in English Title: Decisions of administrative courts concerning actions against the decision of administrative body in cases of administrative delicts A subject matter of this thesis is analysis of current law and judicial practice in field of review of decisions of administrative bodies in cases of administrative delicts. In introduction of the thesis the author briefly sums up the historical development of the administrative jurisprudence and the influence of international regulation and judicial decisions of the international courts. The author describes and analyzes international requirements on deciding in full jurisdiction and relevant law in the Czech Republic. In this context, the author briefly analyzes the current and relevant law in Germany and Poland. The thesis analyzes whether the Czech law meets the requirements on deciding in full jurisdiction of not. The author describes chosen particularities of law regarding the judicial review of administrative delicts and the influence of judicial decisions upon the limits of the relevant law. The thesis further analyzes judicial decisions and its influence upon possible extension of protection of offender of administrative delict. The author further considers and analyzes court's right to moderate the punishment, its legal scope and possible...

O controle judicial de constitucionalidade moderno nasceu nos Estados Unidos, a partir da decisão do caso Marbury v. Madison, em 1803. Desde então pode-se dizer que as atenções do meio acadêmico jurídico, especialmente no campo do direito contitucional, foram progressivamente voltando-se a essa prática, com vistas a melhor compreendê-la. A partir da segunda metade do século XX, o controle de constitucionalidade foi amplamente difundido e hoje está presente na grande maioria dos países democráticos. Mais recentemente, os debates sobre o tema convergiram para os excessos cometidos pelos órgãos incumbidos, em cada Estado, da tarefa de revisar a constitucionalidade da legislação. Foram colocados no centro das discussões não apenas o modo por meio do qual os órgãos de controle atuam, especialmente o Poder Judiciário, mas também a própria legitimidade do exercício dessa função, tendo em vista as tensões existentes entre o controle de constitucionalidade das leis por órgãos não representativos e os princípios democrático e do Estado de Direito. Dessa forma, a tese inicia-se buscando compreender as origens do judicial review na tradição do common law inglês; em seguida, procura desvendar como a tradição do direito inglês foi incorporada aos Estados Unidos e compatibilizada à sua constituição escrita; passa, então, a descrever as dificuldades que os autores modernos encontraram para justificar o exercício do controle judicial de constitucionalidade, tendo em vista a dificuldade contramajoritária que enfrenta; expõe, assim, algumas críticas ao que se convencionou chamar de supremacia judicial, tese que afirma competir ao Poder Judiciário proferir a última palavra sobre o significado da Constituição; e, por fim, reinserindo o debate no plano do constitucionalismo político, a tese explicita a noção de diálogo institucional e tenta imaginar os papéis institucionais que Cortes e Parlamentos exercem ou devem exercer nesse debate, com foco especialmente no Brasil e na relação entre o Supremo Tribunal Federal e o Congresso Nacional relativamente à interpretação da Constituição. / This thesis focuses on the problems of the contemporary constitutional review in Brazil. It is widely recognised that constitutional review was established in 1803 with the landmark case Marbury v Madison. By the second half of the 20th century some form of constitutional review had been adopted by most western democracies. More recently the excesses of such a form of control of the legislative function have shifted the experts attention to the phenomenon of judicial supremacy. Because it is most frequently performed by unelected officials, the procedures of judicial review have been put under scrutiny and its very legitimacy has been questioned. This tension between the majoritarian principle and the judicial function of constitutional review became known as the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Although our main focus is on the Brazilian constitutional review, we start by going back to the beginnings of the judicial review within the common law tradition in order to understand the primitive structure of this function. Then we move on to its transplantation into American legal practice, which uses a written constitution as a basis for the judicial review. Next, we examine some of the contemporary uses of constitutional review, as depicted by its critics. Finally, we analyse the relations between the Supreme Court and the National Congress of Brazil in performing judicial review. We argue that in order to overcome the counter-majoritarian difficulty, we must accept this constitutional function as a political one, which means moving beyond its judicial features and including other institutions, such as the Congress, in the process of judging whether or not statutes should be invalidated when they breach the constitution. We call this widening of the range of institutions capable of participating in the constitutional review institutional dialogue.