Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die lokvalstelsel as misdaadbekampingsmetode lank reeds bestaan, is die toepassing daarvan nog altyd kontroversieE!I. Hierdie omstredenheid is die laaste paar jaar op die voorgrond gedryf deur 'n Regskommissie-ondersoek, sowel as deur die aanvaarding van 'n Handves van Menseregte. Ondersoek word ingestel na hierdie omstredenheid deur te kyk na die inhoud en toepassing van die stelsel, sowel as na die rol wat private persona, die polisie en die hot by die stelsel speeL Die gevolgtrekking waartoe gekom word, is dat die omstredenheid van die stelsel te danke is aan die feit dat dit verband hou met pro-aktiewe regshandhawing, wat in wese bestaan uit die gebruik van misleiding ten einde die pleging van 'n misdaad teweeg te bring. Die probleem met pro-aktiewe regshandhawing is dat dit 'n geleentheid skep vir die uitoefening van polisiediskresie wat grootliks sonder beheer geskied, met potensiele wanoptrede aan die kant van regshandhawers en die ondermyning van die publiek se vertroue in die billikheid van die strafregspleging. Ondersoek word gevolglik ingestel na metodes om diskresie-uitoefening by die lokvalstelsel te regverdig, aangesien daar wei ruimte is vir diskresionere magte wat behoorlik begrens, gestruktureer en gekontroleer is. Die vernaamste metodes van beheer oor diskresie­ uitoefening by die lokvalstelsel, naamlik die uitsluiting van getuienis en weerstand in 'n strafgeding, word grondig ondersoek met verwysing na die Engelse-, Amerikaanse- en Kanadese reg. Dit is egter die uitgangspunt van hierdie proefskrif dat wetgewende strukturering van diskresie-uitoefening by die lokvalstelsel die mees effektiewe oplossing bied vir meeste van die problema van die stelsel. Die enigste aanvaarbare basis waarop die lokvalstelsel kan funksioneer, is om deur middel van wetgewing die trefwydte van toelaatbare lokvaltegnieke en die beperkinge waarbinne regshandhawers regsonderdane mag beweeg om misdade te pleeg, te definieer. Daar is dus 'n behoefte aan die kodifisering van standaarde waaraan voldoen moet word voordat enige lokvaloperasie behoort te begin. / Although the system of trapping has long been used as a method of preventing crime, its employment has always been controversial. In the recent past, this controversy has come to the front due to an investigation by the South African Law Commission and the acceptance of a Bill of Rights. This thesis investigates this controversy by looking at the contents and application of the system, as well as the role which private persons, the police and the court play in the system. The conclusion arrived at, is that the controversy surrounding the system is due to the fact that it has to do with pro-active law enforcement, which consists of the use of deception to induce the performance of a criminal act. The problem with pro-active law enforcement is that it creates an opportunity for the exercise of police discretion which is mainly uncontrolled, with potentialmisconduct on the part of law enforcement officials and the subversion of public trust in the reasonableness of the criminal justice system. Consequently, methods by which the exercise of discretion in the system of trapping can be justified are investigated, since there is room for discretionary powers which are properly circumscribed, structured and controlled. The main methods of control over the exercise of discretion in the system of trapping, namely the exclusion of evidence and a defence in a criminal proceeding, are fully investigated with reference to English, American and Canadian law. Having considered the above, the conclusion is advanced that legislative structuring of the exercise of discretion in the system of trapping offers the most effective solution for most of the problems underlying the system. The only acceptable basis on which the system can function, is to define the scope of acceptable trapping techniques and the confines within which law enforcement officials may prevail on someone to commit a crime. This must be done by means of legislation. Accordingly, there is a need for codification of standards which have to be complied with before any trapping operation may commence. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.D. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Laws

« Lorsque, à l’occasion d’une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d’Etat ou de la Cour de cassation… ». Le nouvel article 61-1 de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 a ouvert un champ contentieux inconnu en France : celui de la constitutionnalité de la loi en vigueur. Le pouvoir de révision constitutionnelle a renforcé et étendu la compétence d’une institution à caractère juridictionnel, le Conseil constitutionnel, bénéficiant d’une qualité spécifique d’attribution tirée de la source constitutionnelle. Dans un vocabulaire juridique largement admis, le juge constitutionnel est distinct d’autres catégories de juges : « juges ordinaires », ou « internationaux ». La question initiale est alors la suivante : pourquoi peut-il être fondé juridiquement de penser et de promouvoir le postulat, selon lequel le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois doit s’exercer de façon concentrée ? Parce qu’il apparaît qu’en France, le discours sur le juge constitutionnel et la justice constitutionnelle