<p>Investor Relations is a function used by companies to compete for capital by creating relations with investors. It is a young function, earlier practiced by the same people who had responsible for exercising the Public Relations.</p><p>Investor Relations has evolved a great deal lately but there are still no concrete theories behind the function. The aim though is clear and there are literature explaining how to practice the different parts. The most research within Investor Relations uses the theory of Relationship Marketing. Lately the two authors Hägg and Preiholt have started to examine what they call Financial Marketing since Investor Relations is about relations between actors on financial markets primarily.</p><p>In this paper, we examine the aspect of information in Investor Relations. Communication is very important for good results. Therefore it is essential that the information given to the different stakeholders is understood by everyone.</p><p>The first questions is whether the information is really distributed to everyone. For this there are several legal restrictions who make sure that, at least the companies noted on the stock market, release information that can affect the stock price in a manner that is considered reaching all the stakeholders at the same time.</p><p>The second question is whether the level of the information is low enough for everyone interested to understand. There is a tendency to insert a text box in the annual reports where some words and concepts are explained. The companies bring more complex notions into discussion when the information regarded is communicated only with more professional agents, like analytics for example.</p><p>The third question treated in this paper regards how willing the noted companies are to share information beyond what is required by the legal restrictions. More than half of the content of the annual report consists of additional information. The companies are generally very open to the public and do not mind sharing information. Among the factors that stand in the way of this are first of all the question of resources, primarily financial ones. The second factor is the increasing legal restrictions. To make sure all of restrictions are being followed correct, both the resources and the creativity have to take the downside.</p><p>There is also a matter of deciding what more information needs to be communicated and shared. The companies might feel that the regulations cover about everything and no more additional information is necessary. It is up to the management of any company to decide what information to communicate, how and when. Generally it is considered that the information is being well distributed to everyone interested. The problem is that not every single shareholder is really interested.</p><p>In the financial market, the information is available for everyone and free to acquire. By only a phone call one can ask the CEO anything regarding the company. The primarily difference between those who are in possession of more information than others is as simple as that they spend much more time on collecting and analyzing information. In combination with their past experiences and their professional knowledge they get an advantage.</p>

For an investment treaty tribunal to proceed to adjudge the merits of claims arising out of an investment, it must have jurisdiction over the parties and the claims, and the claims submitted to the tribunal must be admissible. Inconsistent interpretations of substantive and procedural principles of international investment law that govern the existence and exercise of the arbitral tribunal’s supremacy to adjudge an investment dispute have caused incoherence in investment treaty arbitration. The thesis is an in-depth study of article 25 of the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which articulates the Material, Personal and Consensual requirements for establishing the existence of the adjudicative power (Jurisdiction) for dispute resolution and to exercise that adjudicative power (Admissibility) under the aegis of ICSID. The main findings of the research are as follows: 1) ICSID’s double-filtering nature, which has been largely overlooked in ICSID jurisprudence, is fundamental to correct decision-making by arbitral tribunals when deciding on admissibility and jurisdiction issues. 2) ‘Fraudulent intent’ criterion, which borrows its rationale from the concurrent themes in international law jurisprudence, is instrumental to test compliance as required in the upper jurisdictional threshold. 3) ‘Bona fide investor’ test used to measure compliance with the objective requirements of article 25 of the ICSID runs counter to the object and purpose of the Convention. 4) ‘Dynamic’ test, rather than plain ‘objective’ test, would be the adequate pattern to ensure compliance with article 25 of the ICSID Convention for the contemplated investment due to evolving meaning of such generic term. 5) ‘Lex Juridictio’ or set of rules, principals and mechanisms governing jurisdictional and admissibility issues is required as foundation for legal unification and harmonization.

This master´s thesis deals with the issue of purchase of the apartment from the perspective of an investor. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the possible variants of purchase of the apartment, while the main attention is focused on a comparison of the acquisition of an existing apartment, which requires reconstruction, and on the possibility of the construction of a new apartment in the form of loft conversion or superstructure. Possible variants of the solution are discussed in a broader context in order to determine the optimal variant for the investor.