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-10-04T17:03:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Wagner Radke_.pdf: 1510210 bytes, checksum: ec906535607940dc5b17d9cefd79300b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-04T17:03:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael Wagner Radke_.pdf: 1510210 bytes, checksum: ec906535607940dc5b17d9cefd79300b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-30 / Nenhuma / Este trabalho visa realizar uma análise dos limites democráticos das decisões judiciais, sobretudo as relativas a jurisdição constitucional, dado que a amplitude de suas cláusulas invoca considerações morais. Assim, busca-se fornecer uma resposta para o seguinte problema de pesquisa: Quais os limites democráticos de atuação do Poder Judiciário, em sede de jurisdição constitucional, a partir de determinada concepção de democracia? A resposta para essa pergunta necessariamente impõe uma análise da tensão entre direitos e democracia, para que possamos ofertar uma resposta acerca da legitimidade judicial. Para tanto, iniciaremos o debate com a apresentação dos antecedentes históricos da jurisdição constitucional, para demonstrar a juridicidade da intepretação constitucional. Estabelecido o chão comum, buscaremos explicitar algumas concepções de democracia dentro do campo da filosofia política - liberal, republicana e democracia deliberativa - para compreender como cada uma dessas posições trabalha com essa tensão entre direito e democracia. Naturalmente, mostra-se importante fazer uma análise de importantes teorias que trabalham com esse problema, integrando a filosofia política com a questão da legitimidade interpretativa do Poder Judiciário, sobretudo para delimitar os limites deste nas democracias contemporâneas. Dentre esses teóricos, dois apresentam concepções mais restritivas da atividade judicial – Habermas e Sunstein – e dois concebem uma atuação substantiva como democrática – Dworkin e Post/Siegel. A dissertação pretende articular essas complexas concepções de forma harmoniosa para responder o problema central que foi colocado e, finalmente, poder tomar uma posição coerente sobre os limites democráticos da atuação do Poder Judiciário. / This work aims to make an analysis of the democratic limits of the judicial decisions, mainly those related to judicial review, given that the amplitude of its clause invokes moral considerations. Therefore, we look forward providing an answer to the main question of this research: What are the democratic limits of action of the Judicial Power, when it comes to the judicial review, from distinct conceptions of democracy? The answer to this question necessarily imposes to make an analysis of the tension between rights and democracy to allow us to offer a proper answer to the question of judicial legitimacy. To do so, we begin our debate with the presentation of the historical background of the judicial review, in order to demonstrate the judicial character of the constitutional interpretation. With the common ground established, we seek to explicit some conceptions of democracy within the area of political philosophy– liberal, republican and deliberative democracy – to understand how each one of those thinks about the tension between rights and democracy. Naturally, it’s also important to make an analysis of important theories that also think about this issue, with an integrative view of political philosophy with the question of the judicial legitimacy to perform legal interpretation, mainly to establish its the limits in the contemporary democracies. Among these theoretical thinkers, two of them present conceptions more restrictive to judicial activity – Habermas and Sunstein - and two conceive a more substantive performance as democratic – Dworkin and Post/Siegel. This research intends to harmonically articulate these complex theories to answer the main question that was made and, finally, be able to offer a coherent position to about the democratic limits of the Judicial Power in a democracy.