procède non d’un discours interne au système juridique (discours du droit) mais sur un discours externe (discours sur le droit), celui des juristes savants et de la prétention à connaître de façon scientifique l’objet juridique.Faisant le choix d’un paradigme herméneutique pour la connaissance juridique, le présent travail propose de traiter la question de la spécificité de l’office juridictionnel dans l’opération d’application du droit qui s’y rattache. La spécificité de la norme constitutionnelle fonde celle d’une fonction constitutionnelle au sein de l’ordre juridique, permettant de modéliser la voie d’un espace processuel de résolution éthique des conflits d’interprétation constitutionnelle. / “If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’État or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council…”The new article 61-1 of the Constitution of October 4th, 1958, strengthens the constitutional review of laws in France. For that purpose, the jurisdictional remit of the Constitutional Council has been extended. By its constitutional habilitation, this institution would be in a position to benefit from the recognition of a special authority. In the prevailing legal vocabulary, to describe a legal system such as the French one, the constitutional judge is singled out from other judges (“ordinary” judges for example, etc.).Therefore, the first question to be asked is: why should it be legally founded to think and promote the basic premise which is that the constitutional review of laws shall be exercised by a single body? In France indeed, developments about the constitutional judge or constitutional justice don’t stem from an internal perspective of the juridical system but originates from the external discourse of learned lawyers who ambition to scientifically approach law.With a hermeneutical paradigm for legal knowledge, this study tries to deal with the question of a judicial office through a process of normative concretization. In this view, the characteristics of the constitutional norm found a constitutional function into the legal order. Then, it seems to be possible to imagine a processual space allowing the ethical resolution of interpretative conflicts.

Expression la plus caractéristique du pouvoir de l’administration, la décision administrative est une notion familière. Pourtant, les données observables en droit positif s’avèrent hétérogènes et contingentes, compromettant la possibilité d’en circonscrire la teneur. Et derrière un consensus apparent, les présentations doctrinales de l’action adminis-trative unilatérale se caractérisent par un éclatement terminologique et conceptuel. Le choix a été fait de construire une définition, à partir d’une analyse critique du droit positif et du discours doctrinal, pour en éprouver les mérites en vue d’une meilleure compréhension de l’administration et de son droit. Signification impérative d’une manifestation de volonté uni-latérale et arrêtée d’une autorité administrative, la décision administrative constitue un utile outil d’analyse du pouvoir de l’administration, du contrôle du juge sur celui-ci et de la place à laquelle les citoyens peuvent prétendre dans son élaboration et sa mise en oeuvre. Distincte de l’incitation ou de la déclaration d’intention, la décision demeure le mode privilégié de direction de la conduite des citoyens et l’objet principal du contrôle du juge sur la légalité de l’action administrative. La portée explicative de cette définition est complétée par la compréhension qu’elle autorise des usages stratégiques que les acteurs du droit administratif peuvent en faire. En tant que signification, la décision révèle les luttes qu’ils mènent pour l’identification, au cas concret, de la portée des divers actes de l’administration ; enjeu de pouvoir, elle fait ressortir les stratégies de légitimation qui entourent son emploi par les autorités publiques. / One of the most characteristic expression of the administrative activities, the administrative decision is a familiar concept. Nevertheless, positive law on this subject turns out to be disparate and contingent. And behind a seeming consensus, the authors pre-sent the unilateral administrative actions with real terminological and conceptual disparities. The choice has been made to build a definition, from a critical analysis of positive law and doctrinal views, so as to test its merits with an eye to a better understanding of the Admin-istration and its law. Imperative meaning of a fixed and unilateral act of will of an adminis-trative body, the administrative decision is a useful tool to analyse the power of the Admin-istration, the judicial review of it and the place that citizens can aspire to in the process of its making and its implementation. Distinct from incitation or mere declaration of intent, deci-sion remains the preferred way of directing citizens behaviour and the main object of the judicial review of administrative acts. The explanatory impact of this definition is supple-mented by the understanding it enables of the strategical uses that actors of administrative law make of it. As a meaning, decision reveals the struggles they wage to identify, in a specif-ic case, the impact of the various acts of administrative bodies ; as a power issue, it brings out the strategies of legitimization that surround its use par public authorities.