As startups, caracterizadas pela proposta de oferecer um produto ou serviço inovador, com alto grau de incerteza de sucesso, normalmente têm a necessidade de financiamento por capital externo para que consigam atingir seu crescimento. Em razão das incertezas que cercam uma empresa startup, normalmente, são raros os financiamentos disponíveis por bancos ou empresas financeiras. Como forma de suprir este buraco no financiamento de startups, encontram-se os investidores anjo, investidores individuais que caracterizam-se por investirem seu próprio capital em startups, em troca de percentuais na gestão da empresa. O perfil destes investidores anjo têm sido objeto de estudo em diversos países, principalmente no entendimento dos critérios que estes investidores utilizam para chegar à decisão de investimento. Entretanto, pouco se sabe sobre os critérios utilizados pelos investidores anjo brasileiros para decisão de investirem em startups. Desta forma, a presente pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar os critérios que determinam a decisão de Investidores Anjo brasileiros em investirem em startups. A fim de cumprir os objetivos desta pesquisa, a metodologia foi estruturada na natureza exploratório-descritiva com abordagem qualitativa. A coleta de dados foi realizada por meio de entrevistas junto a investidores anjo e especialistas, onde são analisadas a importância dada pelos entrevistados aos 17 critérios de decisão de investimento mais citados por investidores anjo na literatura internacional, bem como os critérios classificados como mais importantes. Observou-se que os investidores anjo brasileiros assemelham-se aos de outros países ao darem importância a grande maioria dos critérios levantados. Os critérios citados de maior importância foram de \"rentabilidade real\", \"interesse e benefícios do produto\", \"inovação e qualidade do produto\" e \"ROI/valorização\". Foi possível identificar similaridade entre investidores anjo brasileiros e investidores anjo de outros países acerca da importância dos critérios de decisão identificados na literatura. A pesquisa identificou limitações acerca do acesso aos investidores anjo brasileiros, de informações na literatura nacional e de informações sobre o perfil dos investidores anjo no Brasil. Notou-se que o investidor anjo ainda é pouco estudado pelos pesquisadores brasileiros, não sendo possível identificar muitas pesquisas sobre este tema. Esta pesquisa contribui ao ser um passo para o entendimento de um contexto ainda pouco explorado, o processo de decisão de investimento de investidores anjo em startups, bem como ao identificar os critérios de decisão de investimento considerados importantes pelos investidores anjo brasileiros. / Startups, characterized by the proposal to offer an innovative product or service with a high degree of uncertainty of success, usually have the need for foreign capital financing to help them reach their growth. Given the uncertainties surrounding a startup company, seldom are there funds available from banks or financial companies. In order to meet this gap in startups financing, one can find business angels, who are individual investors characterized by investing their own capital in startups. What they ask in return is a percentage in the company\'s management. The profile of these business angels has been studied in several countries, especially in the understanding of the criteria that these investors use to reach the investment decision. However, little is known about the criteria used by brazilian angel investors as far as this decision to invest in startups is concerned. Thus, the current study aims at analyzing the criteria that determine the brazilian business angels\' decision to invest in startups. In order to meet the objectives of this research, the methodology was structured in exploratory and descriptive qualitative approach. Data collection was performed through interviews with business angels and experts, where there was an analysis of the importance given by these respondents to the seventeen investment decision criteria most frequently cited by business angels in the international literature, as well as the criteria rated as the most important ones. It was observed that brazilian business angels are similar to those from other countries as they acknowledge importance to the majority of surveyed criteria. The most important criteria cited were \"realistic profitability\", \"interest and benefits of the product\", \"innovation and product quality\" and \"ROI/valuation\". It was possible to identify similarities between brazilian business angels and angels from other countries concerning the importance of decision criteria identified in the literature. The research spotted limitations concerning the access to brazilian business angels, on the national literature and information on the profile of business angels in Brazil. It was observed that the business angel is still little studied by brazilian researchers, what makes it unable to identify a lot of research on this topic. This research contributes for being a step towards the understanding of a still little explored context, the process of investment decision by the angel investors in startups as well as to identify the investment decision criteria considered important by Brazilian angel investors.