[pt] A presente dissertação se propõe a analisar a extensão do controle judicial aplicável às decisões proferidas pelo Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - CADE (“CADE”), autarquia vinculada ao Ministério da Justiça que detém a competência legal de prevenir e reprimir infrações à ordem econômica. Analisaremos a extensão, e não a viabilidade em si, do controle judicial aplicável às decisões do CADE, pois é princípio assente em nosso Direito, com respaldo no próprio texto constitucional, que nenhuma lesão de direito poderá ser subtraída à apreciação do Poder Judiciário (art. 5º, inciso XXXV, da Constituição Federal de 1988). Por uma questão lógica e programática, iniciaremos o estudo abordando aspectos relevantes da discricionariedade administrativa, que é um dos temas mais apaixonantes do Direito Público e que mereceu a incansável dedicação de juristas ilustres, como Seabra Fagundes, Caio Tácito, Afonso Rodrigues Queiró, Eduardo García de Enterría, Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello, apenas para citar alguns. Dentro do amplo tema da discricionariedade, despertou-nos especial interesse a relação entre a competência discricionária e os conceitos jurídicos indeterminados. Essa discussão, embora ainda incipiente em nosso ordenamento jurídico, vem atraindo cada vez mais a atenção dos estudiosos em direito administrativo, não havendo ainda uma uniformidade de opiniões a respeito do assunto. A seguir, analisaremos as técnicas de controle judicial dos atos administrativos de forma geral, que, desde as Teorias do Desvio de Poder e do Controle dos Motivos do Ato Administrativo, foram sendo aprimoradas ao longo dos anos. Aqui também abordaremos a superação, a partir do pós-positivismo, do antigo dogma da insindicabilidade do mérito do ato administrativo, especialmente em caso de violação a princípios gerais de direito assegurados pelos ordenamentos constitucional e infraconstitucional vigentes. Abordados os aspectos relevantes acerca da discricionariedade administrativa, passaremos a analisar os princípios jurídicos que regem a ordem econômica, a finalidade inspiradora da legislação infraconstitucional de proteção ao direito da concorrência e, em especial, as competências legais do CADE. Em capítulo específico, examinaremos ainda a natureza jurídica das decisões proferidas pelo CADE nos processos de conduta e nos atos de concentração econômica, o que é imprescindível para se determinar a extensão do controle judicial aplicável. Pretendemos dar especial ênfase à controvérsia na doutrina quanto à existência ou não de discricionariedade em favor do CADE para deferir ou indeferir atos de concentração submetidos à sua análise, identificando em que situações hipotéticas a discricionariedade poderia se verificar. Nesse contexto chama a atenção a faculdade outorgada ao CADE pela Lei nº 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994 (art. 54, parágrafos 1º e 2º), de aprovar determinadas operações que, embora sejam potencialmente lesivas à concorrência, são capazes de gerar eficiências, segundo a acepção do termo no âmbito do direito econômico, como, por exemplo, avanços tecnológicos, aumento ou diversificação na produção, aprimoramento na qualidade dos bens ou serviços, entre outras. Pretendemos indicar como a doutrina tem interpretado esses dispositivos legais, isto é, se eles representam ou não a outorga de uma certa margem de discrição ao CADE nessas situações. A nossa proposta, assim, é tentar delimitar o núcleo de incidência da discricionariedade, acaso existente, e a extensão do controle judicial aplicável às decisões do CADE, levando em consideração a existência de conceitos jurídicos indeterminados na Lei nº 8.884/94, bem como o papel que os princípios hoje exercem como balizadores da atuação de qualquer ente administrativo. Também buscaremos traçar um perfil dos litígios existentes contra o CADE, realizando uma análise crítica da jurisprudência brasileira, para após tecer nossas considerações finais sobre o tema. / [en] The objective of the present essay is to analyze the judicial review applicable to the decisions rendered by the Administrative Council of Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica - CADE), an agency reporting to the Ministry of Justice legally competent to prevent and repress violations to the economic order. This essay analyzes the extent but not the viability, per se, of the judicial review applicable to CADE s decisions, because it is a principle of Brazilian Law, supported by the Federal Constitution, that the law shall not exclude from appreciation by the Judiciary Branch an injury or threat to a right (art. 5, XXXV, of the 1988 Federal Constitution). For the sake of logic and planning, this essay will initially approach relevant aspects of administrative discretion - one of the most fascinating themes of Public Law and worthy of endless dedication by distinguished jurists such as Seabra Fagundes, Caio Tácito, Afonso Rodrigues Queiró, Eduardo García de Enterría, and Celso Antônio Bandeira de Mello, among others. In the scope of administrative discretion, the relationship between discretionary competence and undetermined legal concepts was an issue that has specially called our attention. This discussion, although still incipient in our legal system, has increasingly been attracting the attention of scholars dedicated to administrative law. Nonetheless, a peaceful understanding has not been reached in this respect yet. The techniques for judicial review of administrative acts - which have been perfected since the establishment of the theories of Deviation of Power and Control of the Reasons of the Administrative Act - will be analyzed subsequently. We will also address the elimination, in the post-positivism era, of the ancient dogma banning the judicial review of the merits of the administrative