S'inspirant du modèle français, le législateur iranien a créé en 1960 une nouvelle institution : le Conseil d'État iranien. Mais la loi n'a jamais été appliquée. La Cour de Justice Administrative (CJA) actuelle a été créé par l'article 173 de la Constitution de 1979, pour exercer le contrôle judiciaire sur les organismes et les agents de l'autorité publique, sous l'autorité du pouvoir judiciaire. La CJA est compétente pour les recours en excès de pouvoir contre les actes administratifs et contre les fonctionnaires publics. Le contentieux de la légalité des actes administratifs en droit iranien distingue les recours objectifs envisagés à l'article 19 de la loi de 2006 relative à la CJA et les recours subjectifs prévus à l'article 13 de cette loi. L'Assemblée générale de la CJA est compétente pour les recours objectifs et les Chambre de cette Cour pour les recours subjectifs. Ce qui caractérise la CJA, c'est qu'elle soit principalement le juge de première et de dernière instance. En matière de décisions définitives des juridictions spécialisées, elle agit en tant que juge de cassation. Elle est le juge du droit commun des litiges administratifs car dans le système iranien, il n'existe ni des tribunaux administratifs ni des cours administratives d'appel. / Inspired by the French model, the Iranian legislator created in 1960 a new institution: The Council of State of Iran. But the law has never been implemented. The Court of Administrative Justice (CAJ) of that time was created by the section 173 of the 1979 Constitution to exercise judicial control over agencies and the agents of public authority under the authority of the judiciary. The CAJ is responsible for the excessive use of power against administrative acts and against agents' administration. The dispute on the legality of administrative acts in Iranian law distinguishes between the objective appeals envisaged in article 19 of the 2006 Act on the CAJ and the subjective appeals provided in article 13 of this law. The General Assembly of the CAJ is responsible for the objective appeals and The Chamber of this Court is responsible for the subjective appeals. What characterizes the CAJ is that it is primarily the judge of the first and the last instance. In terms of final decisions of the specialized courts, it acts as a court of cassation. It is the judge of the common administrative law cases as in the Iranian system; then there are no administrative courts or administrative courts of appeal.

Constitui objeto de investigação da presente tese o suprimento das omissões legislativas inconstitucionais pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal por meio do mandado de injunção. Pretende-se demonstrar que a Constituição, ao instituir o mandado de injunção, não apenas sinalizou que as omissões inconstitucionais merecem censura, mas também estabeleceu meio próprio para que o cidadão possa impugná-las. No controle concreto das omissões legislativas inconstitucionais por meio do mandado de injunção, defende-se que há uma reserva de jurisdição constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Para demonstrar essa assertiva, a tese desenvolveu, em sua primeira parte, uma reflexão sobre o processo de aplicação do direito e a função da legislação nesse mister. A conclusão a que se chegou é de que a legislação ainda constitui uma peça relevante no processo de interpretação e aplicação do direito. Num segundo momento, tendo como eixo de investigação o princípio da separação de Poderes, observar-se-á que a Constituição de 1988 e a prática constitucional que se estabeleceu sob seu marco instituíram a jurisdição constitucional como mais um mecanismo de controle do poder político e consagraram o Supremo Tribunal como Tribunal Constitucional. Na última parte da pesquisa, busca-se demonstrar que há competência exclusiva do Supremo Tribunal Federal no controle das omissões legislativas em face da Constituição Federal. O mandado de injunção, nesse cenário, é importante instrumento de acesso direto do cidadão ao Supremo Tribunal Federal para suscitar esse controle. Essa leitura que se faz da Constituição se justifica pela identificação da omissão legislativa como fenômeno que não se confunde com o da simples ausência de lei ou de indeterminação semântica do direito, merecendo métodos próprios de enfrentamento. Além disso, essa leitura da Constituição encontra razão de ser pela forma que se concebe a jurisdição constitucional, como sendo uma atividade política prudencial, que permite que se estabeleça um diálogo institucional não apenas entre o Supremo Tribunal Federal e o Poder Legislativo, mas também entre a jurisdição constitucional prestada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal e a jurisdição ordinária. / The thesis deals with the process of constitutional adjudication in case of legislative omissions (legal gaps that violate constitutional determinations or unconstitutionality by legislative omission). It gives special