Thesis advisor: Edith Hotchkiss / Chapter one of this dissertation provides new evidence on the existence of dividend clienteles for institutional investors. We directly examine individual institutions' preferences for dividend paying stocks based on the characteristics of stocks held in their portfolio. Many institutions follow persistent investment styles, maintaining relatively high or low dividend yield portfolios over time. Institutions which hold portfolios of higher yielding stocks are significantly more likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase or sell their stock in response to a decrease. For a subset of institutions, we directly observe the proportion of their portfolio managed on behalf of taxable clients. Consistent with tax-induced dividend clienteles, institutions with more taxable clients are less likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase. Finally, we show that stock price reactions to announcements of dividend increases are related to characteristics of the institutions holding the stock. Our results suggest that tax status, as well as other factors are important in explaining observed clientele behavior. Chapter two explores the determinants of heterogeneity in institutional investor portfolio preferences and the relationship between institutions and the clients they serve. I find that the characteristics of an institution's clients and the characteristics of the institution itself are both important determinants of portfolio preferences and trading behavior. Specifically, I find that institutions traditionally subject to prudent investor laws are more likely to invest in high quality stocks, although, institutions sub-managing money for pension funds are less prudent than pension managers themselves. In addition, I find that institutions with taxable clients are likely to avoid unnecessary dividend taxation and turn over their portfolios less frequently. More generally, institutions exhibit systematic shifts in their exposure to common risk factors that may be explained in part by the levels and changes in client composition. While evidence for a causal link between client shifts and institutional preferences is limited to mutual funds, contemporaneous changes in clients and portfolio characteristics suggest that the dynamics of institutional investment are closely related to the nature of the clients served. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2007. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

Pour un investisseur, les choix sont multiples. Il convient tout d'abord d'élaborer à partir de critères qui sont propres à chacun (période d'investissement, performance, risque, liquidité…), une allocation entre les différents actifs possibles. Lorsque cette allocation est réalisée, le problème est ensuite de sélectionner les meilleurs vecteurs de chaque classe d'actifs, sous les contraintes qui ont été celles de l'élaboration de l'allocation. Notre travail s'est limité à la seule classe d'actif actions. 1. LA SELECTION D’OPCVM ACTIONS. Comment l'investisseur peut-il gérer ses actions ? Différents choix sont possibles : - gérer son portefeuille d'actions en direct ; - gérer un portefeuille d’OPCVM actions (ou déléguer par mandat la gestion à des professionnels) ; - gérer son investissement actions par le biais d'indices ; - utiliser un mélange des différentes méthodes précédentes. Notre étude portera sur le cas où l'investisseur a choisi la délégation totale ou partielle de son portefeuille d’actions à un professionnel, que ce soit l'allocation à l'intérieur de la classe d'actifs actions (allocation géographique, sectorielle, style de gestion, etc.) ou la sélection (choix des titres), ou les deux. Cette décision suppose qu’il considère que certains professionnels feront mieux que lui, et mieux que le marché, car dans le cas contraire il préférera soit gérer lui-même, soit s'en remettre aux produits indiciels. Il reste toutefois un cas particulier que nous pourrions appeler « le pari de Pascal de la gestion ». L'investisseur n'est pas persuadé qu'un gérant professionnel peut faire mieux que le marché, mais il a quand même un doute. S’il y en avait un ou quelques-uns ? [...] / No English summary available.