act, especially in case of violation of legal principles guaranteed by the Constitution and ordinary legislation. After the analysis of the relevant aspects of administrative discretion, we will review the legal principles that govern the economic order, the objectives of antitrust legislation and, mainly, CADE s legal competence. In a specific chapter, we will focus on the legal nature of the decisions rendered by CADE in cases involving anticompetitive practices and in the analysis of concentration acts, which is necessary in order to determine the extent of the judicial review applicable. Special attention was drawn on the controversy regarding the existence or not of discretional powers on the benefit of CADE in granting or denying approval to concentration acts submitted to its analysis. We will also identify situations in which such discretional powers could theoretically take place. In this scenario, the faculty granted to CADE by Law 8,884 of June 11th, 1994 (art. 54, paragraphs 1 and 2) to approve certain transactions which, although potentially harmful to competition, might give rise to efficiencies - in the scope of the meaning attributed to the term by economic law - such as, for instance, technological progress, production increase or diversification, improvement of the quality of goods or services, among others. This essay also indicates how legal scholars have construed such legal provisions, i.e., whether or not such legal provisions actually confer a certain discretion to CADE under those circumstances. Thus, the aim of this essay is to outline the area of administrative discretion, if any, and the extent of the judicial review applicable to CADE`s decisions, taking into consideration the existence of undetermined legal concepts in Law No. 8,884/94, as well as the role played by the principles in guiding the acts performed by any administrative entity. This essay also seeks to delineate the profile of the existing disputes against CADE in Brazilian Courts and to make a critical analysis of our case law. At the end we will make our final consid

The term &#039 / Costitutional Democracy&#039 / is characterized by an underlying conceptual tension between the rule of law and populSar sovereignty. This is reflected in the controversy surrounding the judicial review of legislation in contemporary political systems. In this thesis, the development of the idea of &#039 / governmernt under law&#039 / in political thought, contemporary debates on the doctrine of judicial review and normative relation between law and politics is analyzed. It is concluded that both &#039 / constitutionality&#039 / and &#039 / popular sovereignty&#039 / are essentil to modern democracy. Yet, it might be problematic to disassociate constitutional law from ordinary politics, since the latter is the principal means through which a polity shapes its future.

This paper focuses on the evolution of “reasonableness” as a unitary standard of judicial review and the role of tribunal expertise in that process. The modern era begins with Nipawin in 1973, a time when judicial review operated with a crude binary system of standards that allowed for either full curial deference (patent unreasonableness) or no deference (correctness). It ends in 2008 with Dunsmuir and the jettisoning of the highest standard of curial deference, the standard of patent unreasonableness. Correctness is now implicitly understood not as a standard but, as the justified absence of the need to extend deference to a tribunal`s decision. Patent unreasonableness and the middle ground standard of reasonableness have ostensibly been "collapsed" into a single more rational, workable, flexible and sophisticated unitary system based on the multi faceted standard of reasonableness. It is argued that the new “standard of review analysis” expressed in Dunsmuir is simply a comprehensive restatement of all the previously articulated diverse and, typically, non-dispositive factors and exceptions. The hallmarks of this new standard are the recognition that, more often than not in administrative law, there is no one right or best answer and that, a reviewing court will respect and affirm a tribunal’s choice if it is within the range of options provided it is well reasoned. This paper also addresses the primarily academic criticism of the Supreme Court over conceptual problems in distinguishing patent unreasonableness from reasonableness, a dispute fuelled by this court’s continued attempts to justify a standard of review that allowed for a tribunal’s right to be wrong. It is argued that patent unreasonableness had become less of a standard of review and more of a simple expression of judicial censure for egregious fault in decision making; a qualifier to a finding of unreasonableness. Arguably that role may have been preserved even with the collapsing of the two standards into one standard in Dunsmuir. While Dunsmuir should have clarified many of the issues the three-way difference of opinion in the Court demonstrates continuing deep rifts that may portend further uncertainty. Uptake by lower courts indicates otherwise. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2009-03-17 14:58:15.299