attention to the constitutional remedy called writ of injunction (mandado de injunção), which allows citizens to directly access the Brazilian Constitutional Court in case of violation of constitutional rights and freedoms that result from the lack of an enabling legislation. The research seeks to provide a theoretical guidance to understand this problem and its possible solutions. It is argued that the problem of legislative omission is fundamentally a problem about the relationship between the legislative and the courts, and about the limits to constitutional adjudication. The challenge is to guarantee the effectiveness of constitutional rights without undermining democracy (and the powers of the legislative branch). It is argued that, within the Judiciary, only the Constitutional Court has the power to review legislative omissions. The techniques to judge legislative omissions should improve the institutional dialogue between the Constitutional Court, the Legislature and the ordinary courts. I argue that the control of legislative omissions is compatible with constrained judicial review (weak judicial review). Facing a case of unconstitutional legislative omission, the Constitutional Court has a privileged but not unlimited role in interpreting the Constitution. Ruling on constitutional questions about legislative omissions, the Constitutional Court should either call for legislative action or be open to legislative revision in the short run.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Salomao Czelusniak.pdf: 2981343 bytes, checksum: da437c500896ac9b7af85569b41bd1bd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-15 / This paper-work is the result of a research about the judicial revision of regulatory rules thru class actions lawsuits. The main concern about this theme relies on the possibility that this kind of judicial review allows judges to modify regulatory policies, due to the collective consequences (effects) of class actions lawsuits decisions. Two major problems can be identified regarding this theme: (i) the rulemaking possibilities of class actions lawsuits on regulatory matters; (ii) the possibility that dissonant decisions in class actions lawsuits regarding the same regulatory matter conducts to a situation where the regulatory policy varies in different parts of the country (some affect by class actions lawsuits, some not). The research was focused on decisions of Brazil s Superior Court of Justice in class actions lawsuits about the telecommunications regulation. These decisions were analyzed with focus on the two major problems described above. The final results show that the Superior Court of Justice still doesn t argue about these major problems in most of the cases. In spite of that, some few decisions have discussed relevant issues about these problems. The final conclusion is that the discussions about these two major problems need to be intensified in the Superior Court of Justice. A good way to start this discussion intensifying process is to take the issues debated in the most complex decisions herein analyzed as guidelines to futures cases / Este trabalho é o resultado de uma pesquisa sobre o controle judicial de normas regulatórios através de ações coletivas. Na medida em que as decisões dessas ações possuem efeitos gerais, a principal preocupação a respeito desse tipo de controle é a possibilidade de que o Judiciário altere normas regulatórias ou suspenda sua vigência. Os dois principais problemas relacionados a isso são: (i) o potencial normativo da tutela coletiva face à regulação; (ii) a possibilidade de que decisões divergentes em ações coletivas que questionem as mesmas normas regulatórias levem a um cenário de vigência territorial fragmentada dessas normas. A pesquisa teve como objeto decisões do Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) em ações coletivas que questionavam normas regulatórias da Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações (ANATEL). Essas decisões foram analisadas sob o enfoque dos dois problemas descritos acima. Os resultados da pesquisa demonstram que o STJ ainda não tem discussões maduras sobre o tema; poucas são as decisões que tratam de maneira mais aprofundada dos dois problemas mencionados. Apesar disso, algumas decisões abordaram esses problemas e desenvolveram discussões relevantes a respeito deles. A conclusão é de que tais discussões precisam ser intensificadas no STJ, o que poderia ser feito a partir das diretrizes traçadas nas decisões mais complexas analisadas neste trabalho

