other populations and (2) a state’s (and its population’s) right to territory and its natural resources. The IV reasonably takes both moral claims into consideration, and a moral theory that does not appear to be able to respond to both moral claims is in a position of weakness compared to those theories which are able. I argue that utilitarianism is in an apparent position of weakness in this way. I then use the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile as an example of the SNR dilemma. A claim that utilitarianism can deal with the SNR dilemma in two distinct ways is presented: (i) under the assumption that independent states maximize utility, and (ii) under the assumption that a world government maximizes utility. I deem both alternative utilitarian arguments to deal with the SNR dilemma, but view (i) as superior as it operates in the status quo. I answer three objections: one concerning the worry that utilitarianism does not respect both intuitive moral claims in all scenarios, one questioning whether utilitarianism actually fails to respond to one of the intuitive moral claims, and one concerning the relevancy and value of showing that utilitarianism can reach the IV in a non-instrumental way. I conclude that utilitarianism is well equipped to deal with the SNR dilemma, either by generating the IV or by eliminating the SNR dilemma.

This study aims to shed light on the ethical implications of Sweden’s arms export to Saudi Arabia. It compares the compatibility of such exports with fundamental human rights standards and analyses the Swedish Government's justification of arms trade to Saudi Arabia in relation to international and local ethics, considering the principles of human rights, conflict resolution, states’ responsibility in promoting peace and conflict resolution and the recognition of people’s shared responsibility for the well-being of all people. It analyses governmental statements, documents on arms trade and Swedish legislation in comparison to their international commitments through the lens of the analytical framework grounded in international ethics. The thesis has been conducted as a qualitative case and desk study with abductive reasoning. The findings highlight the complex tension between ethical responsibility of states in the international arena. By applying international ethics as the analytical framework, it offers insight into the role of states in promoting ethical standards in arms trade and the broader realm of international relations.

Réalisé en cotutelle avec le Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris, pour un doctorat en études politiques. / L’intervention militaire justifiée par des raisons humanitaires est une constante de l’ordre international, désignée par différentes appellations : intervention d’humanité au XIXe siècle, intervention humanitaire (humanitarian intervention) dans la tradition anglophone, droit ou devoir d’ingérence en France, responsabilité de protéger depuis quelques années. L’objectif de cette thèse interdisciplinaire est de comprendre ce phénomène complexe dans toutes ses dimensions – historique, juridique, éthique et politique – et d’élaborer une théorie réaliste de l’intervention par l’analyse de cinq critères : cause juste, autorité légitime, bonne intention, dernier recours et proportionnalité. Nous montrons que le réalisme n’est pas une conception amorale de la politique étrangère mais une exigence épistémologique d’analyser les relations internationales comme elles sont plutôt que comme l’on voudrait qu’elles soient. Que l’intervention dite humanitaire n’est pas, contrairement à un préjugé répandu, un phénomène récent, ni même hérité du XIXe siècle, mais qu’on peut en retracer la généalogie sur plusieurs millénaires dans plusieurs civilisations. Qu’aucune des terminologies employées n’est satisfaisante. Qu’il faut abandonner le critère de bonne intention car l’Etat intervenant n’est pas, ne peut pas et ne doit pas être désintéressé. Qu’il est possible de défendre un interventionnisme minimal, dans certains cas et à certaines conditions, tout en assumant cette absence de désintéressement, la sélectivité des interventions, le risque d’abus et l’incertitude du résultat. / Military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds is a constant of the international order, designated by different names: “intervention d’humanité” in the nineteenth century, humanitarian intervention in the English-speaking tradition, “droit” or “devoir d’ingérence” in France, responsibility to protect the last few years. The aim of this interdisciplinary dissertation is to understand this complex phenomenon in all its dimensions - historical, legal, ethical and political - and develop a realistic theory of intervention by the analysis of five criteria: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort and proportionality. We show that realism is not an amoral conception of foreign policy but an epistemological commitment to analyze international relations as they are rather than as we would like them to be. That so-called humanitarian intervention is not, contrary to a widespread prejudice, a recent phenomenon, or even inherited from the nineteenth century. We can trace its genealogy in several millennia in many cultures. That none of the terminology used is satisfactory. That one must abandon the criterion of good intention because the intervening state is not, cannot and should not be disinterested. That it is possible to defend a minimal interventionism, in some cases and under certain conditions, while assuming the lack of disinterestedness, the selectivity of interventions, the risk of abuse and the uncertainty of the result.

