Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be <em>justified</em> in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

劉卓輝. / "2009年9月". / "2009 nian 9 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-125). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Liu Zhuohui. / 論文摘要 --- p.頁ii / Chapter 第一章 --- 導言 --- p.頁5 / 背景 --- p.5 / 文獻回顧 --- p.12 / 論文主旨 --- p.17 / Chapter 第二章 --- 蒂利希拯救論的框架：上帝與世界的關係 --- p.頁19 / 引言 --- p.19 / 「文化神學」、及宗教與文化的關係 --- p.20 / 上帝與世界的關係、及恩典的內蘊性 --- p.25 / 「新教原則」與「大公實質」的互補及相互重要性 --- p.32 / 小結 --- p.46 / Chapter 第三章 --- 蒂利希論稱義 --- p.頁47 / 引言 --- p.47 / 「因恩典藉信稱義」 --- p.47 / 蒂利希對「信」和「恩典」的理解 --- p.55 / 蒂利希對稱義的理解和信義宗傳統的關係 --- p.61 / 小結 --- p.69 / Chapter 第四章 --- 蒂利希論拯救的多重向度 --- p.頁70 / 引言 --- p.70 / 多重向度的拯救 --- p.70 / 稱義與拯救的關係 --- p.78 / 對信義宗和天主教拯救觀的雙重批判 --- p.86 / 小結 --- p.92 / Chapter 第五章 --- 對信義宗-天主教有關稱義/成義的對話的意義 --- p.頁93 / 引言 --- p.93 / 「恩典」的觀念 --- p.93 / 如何理解稱義/成義？ --- p.100 / 稱義/成義在教義中的地位 --- p.106 / 對蒂利希的一些批判性評價 --- p.113 / 小結 --- p.117 / Chapter 第六草 --- 結論 --- p.頁118 / 參考書目 --- p.頁120

Notre travail se positionne dans la thématique du traitement automatique du langage et plus précisément des systèmes de question-réponse. Il se fonde sur la notion de justification, qu'il formalise dans un modèle faisant intervenir trois types de phénomène linguistiques : les variations paradigmatiques locales d'un terme (sémantiques, morphologiques, inférences), les liens syntagmatiques entre les constituants d'une phrase, et une composante de sémantique énonciative reliant des éléments distants (anaphores, coréférences, thématisation), dans un contexte multiphrase, aussi bien mono- que multi-documents. Nous fondons notre formalisation de la structure des justifications sur un corpus de couples question-réponse extrait de façon semi-automatique. Ensuite, nous décrivons et évaluons un programme extrayant d'articles de journaux justifications structurées. Notre programme vise à conserver au système la capacité de produire une justification structurée, tout en rendant possible l'intégration modulaire d'une grande hétérogénéité de traitements linguistiques, de nature, de niveau de granularité et de fiabilité variés.

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This dissertation examines the meaning and function of the theme of judgment according to works in the epistle to the Romans. It may be summarized with two theses: First, in Romans 1:18-3:20, the judgment motif primarily functions to make a universal accusation of sin and guilt which lays the foundation for Paul's doctrine of justification by faith. Second, within the argument of Romans, justification by faith is an alternative, saving approach to the positive recompense of the final judgment. Two other functions of the motif are also identified in the letter. In Romans 3:1-8 the theme of judgment functions to make a defense of the righteousness of God. This passage also confirms my argument that judgment functions as an accusation against the Jewish people in 2:1-29, because it answers objections to that accusation. Finally, in Romans 14:1-23 the theme of judgment according to works functions to make an exhortation to the Christian community at Rome. In this passage Paul is confident that his Christian audience will stand at the judgment because of the saving work of God.

The premise for this study is the question how we should relate to people with different religious beliefs. The aim is to examine if an existence characterized by a religious diversity should affect the certainty and confidence in our faith. To answer my question I have turned to the philosophers David Basinger, Mikael Stenmark, William Lane Craig and Robert McKims different views on this issue. Using an approach based on a comparative method and argument analysis I have then assessed their different opinions in the matter. Based on my own discussion of these arguments I conclude that a religious diversity should imply a reduction in our own religious confidence and that it should be reduced in relation to the amount of disagreement that exist between conflicting religious perspectives in an specific case and matter. This may also foster a reduction of religious intolerance through a nuanced of our own belief while highlighting the conceptions and values in our own religion that stresses tolerance.

Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the author observed that though international law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the inability of weaker nations to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence, he proposes "Moral Consistency" as a required condition for launching pre-emptive strikes with two main aims - to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal justice.

Having soberly reflected upon the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the author observed that though international law and treaties restrict pre-emptive war, they do allow for war in self-defense. Consequently, some powerful nations have used this as a justification for launching pre-emptive strikes. The threats posed by the powerful nations using self-defense as a justification for pre-emptive strikes and the inability of weaker nations to do the same, greatly account for the unprecedented explosion of global terrorism. The author thinks that confronting terrorism therefore requires a pro-pacifist ethical framework whose principles have to be applied with international law to narrow the legitimacy of self-defense wars. Hence, he proposes "Moral Consistency" as a required condition for launching pre-emptive strikes with two main aims - to reduce violent conflicts and to draw a substantial distinction between reason and justification, and between crime and criminal justice.