As many scholars have noted, in the immediate years after the First World War, the British Empire faced important challenges to its future survival, not least of which was the growth of three key movements: Bolshevism, Islamism and nationalism. This thesis examines how Britain coped with these problems, by exploring the internal government debates regarding foreign policy formulation towards South Asia, specifically in the countries of Persia and Afghanistan. It is the contention of this work that the current literature on this subject suffers from certain flaws, the first being that not enough writers have discussed the interrelation of these three movements. Secondly, there has been a lack of focus on how officials in London and in Delhi thought quite differently on the issue of Britain’s foreign policy in South Asia after 1918. This thesis will address these, and other, gaps in the literature. It will contend that there were those within the Home government who displayed a particular mode of thought – a ‘Great Game mentality’ – towards this region. This mentality was influenced by the legacy of the earlier, 19th-century rivalry between Britain and Russia, and resulted in a tendency to over-emphasise the threat of Russian Bolshevism to Britain’s imperial interests in South Asia, whilst at the same time under-emphasising the threat of nationalism and pan-Islamism across Persia, Afghanistan and India. When the Indian government questioned this Great Game mentality, it was largely ignored and frequently maligned. The work will demonstrate how those of the Great Game mind-set dominated the creation of Britain’s policy towards Persia, Afghanistan and adjoining regions in 1918 and 1919, how events of 1920 and 1921 forced London to reassess this Great Game thinking, and how (by 1922 and 1923) this re-evaluation had developed into re-formulation of British foreign policy in South Asia.

This dissertation is an examination of the UK’s counter-terrorism policies and practices that have been adopted since the attacks of 9/11 in the United States. Using a theoretical framework of ‘power’ and ‘hegemony’ to guide the research, and an investigative research approach, the dissertation examines how the UK has, in the name of confronting an ideologically and religiously motivated global opponent, enacted a two pronged approach that integrates key aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. The first ties into the use of ‘coercion’ that is undertaken under the policy heading of ‘Pursue’ and covers activities that revolve around the use of policing, military, juridical and executive powers to investigate, prosecute and take preventative and pre-emptive action against suspected terrorists and the second ties into the use of ‘propaganda’ and ‘communication’ that is undertaken through the ‘Prevent’ policy, which attempts to challenge and counter those individuals who do not promulgate unlawful or violent views but support al-Qaida’s grievances and ideology and are thus claimed to be more likely to become involved in terrorism. In order to inform Prevent activity, information and intelligence – a cardinal principle of counterinsurgency – is a prerequisite. This dissertation therefore shows how intelligence and information is collected and used by examining Prevent activity at UK universities. It then proceeds to contextualise counter-terrorism policy and practice through an examination of counterinsurgency doctrine, and in particular, ‘strategic communication’. The dissertation argues that the integration of key elements of counterinsurgency doctrine into counter-terrorism policy and practice suggests that the policy, rather than being a mere response to terrorism, is an organised and strategic effort to use coercion and propaganda to control the behaviour and activity of Muslim communities and thereby constitutes a form of state-terrorism.