L’intervention militaire justifiée par des raisons humanitaires est une constante de l’ordre international, désignée par différentes appellations : intervention d’humanité au XIXe siècle, intervention humanitaire (humanitarian intervention) dans la tradition anglophone, droit ou devoir d’ingérence en France, responsabilité de protéger depuis quelques années. L’objectif de cette thèse interdisciplinaire est de comprendre ce phénomène complexe dans toutes ses dimensions – historique, juridique, éthique et politique – et d’élaborer une théorie réaliste de l’intervention par l’analyse de cinq critères : cause juste, autorité légitime, bonne intention, dernier recours et proportionnalité. Nous montrons que le réalisme n’est pas une conception amorale de la politique étrangère mais une exigence épistémologique d’analyser les relations internationales comme elles sont plutôt que comme l’on voudrait qu’elles soient. Que l’intervention dite humanitaire n’est pas, contrairement à un préjugé répandu, un phénomène récent, ni même hérité du XIXe siècle, mais qu’on peut en retracer la généalogie sur plusieurs millénaires dans plusieurs civilisations. Qu’aucune des terminologies employées n’est satisfaisante. Qu’il faut abandonner le critère de bonne intention car l’Etat intervenant n’est pas, ne peut pas et ne doit pas être désintéressé. Qu’il est possible de défendre un interventionnisme minimal, dans certains cas et à certaines conditions, tout en assumant cette absence de désintéressement, la sélectivité des interventions, le risque d’abus et l’incertitude du résultat. / Military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds is a constant of the international order, designated by different names: “intervention d’humanité” in the nineteenth century, humanitarian intervention in the English-speaking tradition, “droit” or “devoir d’ingérence” in France, responsibility to protect the last few years. The aim of this interdisciplinary dissertation is to understand this complex phenomenon in all its dimensions - historical, legal, ethical and political - and develop a realistic theory of intervention by the analysis of five criteria: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort and proportionality. We show that realism is not an amoral conception of foreign policy but an epistemological commitment to analyze international relations as they are rather than as we would like them to be. That so-called humanitarian intervention is not, contrary to a widespread prejudice, a recent phenomenon, or even inherited from the nineteenth century. We can trace its genealogy in several millennia in many cultures. That none of the terminology used is satisfactory. That one must abandon the criterion of good intention because the intervening state is not, cannot and should not be disinterested. That it is possible to defend a minimal interventionism, in some cases and under certain conditions, while assuming the lack of disinterestedness, the selectivity of interventions, the risk of abuse and the uncertainty of the result. / Réalisé en cotutelle avec le Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris, pour un doctorat en études politiques.

Taking as its starting point Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s theses on liberalism and war, and Dillon and Reid’s extensive engagement thereof, this thesis offers a critical conceptualization of drones and drone warfare. I argue that deployment of drones specifically over and against bodies and communities in conflict zones in and between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and until recently, Libya, is the material practice of a legal and political doctrine and precedent that has been established and policed most prominently by the United States and its military and intelligence apparatuses since the end of the Cold War. This novel precedent, however - due to its necessarily mutually constitutive relationship with a perceived danger said to be emerging from specific spaces, bodies, and communities in the decolonized and still-colonized worlds - locates its ontological and thus political genealogy in the anthropological knowledge that legally justified the (in)humanity of peoples and communities in these spaces during the era of high imperialism that lasted roughly from the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. I theorize this as a mode of political, tragic nihilism through a reading of some key theories of Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, and Nietzsche and specifically, their import to the field of critical security and international relations theory. I demonstrate that the semiotic image of the drone is a highly pertinent point of departure through which we can understand these political stakes of strategic discourses enunciating the imperatives of both the Revolution in Military Affairs as well as recent global counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations, specifically as they relate to claims about what it is drones are said to productively offer such militaristic projects. Ultimately, I argue that it is through the semiotic image of the drone as a clean, precise tactic that furthers the strategic goals of counterterrorism to target specific bodies that we can begin to politically theorize a particularly malignant political nihilism symptomatic of contemporary liberal societies. However, I also suggest that it is through Nietzsche’s politics of nihilism that we can begin to think about radical critical interventions that resist such a dangerous mode of politics. / Graduate

S U M M A R Y This submitted dissertation thesis deals with the problematics of social cohesion through effects analysis of cultural values on the development of social and political relations in a society as such. The efforts of the thesis are not only directed towards articulation of Rawls's principals of justice, but they also reveal the desire to connect with the topic of the basic human rights from which questions of a suitable concept of societies derive. It actually means that the suitable concept in which it would be possible to achieve, from the point of view of intersubjective relations, a sufficient level of social cohesion and that way to strengthen an important factor for sustainability of social relations in societies as such. From the point of view of methodology, these thesis are for sufficient review as well as easier orientation in the whole work divided into 4 parts, which split further into 5 chapters. Before the four parts, the INTRODUCTION comes and it tries to be not only practical, but also academic in style to provide an introductory beginning of my work. Then, it is possible to say that every part of the four in my thesis deals with a research area of social sciences that is related to politological research as such. Nevertheless, my intention is to persuade readers that there is a...