A Constituição Federal de 1988 inovou ao trazer um artigo (4o) especificamente dedicado a estabelecer os princípios das relações internacionais do Brasil. Esta tese situa essa inovação no contexto da evolução constitucional brasileira, examina se os atos praticados pelo Poder Executivo no exercício da competência para conduzir as relações internacionais podem ser submetidos ao controle jurisdicional e, finalmente, avalia como um dos princípios do art. 4o o da prevalência dos direitos humanos poderia ser utilizado como parâmetro para aferição de constitucionalidade, buscando identificar que exigências ele impõe ao Estado brasileiro em sua atuação externa. Com base na investigação da jurisprudência local e estrangeira, demonstra-se que a judicialização de questões internacionais é um processo já em curso, mas que, na ausência de uma definição mais clara do papel que cabe ao Judiciário no campo das relações internacionais, esse Poder tem reagido de forma incerta e pouco consistente às demandas que lhe são apresentadas. Nesse contexto, são identificados os principais obstáculos jurídicos geralmente oferecidos ao controle jurisdicional dos atos de relações internacionais no Brasil para, em seguida, expor suas fragilidades, sustentando-se a possibilidade desse tipo de controle. Em situações em que o princípio da prevalência dos direitos humanos seja relevante, trata-se de verificar se o Executivo agiu internacionalmente com observância dos direitos humanos de quaisquer indivíduos que possam ser afetados pelo ato em questão, sejam ou não brasileiros, estejam ou não em território nacional. Condutas (ações ou omissões) eventualmente restritivas dos direitos humanos, desacompanhadas de fundamentação constitucional, podem corresponder a uma violação do princípio e ser, portanto, objeto da censura judicial. A tese se encerra com um estudo de casos, onde essas ideias são aplicadas a duas situações concretas. / The 1988 Federal Constitution broke new ground by establishing in a specific provision (Article 4) the directive principles for Brazils international relations. The present thesis firts considers this provision in light of the Brazilian constitutional history, it further questions whether acts from the Executive branch in exercise of its constitutional mandate to conduct foreign policy are subject to judicial review and, finally, it discusses how a specific principle established by Article 4 the one determining primacy of human rights in international relations operates as a constitutional standard, seeking to clarify what are the obligations that this provision imposes on the Brazilian State while conducting its foreign policy. Based on an analysis of case law from Brazil and other jurisdictions, this thesis argues that the judicialization of international relations is already underway, although the Judiciary has not been able to develop assertive and consistent judicial standards to resolve cases dealing with issues of foreign policy, considering the lack of a clear definition of the role to be played by the Judiciary in this realm. In this sense, the thesis takes into account the main legal barriers generally faced in cases of judicial review of foreign policy issues in Brazil, revealing some of its shortcomings, and argues in favor of such judicial scrutiny. In cases where the principle of primacy of human rights applies, the act of the Executive branch should protect the human rights of all individuals involved by this act, regardless their nationality (Brazilian or not) or location (national territory or abroad). Restrictive measures (actions or omissions) that limit human rights, without a constitutional basis, can amount to a violation of the abovementioned principle, and, therefore, might be struck down by the Judiciary. This thesis concludes with a case study, where those ideas are applied to two particular situations.

O presente estudo propõe uma reflexão sobre a justiciabilidade dos direitos sociais com o intuito de averiguar como o Poder Judiciário lida e delineia seu campo de atuação frente a esses direitos. Esse não é um tema novo. Muito já se discutiu sobre a questão a juridicidade e exigibilidade dos direitos sociais, bem como sobre a legitimidade do juiz tomar decisões políticas, realocando recursos públicos e elegendo prioridades de investimento. Recentemente, a abordagem sobre a capacidade institucional da revisão judicial de atos ou omissões do Poder Executivo é um tema que vem amadurecendo na academia jurídica brasileira. Essa crítica aponta para as dificuldades institucionais do Poder Judiciário lidar com os conflitos chamados distributivos e centraliza-se no argumento de que o Judiciário não tem as ferramentas necessárias para atuar nesse tipo de conflito, vez que foi estruturado para julgar conflitos individuais, voltados para o passado. Em síntese, a teoria da capacidade institucional sustenta que os tribunais desconsideram a natureza plurilateral dos direitos sociais em suas decisões e julga os conflitos coletivos como se fossem direitos individuais, ferindo o princípio da igualdade. Nesse trabalho pretendemos testar a pertinência da teoria da capacidade institucional por meio da análise de decisões judiciais coletivas (interesses difusos, coletivos ou individuais homogêneos) sobre o direito à educação. Para que a pesquisa sobre justiciabilidade e a capacidade institucional seja