違規給企業帶來的主要後果是企業名譽的損失。然而，我們對以下問題卻知之甚少：企業在違規事件中是怎樣損失名譽的？為什麼同樣程度的違規給不同企業帶來的名譽損失卻不同？等等。本文綜合了來自犯罪學、財務學和社會心理學方面的文獻，把企業名譽定義為利益相關者對企業的情感，同時把違規事件看成是導致這種情感變化的誘因。 / 本文構建了一個綜合的理論模型，研究企業股東和企業自身的情感和情感變化。首先，本文提出，企業違規違反了股東對企業的道德期望和基本情感，使股東的情感發生偏移，並最終導致企業名譽的損失。在情感偏移的形成過程中，股東傾向于根據違規線索的診斷性特徵，把他們的基本情感用作透視鏡或者參照點來評價違規企業。第二，本文認為，違規企業通過在致歉公告中列出恢復性行動或語言，可以恢復股東對企業的基本情感並且減少企業名譽的損失。然而在情感恢復過程中，股東傾向于將恢復性行動或語言的心理距離與違規線索的心理距離進行比較，並據此調整他們對企業的評價和情感。第三，與其他違規企業相比，那些表達了愧疚感的違規企業在未來會約束自己的行為，降低了反復違規的傾向。但是隨著本次懲罰強度的不同，以及企業直接或間接地被懲罰經歷的不同，違規企業對本次懲罰的目的和道德意義的評價也會不同，並由此影響企業表達愧疚感的傾向。 / 本文的貢獻主要集中在以下四個方面。首先，通過強調情感在企業和股東關係中的重要性，豐富了關於公司治理的研究。第二，本文從情感視角去探討存在于股東和企業在資訊評價中各種的偏見，而這些偏見會影響他們對違規事件的情感和行為反應，以此拓展了集中於經濟視角的企業違規研究。第三，本文通過借鑒解釋層次理論中的觀點來研究企業恢復性行動和語言的特徵以及他們在股東情感恢復和企業榮譽恢復過程中的作用，這豐富了關於企業層的影像管理和危機管理研究。第四，本文通過強調企業內化懲罰在約束企業違規行為方面的作用，這對補充了關於懲罰的研究，並具有現實意義。 / A consequence of corporate fraud studied in the literature is reputational penalty on the fraud firm. However, little is known about how a fraud firm loses its reputation after the fraud incident and why firms receive different levels of reputational penalty given the same level of fraud severity. Integrating literatures from criminology, finance, and social psychology, this dissertation conceptualizes firm reputation as stakeholders’ (mainly shareholders here) sentiment toward the firm and a fraud incident as a trigger of shareholders’ sentiment changes. / In this dissertation, I develop an integrated model that examines the sentiment changes of shareholders and sentiment restoration efforts made by the fraud firms. In the first study, I propose that corporate fraud violates shareholders’ normative expectations and fundamental sentiments toward the fraud firm, which leads to shareholders’ sentiment deflection and subsequently propels them to implement behavioral penalty on the fraud firm, that is, reputational penalty. During the process of sentiment deflection, shareholders tend to use the fundamental sentiment that they have adapted to as reference points to evaluate the fraud firm, depending on the salience of the fraud incident and the salience of the fraud firm. In the second study, I argue that the fraud firm can restore shareholders’ sentiment and minimize its reputation loss by expressing restorative actions in public apology announcement. However, during the process of sentiment restoration, shareholders tend to adjust their evaluation of the firm based on the relative psychological distance of the restorative actions compared with that of the fraud cues and sentiment cues. The third study focuses on guilt sentiments of the fraud firm, which have been found to have long-term impact on the fraud firm by transforming their future behaviors. I propose that fraud firms that express guilt sentiments after fraud punishment are more likely to restrain from repeated fraudulent behaviors in the future. However, variations in punishment intensity, together with the fraud firms’ direct and indirect punishment experiences, will influence their tendency to express guilt sentiments. / This dissertation aims to offer several contributions. First, by underscoring the importance of sentiment in the firm-shareholder relationship, it contributes to the corporate governance literature that mainly uses cognitive frameworks in the analysis. Second, it takes a sentiment approach to explore various biases embedded in shareholders’ and the firm’s evaluation of the informational cues that could influence their sentimental and behavioral reactions to the fraud incident, thus extending the corporate fraud literature that predominantly focuses on economics perspectives. Third, by examining the characteristics of firms’ restorative actions and languages and their effects on shareholders’ sentiment restoration and firm reputational repair, this dissertation contributes to the literatures of corporate turnaround and organizational-level impression management. Finally, it also contributes to the punishment literature by highlighting the internal transformation of the fraud firms, thus providing implications to stock exchange regulator and policy-makers in emerging economies. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Xu, Yuehua. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-137). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese. / ABSTRACT --- p.I / CHINESE ABSTRACT --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.V / LIST OF TABLES --- p.IX / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.X / Chapter CHAPTER 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation and Research Questions --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Theoretical Framework and Premise --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3 --- Contributions --- p.9 / Chapter 1.4 --- Organization of the Dissertation --- p.11 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 --- STUDY ONE: A SENTIMENT MODEL OF FIRM REPUTATIONAL PENALTY FOLLOWING CORPORATE FRAUD --- p.13 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2 --- Theoretical Background --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Corporate Fraud and Reputational Penalty --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Sentiment --- p.19 / Chapter 2.3 --- Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses --- p.21 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Re-conceptualization of Firm Reputation and Theoretical Framework --- p.21 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Stimuli - Sentimental Reaction - Behavior: The Process from Fraud Detection to Reputational Penalty --- p.26 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Adaptive Levels of Moral Sentiment and Sentiment Rigidity --- p.28 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- The Moderating Effects of Cue Diagnosticity and Firm Visibility --- p.30 / Chapter 2.4 --- Methods --- p.34 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Empirical Setting --- p.34 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Sample and Data Collection --- p.35 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Measurement --- p.37 / Chapter 2.5 --- Results --- p.45 / Chapter 2.6 --- Discussion --- p.56 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 --- STUDY TWO: FIRM RESTORATIVE EFFORTS AND REPUTATIONAL REPAIR AFTER CORPORATE FRAUD --- p.59 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Background --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Firm Efforts to Turn Around from Fraud Incidents --- p.61 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Apology --- p.63 / Chapter 3.3 --- Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Sentiment Restoration and Pragmatic Attitudes toward Restorative Efforts --- p.65 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- The Construal Level of Restorative Cues --- p.68 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- The Distance of Problem Cues: The Delay of Punishment --- p.70 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Shareholders’ Negative Sentimental Reaction: Media Negative Comments --- p.72 / Chapter 3.4 --- Methods --- p.74 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Sample and Data Collection --- p.74 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Measurement --- p.75 / Chapter 3.5 --- Results --- p.79 / Chapter 3.6 --- Discussion --- p.84 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 --- STUDY THREE: THE EFFECTS OF PUNISHMENT ON FRAUD FIRMS’ GUILT SENTIMENT EXPRESSION --- p.86 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.86 / Chapter 4.2 --- Theoretical Background: Punishment --- p.88 / Chapter 4.3 --- Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses --- p.90 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- The Expression of Guilt Sentiment and Repeated Fraud --- p.91 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Punishment Intensity and Guilt Sentiment --- p.93 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Normalization: The Moderating Effects of Direct and Indirect Punishment Experience --- p.95 / Chapter 4.4 --- Methods --- p.98 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Sample and Data Collection --- p.98 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Measurement --- p.99 / Chapter 4.5 --- Results --- p.102 / Chapter 4.6 --- Discussion --- p.110 / Chapter CHAPTER 5 --- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION --- p.111 / Chapter 5.1 --- Conclusion --- p.111 / Chapter 5.2 --- Contributions to Theory and Practice --- p.112 / Chapter 5.3 --- Limitations and Implications for Future Research --- p.115 / REFERENCES --- p.117

Some commentators attribute the success of certain hedge fund activism events to “wolf pack” activism, the support offered by other investors, many of whom are thought to accumulate stakes in the target firms before the activists’ campaigns are publicly disclosed. This paper investigates wolf-pack activism by considering the following questions: Is there any evidence of wolf-pack formation? Is the wolf pack formed intentionally (by the lead activist) or does it result from independent activity by other investors? Does the presence of a wolf pack improve the activist’s ability to achieve its stated objectives? First, I find that investors other than the lead activist do in fact accumulate significant share-holdings before public disclosure of activists’ campaigns, a result consistent with wolf-pack formation. Second, these share accumulations are more likely to be mustered by the lead activist rather than occurring spontaneously. Notably, for example, the other investors are more likely to be those who had a prior trading relationship with the lead activist. Third, the presence of a wolf pack is associated with a greater likelihood that the activist will achieve its stated objectives (e.g., will obtain board seats) and higher future stock returns over the duration of the campaign.