This is a study of the identities and political mobilisation of the Lebanese Shiʿa throughout the modern history of Lebanon. Currently, the dominant paradigms for such studies focus on the question of sectarianism in Lebanon and the corresponding Shiʿi political movements, Amal and Hizbullah. This thesis presents an alternative approach. It argues that secular identities have also been an important component of the Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation. This is explored through an analysis of the relationship between the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the communist Shiʿa. Drawing on interviews with senior LCP officials, current and former Shiʿi communists, party documents and additional interview evidence from the documentary film, We Were Communists, this thesis examines the origins, evolution and transformation of the relationship between the LCP and the Shiʿa after Lebanese independence in 1943, until the end of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990. Utilising the concepts of identity and political mobilisation, this thesis develops a hybridised approach to the study of political identity that combines primordial with constructionist readings of identity. This acknowledges the presence of a repertoire of multiple and varied identities among any individual or group, and their potential for mobilisation. Rather than assuming the domineering influence of primordial sentiments, such as sectarian identity, the hybridised approach requires an analysis of the conditions under which a particular identity becomes the basis for political mobilisation. In the aftermath of Lebanese independence in 1943, the Shiʿi community’s political mobilisation was characterised by a politics of resistance. This was a product of the legacy of the Shiʿi community’s experience of the French Mandate (1920-1943), as well as the newly reformulated confessional political system that was established by the National Pact (1943). The net effect of these processes was the marginalisation of the Shiʿa. The LCP, as a prominent anti-system opposition movement in Lebanon at this time, became the Shiʿi community’s main vehicle for the mobilisation and development of their resistance identity. During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) the relationship between communism and the Shiʿa transformed as the LCP went into decline and new Shiʿi political actors emerged. The mantle of the Shiʿi community’s resistance identity became subject to the tensions between communism and communalism within the community. In the end, the Shiʿi community’s resistance identity was adopted and repackaged by Hizbullah, under whose auspices it remains today. The Shiʿi-communist relationship constitutes the Shiʿi community’s first engagement with formal, party-based and ideologically driven political mobilisation in Lebanon. The impact and legacy of the LCP’s influence on the Shiʿa in these terms encompasses not just the communist Shiʿa, but every other political actor in the community. Concern over the growing influence of communism led directly to the political mobilisation of the previously quietist Shiʿi religious clerics. This outcome is represented by the arrival of Imam Musa al-Sadr to Lebanon in 1959 and his stated goal of combatting the influence of communism among the Shiʿa. This thesis is an important addendum to the current understanding of the origins of Shiʿi political mobilisation, which erroneously place Musa al-Sadr at the beginning of that process. This study’s emphasis on alternative, non-sectarian forms of political identity is also a reminder of the Shiʿi community’s political diversity at a time when critical voices, resentful of Hizbullah’s and Amal’s monopoly, are currently emerging from within the ShiʿI community.

Este trabalho procura analisar a história libanesa (até abril de 2005), no intuito de encontrar subsídios para entender se o Estado que fora criado após o Mandato francês (1920-43), transformou-se numa Democracia. A discussão acerca de o Líbano ser considerado estadonação, também está presente no contexto histórico desse trabalho. Paralelamente aos questionamentos feitos sobre o sistema político libanês, analisam-se o surgimento do grupo xiita (Hizbullah), seu projeto islamista inicial e suas razões para transformar-se em partido político. Questionam-se as ligações: Hizbullah-Irã e Hizbullah- Síria. Na conclusão questiona-se, a partir dos modelos de democracia de Dahl, Lijphart e Sartori, se o Líbano hoje é um país democrático e se houve transformação no sistema político libanês com a inserção de uma organização islamista. / This work analyzes Lebanon\'s history until April, 2005, with the objective to determine if the State that came into being at the end of the French Mandate (1943) evolved into a democracy. The historical introduction also discusses to what degree Lebanon can be considered a nationstate. In parallel to the arguments about the Lebanese political system, we analyze the emergence of the Shiite group Hizbullah is analyzed, its initial Islamist project, and its transformation into a political party. Its links with Iran and Syria are also considered. In conclusion Dahl\'s, Lijphart\'s, and Sartori\'s models are applied to inquire if Lebanon today is a democratic country, and to what extent its political system had changed through the integration of an Islamist organization.