viabilizada, percorreremos o seguinte caminho: no primeiro capítulo abordaremos alguns pressupostos sobre a compreensão do direito que será adotada nesse trabalho. Em seguida, faremos um panorama geral dos principais argumentos que debatem a exigibilidade dos direitos sociais, com enfoque na crítica da capacidade institucional. No terceiro capítulo analisaremos as decisões do Poder Judiciário e, por fim, encerraremos o trabalho com algumas conclusões sobre a pertinência da teoria da capacidade institucional. / This essay proposes a discussion on the judicial review and enforcement of social rights, arguing how Brazilian courts understand and establish their boundaries for action on this regard. It is not a new subject of analysis. The enforcement of social rights has been extensively discussed in previous works, along with the legitimate power of courts to take political decisions, reallocating public resources and determining priorities for public expenditures. Such approach - the institutional capacity for judicial review of acts and omissions of the Executive - has been recently maturing in the Brazilian legal academy. In general, it argues that there are institutional constraints for courts to deal with distributive conflicts, and therefore they are not prepared to handle such cases. We intend herein to test this institutional capacity argument by analyzing judicial decisions. Such argument is usually based on the fact that the courts disregard the polycentric nature of social rights (Fuller, 1976), and treats the lawsuit as a bipolar controversy. The dilemma is that the impact of this judgment is not confined to the parties and its consequences may affect thirds, disrespecting the equality principle. We investigate how Brazilian Courts decide on collective conflicts arising from social rights, and how satisfactory such decisions may be considered, in terms of their institutional and juridical coherence. In order to carry out such task, this essay has the following structure: (i) in the first chapter we describe the assumptions on the concept of Law adopted herein; (ii) thereafter, we sketch an overview of the main arguments regarding the enforcement of social rights, emphasizing the institutional capacity argument; (iii) in the third chapter we analyze the decisions of Brazilian Courts; and, finally, (iv) we conclude the essay by testing (whether confirming or not) the arguments of the institutional capacity argument.

Este trabalho trata do papel desempenhado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal na apreciação de questões relativas ao Sistema Constitucional Tributário brasileiro à luz dos direitos fundamentais. Com efeito, o STF é responsável por guardar os direitos fundamentais também quando decide controvérsias constitucionais tributárias, o que significa considerar o delicado equilíbrio entre a proteção dos contribuintes e a necessidade de o Estado arrecadar os recursos suficientes à concretização dos direitos fundamentais. Assim, a tese tem dois objetivos. Por um lado, pretende identificar se o Supremo Tribunal Federal adota algum parâmetro condizente com os direitos fundamentais ao julgar questões constitucionais relativas ao sistema tributário. Nessa perspectiva, diversos acórdãos do Supremo Tribunal Federal, proferidos na égide da CF/1988, são analisados com vistas a examinar se a Corte tem cumprido bem suas responsabilidades constitucionais. Por outro lado, sugere o Estado Fiscal como parâmetro adequado aos direitos fundamentais e ao sistema constitucional tributário, considerando sua preocupação tanto com a proteção dos contribuintes quanto com a existência de meios mínimos para o financiamento das atividades públicas. / This work is about the role of the Supremo Tribunal Federal in the Brazilian constitutional tax system in light of the fundamental rights. Doubtlessly, the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) is responsible for safekeeping and enforcing fundamental rights even when it decides constitutional tax controversies. The enforcement of fundamental rights in tax issues means accounting for the delicate balance between the protection of taxpayers and the necessity for the State to raise enough funds to implement fundamental rights. Thus the thesis has two objectives. On the one hand, the study aims to identify if the Supremo Tribunal Federal abides by any guideline consistent with the fundamental rights when ruling constitutional cases regarding the tax system. Therefore, various decisions of the Supremo Tribunal Federal, taken in the scope of the Federal Constitution of 1988, will be selected and analysed in order to examine if the Court has fulfilled its constitutional duties. On the other hand, the work suggests the Tax State as an adequate guideline to the fundamental rights and to the constitutional tax system, regarding its concern not only with taxpayers´ protection but also with the existence of minimum resources to fund public activities.