Something to Talk About: Applying the Unwritten Principle of Democracy to Secure a Constitutional Right to Access Government Information in Canada by Vincent Clayton Kazmierski A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science Faculty of Law University of Toronto 2008 ABSTRACT In this thesis, I argue that the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy provides a foundation for the recognition of a constitutional right to access government information in Canada. More specifically, I argue that the principle of democracy can be used to fill the “access gap” in the written provisions of the Constitution. I begin by synthesizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence and the work of a number of academics to outline guidelines for the recognition of unwritten constitutional principles. I also attempt to construct a coherent account of the content and effect of the constitutional principle of democracy. I proceed to argue that recognition of a right of access to government information as part of the principle of democracy fits within the guidelines I identify as it is supported by “strong” pragmatic, historical and structural evidence. I then demonstrate how the constitutional right of access to government information may be applied to protect access to information in at least three different ways: through statutory interpretation, through the regulation of administrative discretion, and, in exceptional circumstances, through the invalidation of legislation. I rely on the work of a number of British scholars and on aspects of David Dyzenhaus’s conception of law as a culture of justification to help bridge the divide between the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of unwritten constitutional principles and the concerns raised by critics of that approach. I argue that the application of the principle of democracy respects the primary role of democratically elected representatives of the public, while establishing that the judiciary also has an important role to play in the identification and enforcement of fundamental values. I suggest that this judicial role can be effectively constrained through the guidelines sketched by the Supreme Court and more fully articulated in this thesis. Finally, I argue that the application of the principle of democracy to invalidate legislation can also be justified in exceptional circumstances where the legislation imposes substantial impediments on fundamental aspects of the democratic process. In such cases, the principle of parliamentary supremacy is properly counterbalanced by the principle of democracy.

Something to Talk About: Applying the Unwritten Principle of Democracy to Secure a Constitutional Right to Access Government Information in Canada by Vincent Clayton Kazmierski A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science Faculty of Law University of Toronto 2008 ABSTRACT In this thesis, I argue that the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy provides a foundation for the recognition of a constitutional right to access government information in Canada. More specifically, I argue that the principle of democracy can be used to fill the “access gap” in the written provisions of the Constitution. I begin by synthesizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence and the work of a number of academics to outline guidelines for the recognition of unwritten constitutional principles. I also attempt to construct a coherent account of the content and effect of the constitutional principle of democracy. I proceed to argue that recognition of a right of access to government information as part of the principle of democracy fits within the guidelines I identify as it is supported by “strong” pragmatic, historical and structural evidence. I then demonstrate how the constitutional right of access to government information may be applied to protect access to information in at least three different ways: through statutory interpretation, through the regulation of administrative discretion, and, in exceptional circumstances, through the invalidation of legislation. I rely on the work of a number of British scholars and on aspects of David Dyzenhaus’s conception of law as a culture of justification to help bridge the divide between the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of unwritten constitutional principles and the concerns raised by critics of that approach. I argue that the application of the principle of democracy respects the primary role of democratically elected representatives of the public, while establishing that the judiciary also has an important role to play in the identification and enforcement of fundamental values. I suggest that this judicial role can be effectively constrained through the guidelines sketched by the Supreme Court and more fully articulated in this thesis. Finally, I argue that the application of the principle of democracy to invalidate legislation can also be justified in exceptional circumstances where the legislation imposes substantial impediments on fundamental aspects of the democratic process. In such cases, the principle of parliamentary supremacy is properly counterbalanced by the principle of democracy.

In the last decade, parties to arbitration agreements have attempted to broaden the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards by contract, beyond the boundaries established in international and domestic arbitration statutes. This thesis analyzes this contractual expansion of judicial review from an international perspective. To this end, the standard of judicial review under the most important international instruments pertaining to commercial arbitration is examined: the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The study then addresses the question as to whether provisions for heightened judicial review of arbitral awards would be enforceable under the legislation of three major players in commercial arbitration: England, France and the United States. An analysis of the legitimacy of agreements that provide for expanded judicial review under the New York Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law follows. The thesis concludes with an assessment of the impact the mentioned clauses would represent for the institution of arbitration and its advantages.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed 5 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Law. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.