<p>This is an essay about the political development of Iraq after the overthrow of the Baath regime by the coalition forces in 2003. Almost seven years later, the political scene is still characterised by chaos, even though the country entered a new phase with the adoption of democratic thinking and a new openness to the world. The unstable political situation is a product of inter-ethnic conflict and the interference by neighbouring countries. Iraq is up against two formidable tasks – building democracy and building a nation. The essay sets out to explore the prospects of this dual mission.</p><p>The essay breaks down into three distinct, theoretically motivated parts or sections. The first part is inspired by O’Donnell & Schmitter’s transition theory and revolves around Iraq’s transition from dictatorship to democracy. The second part sets out to evaluate the development of democracy in Iraq after Saddam Hussein in the light of the seven institutional criteria of <em>polyarchies</em> as identified by Robert Dahl. The third part evaluates Iraq in terms of Arendt Lijphart’s groundbreaking theory about consensus as a pre-condition for democracy in highly divided societies.</p><p>The investigation confirms the general picture of the political situation in Iraq as unstable but with one notable exception – the Kurdish region. The constitution testifies to the ambition to turn Iraq into a polyarchy with strong elements of consensual democracy, but the spirit of the constitution is frequently violated by government institutions and individual politicians. The consensual features have in fact served as safety valve for the ethnic and religious minorities of Iraq; but it is an open question whether they will survive the onslaught by Prime Minister Al-Maliki, a recent convert to the Westminster model. The unclear relationship between Islam and democracy also looms large in the background in a country like Iraq and must somehow be resolved by the governing elite.</p>

Den här religionsvetenskapliga uppsatsen är metodologiskt en idéhistorisk analys. Jag söker svara på om och i så fall hur termen jahiliyya fyllts med innehåll genom historien, och framför allt hur jahiliyya används i en inom-muslimsk debatt idag och varför.  Jag har använt mig av religionssociologiska teorier om religion och identitet i syfte att söka svara på min frågeställning. I arbetet har jag kommit fram till hur man med hjälp av det religiösa språket genom in – och utgrupper och med en dualistisk världsbild fyllt termen jahiliyya med innehåll i syfte att skapa ett vi och dem tänkande.

<p>Den här religionsvetenskapliga uppsatsen är metodologiskt en idéhistorisk analys. Jag söker svara på om och i så fall hur termen <em>jahiliyya</em> fyllts med innehåll genom historien, och framför allt hur <em>jahiliyya</em> används i en inom-muslimsk debatt idag och varför.  Jag har använt mig av religionssociologiska teorier om religion och identitet i syfte att söka svara på min frågeställning. I arbetet har jag kommit fram till hur man med hjälp av det religiösa språket genom in – och utgrupper och med en dualistisk världsbild fyllt termen <em>jahiliyya </em>med innehåll i syfte att skapa ett <em>vi och dem </em>tänkande.</p>

The Islamic Revival in post-Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) offers a rich case study concerning the role of Islamism in international politics. The international relations literature on the region has not explored this phenomenon deeply, due in part to the limited account of ideational factors offered by the predominant approaches to international relations theory. Building on the constructivist argument that a causal account of ideational factors can be supplemented with a constitutive account that locates these factors in their social and historical contexts, the thesis explores ideology as a conceptual framework that may be used to link the different manifestations of political Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia, including Islamist movements (Islamic Renaissance Party, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Hizb ut-Tahrir), the repression and cooptation of the Islamic revival Central Asian states, and the perception of the Islamic Revival as a threat to regional and international security.

The Islamic Revival in post-Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) offers a rich case study concerning the role of Islamism in international politics. The international relations literature on the region has not explored this phenomenon deeply, due in part to the limited account of ideational factors offered by the predominant approaches to international relations theory. Building on the constructivist argument that a causal account of ideational factors can be supplemented with a constitutive account that locates these factors in their social and historical contexts, the thesis explores ideology as a conceptual framework that may be used to link the different manifestations of political Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia, including Islamist movements (Islamic Renaissance Party, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Hizb ut-Tahrir), the repression and cooptation of the Islamic revival Central Asian states, and the perception of the Islamic Revival as a threat to regional and international security.

This study examines Hamas’ policies and opinions on women’s rights and participation in the public sphere from a perspective of Islamic feminism. A theoretical framework of Islamic feminism is developed in this thesis and can be applied to other Islamist organisations and parties. The study shows that Hamas’ policies and statements on the topic of women’s rights and political participation have changed from not qualifying as feminist at all to showing tendencies of an Islamic feminism in line with the Legalist model presented. This is partly due to the democratic elements of Hamas, which points towards that this might be a possible future for other Islamist parties which have gained power democratically, such as from the Arab spring.