We analyze which utility function would best represent the Brazilian representative investor with a one-month investment horizon who has to allocate his wealth across three main asset classes (bonds, equities, and risk free). To do this, we compute the optimal portfolio weights by considering four different specifications for the utility function: (i) mean-variance, (ii) constant relative risk aversion (expected utility functions), (iii) ambiguity aversion, and (iv) loss aversion (non-expected utility functions). We compare the optimal portfolio weights to the empirical portfolio - computed by considering the market value of all the assets in our sample - using the Mahalanobis distance. Our results indicate that the traditional utility function, the mean-variance utility, should not be used to represent the behavior of the Brazilian investor. All other utilities are statistically equal and could be used to compute optimal portfolios for the Brazilian investor. However, the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and the ambiguity aversion functions are only justified for extremely high levels of risk aversion. As the loss averse function showed the lowest Mahalanobis distance, we propose that the Brazilian investor is best represented by a utility function that incorporates aversion to losses, in which the decrease of utility caused by a loss is much greater than the increase caused by a gain of equal magnitude. Moreover, this different impact of gains and losses on the investor\'s utility leads individuals to behave as investors with high risk aversion and justifies the fact that loss-aversion preferences have also been widely used to explain why the high risk premium might be consistent with high levels of risk aversion. / Analisamos qual função utilidade representa melhor o investidor representativo brasileiro que aloca sua riqueza em três principais classes de ativos (títulos, ações e livre de risco) e com um horizonte de investimento de um mês. Para isso, calculamos os pesos ótimos do portfólio considerando quatro especificações diferentes para a função utilidade: (i) média-variância, (ii) aversão relativa ao risco constante (funções utilidade esperadas), (iii) aversão à ambiguidade, (iv) aversão à perdas (funções utilidade não esperadas). Comparamos os pesos do portfólio ótimo com o portfólio empírico - calculado considerando o valor de mercado de todos os ativos em nossa amostra - usando a distância de Mahalanobis. Nossos resultados indicam que a função utilidade tradicional de média-variância não deve ser utilizada para representar o comportamento do investidor brasileiro. Todas as demais especificações de função utilidade são estatisticamente iguais e podem ser utilizadas para computar o portfólio ótimo do investidor brasileiro. Entretanto, as funções CRRA e de aversão à ambiguidade são justificadas apenas com níveis extremamente elevados de aversão ao risco. Como o portfólio ótimo com função utilidade do tipo aversão à perdas apresentou a menor distância de Mahalanobis, propomos que o investidor brasileiro é melhor representado por uma função que incorpora aversão à perdas, em que a diminuição da utilidade causada por uma perda é muito maior do que o aumento causado por um ganho de igual magnitude. Além disso, esse impacto diferente de ganhos e perdas na utilidade do investidor leva os indivíduos a comportar-se como investidores com grande aversão ao risco e justifica o fato de que as preferências de aversão à perdas também foram amplamente utilizadas para explicar por que o prêmio de risco pode ser consistente com altos níveis de aversão ao risco.

In the current investment climate, most investor-state disputes are settled through investment arbitration. Investor-state arbitration enables the foreign investor to bring a case before a neutral forum, whose decision is binding and enforceable in countries across the world. In instances where the dispute is governed by an arbitration clause, the clause places the disputing parties under the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. In the event of achieving a victory, the investor may nonetheless come up against the obstacle of state sovereignty, even though the state party has ostensibly waived sovereign immunity from jurisdiction. If a state rejects to comply with an award, then investors must commence a worldwide search (forum-shopping), with a view to retrieving the assets that have been awarded. In instances where the state party is victorious, there is a danger that the award payment will not be made if the foreign investor has already declared bankruptcy. Although there are two Conventions (ICSID and the New York Convention) that facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards, neither one is sufficient to preclude the emergence of the enforcement issue. In both instances, this issue is damaging as it wastes time and money, ultimately contributing to wider inefficiencies and uncertainties in investor-state arbitration. In addressing themselves to this problem and aspiring to the reduction of the obstacle of sovereign immunity from execution, scholars and practitioners have put forward two practical solutions; firstly, a hybrid sovereignty act has been proposed; secondly, it has been suggested that the World Bank could take punitive action, refusing to provide the state party with further loans until the award is resolved. However, these proposals have, to date, not been practically applied or developed. This thesis has two primary objectives: firstly, it attempts to analyse previous solutions that have been addressed to the enforcement issue of ICSID awards: secondly, it addresses itself to two alternatives: 1) that the ICSID Administrative council can review compliance with awards; 2) that countermeasures can be initiated against the failing state under the law of state responsibility (the ILC Articles on State Responsibility). In concluding, the thesis will consider the various advantages and disadvantages associated with each of the aforementioned solutions, ultimately proposing an approach that is best-suited to upholding the interest of the victorious party at the enforcement stage.